Can bootstrapping explain concept learning?

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• 作者：Jacob Beck ^{jbeck@yorku.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Bootstrapping ; Concept learning ; Susan Carey ; Concepts ; Computational constraints
• 刊名：Cognition
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：158
• 期：Complete
• 页码：110-121
• 全文大小：355 K

文摘

Susan Carey’s account of Quinean bootstrapping has been heavily criticized. While it purports to explain how important new concepts are learned, many commentators complain that it is unclear just what bootstrapping is supposed to be or how it is supposed to work. Others allege that bootstrapping falls prey to the circularity challenge: it cannot explain how new concepts are learned without presupposing that learners already have those very concepts. Drawing on discussions of concept learning from the philosophical literature, this article develops a detailed interpretation of bootstrapping that can answer the circularity challenge. The key to this interpretation is the recognition of computational constraints, both internal and external to the mind, which can endow empty symbols with new conceptual roles and thus new contents.