财政分权、地方政府行为与雾霾污染——基于73个城市PM2.5浓度的实证研究
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摘要
改革开放以来,在全面建成小康社会的道路上,生态环境高质量业已成为新时代新征程上的根本遵循。基于73个地市级城市面板数据,使用GMM系统模型实证检验财政分权、政府行为对雾霾污染的影响,研究发现:(1)财政分权与雾霾污染显著正相关,表明中国式财政分权加剧了雾霾污染。(2)地方政府竞争与雾霾污染存在显著负相关,表明地方政府竞争在一定程度上对雾霾污染存在抑制作用。(3)雾霾污染与环境保护支出和财政收入分权的交互项系数显著正相关,说明地方政府行为通过加大环境保护支出进而改善雾霾污染。基于此,提出优化财政分权制度,规范地方政府竞争机制,完善雾霾治理支出保障制度的对策建议。
Since the reform and opening up,on the road to building a well-to-do society in an all-round way,the high quality of the ecological environment has become the fundamental principle for the new era. Based on the data of 73 city-level cities,using the GMM system dynamic model to empirically verify the effect of fiscal decentralization and government behavior on haze pollution. The results of the empirical research show:( 1) Fiscal decentralization is significantly and positively related to smog pollution,indicating that fiscal decentralization can exacerbate smog pollution levels.( 2) There is a significant negative relationship between local government competition and smog pollution,indicating that local government competition has a certain degree of inhibition of smog pollution.( 3) There is a significant positive correlation between smog pollution and the interaction coefficient between environmental protection expenditures and fiscal revenue decentralization,which shows that local government behavior improves smog pollution by increasing environmental protection expenditures. Based on this,the paper has proposed the policy suggestion that we should optimize the fiscal decentralization system,and regulate the local government competition mechanism,and improve the measures and proposals for the protection system of haze governance expenditure.
Since the reform and opening up,on the road to building a well-to-do society in an all-round way,the high quality of the ecological environment has become the fundamental principle for the new era. Based on the data of 73 city-level cities,using the GMM system dynamic model to empirically verify the effect of fiscal decentralization and government behavior on haze pollution. The results of the empirical research show:( 1) Fiscal decentralization is significantly and positively related to smog pollution,indicating that fiscal decentralization can exacerbate smog pollution levels.( 2) There is a significant negative relationship between local government competition and smog pollution,indicating that local government competition has a certain degree of inhibition of smog pollution.( 3) There is a significant positive correlation between smog pollution and the interaction coefficient between environmental protection expenditures and fiscal revenue decentralization,which shows that local government behavior improves smog pollution by increasing environmental protection expenditures. Based on this,the paper has proposed the policy suggestion that we should optimize the fiscal decentralization system,and regulate the local government competition mechanism,and improve the measures and proposals for the protection system of haze governance expenditure.
引文
[1]蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6)4-11.
[2]张欣怡.财政分权下地方政府行为与环境污染问题研究[J].经济问题探索,2015(3):32-41.
[3]陈抗,HILLMAN A L,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化---从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(1):111-130.
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[6]FREDRIKSSON,MILLIMET D.Is there a California effect in US environmental policymaking[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2002,32(6):737-764.
[7]段龙龙,刘秀伟.中国式财政分权、城镇化与城市空气质量[J].环境与社会,2016(6):58-61.
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[10]黄国宾,周业安.财政分权与节能减排---基于转移支付的视角[J].中国人民大学学报,2014(6):67-76.
[11]潘敏杰,武舜臣,张继良.中国式分权、环境规制与雾霾污染[J].产业经济,2017(1):5-19.
[12]KUNCE M,SHOGREN J F.Destructive interjurisdictional competition:Firm,capital and labor mobility in a model of direct emission control[J].Ecological Economic,2007,60(3):543-549.
[13]李敬涛.财政分权、信息公开与官员腐败---基于宏微观制度环境的双重考察[J].会计与经济研究,2016(3):25-44.
[14]谭娟.基于VAR模型的我国政府环境规制对低碳经济影响分析[J].科学管理研究,2013(24):21-24.
[15]SUN X Z,LU C X.Major problems and countermeasures for the establishment of ecological compensation systems for national key ecological function areas[J].Journal of Resources and Ecology,2015(6):363-368.
[16]马海涛,师玉朋.三级分权、支出偏好与雾霾治理的机理---基于中国式财政分权的博弈分析[J].当代财经,2016(8):24-32.
[17]QIAN B Y,ROLAND G.Federalism and the soft budget constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[18]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(4):4-11.
[19]吴顺恩.我国财政分权体制下的环境污染问题研究[J].生态经济,2014(12):151-154.
[20]吴俊培,丁玮蓉,龚旻.财政分权对中国环境质量影响的实证分析[J].财政研究,2015(11):56-63.
[21]方红生,张军.财政集权的激励效应再评估:攫取之手还是援助之手?[J].管理世界,2014(2):21-31.
[22]闫文娟.财政分权、政府竞争与环境治理投资[J].财贸研究,2012(5):91-97.
[23]VAN A D,MARTIN R V,BRAUER M,el al.Use of satellite observations for long-term exposure assessment of global concentrations of fine particulate matter[J].Environmental Health Perspectives,2015,123(2):135-143.
[24]陈硕,高琳.央地关系:财政分权度量及作用机制再评估[J].管理世界,2012(06):43-59.
[25]王文剑,覃成林.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区性差异---基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验[J].管理世界,2008(1):9-21.
[26]薛慧光,石晓平,唐鹏.中国式分权与城市土地出让价格的偏离---以长三角地区城市为例[J].资源科学,2013(6):1134-1142.
[27]吴勋,王琳.财政分权、区域经济发展与国家审计功能---基于省级审计机关的面板数据分析[J].经济问题,2015(10):107-112.
[28]张欣怡.财政分权下的政府行为与环境污染研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2014.
[29]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Environmental impacts of a north american free trade agreement[R].NBER Working Paper,Cambridge MA,1991.
[30]潘慧峰,王鑫,张书宇.雾霾污染的持续性及空间溢出效应分析---来自京津冀地区的证据[J].中国软科学,2015(12):134-143.
(1)“用脚投票”是指在人口流动不受限制、存在大量辖区政府、辖区间无利益外溢、信息完备等假设条件下,由于各辖区政府提供的公共产品和税负组合不尽相同,所以各地居民可以根据各地方政府提供的公共产品和税负的组合情况,来自由选择那些最能满足自己偏好的地方定居。
(2)拉萨部分数据严重缺失,因此剔除作为遗失值处理。
[2]张欣怡.财政分权下地方政府行为与环境污染问题研究[J].经济问题探索,2015(3):32-41.
[3]陈抗,HILLMAN A L,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化---从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(1):111-130.
[4]OATES W E.Fiscal federalism[M].New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972.
[5]LEVINSON A.Environmental regulatory competition:A status report and some new evidence[J].National Tax Journal,2003,56(1):91-106.
[6]FREDRIKSSON,MILLIMET D.Is there a California effect in US environmental policymaking[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2002,32(6):737-764.
[7]段龙龙,刘秀伟.中国式财政分权、城镇化与城市空气质量[J].环境与社会,2016(6):58-61.
[8]ZHENG S Q,MATTHEW E K,SUN WZ,et al.Incentivizing China’s urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities:The role of the central government and public environmentalism[R].NBER Working paper,2013.
[9]郭平,杨梦洁.中国财政分权制度对地方政府环境污染治理的影响分析[J].城市发展研究,2014(7):84-90.
[10]黄国宾,周业安.财政分权与节能减排---基于转移支付的视角[J].中国人民大学学报,2014(6):67-76.
[11]潘敏杰,武舜臣,张继良.中国式分权、环境规制与雾霾污染[J].产业经济,2017(1):5-19.
[12]KUNCE M,SHOGREN J F.Destructive interjurisdictional competition:Firm,capital and labor mobility in a model of direct emission control[J].Ecological Economic,2007,60(3):543-549.
[13]李敬涛.财政分权、信息公开与官员腐败---基于宏微观制度环境的双重考察[J].会计与经济研究,2016(3):25-44.
[14]谭娟.基于VAR模型的我国政府环境规制对低碳经济影响分析[J].科学管理研究,2013(24):21-24.
[15]SUN X Z,LU C X.Major problems and countermeasures for the establishment of ecological compensation systems for national key ecological function areas[J].Journal of Resources and Ecology,2015(6):363-368.
[16]马海涛,师玉朋.三级分权、支出偏好与雾霾治理的机理---基于中国式财政分权的博弈分析[J].当代财经,2016(8):24-32.
[17]QIAN B Y,ROLAND G.Federalism and the soft budget constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[18]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(4):4-11.
[19]吴顺恩.我国财政分权体制下的环境污染问题研究[J].生态经济,2014(12):151-154.
[20]吴俊培,丁玮蓉,龚旻.财政分权对中国环境质量影响的实证分析[J].财政研究,2015(11):56-63.
[21]方红生,张军.财政集权的激励效应再评估:攫取之手还是援助之手?[J].管理世界,2014(2):21-31.
[22]闫文娟.财政分权、政府竞争与环境治理投资[J].财贸研究,2012(5):91-97.
[23]VAN A D,MARTIN R V,BRAUER M,el al.Use of satellite observations for long-term exposure assessment of global concentrations of fine particulate matter[J].Environmental Health Perspectives,2015,123(2):135-143.
[24]陈硕,高琳.央地关系:财政分权度量及作用机制再评估[J].管理世界,2012(06):43-59.
[25]王文剑,覃成林.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区性差异---基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验[J].管理世界,2008(1):9-21.
[26]薛慧光,石晓平,唐鹏.中国式分权与城市土地出让价格的偏离---以长三角地区城市为例[J].资源科学,2013(6):1134-1142.
[27]吴勋,王琳.财政分权、区域经济发展与国家审计功能---基于省级审计机关的面板数据分析[J].经济问题,2015(10):107-112.
[28]张欣怡.财政分权下的政府行为与环境污染研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2014.
[29]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Environmental impacts of a north american free trade agreement[R].NBER Working Paper,Cambridge MA,1991.
[30]潘慧峰,王鑫,张书宇.雾霾污染的持续性及空间溢出效应分析---来自京津冀地区的证据[J].中国软科学,2015(12):134-143.
(1)“用脚投票”是指在人口流动不受限制、存在大量辖区政府、辖区间无利益外溢、信息完备等假设条件下,由于各辖区政府提供的公共产品和税负组合不尽相同,所以各地居民可以根据各地方政府提供的公共产品和税负的组合情况,来自由选择那些最能满足自己偏好的地方定居。
(2)拉萨部分数据严重缺失,因此剔除作为遗失值处理。
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