股权质押与市值管理:基于中国沪深股市A股上市公司的实证检验
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摘要
本文以沪深两市上市公司为研究对象,基于2012-2016年的样本数据,运用STATA14探讨了上市公司发生股权质押后,相较不存在股权质押的公司是否会更有可能进行市值管理,以及股权质押、股权激励和市值管理三者之间的传导机制。基于相关数据的实证结果显示,控股股东在发生股权质押行为后,为了避免股价发生异常波动或者持续下跌从而引发公司治理层面的风险,相较不存在控股股东股权质押情形的公司的确更有可能进行市值管理;进一步分析发现,股权质押后,控股股东会通过股权激励这种手段来进行市值管理。
Due to the increasing investment opportunities of enterprises,share pledge has also attracted more and more attention from enterprises and investors.When there are capital requirements for controlling shareholders of listed companies,with low cost,strong liquidity and high efficiency,share pledge has become one of the preferred financing methods for controlling shareholders.However,this is not without risk.Because of the uncertainty of the value of the pledge equity and the immaturity of the securities market,once the stock market environment changes,such as abnormal or continuous fluctuations in stock prices,if the controlling shareholder fails to make up the value of the pledge in time,controlling shareholders will be forced to liquidate or even transfer control,thus triggering the risk of corporate governance.In the face of frequent incidents of default in the capital market,how will listed companies with share pledge reduce the risk of pledge is worth studying.In this paper,the main problems of this study are divided into two aspects.First,compared with other enterprises,whether controlling shareholders are more likely to have market value management after share pledge.Second,after the occurrence of share pledge,whether controlling shareholders adopt equity incentive to manage market capitalization.The initial sample is selected from all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016.In order to ensure the integrity and continuity of data,the financial industry,St,*st and outliers and missing values are excluded.12829 sample data are obtained,while all statistics are from the CSMAR database,whose raw data were processed.In this paper,the relationship between equity pledge and market value management is analyzed through OLS multiple regression model.Then,by simultaneous equations,we examine the transmission mechanism between share pledge,equity incentive and market value management among the three are examined.The empirical results in this paper show that,first,the coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive,which has a significant positive correlation at 1% significant level.Compared with companies without share pledge,controlling shareholders are more likely to carry out market value management to avoid abnormal fluctuation of stock price after pledge.Second,The coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level;the correlation coefficient between equity incentive and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level;the regression of the last three variables in one equation is also positively correlated with the level of 1%.This indicates that the mediation effect is valid.The research contributions of this paper are embodied in the following three aspects:first,taking share pledge as explanatory variable,and using market value management as explanatory variable,the direct correlation between the two,enriching the research on the motivation of market value management is studied;secondly,taking event behavior-economic-consequences as research paradigm,and taking equity incentive as an intermediary variable,the transmission mechanism between share pledge,equity incentive and market value management among the three is explored;thirdly,the understanding of investors on the share pledge is deepened,which is of reference significance for the government and regulatory departments to formulate relevant policies.
Due to the increasing investment opportunities of enterprises,share pledge has also attracted more and more attention from enterprises and investors.When there are capital requirements for controlling shareholders of listed companies,with low cost,strong liquidity and high efficiency,share pledge has become one of the preferred financing methods for controlling shareholders.However,this is not without risk.Because of the uncertainty of the value of the pledge equity and the immaturity of the securities market,once the stock market environment changes,such as abnormal or continuous fluctuations in stock prices,if the controlling shareholder fails to make up the value of the pledge in time,controlling shareholders will be forced to liquidate or even transfer control,thus triggering the risk of corporate governance.In the face of frequent incidents of default in the capital market,how will listed companies with share pledge reduce the risk of pledge is worth studying.In this paper,the main problems of this study are divided into two aspects.First,compared with other enterprises,whether controlling shareholders are more likely to have market value management after share pledge.Second,after the occurrence of share pledge,whether controlling shareholders adopt equity incentive to manage market capitalization.The initial sample is selected from all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016.In order to ensure the integrity and continuity of data,the financial industry,St,*st and outliers and missing values are excluded.12829 sample data are obtained,while all statistics are from the CSMAR database,whose raw data were processed.In this paper,the relationship between equity pledge and market value management is analyzed through OLS multiple regression model.Then,by simultaneous equations,we examine the transmission mechanism between share pledge,equity incentive and market value management among the three are examined.The empirical results in this paper show that,first,the coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive,which has a significant positive correlation at 1% significant level.Compared with companies without share pledge,controlling shareholders are more likely to carry out market value management to avoid abnormal fluctuation of stock price after pledge.Second,The coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level;the correlation coefficient between equity incentive and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level;the regression of the last three variables in one equation is also positively correlated with the level of 1%.This indicates that the mediation effect is valid.The research contributions of this paper are embodied in the following three aspects:first,taking share pledge as explanatory variable,and using market value management as explanatory variable,the direct correlation between the two,enriching the research on the motivation of market value management is studied;secondly,taking event behavior-economic-consequences as research paradigm,and taking equity incentive as an intermediary variable,the transmission mechanism between share pledge,equity incentive and market value management among the three is explored;thirdly,the understanding of investors on the share pledge is deepened,which is of reference significance for the government and regulatory departments to formulate relevant policies.
引文
[1]高兰芬.董监事股权质押之代理问题对会计资讯与公司绩效之影响[D].台湾:成功大学,2002.
[2]龚俊琼.我国上市公司大股东股权质押的动机及后果[J].当代经济,2015,31(20):12-13.
[3]Yeh Y,Ko C,Su Y.Utimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders:New evidence from Taiwan[J].Academia Economic Papers,2003,31(3):263-299.
[4]郝项超,梁琪.最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么[J].会计研究,2009,30(7):57-63.
[5]郑国坚.大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,23(9):72-87.
[6]Chen Yehning,Hu Shingyang.The controlling shareholder's personal stock loan and firm performance[R].Working Paper,Taiwan University,2001.
[7]谢德仁,郑登津.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗[J].管理世界,2016,32(5):128-140.
[8]李秉祥,简冠群.控股股东股权质押、投资者情绪与定向增发股价长期表现[J].中央财经大学学报,2017,37(11):75-84.
[9]张钰.市值管理与商业银行市值最大化[J].理论探索,2007,24(6):110-111.
[10]伍华林.我国上市公司市值管理问题研究[J].经济导刊,2007,16(11):37-38.
[11]杜江,史天雄.基于市值管理理论的选股模型应用[J].湖南大学学报,2010,24(7):63-66.
[12]李永伟,李若山.上市公司股权质押下的“隧道挖掘”:明星电力资金黑洞案例分析[J].财务与会计,2007,29(2):39-42.
[13]黎来芳.商业伦理、诚信义务与不道德控制-鸿仪系“掏空”上市公司案例[J].会计研究,2005,26(11):8-14.
[14]Jensen M C,MeCkling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership strueture[J].Journal of Financial Eeonomies,1976,32(3):305-360.
[15]施光耀,刘国芳.股权激励:市值管理新趋势[J].资本市场,2007,19(2):32-35.
[16]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲.为上市公司股权激励制度设计:是激励还是福利[J].管理世界,2009,25(9):131-147.
[17]刘广生,马悦.中国上市公司实施股权激励的效果[J].中国软科学,2013,28(7):110-121.
[18]田轩,孟清扬.股权激励计划能促进企业创新吗[J].南开管理评论,2018,21(3):176-190.
[19]章雁,樊晓霞.中小板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(11):405-410.
[20]康玲.股权激励对公司股价的影响研究[J].财会通讯,2015,36(8):29-31.
[21]Kaiser H F.A second generation little jiffy[J].Psychometrika,1970,35(4):401-415.
[22]黄之骏,王华.经营者激励与企业价值[J].中国会计评论.2006,4(6):29-58.
[23]刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨,等.业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):49-58.
[24]李旎,郑国坚.市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J].会计研究,2015,36(5):42-49.
[2]龚俊琼.我国上市公司大股东股权质押的动机及后果[J].当代经济,2015,31(20):12-13.
[3]Yeh Y,Ko C,Su Y.Utimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders:New evidence from Taiwan[J].Academia Economic Papers,2003,31(3):263-299.
[4]郝项超,梁琪.最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么[J].会计研究,2009,30(7):57-63.
[5]郑国坚.大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,23(9):72-87.
[6]Chen Yehning,Hu Shingyang.The controlling shareholder's personal stock loan and firm performance[R].Working Paper,Taiwan University,2001.
[7]谢德仁,郑登津.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗[J].管理世界,2016,32(5):128-140.
[8]李秉祥,简冠群.控股股东股权质押、投资者情绪与定向增发股价长期表现[J].中央财经大学学报,2017,37(11):75-84.
[9]张钰.市值管理与商业银行市值最大化[J].理论探索,2007,24(6):110-111.
[10]伍华林.我国上市公司市值管理问题研究[J].经济导刊,2007,16(11):37-38.
[11]杜江,史天雄.基于市值管理理论的选股模型应用[J].湖南大学学报,2010,24(7):63-66.
[12]李永伟,李若山.上市公司股权质押下的“隧道挖掘”:明星电力资金黑洞案例分析[J].财务与会计,2007,29(2):39-42.
[13]黎来芳.商业伦理、诚信义务与不道德控制-鸿仪系“掏空”上市公司案例[J].会计研究,2005,26(11):8-14.
[14]Jensen M C,MeCkling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership strueture[J].Journal of Financial Eeonomies,1976,32(3):305-360.
[15]施光耀,刘国芳.股权激励:市值管理新趋势[J].资本市场,2007,19(2):32-35.
[16]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲.为上市公司股权激励制度设计:是激励还是福利[J].管理世界,2009,25(9):131-147.
[17]刘广生,马悦.中国上市公司实施股权激励的效果[J].中国软科学,2013,28(7):110-121.
[18]田轩,孟清扬.股权激励计划能促进企业创新吗[J].南开管理评论,2018,21(3):176-190.
[19]章雁,樊晓霞.中小板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(11):405-410.
[20]康玲.股权激励对公司股价的影响研究[J].财会通讯,2015,36(8):29-31.
[21]Kaiser H F.A second generation little jiffy[J].Psychometrika,1970,35(4):401-415.
[22]黄之骏,王华.经营者激励与企业价值[J].中国会计评论.2006,4(6):29-58.
[23]刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨,等.业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):49-58.
[24]李旎,郑国坚.市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J].会计研究,2015,36(5):42-49.
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