“营改增”下的土地财政:建设用地规划指标的约束
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摘要
"营改增"是结构性减税的重头戏,会对地方政府财税收入产生显著影响,也必然会对地方政府重要收入来源-土地财政产生影响。随着建设用地逐渐突破2020年的规划控制指标,地方政府受到建设用地规划指标限制的压力逐渐增大,这是否会限制土地财政收入增加呢?文章利用2009-2015年的土地出让数据,实证分析了"营改增"后市、县地方政府土地财政收入的变化,并考虑建设用地控制指标在该影响机制中的作用。研究发现:(1)"营改增"对地方政府土地财政收入有显著的正向影响,但土地财政收入的增加受建设用地控制指标的约束;(2)建设用地控制指标的约束作用从2014年开始凸显;(3)市级地方政府对建设用地控制指标更敏感。文章的研究对深化认识新一轮财税体制改革和加强市县层面差别化的土地财政管控具有重要理论和现实意义。
Business Tax to Value-added Tax Reform(BTtoVAT)is the continuation and the fundamental measure of the structural tax cuts policy. On January 1,2012,the pilot reform of BTtoVAT was initiated in Shanghai. Since then,BTtoVAT has gradually achieved the expansion from breadth and depth. It was fully implemented in China on May 1,2016. With the expansion of BTtoVAT,the effect of tax reduction is gradually obvious. Tax reduction is not only reflected in the decline of taxpayers' tax burden,but also reflected in the reduction of government tax revenue and fiscal revenue. Studies show that in the short term,BTtoVAT significantly increases the financial pressure on local governments.This paper will test whether the fiscal pressure brought by BTtoVAT further increases local governments' dependence on land finance. At the same time,the announcement of national land supervision issued on March21,2014 revealed that the scale of construction land in some provinces in 2013 had exceeded the planning target of 2020. Then,as the construction land breaks through the planning target of 2020,the pressure on local governments to be restricted by the binding target of construction land gradually increases. Will their behaviors of transferring construction land to obtain land finance revenue be constrained?Therefore,this paper mainly studies the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue,and analyzes whether this impact is constrained by the binding target of construction land.Based on the existing literature and data,this paper constructs an analysis framework. Furthermore,it uses econometric models to examine the impact of B2V on land finance revenue and considers the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land based on the China Land Market Website's land transfer dataset in 82 cities and 422 counties from 2009 to 2015. The major findings are as follows:First,B2V has a positive impact on local governments' land finance revenue,and the impact of B2V on land finance revenue is constrained by the binding target of construction land. Second,the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land has begun to be highlighted since 2014. Third,prefecture-level governments are more sensitive to the binding target of construction land than county-level governments.The main contributions are reflected in the following three points:First,the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue is analyzed. Second,in the process of analyzing land finance revenue,the constraint effect of the binding target of construction land is considered. Third,we distinguish prefecture-level and county-level local governments in the process of empirically analyzing land finance revenue. This study has important theoretical and practical significance for deepening the new round of fiscal and tax system reform represented by BTtoVAT,controlling the differentiated land finance revenue at prefecture and county levels,and even improving the binding target of construction land at prefecture and county levels.
Business Tax to Value-added Tax Reform(BTtoVAT)is the continuation and the fundamental measure of the structural tax cuts policy. On January 1,2012,the pilot reform of BTtoVAT was initiated in Shanghai. Since then,BTtoVAT has gradually achieved the expansion from breadth and depth. It was fully implemented in China on May 1,2016. With the expansion of BTtoVAT,the effect of tax reduction is gradually obvious. Tax reduction is not only reflected in the decline of taxpayers' tax burden,but also reflected in the reduction of government tax revenue and fiscal revenue. Studies show that in the short term,BTtoVAT significantly increases the financial pressure on local governments.This paper will test whether the fiscal pressure brought by BTtoVAT further increases local governments' dependence on land finance. At the same time,the announcement of national land supervision issued on March21,2014 revealed that the scale of construction land in some provinces in 2013 had exceeded the planning target of 2020. Then,as the construction land breaks through the planning target of 2020,the pressure on local governments to be restricted by the binding target of construction land gradually increases. Will their behaviors of transferring construction land to obtain land finance revenue be constrained?Therefore,this paper mainly studies the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue,and analyzes whether this impact is constrained by the binding target of construction land.Based on the existing literature and data,this paper constructs an analysis framework. Furthermore,it uses econometric models to examine the impact of B2V on land finance revenue and considers the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land based on the China Land Market Website's land transfer dataset in 82 cities and 422 counties from 2009 to 2015. The major findings are as follows:First,B2V has a positive impact on local governments' land finance revenue,and the impact of B2V on land finance revenue is constrained by the binding target of construction land. Second,the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land has begun to be highlighted since 2014. Third,prefecture-level governments are more sensitive to the binding target of construction land than county-level governments.The main contributions are reflected in the following three points:First,the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue is analyzed. Second,in the process of analyzing land finance revenue,the constraint effect of the binding target of construction land is considered. Third,we distinguish prefecture-level and county-level local governments in the process of empirically analyzing land finance revenue. This study has important theoretical and practical significance for deepening the new round of fiscal and tax system reform represented by BTtoVAT,controlling the differentiated land finance revenue at prefecture and county levels,and even improving the binding target of construction land at prefecture and county levels.
引文
[1]范子英.土地财政的根源:财政压力还是投资冲动[J].中国工业经济,2015,(6):18-31.
[2]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究,2017,(2):82-95.
[3]高培勇.“营改增”的功能定位与前行脉络[J].税务研究,2013,(7):3-10.
[4]何代欣.“营改增”的政府间收入分配效应——基于税收收入弹性变动的测算与评估[J].经济社会体制比较,2016,(3):84-93.
[5]胡怡建,田志伟.我国“营改增”的财政经济效应[J].税务研究,2014,(1):38-43.
[6]卢洪友,王云霄,祁毓.“营改增”的财政体制影响效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2016,(3):71-83.
[7]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009,(7):21-33.
[8]王健,吴群,彭山桂,等.“营改增”是否影响了地方政府土地财政收入[J].财贸研究,2017,(12):82-94.
[9]吴群,李永乐.财政分权、地方政府竞争与土地财政[J].财贸经济,2010,(7):51-59.
[10]谢冬水.地方政府竞争、土地垄断供给与城市化发展失衡[J].财经研究,2016,(4):102-111.
[11]余莎,游宇.合伙卖地?地方政府合作与土地资源配置[J].财经研究,2017,(12):58-73.
[12]张炜.基于制度经济学视角的“营改增”改革成本分析[J].税务研究,2014,(1):79-82.
[13]赵方,袁超文.“营改增”对各行业税负的影响效应——基于投入产出表的分析[J].上海经济研究,2016,(11):31-35.
[14]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[15]Liu Y Z,Alm J.“Province-Managing-County” fiscal reform,land expansion,and urban growth in China[J]. Journal of Housing Economics,2016,33:82-100.
(1)数据来源于《中国国土资源统计年鉴》,统计区域为2012年下半年开始“营改增”试点的江苏省、浙江省、福建省和广东省四个省份。
(1)数据来源于中国土地市场网、《中国城市统计年鉴》和《中国县域统计年鉴》,统计区域包括河北、山东、江苏、浙江、福建和广东。
(1)与下文实证分析采用的研究区域一致,即82个市和422个县。
(1)限于篇幅,结果未列出,如有需要联系作者索要。
(2)限于篇幅,结果未列出,如有需要联系作者索要。
(1)感谢两位匿名审稿人提出更细维度研究的建议,我们将在本文基金项目的资助下继续开展深入的研究。
[2]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究,2017,(2):82-95.
[3]高培勇.“营改增”的功能定位与前行脉络[J].税务研究,2013,(7):3-10.
[4]何代欣.“营改增”的政府间收入分配效应——基于税收收入弹性变动的测算与评估[J].经济社会体制比较,2016,(3):84-93.
[5]胡怡建,田志伟.我国“营改增”的财政经济效应[J].税务研究,2014,(1):38-43.
[6]卢洪友,王云霄,祁毓.“营改增”的财政体制影响效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2016,(3):71-83.
[7]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009,(7):21-33.
[8]王健,吴群,彭山桂,等.“营改增”是否影响了地方政府土地财政收入[J].财贸研究,2017,(12):82-94.
[9]吴群,李永乐.财政分权、地方政府竞争与土地财政[J].财贸经济,2010,(7):51-59.
[10]谢冬水.地方政府竞争、土地垄断供给与城市化发展失衡[J].财经研究,2016,(4):102-111.
[11]余莎,游宇.合伙卖地?地方政府合作与土地资源配置[J].财经研究,2017,(12):58-73.
[12]张炜.基于制度经济学视角的“营改增”改革成本分析[J].税务研究,2014,(1):79-82.
[13]赵方,袁超文.“营改增”对各行业税负的影响效应——基于投入产出表的分析[J].上海经济研究,2016,(11):31-35.
[14]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[15]Liu Y Z,Alm J.“Province-Managing-County” fiscal reform,land expansion,and urban growth in China[J]. Journal of Housing Economics,2016,33:82-100.
(1)数据来源于《中国国土资源统计年鉴》,统计区域为2012年下半年开始“营改增”试点的江苏省、浙江省、福建省和广东省四个省份。
(1)数据来源于中国土地市场网、《中国城市统计年鉴》和《中国县域统计年鉴》,统计区域包括河北、山东、江苏、浙江、福建和广东。
(1)与下文实证分析采用的研究区域一致,即82个市和422个县。
(1)限于篇幅,结果未列出,如有需要联系作者索要。
(2)限于篇幅,结果未列出,如有需要联系作者索要。
(1)感谢两位匿名审稿人提出更细维度研究的建议,我们将在本文基金项目的资助下继续开展深入的研究。
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