农业污染背景下农业补贴政策的作用机理与效应分析
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摘要
农业补贴政策是我国农业经济领域的一项重要的财政政策,虽然在保证粮食产量安全方面起到了巨大的激励作用,但是对环境影响的作用机制愈发受到关注。农业补贴政策通过影响农民的预期收益,影响其生产方式,最终对生态环境造成影响。本文以有效控制农业污染为目标,将农业补贴政策划分为产量补贴政策与绿色补贴政策,并构建了农民专业合作社的古诺竞争博弈模型,进而分析比较两种不同补贴政策在均衡状态下的环境重要性、污染排放率、农业补贴率、排污税率等因素对补贴效应和社会福利的影响。研究发现:(1)在两种补贴政策下,均衡农产品产量、生产者剩余、消费者剩余、政府预算支出和社会福利都随着补贴率的增加而增加。(2)绿色生产投资量随着绿色补贴率的增加而增加。(3)在产量补贴政策下,均衡农产品价格随着补贴率的增加而降低,而农业排污量随补贴率的增加而增加;绿色补贴政策的作用恰好相反。(4)与产量补贴政策的实施效果相比,绿色补贴政策下的农产品价格较高、污染排放较少。但生产者剩余和政府预算支出则不确定。还发现,存在一个边际补贴率的阈值,当边际补贴率低于阈值时,与产量补贴政策相比,绿色补贴政策下的均衡农产品产量和消费者剩余较高。本研究的政策启示在于,绿色补贴政策可以有效缓解中国农业发展中的"粮食数量与环境质量之间相互矛盾"困境。采取低于阈值的产量补贴率和高于阈值的绿色补贴率的补贴政策组合策略,可以在保证农产品产量的同时促进绿色农业的发展。
The agricultural subsidy policy is an important kind of fiscal policy for agricultural economy in China. Although it has played a huge incentive role in ensuring the quantity of grain production,the impact mechanism on environment has received more and more attention. The agricultural subsidy policy affects the farmers' expected income,their production methods,and ultimately the ecological environment. In order to effectively control agricultural pollution,this paper divides agricultural subsidy policy into production subsidy policy and green subsidy policy firstly,and constructs the Cournot competition game model of farmers' professional cooperatives,and then analyzes and compares the influences of four factors on subsidy effects and social welfare in equilibrium. The four factors are the importance of environment,pollution emission rate,agricultural subsidy rate,and sewage tax rate. We found that:First,under the two subsidy policies,agricultural output,producer surplus,consumer surplus,government budget expenditure and social welfare all increase with the increase of subsidy rate. Second,the amount of green production investment increases as the green subsidy rate increases. Third,under the production subsidy policy,the price of agricultural products decreases with the increase of subsidy rate,while the amount of agricultural sewage increases with the increase of subsidy rate; the effect of green subsidy policy is just the opposite. Fourth,compared with the implementation effect of the production subsidy policy,the agricultural products under the green subsidy policy have higher prices and less pollution emissions. But producer surplus and government budget expenditure are uncertain. We also found that there is a threshold for the marginal subsidy rate. When the marginal subsidy rate is lower than the threshold,the agricultural product output and consumer surplus under the green subsidy policy are higher than the production subsidy policy. The policy implications of this study is that the green subsidy policy can effectively alleviate'the dilemma between the quantity of food and environmental quality'in agricultural development. A subsidy policy combination strategy that uses a production subsidy rate below the threshold and a green subsidy rate above the threshold can promote the development of green agriculture while ensuring the output of agricultural products.
The agricultural subsidy policy is an important kind of fiscal policy for agricultural economy in China. Although it has played a huge incentive role in ensuring the quantity of grain production,the impact mechanism on environment has received more and more attention. The agricultural subsidy policy affects the farmers' expected income,their production methods,and ultimately the ecological environment. In order to effectively control agricultural pollution,this paper divides agricultural subsidy policy into production subsidy policy and green subsidy policy firstly,and constructs the Cournot competition game model of farmers' professional cooperatives,and then analyzes and compares the influences of four factors on subsidy effects and social welfare in equilibrium. The four factors are the importance of environment,pollution emission rate,agricultural subsidy rate,and sewage tax rate. We found that:First,under the two subsidy policies,agricultural output,producer surplus,consumer surplus,government budget expenditure and social welfare all increase with the increase of subsidy rate. Second,the amount of green production investment increases as the green subsidy rate increases. Third,under the production subsidy policy,the price of agricultural products decreases with the increase of subsidy rate,while the amount of agricultural sewage increases with the increase of subsidy rate; the effect of green subsidy policy is just the opposite. Fourth,compared with the implementation effect of the production subsidy policy,the agricultural products under the green subsidy policy have higher prices and less pollution emissions. But producer surplus and government budget expenditure are uncertain. We also found that there is a threshold for the marginal subsidy rate. When the marginal subsidy rate is lower than the threshold,the agricultural product output and consumer surplus under the green subsidy policy are higher than the production subsidy policy. The policy implications of this study is that the green subsidy policy can effectively alleviate'the dilemma between the quantity of food and environmental quality'in agricultural development. A subsidy policy combination strategy that uses a production subsidy rate below the threshold and a green subsidy rate above the threshold can promote the development of green agriculture while ensuring the output of agricultural products.
引文
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[23]司言武.农业非点源水污染税收政策研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2010(9):6-9.
[24]NIE P. Innovation considering pollution emission and energy input[J]. Energy&environment,2013,24(6):953-964.
[25]CHOW G C. Economic analysis and policies for environmental problems[J]. Pacific economic review,2011,16(3):339-348.
[26]谭君.税收政策对农业生态环境的影响及对策研究[D].长沙:中南林业科技大学,2016.
[27]李秀芬,朱金兆,顾晓君,等.农业面源污染现状与防治进展[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(4):81-84.
[28]黄汉权,蓝海涛,王为农,等.我国农业补贴政策改革思路研究[J].宏观经济研究,2016(8):3-11.
[29]高玉强,沈坤荣.欧盟与美国的农业补贴制度及对我国的启示[J].经济体制改革,2014(2):173-177.
[30]陈颂东.进一步完善我国的农业补贴体系[J].农村经济,2007(4):15-18.
[31]MEDELLN-AZUARA J,HOWITT R E,HAROU J J. Predicting farmer responses to water pricing,rationing and subsidies assuming profit maximizing investment in irrigation technology[J].Agricultural water management,2012,108:73-82.
[32]NIE P. A monopoly with pollution emissions[J]. Journal of environmental planning and management,2012,55(6):705-711.
[33]CHEN Y,WEN X,WANG B,et al. Agricultural pollution and regulation:how to subsidize agriculture?[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2017,164:258-264.
[2]TANG K,GONG C,WANG D. Reduction potential,shadow prices,and pollution costs of agricultural pollutants in China[J]. Science of the total environment,2016,541:42-50.
[3]HUANG J,YANG G. Understanding recent challenges and new food policy in China[J]. Global food security,2017,12:119-126.
[4]LAI C,HU S,WANG V,et al. Agricultural R&D,policies,(in)determinacy,and growth[J]. International review of economics&finance,2017,51:328-341.
[5]NIE P,CHEN Y,YANG Y,et al. Subsidies in carbon finance for promoting renewable energy development[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2016,139:677-684.
[6]邱君.农业污染治理政策分析[M].北京:中国农业科学技术出版社,2008.
[7]吴连翠,谭俊美.粮食补贴政策的作用路径及产量效应实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013,23(9):100-106.
[8]CHEN Y,WAN J,WANG C. Agricultural subsidy with capacity constraints and demand elasticity[J]. Agricultural economics,2015,61(1):39-49.
[9]周博,翟印礼,钱巍,等.农业可持续发展视角下的我国粮食安全影响因素分析——基于结构方程模型的实证分析[J].农村经济,2015(11):15-19.
[10]胡川,陈静,袁梦琛.我国农业产业链持续低碳化的作用机制研究[J].宏观经济研究,2017(8):152-161.
[11]张舰,亚伯拉罕·艾宾斯坦,玛格丽特·麦克米伦,等.农村劳动力转移、化肥过度使用与环境污染[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(3):149-160.
[12]陆文聪,刘聪.化肥污染对粮食作物生产的环境惩罚效应[J].中国环境科学,2017,37(5):1988-1994.
[13]LI J,RODRIGUEZ D,TANG X. Effects of land lease policy on changes in land use,mechanization and agricultural pollution[J].Land use policy,2017,64:405-413.
[14]梁流涛.农业面源污染形成机制:理论与实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(4):74-80.
[15]杨雪.农业部:有效遏制农业面源污染加剧趋势[J].农村·农业·农民,2015(6):26-27.
[16]魏欣.中国农业面源污染管控研究[D].杨凌:西北农林科技大学,2014.
[17]冯海发.农业补贴制度改革的思路和措施[J].农业经济问题,2015(3):8-10.
[18]吴连翠,柳同音.粮食补贴政策与农户非农就业行为研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(2):100-106.
[19]李慧.构建经济激励机制及服务体系解决农业面源污染问题[D].上海:复旦大学,2011.
[20]熊冬洋.控制农业面源污染的财税政策研究[J].财会月刊,2012(5):32-33.
[21]ABADIE L M,GALARRAGA I,MILFORD A B,et al. Using food taxes and subsidies to achieve emission reduction targets in Norway[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2016,134:280-297.
[22]CHEN Y H,WAN J Y,WANG C. Agricultural subsidy with capacity constraints and demand elasticity[J]. Agricultural economics-zemedelska ekonomika,2015,61(1):39-49.
[23]司言武.农业非点源水污染税收政策研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2010(9):6-9.
[24]NIE P. Innovation considering pollution emission and energy input[J]. Energy&environment,2013,24(6):953-964.
[25]CHOW G C. Economic analysis and policies for environmental problems[J]. Pacific economic review,2011,16(3):339-348.
[26]谭君.税收政策对农业生态环境的影响及对策研究[D].长沙:中南林业科技大学,2016.
[27]李秀芬,朱金兆,顾晓君,等.农业面源污染现状与防治进展[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(4):81-84.
[28]黄汉权,蓝海涛,王为农,等.我国农业补贴政策改革思路研究[J].宏观经济研究,2016(8):3-11.
[29]高玉强,沈坤荣.欧盟与美国的农业补贴制度及对我国的启示[J].经济体制改革,2014(2):173-177.
[30]陈颂东.进一步完善我国的农业补贴体系[J].农村经济,2007(4):15-18.
[31]MEDELLN-AZUARA J,HOWITT R E,HAROU J J. Predicting farmer responses to water pricing,rationing and subsidies assuming profit maximizing investment in irrigation technology[J].Agricultural water management,2012,108:73-82.
[32]NIE P. A monopoly with pollution emissions[J]. Journal of environmental planning and management,2012,55(6):705-711.
[33]CHEN Y,WEN X,WANG B,et al. Agricultural pollution and regulation:how to subsidize agriculture?[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2017,164:258-264.
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