产业精准扶贫的剩余控制权冲突及治理
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摘要
从不完全契约的理论视角,运用"剩余控制权"的概念,分析产业精准扶贫中政府、扶贫企业和贫困农户之间的矛盾与冲突。研究发现,产业精准扶贫的剩余控制权冲突主要表现为:扶贫产业选择合理性与紧迫性之间的冲突;扶贫产业开发盈利性与政治性之间的冲突;扶贫产业发展嵌入性与挤出性之间的冲突。应当从明确产业精准扶贫中的权利义务关系、制定产权整合规则、提高社会嵌入程度和完善法律解决机制等方面化解剩余控制权冲突,以降低扶贫产业开发风险,减少扶贫产业开发的交易成本,增加贫困农户的内生工作能力,促进产业精准扶贫质量的提升。
From the theoretical perspective of incomplete contract,the concept of "residual control rights" is used to analyze the contradictions and conflicts among the government,enterprises and poor farmers in the industrial targeted poverty alleviation. The study found that the conflicts of residual control rights in the industry's targeted poverty alleviation are mainly as follows: conflicts between the rationality and urgency; conflicts between profitability and politics; conflicts between the embeddedness and extrudability. The conflicts should be resolved from clarifying the rights and obligations,formulating property rights integration rules,improving social embeddedness and improving legal settlement mechanisms,so as to reduce the risk and the transaction costs in poverty alleviation industry development,and increase the endogenous working capacity of poor farmers,improve the quality of industrial targeted poverty alleviation.
From the theoretical perspective of incomplete contract,the concept of "residual control rights" is used to analyze the contradictions and conflicts among the government,enterprises and poor farmers in the industrial targeted poverty alleviation. The study found that the conflicts of residual control rights in the industry's targeted poverty alleviation are mainly as follows: conflicts between the rationality and urgency; conflicts between profitability and politics; conflicts between the embeddedness and extrudability. The conflicts should be resolved from clarifying the rights and obligations,formulating property rights integration rules,improving social embeddedness and improving legal settlement mechanisms,so as to reduce the risk and the transaction costs in poverty alleviation industry development,and increase the endogenous working capacity of poor farmers,improve the quality of industrial targeted poverty alleviation.
引文
[1]王敏.论精准扶贫中的形式主义——基本表征、生成机制与治理进路[J].现代管理科学,2018(7):114-116.
[2]朱战辉.精英俘获:村庄结构变迁背景下扶贫项目“内卷化”分析——基于黔西南N村产业扶贫的调查研究[J].天津行政学院学报,2017(5):55-62.
[3]孙兆霞.脱嵌的产业扶贫——以贵州为案例[J].中共福建省委党校学报,2015(3):14-21.
[4]袁明宝.压力型体制、生计模式与产业扶贫中的目标失灵——以黔西南L村为例[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(4):19-25.
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[7]林万龙,华中昱,徐娜.产业扶贫的主要模式、实践困境与解决对策——基于河南、湖南、湖北、广西四省区若干贫困县的调研总结[J].经济纵横,2018(7):102-108.
[8]李卓,左停.资产收益扶贫有助于“减贫”吗?——基于东部扶贫改革试验区Z市的实践探索[J].农业经济问题,2018(10):69-77.
[9]梁栋,吴惠芳.农业产业扶贫的实践困境、内在机理与可行路径——基于江西林镇及所辖李村的调查[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2019(1):49-57.
[10]付江月,陈刚.奖惩机制下企业与贫困户在产业扶贫中的演化博弈研究[J].软科学,2018(10):43-48.
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[14]HART O,MOORE J.Foundations of incomplete contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999(1):115-138.
[15]HART O,MOORE J.On the design of hierarchies:Coordination versus specialization[J].Journal of Political Economy,2005(4):675-702.
[16]莫光辉,张菁.基于“人本主义”视角的贫困人口扶志扶智路径创新[J].中共中央党校学报,2018(3):102-110.
[17]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[18]郑瑞强.贫困群众脱贫内生动力激发:行动框架拓展与实证——以内蒙古兴安盟为例[J].贵州社会科学,2019(1):154-161.
[19]黄中伟,王宇露.关于经济行为的社会嵌入理论研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2007(12):1-8.
[20]周小虎.企业理论的社会资本逻辑[J].中国工业经济,2005(3):84-91.
[2]朱战辉.精英俘获:村庄结构变迁背景下扶贫项目“内卷化”分析——基于黔西南N村产业扶贫的调查研究[J].天津行政学院学报,2017(5):55-62.
[3]孙兆霞.脱嵌的产业扶贫——以贵州为案例[J].中共福建省委党校学报,2015(3):14-21.
[4]袁明宝.压力型体制、生计模式与产业扶贫中的目标失灵——以黔西南L村为例[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(4):19-25.
[5]梁琦,蔡建刚.资源禀赋、资产性收益与产业扶贫——多案例比较研究[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2017(4):85-92.
[6]何阳,孙萍.精准扶贫第三方评估流程再造:理论依据、现实动因与政策设计——对民族地区精准扶贫第三方评估实践的反思[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版),2018(5):177-183.
[7]林万龙,华中昱,徐娜.产业扶贫的主要模式、实践困境与解决对策——基于河南、湖南、湖北、广西四省区若干贫困县的调研总结[J].经济纵横,2018(7):102-108.
[8]李卓,左停.资产收益扶贫有助于“减贫”吗?——基于东部扶贫改革试验区Z市的实践探索[J].农业经济问题,2018(10):69-77.
[9]梁栋,吴惠芳.农业产业扶贫的实践困境、内在机理与可行路径——基于江西林镇及所辖李村的调查[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2019(1):49-57.
[10]付江月,陈刚.奖惩机制下企业与贫困户在产业扶贫中的演化博弈研究[J].软科学,2018(10):43-48.
[11]COASE R.The nature of the firm[J].Economica,1937(16):386-405.
[12]WILLIAMSON O.The economic institutions of capitalism:Firms,markets,relational contracting[M].New York:Free Press,1985.
[13]GROSSMAN S J,HART O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986(4):691-719.
[14]HART O,MOORE J.Foundations of incomplete contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999(1):115-138.
[15]HART O,MOORE J.On the design of hierarchies:Coordination versus specialization[J].Journal of Political Economy,2005(4):675-702.
[16]莫光辉,张菁.基于“人本主义”视角的贫困人口扶志扶智路径创新[J].中共中央党校学报,2018(3):102-110.
[17]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[18]郑瑞强.贫困群众脱贫内生动力激发:行动框架拓展与实证——以内蒙古兴安盟为例[J].贵州社会科学,2019(1):154-161.
[19]黄中伟,王宇露.关于经济行为的社会嵌入理论研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2007(12):1-8.
[20]周小虎.企业理论的社会资本逻辑[J].中国工业经济,2005(3):84-91.
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