股权混合度影响财务风险水平的作用机制——基于非效率投资的中介效应检验
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摘要
区别于现有研究从企业绩效视角考察混合所有制企业股权混合的治理效应,从财务风险视角考察股权混合度的治理效应。以2015—2017年A股沪深市场的混合所有制企业为研究对象,提出"股权混合度—非效率投资—财务风险水平"这一传导机制。实证研究表明:股权混合度与企业财务风险水平、非效率投资显著负相关,非效率投资在股权混合度与财务风险之间承起部分中介效应;将所有样本分为投资过度和投资不足两组的实证结果发现:投资不足在股权混合度与财务风险之间依然起到部分中介作用,且中介效应显著,投资过度在二者间不存在中介效应。一方面揭示股权混合度对财务风险水平的影响机制,丰富完善现有研究;另一方面结合结论要点对混合所有制改革提供对应的股权结构安排措施,促进混合所有制企业高质量低风险稳健发展。
Different from the existing research,this paper examined the governance effect of mixed ownership of mixed ownership from the perspective of enterprise performance. The article examined the governance effect of equity mix from the perspective of financial risk. Taking the mixed ownership system of Ashare Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2015—2017 as the research object,the chain mechanism of"equity blending degree-non-efficiency investment-financial risk level"was proposed. Empirical studies showed that equity mix was significantly negatively correlated with corporate financial risk level and non-efficiency investment. Non-efficiency investments bear a partial mediation effect between equity mix and financial risk; the empirical results of dividing all samples into over-investment and under-investment groups found that:insufficient investment still plays a partial intermediary role between the equity mix and the financial risk level,and the mediation effect is significant. Over-investment does not have a mediating effect between the two. On the one hand,it reveals the impact mechanism of equity mix on financial risk level,and enriches and improves existing research; on the other hand,combined with the conclusions,it provides corresponding equity structure arrangement measures for the reform of mixed ownership in full swing,and promotes the high-quality,low-risk and stable development of mixed-ownership enterprises.
Different from the existing research,this paper examined the governance effect of mixed ownership of mixed ownership from the perspective of enterprise performance. The article examined the governance effect of equity mix from the perspective of financial risk. Taking the mixed ownership system of Ashare Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2015—2017 as the research object,the chain mechanism of"equity blending degree-non-efficiency investment-financial risk level"was proposed. Empirical studies showed that equity mix was significantly negatively correlated with corporate financial risk level and non-efficiency investment. Non-efficiency investments bear a partial mediation effect between equity mix and financial risk; the empirical results of dividing all samples into over-investment and under-investment groups found that:insufficient investment still plays a partial intermediary role between the equity mix and the financial risk level,and the mediation effect is significant. Over-investment does not have a mediating effect between the two. On the one hand,it reveals the impact mechanism of equity mix on financial risk level,and enriches and improves existing research; on the other hand,combined with the conclusions,it provides corresponding equity structure arrangement measures for the reform of mixed ownership in full swing,and promotes the high-quality,low-risk and stable development of mixed-ownership enterprises.
引文
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[20]谭庆美,陈欣,张娜,等.管理层权力、外部治理机制与过度投资[J].管理科学,2015(4):59-70.
[21]BENLEMLIH M,BITAR M.Corporate social responsibility and investment efficiency[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016:1-25.
[22]彭程,杨红,黄荣.企业投资决策与财务风险的动态关系---基于外贸型上市公司的实证研究[J].云南财经大学学报,2012(4):114-121.
[23]庄晓霞.控制权特征、过度投资与财务风险[D].杭州:浙江工商大学,2014.
[24]张文魁.国企改革才是真正的供给侧改革[J].中国经济信息,2016(S1):26-27.
[25]RICHARDSON S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006(2):159-189.
[26]温忠麟.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
[27]张会丽,陆正飞.现金分布、公司治理与过度投资---基于我国上市公司及其子公司的现金持有状况的考察[J].管理世界,2012(3):141-150.
[2]LAEVEN,ROSS LEVINE.Beyond the biggest:Do other large shareholders influence corpora valuations?[R].University of Minnesota,Working Paper,2008(10):66-78.
[3]王欣,韩宝山.混合所有制企业股权结构治理效应分析[J].经济体制改革,2018(6):127-133.
[4]王新红,薛泽蓉,张行.股权混合度、研发投入与国企绩效调节效应分析---基于国企混合所有制改革背景[J].财会通讯,2018(18):43-59.
[5]刘新民,于文成,王垒.国企董事社会网络水平对双重任务的影响分析:股权混合度的调节效应[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2018(7):72-87.
[6]王晓亮,李鹏媛,王青松.定向增发、股权结构与企业风险承担研究[J].云南财经大学学报,2018(11):61-71.
[7]张长征,方卉.控制股东掠夺行为是股价崩盘的推手?---基于创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险的实证检验[J].投资研究,2018(9):136-146.
[8]黄曼行.我国中小企业股权结构与财务风险实证研究[J].现代管理科学,2013(11):108-110.
[9]岳宝宏,何蒙巧.民营企业海外并购财务风险评价体系的构建[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学),2019(1):49-59.
[10]HAO Y H,WANG Q,WANG S X.The analysis of the balance path of the second largest shareholder to the largest shareholder---Multiple case study of private and state-owned enterprises in China[J].Journal of Business Economics,2015:27-35.
[11]李建伟,包月阳.我国发展混合所有制经济的案例研究---工大集团发展混合所有制的经验与启示[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学),2015(7):1-8.
[12]AYBERT C,BRUGUA M,DOLLA A,et al.A sequential electron transfer from hydrogenases to cytochromes in sulfate-reducing bacteria[J].Biochimica et Biophysica Acta(BBA)/Protein Structure and Molecular Enzymology,2000(1):85-92.
[13]李甲稳,王颖.公司产品市场竞争与资本结构决定的实证分析---对国有企业混合所有制改革进程的启示[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2017(7):201-207.
[14]张祥建,郭丽虹,徐龙炳.中国国有企业混合所有制改革与企业投资效率---基于留存国有股控制和高管政治关联的分析[J].经济管理,2015(9):132-145.
[15]严若森.金融危机下国有化与企业短期财务风险关系的实证研究---基于中国制造业A股上市公司的经验证据[J].人文杂志,2010(5):86-90.
[16]宫海亮,迟旭升,徐婷婷.我国中小企业治理结构与财务风险相关性研究---基于中小企业板上市公司的经验数据[J].苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014(4):123-131.
[17]许为宾,周建.混合所有制、股权制衡与国企过度投资:基于政治观和经理人观的解释[J].广东财经大学学报,2017(2):53-62.
[18]HUBBARD R G,PALIA D.A reexamination of the conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s:An internal capital markets view[J].Journal of Finance,1999(3):1 131-1 152.
[19]CLEARY S,POVEL P,RAITH M.The U-shaped investment curve:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,2007(1):1-39.
[20]谭庆美,陈欣,张娜,等.管理层权力、外部治理机制与过度投资[J].管理科学,2015(4):59-70.
[21]BENLEMLIH M,BITAR M.Corporate social responsibility and investment efficiency[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016:1-25.
[22]彭程,杨红,黄荣.企业投资决策与财务风险的动态关系---基于外贸型上市公司的实证研究[J].云南财经大学学报,2012(4):114-121.
[23]庄晓霞.控制权特征、过度投资与财务风险[D].杭州:浙江工商大学,2014.
[24]张文魁.国企改革才是真正的供给侧改革[J].中国经济信息,2016(S1):26-27.
[25]RICHARDSON S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006(2):159-189.
[26]温忠麟.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
[27]张会丽,陆正飞.现金分布、公司治理与过度投资---基于我国上市公司及其子公司的现金持有状况的考察[J].管理世界,2012(3):141-150.
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