董事高管责任保险、公司治理与企业创新——基于A股上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
作为重要的公司治理机制,董事高管责任保险由于直接影响管理层的激励约束和风险偏好,因而与企业创新存在理论上的关联,但是否具有事实上的因果关系,却并未得到充分的实证研究。本文以2003—2016年沪深A股上市公司为初始样本,基于PSM的研究设计,实证发现董事高管责任保险的引入,显著提高了企业的创新产出和创新效率,从而符合激励效应假说。Heckman两阶段法等一系列检验结果也表明了该结论的稳健性。机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险的引入,主要是通过风险承担渠道和管理效率渠道来影响企业创新。在考虑了制度环境的调节效应后,进一步的研究发现,当投资者保护程度较高、公司面临被诉风险较大时,董事高管责任保险的激励效果和对企业创新的促进作用更加显著。本研究提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响企业创新的证据,表明董事高管责任保险在中国资本市场中仍然是一种较为有效的公司治理机制。
As an important corporate governance mechanism,Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance) directly affects the incentive constraints and risk preference of management.However,whether D&O Insurance affects corporate innovation has not been fully studied.Based on the PSM research design,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2016 as the initial sample,and finds that the D&O Insurance significantly improves the innovation output and innovation efficiency,thus conforming to the incentive effect hypothesis.A series of test results such as that of the Heckman two-stage method show the robustness of the conclusion.The mechanism analysis shows that the D&O Insurance mainly affects corporate innovation through the risk-taking channel and the management efficiency channel.After considering the moderating effect of institutional environment,it is further found that the incentive effect of D&O Insurance is more significant when the degree of investor protection is higher and the company faces greater risk of being sued.This study not only provides evidence that insurance contracts influence corporate innovation through corporate governance channels,but also indicates that D&O Insurance is a more effective corporate governance mechanism in China's capital market.
As an important corporate governance mechanism,Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance) directly affects the incentive constraints and risk preference of management.However,whether D&O Insurance affects corporate innovation has not been fully studied.Based on the PSM research design,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2016 as the initial sample,and finds that the D&O Insurance significantly improves the innovation output and innovation efficiency,thus conforming to the incentive effect hypothesis.A series of test results such as that of the Heckman two-stage method show the robustness of the conclusion.The mechanism analysis shows that the D&O Insurance mainly affects corporate innovation through the risk-taking channel and the management efficiency channel.After considering the moderating effect of institutional environment,it is further found that the incentive effect of D&O Insurance is more significant when the degree of investor protection is higher and the company faces greater risk of being sued.This study not only provides evidence that insurance contracts influence corporate innovation through corporate governance channels,but also indicates that D&O Insurance is a more effective corporate governance mechanism in China's capital market.
引文
1.胡国柳和胡珺,董事高管责任保险与企业风险承担:理论路径与经验证据,会计研究,2017年第5期,32-38。
2.黎文靖和郑曼妮,实质性创新还是策略性创新?--宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响,经济研究,2016年第4期,60-73。
3.凌士显和白锐锋,董事高管责任保险的公司治理作用--基于双重代理成本的视角,财贸经济,2017年第12期,95-110。
4.凌士显和白锐锋,董事责任保险、董事会治理与企业创新,科技进步与对策,2018年第10期,100-106。
5.潘锡泉,存款保险与商业银行风险承担:理论假设与实证检验,金融监管研究,2018年第4期,87-100。
6.权小锋和尹洪英,中国式卖空机制与公司创新--基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验,管理世界,2017年第1期,128-144。
7.余明桂、钟慧洁和范蕊,业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?,经济研究,2016年第12期,104-117。
8.袁蓉丽、文雯和谢志华,董事高管责任保险和财务报表重述,会计研究,2018年第5期,21-27。
9.张敏、童丽静和许浩然,社会网络与企业风险承担--基于我国上市公司的经验证据,管理世界,2015年第11期,161-175。
10.赵杨和Hu J.,董事及高管责任保险:激励还是自利?--基于中国上市公司的实证检验,中国软科学,2014年第9期,147-164。
11.郑志刚等,公司章程条款的设立、法律对投资者权力保护和公司治理--基于我国A股上市公司的证据,管理世界,2011年第7期,141-153。
12.钟腾,金融发展如何支持企业创新:研究综述和展望,金融监管研究,2019年第4期,62-76。
13.Balsmeier,B.,L.Fleming,and G.Manso,Independent Boards and Innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2017,Vol.123,536-557.
14.Baranchuk,N.,R.Kieschnick,and R.Moussawi,Motivating innovation in newly public firms,Journal of Financial Economics,2014,Vol.111,578-588.
15.Chalmers,J.M.R.,L.Y.Dann,and J.Harford,Managerial Opportunism?Evidence from Directors'and Officers'Insurance Purchases,The Journal of Finance,2002,Vol.57,609-636.
16.Chang,X.,K.Fu,A.Low,and W.Zhang,Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2015,Vol.115,168-188.
17.Chen,Z.,O.Z.Li,and H.Zou,Directors'and officers'liability insurance and the cost of equity,Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,Vol.61,100-120.
18.Core,J.E,On the Corporate Demand for Directors'and Officers'Insurance,Journal of Risk&Insurance,1997,Vol.64,63-87.
19.Jiatao,L.I.,and Y.I.Tang,CEO Hubris And Firm Risk Taking In China:The Moderating Role Of Managerial Discretion,Academy of Management Journal,2010,Vol.53,45-68.
20.Lin,C.,M.S.Officer,R.Wang,and H.Zou,Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance and Loan Spreads,Journal of Financial Economics,2013,Vol.110,37-60.
21.Lin,C.,M.S.Officer,and H.Zou,Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes,Journal of Financial Economics,2011,Vol.102,507-525.
22.Sunder,J.,S.V.Sunder,and J.Zhang,Pilot CEOs and Corporate Innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2016,Vol.123,209-224.
23.Zou,H.,S.Wong,C.Shum,J.Xiong,and J.Yan,Controlling-minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance:Evidence from China,Journal of Banking&Finance,2008,Vol.32,2636-2645.
2.黎文靖和郑曼妮,实质性创新还是策略性创新?--宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响,经济研究,2016年第4期,60-73。
3.凌士显和白锐锋,董事高管责任保险的公司治理作用--基于双重代理成本的视角,财贸经济,2017年第12期,95-110。
4.凌士显和白锐锋,董事责任保险、董事会治理与企业创新,科技进步与对策,2018年第10期,100-106。
5.潘锡泉,存款保险与商业银行风险承担:理论假设与实证检验,金融监管研究,2018年第4期,87-100。
6.权小锋和尹洪英,中国式卖空机制与公司创新--基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验,管理世界,2017年第1期,128-144。
7.余明桂、钟慧洁和范蕊,业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?,经济研究,2016年第12期,104-117。
8.袁蓉丽、文雯和谢志华,董事高管责任保险和财务报表重述,会计研究,2018年第5期,21-27。
9.张敏、童丽静和许浩然,社会网络与企业风险承担--基于我国上市公司的经验证据,管理世界,2015年第11期,161-175。
10.赵杨和Hu J.,董事及高管责任保险:激励还是自利?--基于中国上市公司的实证检验,中国软科学,2014年第9期,147-164。
11.郑志刚等,公司章程条款的设立、法律对投资者权力保护和公司治理--基于我国A股上市公司的证据,管理世界,2011年第7期,141-153。
12.钟腾,金融发展如何支持企业创新:研究综述和展望,金融监管研究,2019年第4期,62-76。
13.Balsmeier,B.,L.Fleming,and G.Manso,Independent Boards and Innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2017,Vol.123,536-557.
14.Baranchuk,N.,R.Kieschnick,and R.Moussawi,Motivating innovation in newly public firms,Journal of Financial Economics,2014,Vol.111,578-588.
15.Chalmers,J.M.R.,L.Y.Dann,and J.Harford,Managerial Opportunism?Evidence from Directors'and Officers'Insurance Purchases,The Journal of Finance,2002,Vol.57,609-636.
16.Chang,X.,K.Fu,A.Low,and W.Zhang,Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2015,Vol.115,168-188.
17.Chen,Z.,O.Z.Li,and H.Zou,Directors'and officers'liability insurance and the cost of equity,Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,Vol.61,100-120.
18.Core,J.E,On the Corporate Demand for Directors'and Officers'Insurance,Journal of Risk&Insurance,1997,Vol.64,63-87.
19.Jiatao,L.I.,and Y.I.Tang,CEO Hubris And Firm Risk Taking In China:The Moderating Role Of Managerial Discretion,Academy of Management Journal,2010,Vol.53,45-68.
20.Lin,C.,M.S.Officer,R.Wang,and H.Zou,Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance and Loan Spreads,Journal of Financial Economics,2013,Vol.110,37-60.
21.Lin,C.,M.S.Officer,and H.Zou,Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes,Journal of Financial Economics,2011,Vol.102,507-525.
22.Sunder,J.,S.V.Sunder,and J.Zhang,Pilot CEOs and Corporate Innovation,Journal of Financial Economics,2016,Vol.123,209-224.
23.Zou,H.,S.Wong,C.Shum,J.Xiong,and J.Yan,Controlling-minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance:Evidence from China,Journal of Banking&Finance,2008,Vol.32,2636-2645.
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