人类命运共同体原则下的全球气候博弈分析
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摘要
国际气候谈判目前已经进行超过20年,随着国际政治体系、经济体系的不断变化,各国之间围绕气候问题的博弈也在不断进行。本文从"人类命运共同体"思想出发,以全球环境谈判模型(IEAs)为基础,引入国家的"社会偏好"这一概念,从利己效用、公平效用和效率效用三个维度建立国家效用函数,从博弈论角度对国家的减排行为进行讨论与分析。研究结论显示:国家的社会偏好对国际气候合作有着显著影响,利己效用对合作减排产生不利影响,公平效用对合作减排的影响存在不确定性,而效率效用对合作减排产生有利影响,参与减排的国家数量越多越有利于提升减排水平。另外,惩罚机制的存在可以有效遏制搭便车及偷懒行为,进而促进合作减排。最后,本文结合目前国际气候博弈格局分析中国的定位,对我国如何参与国际气候谈判和制定能源经济政策提出对策和建议。
International climate negotiations have been going on for more than 20 years. With the changes of international politics and economic systems,the game between countries on climate issues is continuing. This paper starts with the idea of "A human community of common destiny"and bases on the International Environment Agreement Model( IEAs),introduces the concept of"national social preferences",uses self-interest utility,fair utility and efficiency utility to establish the national utility function. The national emission reduction behavior is discussed and analyzed from the perspective of game theory. The conclusion reveals that the country's social preferences indeed have a significant impact on international climate cooperation. The effect of self-interest utility and efficiency utility has an adverse impact on cooperation and emission reduction. The effect of fair utility is uncertain,but the effect of efficiency utility is active. The more countries participate in emission reduction,the more benefit it is. In addition,the existence of a punishment mechanism can effectively curb free riders and lazy behavior. Finally,this paper analyzes China's positioning based on the current pattern of international climate game,and puts forward some suggestions for China to participate in international climate negotiations and formulate energy economic policies.
International climate negotiations have been going on for more than 20 years. With the changes of international politics and economic systems,the game between countries on climate issues is continuing. This paper starts with the idea of "A human community of common destiny"and bases on the International Environment Agreement Model( IEAs),introduces the concept of"national social preferences",uses self-interest utility,fair utility and efficiency utility to establish the national utility function. The national emission reduction behavior is discussed and analyzed from the perspective of game theory. The conclusion reveals that the country's social preferences indeed have a significant impact on international climate cooperation. The effect of self-interest utility and efficiency utility has an adverse impact on cooperation and emission reduction. The effect of fair utility is uncertain,but the effect of efficiency utility is active. The more countries participate in emission reduction,the more benefit it is. In addition,the existence of a punishment mechanism can effectively curb free riders and lazy behavior. Finally,this paper analyzes China's positioning based on the current pattern of international climate game,and puts forward some suggestions for China to participate in international climate negotiations and formulate energy economic policies.
引文
[1]薄燕:《国际谈判与国内政治:对美国与〈京都议定书〉的双层博弈分析》,复旦大学2003年。
[2]陈刚:《〈京都议定书〉与集体行动逻辑》,《国际政治科学》2006年第2期。
[3]陈洪波、蒋天文:《温室气体减排的国际政治博弈》,《世界经济与政治》2005年第10期。
[4]胡鞍钢、管清友:《中国应对全球气候变化的四大可行性》,《清华大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2008年第6期。
[5]荆克迪、安虎森、田柳:《国际碳减排合作的博弈论分析》,《西南民族大学学报》(人文社会科学版)2014年第6期。
[6]纪玉山、赵洪亮:《维护中国发展权视角下的国际碳博弈——兼议经济增长与气候变化问题之争》,《社会科学辑刊》2011第6期。
[7]倪娟:《气候俱乐部:国际气候合作的新思路》,《国外社会科学》2016年第3期。
[8]彭水军、张文城:《国际碳减排合作公平性问题研究》,《厦门大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2012年第1期。
[9]秦天宝:《扬弃“技术理性”回归伦理谈判——科技知识背景下全球气候谈判法律模式之展望》,《中国地质大学学报》(社会科学版)2012年第2期。
[10]谢富胜、程瀚、李安:《全球气候治理的政治经济学分析》,《中国社会科学》2014年第11期。
[11]余光英、祁春节:《国际碳减排利益格局:合作及其博弈机制分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》2010年第5期。
[12]杨昊:《全球公共物品分类:外交决策的视角》,《世界经济与政治》2015年第4期。
[13]Andreoni J. Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,Economic Journal,1990,100(401):464-477.
[14]Bernard A,Haurie A,Vielle M,et al. A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia,China,and Annex B countries,Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2008,32(6):1830-1856.
[15]Barrett S. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements,Oxford Economic Papers,1994,46(46):878-894.
[16]Bergstrom T C,Blume L,Varian H. Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods:An improved proof,Journal of Public Economics,1992,49(3):391-392.
[17]Charness G,Rabin M. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117(3):817-869.
[18]Charness G,Yang C L. Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2014,102(2):119-132.
[19]Fehr E,Fischbacher U. Why social preferences matter-The impact of non-selfish motives on competition,cooperation and incentives,Economic Journal,2002,112(478):C1-C33.
[20]Finus M,Finus M. Game theory and international environmental cooperation,Edward Elgar,2001:503-510.
[21]Helm D,Hepburn C,Ruta G. Trade,climate change,and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2012,28(28):368-394.
[2]陈刚:《〈京都议定书〉与集体行动逻辑》,《国际政治科学》2006年第2期。
[3]陈洪波、蒋天文:《温室气体减排的国际政治博弈》,《世界经济与政治》2005年第10期。
[4]胡鞍钢、管清友:《中国应对全球气候变化的四大可行性》,《清华大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2008年第6期。
[5]荆克迪、安虎森、田柳:《国际碳减排合作的博弈论分析》,《西南民族大学学报》(人文社会科学版)2014年第6期。
[6]纪玉山、赵洪亮:《维护中国发展权视角下的国际碳博弈——兼议经济增长与气候变化问题之争》,《社会科学辑刊》2011第6期。
[7]倪娟:《气候俱乐部:国际气候合作的新思路》,《国外社会科学》2016年第3期。
[8]彭水军、张文城:《国际碳减排合作公平性问题研究》,《厦门大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2012年第1期。
[9]秦天宝:《扬弃“技术理性”回归伦理谈判——科技知识背景下全球气候谈判法律模式之展望》,《中国地质大学学报》(社会科学版)2012年第2期。
[10]谢富胜、程瀚、李安:《全球气候治理的政治经济学分析》,《中国社会科学》2014年第11期。
[11]余光英、祁春节:《国际碳减排利益格局:合作及其博弈机制分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》2010年第5期。
[12]杨昊:《全球公共物品分类:外交决策的视角》,《世界经济与政治》2015年第4期。
[13]Andreoni J. Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods:A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,Economic Journal,1990,100(401):464-477.
[14]Bernard A,Haurie A,Vielle M,et al. A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia,China,and Annex B countries,Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2008,32(6):1830-1856.
[15]Barrett S. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements,Oxford Economic Papers,1994,46(46):878-894.
[16]Bergstrom T C,Blume L,Varian H. Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods:An improved proof,Journal of Public Economics,1992,49(3):391-392.
[17]Charness G,Rabin M. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117(3):817-869.
[18]Charness G,Yang C L. Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2014,102(2):119-132.
[19]Fehr E,Fischbacher U. Why social preferences matter-The impact of non-selfish motives on competition,cooperation and incentives,Economic Journal,2002,112(478):C1-C33.
[20]Finus M,Finus M. Game theory and international environmental cooperation,Edward Elgar,2001:503-510.
[21]Helm D,Hepburn C,Ruta G. Trade,climate change,and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2012,28(28):368-394.
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