全国统一碳排放交易市场对火电企业的经济影响分析
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摘要
火电企业作为首先被纳入全国统一碳排放交易市场的碳排放大户,生产经营必然会受到统一碳排放交易市场机制的影响。研究利用古诺多寡头垄断博弈模型,求解引进统一碳排放交易市场前后企业利润的最优均衡解。应用情景分析法量化五种情景下火电企业的利润变化率,以碳市场价格和免费配额分配比例为敏感性因素进行分析。借鉴前期试点地区的碳市场价格和免费配额比例,模拟全国碳交易。结果显示:当全国统一的碳排放交易市场运行后,火电企业的短期经济效益基本不受影响,但相较于碳市场价格的高低波动,免费碳配额比例的变动对火电企业的经济效益影响更大。
As a carbon emission company that was first included in the national unified carbon emissions trading market,thermal power enterprises will inevitably be affected by the unified carbon trading market mechanism. The study uses the Cournot oligopoly game model to solve the optimal equilibrium solution of corporate profits before and after the introduction of the unified carbon emissions trading market. The scenario analysis method is used to quantify the profit change rate of thermal power enterprises under five scenarios,and the sensitivity is analyzed by the carbon market price and the free quota allocation ratio. Drawing on the carbon market price and free quota ratio in the pilot areas in the previous period,the national carbon trading was simulated,and the short-term economic benefits of thermal power enterprises were basically not affected after the national unified carbon trading market was operated. However,compared with the high and low fluctuations in the carbon market price,the change in the proportion of free carbon allowances has a greater impact on the economic benefits of thermal power companies.
As a carbon emission company that was first included in the national unified carbon emissions trading market,thermal power enterprises will inevitably be affected by the unified carbon trading market mechanism. The study uses the Cournot oligopoly game model to solve the optimal equilibrium solution of corporate profits before and after the introduction of the unified carbon emissions trading market. The scenario analysis method is used to quantify the profit change rate of thermal power enterprises under five scenarios,and the sensitivity is analyzed by the carbon market price and the free quota allocation ratio. Drawing on the carbon market price and free quota ratio in the pilot areas in the previous period,the national carbon trading was simulated,and the short-term economic benefits of thermal power enterprises were basically not affected after the national unified carbon trading market was operated. However,compared with the high and low fluctuations in the carbon market price,the change in the proportion of free carbon allowances has a greater impact on the economic benefits of thermal power companies.
引文
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[12]曾悦.碳期货定价方法及价格预测技术综述[J].新型工业化,2017,7(2):81-88.
[13]王琛.碳配额约束对企业竞争力的影响[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(1):47-55.
[14]王芹鹏,赵道致.竞争市场中生产与碳交易策略[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2016,18(1):54-61.
[15]叶飞,令狐大智.双寡头竞争环境下的碳配额分配策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(12):3038-3046.
[16]陈甬军,左源.工业和居民电力用户需求价格弹性和交叉补贴研究[J].中国物价,2018(7):56-59.
[17]周然,银河证券.电力行业深度报告:火电行业四季度或将面临较大压力[EB/OL].(2018-09-06)[2018-10-18]. http://news. bjx. com. cn/mnews/20180906/926065. shtml.
[2] MARKUS AHMAN L Z. Options for Emission Allowance Allocation under the Emissions Trading Directive[J].Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change,2005(10):597-645.
[3] LARS ZETTERBERG M W K T. Short-run Allocation of Emissions Allowances and Long-term Goals for Climate Policy[J]. Ambio,2012(41):23-32.
[4]操群.碳配额、碳排放交易对短期企业价值影响分析——基于我国碳交易试点省市不同标准的比较[J].研究与创新,2015(16):33-35.
[5]王文军,骆跃军,谢鹏程,等.粤深碳交易试点机制剖析及对国家碳市场建设的启示[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(12):55-62.
[6]李凯杰,曲如晓.碳排放配额初始分配的经济效应及启示[J].国际经济合作,2012(3):21-24.
[7] MICHAEL H,SEBASTIAN V,ANDREAS L. Designing an Emissions Trading Scheme for China—an up-todate Climate Policy Assessment[J]. Energy Policy,2014(75):57-72.
[8] TAN X P,Wang X Y. Dependence Changes between the Carbon Price and Its Fundamentals:A Quantile Regression Approach[J]. Applied Energy,2017(190):306-325.
[9]齐绍洲,赵鑫,谭秀杰.基于EEMD模型的中国碳市场价格形成机制研究[J].武汉大学学报,2015,68(4):56-65.
[10] FAN Y,JIA J J,WANG X,et al. What Policy Adjustments in the EU ETS Truly Affected the Carbon Prices?[J]. Energy Policy,2017(103):145-164.
[11] WANG B,JOTZO F,QI S. Ex-post Cap Adjustment for China’s ETS:An Applicable Indexation Rule,Simulating the Hubei ETS,and Implications for a National Scheme[J]. Climate Policy,2018,18(2):258-273.
[12]曾悦.碳期货定价方法及价格预测技术综述[J].新型工业化,2017,7(2):81-88.
[13]王琛.碳配额约束对企业竞争力的影响[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(1):47-55.
[14]王芹鹏,赵道致.竞争市场中生产与碳交易策略[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2016,18(1):54-61.
[15]叶飞,令狐大智.双寡头竞争环境下的碳配额分配策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(12):3038-3046.
[16]陈甬军,左源.工业和居民电力用户需求价格弹性和交叉补贴研究[J].中国物价,2018(7):56-59.
[17]周然,银河证券.电力行业深度报告:火电行业四季度或将面临较大压力[EB/OL].(2018-09-06)[2018-10-18]. http://news. bjx. com. cn/mnews/20180906/926065. shtml.
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