央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈分析——基于财政分权视角
|
摘要
生态环境是人类社会经济发展过程中的重要组成部分,然而由于粗放的经济发展模式,生态系统退化严重,影响人类幸福感和可持续发展。中央政府和地方政府是生态环境的主要治理主体,因此研究两类群体在生态治理过程中的行为互动机制具有较强的现实意义。基于财政分权的背景,从微观主体的收益函数出发,构建央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈模型,探究两类主体的行为特征及其影响因素。根据复制动态方程分析参与主体的演化规律,采用MATLAB仿真工具分析不同情形下演化均衡状态及收敛趋势。研究结果表明,中央政府与地方政府在一定程度上都是"理性经济人",系统稳定均衡策略取决于地方政府"严格执行"生态治理的净收益和中央政府"严格监管"的净收益,其中关键指标包括:地方政府生态治理执行力度和成本、政绩考核体系中生态指标和经济指标的权重系数、中央政府的监管成本、监管力度和惩罚金额。据此提出"财政分权同时创新地方政绩考核机制、发展比较优势、拓宽监管渠道"等对策建议,引导央地两级政府共同促进生态治理工作有效实施。
Ecological environment is important, but degrades seriously, and the extensive mode of economic development can affect human well-being and sustainable development. It is highly significant to study the interaction mechanisms between the central and local governments because they are the main governing bodies of the ecological environment rehabilitation. Based on the background of fiscal decentralization, we constructed an evolutionary game model between the central and local governments, using the profit function to explore their behavioral characteristics as well as influencing factors. According to the replicator of dynamic equation, this study analyzes the behavior evolution laws of participants and uses the MATLAB simulation tools to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies of the two groups and their convergence trend under different situations. Our results show that the central and local governments represent "economic men" to a certain extent. The stable equilibrium point depends on the net income of local government when they choice the strategy of "strictly implement", and the net income of central government when they choice the strategy of "strictly regulation". The key indicators include the implementation degree, costs, ecological and economic indicators′ weight coefficient of the local government′s ecological rehabilitation, as well as the central government′s regulatory supervision, costs, punishment, and other factors. The above analysis puts forward the countermeasures, such as fiscal decentralization during the innovation of the local performance evaluation mechanism, following comparative development advantages, and widening of the regulatory channels of the central and local governments to guide the improvement of the efficiency of ecological rehabilitation.
Ecological environment is important, but degrades seriously, and the extensive mode of economic development can affect human well-being and sustainable development. It is highly significant to study the interaction mechanisms between the central and local governments because they are the main governing bodies of the ecological environment rehabilitation. Based on the background of fiscal decentralization, we constructed an evolutionary game model between the central and local governments, using the profit function to explore their behavioral characteristics as well as influencing factors. According to the replicator of dynamic equation, this study analyzes the behavior evolution laws of participants and uses the MATLAB simulation tools to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies of the two groups and their convergence trend under different situations. Our results show that the central and local governments represent "economic men" to a certain extent. The stable equilibrium point depends on the net income of local government when they choice the strategy of "strictly implement", and the net income of central government when they choice the strategy of "strictly regulation". The key indicators include the implementation degree, costs, ecological and economic indicators′ weight coefficient of the local government′s ecological rehabilitation, as well as the central government′s regulatory supervision, costs, punishment, and other factors. The above analysis puts forward the countermeasures, such as fiscal decentralization during the innovation of the local performance evaluation mechanism, following comparative development advantages, and widening of the regulatory channels of the central and local governments to guide the improvement of the efficiency of ecological rehabilitation.
引文
[1] United Nations Environment Programme. UNEP Year Book 2014: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment. Nairobi:UNDP,2014.
[2] 甄霖, 王继军, 姜志德, 刘孝盈, 张长印, 马建霞, 肖玉, 谢永生, 谢高地. 生态技术评价方法及全球生态治理技术研究. 生态学报, 2016,36(22): 7152- 7157.
[3] 李晓西, 赵峥, 李卫锋. 完善国家生态治理体系和治理能力现代化的四大关系——基于实地调研及微观数据的分析. 管理世界, 2015, 31(5): 1- 5.
[4] 张文彬, 李国平. 国家重点生态功能区转移支付动态激励效应分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2015, 25(10): 125- 131.
[5] 赵其国, 黄国勤, 马艳芹. 中国生态环境状况与生态文明建设. 生态学报, 2016, 36(19): 6328- 6335.
[6] 刘家根, 黄璐, 严力蛟. 生态系统服务对人类福祉的影响——以浙江省桐庐县为例. 生态学报, 2018, 38(5): 1687- 1697.
[7] 姜珂, 游达明. 基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2016, 26(9): 139- 148.
[8] 左翔, 李明. 环境污染与居民政治态度. 经济学, 2016, 15(4): 1409- 1438.
[9] 陈诗一, 陈登科. 雾霾污染、政府治理与经济高质量发展. 经济研究, 2018, 53(2): 20- 34.
[10] 缪小林, 王婷, 高跃光. 转移支付对城乡公共服务差距的影响——不同经济赶超省份的分组比较. 经济研究, 2017, 52(2): 52- 66.
[11] 尹振东, 汤玉刚. 专项转移支付与地方财政支出行为——以农村义务教育补助为例. 经济研究, 2016, 51(4): 47- 59.
[12] 蔡嘉瑶, 张建华. 财政分权与环境治理——基于“省直管县”财政改革的准自然实验研究. 经济学动态, 2018, 59(1): 53- 68.
[13] Paudyal K, Baral H, Keenan R J. Assessing social values of ecosystem services in the Phewa Lake Watershed, Nepal. Forest Policy and Economics, 2018, 90: 67- 81.
[14] Costanza R, De Groot R, Sutton P, Van Der Ploeg S, Anderson S J, Kubiszewski I, Farber S, Turner R K. Changes in the global value of ecosystem services. Global Environmental Change, 2014, 26: 152- 158.
[15] Mehring M, Ott E, Hummel D. Ecosystem services supply and demand assessment: why social-ecological dynamics matter. Ecosystem Services, 2018, 30: 124- 125.
[16] 苑清敏, 张枭, 李健. 京津冀协同发展背景下合作生态补偿量化研究. 干旱区资源与环境, 2017, 31(8): 50- 55.
[17] 许玲燕, 杜建国, 汪文丽. 农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2017, 27(5): 17- 26.
[18] Diswandi D. A hybrid Coasean and Pigouvian approach to Payment for Ecosystem Services Program in West Lombok: does it contribute to poverty alleviation? Ecosystem Services, 2017, 23: 138- 145.
[19] Juutinen A, Ahtikoski A, Lehtonen M, M?kip?? R, Ollikainen M. The impact of a short-term carbon payment scheme on forest management. Forest Policy and Economics, 2018, 90: 115- 127.
[20] 潘峰, 西宝, 王琳. 基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(6): 1393- 1404.
[21] 王广成, 曹飞飞. 基于演化博弈的煤炭矿区生态修复管理机制研究. 生态学报, 2017, 37(12): 4198- 4207.
[22] Li F, Pan B, Wu Y Z, Shan L P. Application of game model for stakeholder management in construction of ecological corridors: a case study on Yangtze River Basin in China. Habitat International, 2017, 63: 113- 121.
[23] 初钊鹏, 刘昌新, 朱婧. 基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2017, 27(9): 56- 65.
[24] Liu Z Y, Kontoleon A. Meta-analysis of livelihood impacts of payments for environmental services programmes in developing countries. Ecological Economics, 2018, 149: 48- 61.
[25] 陈建宝, 乔宁宁. 地方利益主体博弈下的资源禀赋与公共品供给. 经济学, 2016, 15(2): 693- 722.
[26] Sheng J C, Wu Y, Zhang M Y, Miao Z. An evolutionary modeling approach for designing a contractual REDD+ payment scheme. Ecological Indicators, 2017, 79: 276- 285.
[27] 周伟铎, 庄贵阳, 关大博. 雾霾协同治理的成本分担研究进展及展望. 生态经济, 2018, 34(3): 147- 155.
[28] 彭皓玥. 公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析. 科技进步与对策, 2016, 33(7): 42- 47.
[29] Pargal S, Wheeler D. Informal regulation of industrial pollution in developing countries: evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 104(6): 1314- 1327.
[30] Aerts W, Cormier D. Media legitimacy and corporate environmental communication. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2009, 34(1): 1- 27.
[31] 陈真玲, 王文举. 环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析. 管理评论, 2017, 29(5): 226- 236.
[32] Mitchell W C. Bureaucracy and representative government. By William A. Niskanen Jr. (Chicago & New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971. Pp. 241. $7.75.). American Political Science Association, 1971, 68(4): 1775- 1777.
[33] 郑洁, 付才辉, 张彩虹. 财政分权与环境污染——基于新结构经济学视角. 财政研究, 2018,39 (3): 57- 70.
[2] 甄霖, 王继军, 姜志德, 刘孝盈, 张长印, 马建霞, 肖玉, 谢永生, 谢高地. 生态技术评价方法及全球生态治理技术研究. 生态学报, 2016,36(22): 7152- 7157.
[3] 李晓西, 赵峥, 李卫锋. 完善国家生态治理体系和治理能力现代化的四大关系——基于实地调研及微观数据的分析. 管理世界, 2015, 31(5): 1- 5.
[4] 张文彬, 李国平. 国家重点生态功能区转移支付动态激励效应分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2015, 25(10): 125- 131.
[5] 赵其国, 黄国勤, 马艳芹. 中国生态环境状况与生态文明建设. 生态学报, 2016, 36(19): 6328- 6335.
[6] 刘家根, 黄璐, 严力蛟. 生态系统服务对人类福祉的影响——以浙江省桐庐县为例. 生态学报, 2018, 38(5): 1687- 1697.
[7] 姜珂, 游达明. 基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2016, 26(9): 139- 148.
[8] 左翔, 李明. 环境污染与居民政治态度. 经济学, 2016, 15(4): 1409- 1438.
[9] 陈诗一, 陈登科. 雾霾污染、政府治理与经济高质量发展. 经济研究, 2018, 53(2): 20- 34.
[10] 缪小林, 王婷, 高跃光. 转移支付对城乡公共服务差距的影响——不同经济赶超省份的分组比较. 经济研究, 2017, 52(2): 52- 66.
[11] 尹振东, 汤玉刚. 专项转移支付与地方财政支出行为——以农村义务教育补助为例. 经济研究, 2016, 51(4): 47- 59.
[12] 蔡嘉瑶, 张建华. 财政分权与环境治理——基于“省直管县”财政改革的准自然实验研究. 经济学动态, 2018, 59(1): 53- 68.
[13] Paudyal K, Baral H, Keenan R J. Assessing social values of ecosystem services in the Phewa Lake Watershed, Nepal. Forest Policy and Economics, 2018, 90: 67- 81.
[14] Costanza R, De Groot R, Sutton P, Van Der Ploeg S, Anderson S J, Kubiszewski I, Farber S, Turner R K. Changes in the global value of ecosystem services. Global Environmental Change, 2014, 26: 152- 158.
[15] Mehring M, Ott E, Hummel D. Ecosystem services supply and demand assessment: why social-ecological dynamics matter. Ecosystem Services, 2018, 30: 124- 125.
[16] 苑清敏, 张枭, 李健. 京津冀协同发展背景下合作生态补偿量化研究. 干旱区资源与环境, 2017, 31(8): 50- 55.
[17] 许玲燕, 杜建国, 汪文丽. 农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2017, 27(5): 17- 26.
[18] Diswandi D. A hybrid Coasean and Pigouvian approach to Payment for Ecosystem Services Program in West Lombok: does it contribute to poverty alleviation? Ecosystem Services, 2017, 23: 138- 145.
[19] Juutinen A, Ahtikoski A, Lehtonen M, M?kip?? R, Ollikainen M. The impact of a short-term carbon payment scheme on forest management. Forest Policy and Economics, 2018, 90: 115- 127.
[20] 潘峰, 西宝, 王琳. 基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(6): 1393- 1404.
[21] 王广成, 曹飞飞. 基于演化博弈的煤炭矿区生态修复管理机制研究. 生态学报, 2017, 37(12): 4198- 4207.
[22] Li F, Pan B, Wu Y Z, Shan L P. Application of game model for stakeholder management in construction of ecological corridors: a case study on Yangtze River Basin in China. Habitat International, 2017, 63: 113- 121.
[23] 初钊鹏, 刘昌新, 朱婧. 基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2017, 27(9): 56- 65.
[24] Liu Z Y, Kontoleon A. Meta-analysis of livelihood impacts of payments for environmental services programmes in developing countries. Ecological Economics, 2018, 149: 48- 61.
[25] 陈建宝, 乔宁宁. 地方利益主体博弈下的资源禀赋与公共品供给. 经济学, 2016, 15(2): 693- 722.
[26] Sheng J C, Wu Y, Zhang M Y, Miao Z. An evolutionary modeling approach for designing a contractual REDD+ payment scheme. Ecological Indicators, 2017, 79: 276- 285.
[27] 周伟铎, 庄贵阳, 关大博. 雾霾协同治理的成本分担研究进展及展望. 生态经济, 2018, 34(3): 147- 155.
[28] 彭皓玥. 公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析. 科技进步与对策, 2016, 33(7): 42- 47.
[29] Pargal S, Wheeler D. Informal regulation of industrial pollution in developing countries: evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 104(6): 1314- 1327.
[30] Aerts W, Cormier D. Media legitimacy and corporate environmental communication. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2009, 34(1): 1- 27.
[31] 陈真玲, 王文举. 环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析. 管理评论, 2017, 29(5): 226- 236.
[32] Mitchell W C. Bureaucracy and representative government. By William A. Niskanen Jr. (Chicago & New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971. Pp. 241. $7.75.). American Political Science Association, 1971, 68(4): 1775- 1777.
[33] 郑洁, 付才辉, 张彩虹. 财政分权与环境污染——基于新结构经济学视角. 财政研究, 2018,39 (3): 57- 70.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |