环境规制对企业环境治理行为的影响——基于新《环保法》的准自然实验
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摘要
基于2015年正式实施的新《环保法》这一准自然实验,采用双重差分与倾向得分匹配法,分别从合规动机与竞争优势动机层面考察了环境规制对企业环境治理行为的影响。研究表明,新《环保法》实施并未提高企业环保投资的积极性,反而导致企业缩减生产规模。进行动态效应分析发现,新《环保法》实施对企业环保投资的影响始终不明显,但在实施初期对企业生产规模产生显著负向影响。主要原因在于,新《环保法》实施给企业带来的环境治理压力过大,而资源支持不足。截面异质性分析发现,上述结果并未因企业经营绩效好坏而产生差异,且主要体现在东部地区企业。本文拓展与丰富了企业环境治理行为的影响因素与环境规制经济后果的相关文献,为政府进一步完善环境政策提供有益启示。
The environmental pollution problem encountered in the socio-economic development has long been a focus of government of China.Enterprises as the main polluters of the environment should bear the responsibility of environmental governance.However, the costs of enterprise environmental investment often outweigh the benefits due to the attribute with public goods of the ecological environment, leading to lower willingness to participate in environmental governance.To address this concern, the New Environmental Protection Law(NEPL) has been implemented since 2015.It reinforces the punishment of polluting enterprises and the environmental supervision responsibilities of local officials, which brings enormous environmental governance pressure to them.Considering that the process of marketization in our country has not been completed and the legal system is to be perfected, it is important to examine whether the change of law has impact on the enterprise.However, there is little evidence about whether and how the NEPL influences environmental governance of enterprises due to lack of data.Based on the NEPL, this study examines the effect of environmental regulation on the environmental governance behavior of enterprises using the sample of A-share listed heavy polluting enterprises from 2010 to 2017 based on compliance motivation and competitive advantage motivation.The results show that the implementation of the NEPL has not encouraged enterprises to invest in environmental protection, but has led to lower production.The dynamic effect analysis indicates that the impact of the NEPL on environmental investment of enterprises is still not obvious, but the negative impact on the scale of production of enterprises is short-term.The main reason is that the implementation of the NEPL brings high levels of stress on environmental governance and insufficient financial support to enterprises.Cross-sectional analysis shows that the above results are mainly reflected in eastern region enterprises, and don't change according to the financial performance.This study contributes to the existing literature in several aspects.Firstly, it is rare to test the effectiveness of environmental regulation by using a quasi-natural experiment during China's economic transform period.Based on the implementation of the NEPL, this paper examines its impact on the environmental governance of enterprises which can alleviate the problem of endogeneity effectively.Secondly, we put the implementation of the NEPL and enterprise environmental governance behavior in an integrated analytical framework for the first time, expanding and enriching the enterprise environmental governance factors and environmental regulation economic consequences of the relevant literature.Thirdly, we analyze the impact of the implementation of the NEPL on environmental governance behavior of enterprises and internal mechanism based on compliance motivation and competitive advantage motivation, which is conducive to understanding the change of environmental governance behavior of enterprises and provides suggestions for further optimizing environmental policies.Based on the above findings, this study has several recommendations.Firstly, the pressure of enterprises environmental governance is too much and the financial support is also insufficient under the implementation of the NEPL, causing enterprises to reduce production scale.The regulators should consider increasing resources input when enhancing supervision, to improve the willingness of enterprises to participate in environmental governance, thus helping to promote high-quality sustainable development.Secondly, the effect of the implementation of the NEPL on environmental governance of enterprises can not be reached overnight, it needs technology, culture, staff and other aspects of long-term preparation for enterprises to achieve pollution reduction.Finally, enterprises in different regions have different responses to the implementation of the NEPL.It is essential to investigate comprehensively the characteristics of economic development level and resource endowment in different regions when the government further optimizes environmental policies.
The environmental pollution problem encountered in the socio-economic development has long been a focus of government of China.Enterprises as the main polluters of the environment should bear the responsibility of environmental governance.However, the costs of enterprise environmental investment often outweigh the benefits due to the attribute with public goods of the ecological environment, leading to lower willingness to participate in environmental governance.To address this concern, the New Environmental Protection Law(NEPL) has been implemented since 2015.It reinforces the punishment of polluting enterprises and the environmental supervision responsibilities of local officials, which brings enormous environmental governance pressure to them.Considering that the process of marketization in our country has not been completed and the legal system is to be perfected, it is important to examine whether the change of law has impact on the enterprise.However, there is little evidence about whether and how the NEPL influences environmental governance of enterprises due to lack of data.Based on the NEPL, this study examines the effect of environmental regulation on the environmental governance behavior of enterprises using the sample of A-share listed heavy polluting enterprises from 2010 to 2017 based on compliance motivation and competitive advantage motivation.The results show that the implementation of the NEPL has not encouraged enterprises to invest in environmental protection, but has led to lower production.The dynamic effect analysis indicates that the impact of the NEPL on environmental investment of enterprises is still not obvious, but the negative impact on the scale of production of enterprises is short-term.The main reason is that the implementation of the NEPL brings high levels of stress on environmental governance and insufficient financial support to enterprises.Cross-sectional analysis shows that the above results are mainly reflected in eastern region enterprises, and don't change according to the financial performance.This study contributes to the existing literature in several aspects.Firstly, it is rare to test the effectiveness of environmental regulation by using a quasi-natural experiment during China's economic transform period.Based on the implementation of the NEPL, this paper examines its impact on the environmental governance of enterprises which can alleviate the problem of endogeneity effectively.Secondly, we put the implementation of the NEPL and enterprise environmental governance behavior in an integrated analytical framework for the first time, expanding and enriching the enterprise environmental governance factors and environmental regulation economic consequences of the relevant literature.Thirdly, we analyze the impact of the implementation of the NEPL on environmental governance behavior of enterprises and internal mechanism based on compliance motivation and competitive advantage motivation, which is conducive to understanding the change of environmental governance behavior of enterprises and provides suggestions for further optimizing environmental policies.Based on the above findings, this study has several recommendations.Firstly, the pressure of enterprises environmental governance is too much and the financial support is also insufficient under the implementation of the NEPL, causing enterprises to reduce production scale.The regulators should consider increasing resources input when enhancing supervision, to improve the willingness of enterprises to participate in environmental governance, thus helping to promote high-quality sustainable development.Secondly, the effect of the implementation of the NEPL on environmental governance of enterprises can not be reached overnight, it needs technology, culture, staff and other aspects of long-term preparation for enterprises to achieve pollution reduction.Finally, enterprises in different regions have different responses to the implementation of the NEPL.It is essential to investigate comprehensively the characteristics of economic development level and resource endowment in different regions when the government further optimizes environmental policies.
引文
[1]王兵,戴敏,武文杰.环保基地政策提高了企业环境绩效吗?——来自东莞市企业微观面板数据的证据[J].北京:金融研究,2017,(4):143-160.
[2]沈洪涛,周艳坤.环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据[J].天津:南开管理评论,2017,(6):73-82.
[3]Chen,Z.,M.E.Kahn,Y.Liu,and Z.Wang.The Consequences of Spatially Differentiated Water Pollution Regulation in China[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2018,(88):468-485.
[4]Leiter,A.M.,A.Parolini,and H.Winner.Environmental Regulation and Investment:Evidence from European Industry Data[J].Ecological Economics,2011,70,(4):759-770.
[5]Luo,J.How Does Smog Affect Firm's Investment Behavior?A Natural Experiment Based on a Sudden Surge in the PM2.5 Index[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2017,(10):359-378.
[6]张彩云,吕越.绿色生产规制与企业研发创新——影响及机制研究[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(1):71-91.
[7]刘悦,周默涵.环境规制是否会妨碍企业竞争力:基于异质性企业的理论分析[J].北京:世界经济,2018,(4):150-167.
[8]Berman,E.,and L.T.M.Bui.Environmental Regulation and Productivity:Evidence from Oil Refineries[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,2001,83,(3):498-510.
[9]Liu,M.,R.Shadbegian,and B.Zhang.Does Environmental Regulation Affect Labor Demand in China?Evidence from the Textile Printing and Dyeing Industry[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2017,(86):277-294.
[10]余东华,孙婷.环境规制、技能溢价与制造业国际竞争力[J].北京:中国工业经济,2017,(5):35-53.
[11]盛丹,李蕾蕾.地区环境立法是否会促进企业出口[J].北京:世界经济,2018,(11):145-168.
[12]Shi,X.,and Z.Xu.Environmental Regulation and Firm Export:Evidence from the Eleventh Five-Year Plan in China[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2018,(89):187-200.
[13]王书斌,徐盈之.环境规制与雾霾脱钩效应——基于企业投资偏好的视角[J].北京:中国工业经济,2015,(4):18-30.
[14]Wu,H.,H.Guo,B.Zhang,and M.Bu.Westward Movement of New Polluting Firms in China:Pollution Reduction Mandates and Location Choice[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2017,45,(1):119-138.
[15]张彩云,盛斌,苏丹妮.环境规制、政绩考核与企业选址[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(11):21-38.
[16]唐国平,李龙会,吴德军.环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资[J].北京:会计研究,2013,(6):83-89.
[17]景维民,张璐.环境管制、对外开放与中国工业的绿色技术进步[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(9):34-47.
[18]姜英兵,崔广慧.环保产业政策对企业环保投资的影响:基于重污染上市公司的经验证据[J].重庆:改革,2019,(2):87-101.
[19]Gray,W.B.The Cost of Regulation:OSHA,EPA and the Productivity Slowdown[J].American Economic Review,1987,77,(5):998-1006.
[20]Palmer,K.,W.E.Oates,and P.R.Portney.Tightening Environmental Standards:The Benefit-cost or the No-cost Paradigm[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9,(4):119-132.
[21]Greenstone,M.The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity:Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures[J].Journal of Political Economy,2002,110,(6):1175-1219.
[22]Greenstone,M.,J.A.List,and C.Syverson.The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing[R].NBER Working Paper,2012.
[23]Porter,M.E.,and C.Linde.Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9,(4):97-118.
[24]Porter,M.E.America's Green Strategy[J].Scientific American,1991,264,(4):168.
[25]Jefferson,G.H.,S.Tanaka,and W.Yin.Environmental Regulation and Industrial Performance:Evidence from Unexpected Externalities in China[R].SSRN Working Paper,2013.
[26]韩立岩,蔡立新,尹力博.中国证券市场的绿色激励:一个四因素模型[J].北京:金融研究,2017,(1):145-161.
[27]Martin,P.R.,and D.V.Moser.Managers' Green Investment Disclosures and Investors' Reaction[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61,(1):239-254.
[28]李培功,沈艺峰.社会规范、资本市场与环境治理:基于机构投资者视角的经验证据[J].北京:世界经济,2011,(6):126-146.
[29]Chava,S.Environmental Externalities and Cost of Capital[J].Management Science,2014,60,(9):2223-2247.
[30]黎文靖,路晓燕.机构投资者关注企业的环境绩效吗?——来自我国重污染行业上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:金融研究,2015,(12):97-112.
[31]胡珺,宋献中,王红建.非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理[J].北京:管理世界,2017,(3):76-94,187-188.
[32]刘斌,张列柯.去产能粘性粘住了谁:国有企业还是非国有企业[J].天津:南开管理评论,2018,(4):109-121.
[33]Bertrand,M.,E.Duflo,and S.Mullainathan.How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119,(1):249-275.
[34]Topalova,P.Factor Immobility and Regional Impact of Trade Liberalization:Evidence on Poverty from India[J].American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,2010,2,(4):1-41.
[35]吴秋生,黄贤环.财务公司的职能配置与集团成员上市公司融资约束缓解[J].北京:中国工业经济,2017,(9):156-173.
[36]杨理强,陈少华,陈爱华.内部资本市场提升企业创新能力了吗?——作用机理与路径分析[J].北京:经济管理,2019,(4):175-192.
(1)例如,自2018年3月29日辉丰股份及子公司因涉环保问题接受环保部门开展专项督察的消息被曝光后,股价由3月初的每股5.35元下跌至最低2.36元。
(2)包括:B(采掘业)、C0(食品、饮料)、C1(纺织、服装、皮毛)、C3(造纸、印刷)、C4(石油、化学、塑胶、塑料)、C6(金属、非金属)、C8(医药、生物制品)、D(电力、煤气及水的生产与供应业)。
(3)包括:C2(木材、家具)、C5(电子)、C7(机械、设备、仪表)、C99(其他制造业)。
(4)之所以选择当期发生额是因为企业环保投资包括资产类与费用类支出,由于费用类支出需在期末结转,为了与费用类支出期间保持一致,资产类支出也选择当期发生额,故环保投资为当期发生额。
(5)之所以选择TQ作为模型(2)中成长性的衡量指标,是因为被解释变量用ln(本期营业收入/上期营业收入)衡量,此时继续采用营业收入增长率来衡量成长性容易产生多重共线性问题。
(6)为了更好地观察变化趋势,本文统计的是当期营业收入的自然对数随时间的变动。
(7)此外,本文还对被解释变量进行行业中位数调整,结果未发生变化,备索。
(8)在剔除产能过剩样本后,采用同样的方法对实验组配对,平衡性测试结果表明,匹配后实验组与控制组样本特征变量均无显著差异。由于篇幅所限,未予列示,备索。
(9)具体环境责任评分数据来源于和讯网。
(10)由于篇幅所限,本部分结果不予列示,备索。
(11)“十二五”规划末SO2实际减排率=(“十二五”规划末SO2实际排放量/“十一五”规划末SO2实际排放量)-1。
(12)通过手工搜集财务报表中与环保有关的政府补助汇总获得。
(13)此外,本文进一步将融资约束作为被解释变量,重新回归。借鉴已有研究(吴秋生和黄贤环,2017[35];杨理强等,2019[36]),采用SA指数衡量融资约束,SA=|-0.737×Size+0.043×Size2-0.04×Age|,Size=ln(企业资产总额/1000000)。回归分析发现Treat×Post的系数不显著,表明新《环保法》实施并未能显著缓解企业融资约束,导致企业缺乏环境治理投资的积极性。限于篇幅,未列示回归结果,备索。
(14)根据《中国统计年鉴》,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东、海南,中部地区包括山西、内蒙古、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南、广西,西部地区包括重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆。
[2]沈洪涛,周艳坤.环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据[J].天津:南开管理评论,2017,(6):73-82.
[3]Chen,Z.,M.E.Kahn,Y.Liu,and Z.Wang.The Consequences of Spatially Differentiated Water Pollution Regulation in China[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2018,(88):468-485.
[4]Leiter,A.M.,A.Parolini,and H.Winner.Environmental Regulation and Investment:Evidence from European Industry Data[J].Ecological Economics,2011,70,(4):759-770.
[5]Luo,J.How Does Smog Affect Firm's Investment Behavior?A Natural Experiment Based on a Sudden Surge in the PM2.5 Index[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2017,(10):359-378.
[6]张彩云,吕越.绿色生产规制与企业研发创新——影响及机制研究[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(1):71-91.
[7]刘悦,周默涵.环境规制是否会妨碍企业竞争力:基于异质性企业的理论分析[J].北京:世界经济,2018,(4):150-167.
[8]Berman,E.,and L.T.M.Bui.Environmental Regulation and Productivity:Evidence from Oil Refineries[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,2001,83,(3):498-510.
[9]Liu,M.,R.Shadbegian,and B.Zhang.Does Environmental Regulation Affect Labor Demand in China?Evidence from the Textile Printing and Dyeing Industry[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2017,(86):277-294.
[10]余东华,孙婷.环境规制、技能溢价与制造业国际竞争力[J].北京:中国工业经济,2017,(5):35-53.
[11]盛丹,李蕾蕾.地区环境立法是否会促进企业出口[J].北京:世界经济,2018,(11):145-168.
[12]Shi,X.,and Z.Xu.Environmental Regulation and Firm Export:Evidence from the Eleventh Five-Year Plan in China[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2018,(89):187-200.
[13]王书斌,徐盈之.环境规制与雾霾脱钩效应——基于企业投资偏好的视角[J].北京:中国工业经济,2015,(4):18-30.
[14]Wu,H.,H.Guo,B.Zhang,and M.Bu.Westward Movement of New Polluting Firms in China:Pollution Reduction Mandates and Location Choice[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2017,45,(1):119-138.
[15]张彩云,盛斌,苏丹妮.环境规制、政绩考核与企业选址[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(11):21-38.
[16]唐国平,李龙会,吴德军.环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资[J].北京:会计研究,2013,(6):83-89.
[17]景维民,张璐.环境管制、对外开放与中国工业的绿色技术进步[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(9):34-47.
[18]姜英兵,崔广慧.环保产业政策对企业环保投资的影响:基于重污染上市公司的经验证据[J].重庆:改革,2019,(2):87-101.
[19]Gray,W.B.The Cost of Regulation:OSHA,EPA and the Productivity Slowdown[J].American Economic Review,1987,77,(5):998-1006.
[20]Palmer,K.,W.E.Oates,and P.R.Portney.Tightening Environmental Standards:The Benefit-cost or the No-cost Paradigm[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9,(4):119-132.
[21]Greenstone,M.The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity:Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures[J].Journal of Political Economy,2002,110,(6):1175-1219.
[22]Greenstone,M.,J.A.List,and C.Syverson.The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing[R].NBER Working Paper,2012.
[23]Porter,M.E.,and C.Linde.Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9,(4):97-118.
[24]Porter,M.E.America's Green Strategy[J].Scientific American,1991,264,(4):168.
[25]Jefferson,G.H.,S.Tanaka,and W.Yin.Environmental Regulation and Industrial Performance:Evidence from Unexpected Externalities in China[R].SSRN Working Paper,2013.
[26]韩立岩,蔡立新,尹力博.中国证券市场的绿色激励:一个四因素模型[J].北京:金融研究,2017,(1):145-161.
[27]Martin,P.R.,and D.V.Moser.Managers' Green Investment Disclosures and Investors' Reaction[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61,(1):239-254.
[28]李培功,沈艺峰.社会规范、资本市场与环境治理:基于机构投资者视角的经验证据[J].北京:世界经济,2011,(6):126-146.
[29]Chava,S.Environmental Externalities and Cost of Capital[J].Management Science,2014,60,(9):2223-2247.
[30]黎文靖,路晓燕.机构投资者关注企业的环境绩效吗?——来自我国重污染行业上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:金融研究,2015,(12):97-112.
[31]胡珺,宋献中,王红建.非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理[J].北京:管理世界,2017,(3):76-94,187-188.
[32]刘斌,张列柯.去产能粘性粘住了谁:国有企业还是非国有企业[J].天津:南开管理评论,2018,(4):109-121.
[33]Bertrand,M.,E.Duflo,and S.Mullainathan.How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119,(1):249-275.
[34]Topalova,P.Factor Immobility and Regional Impact of Trade Liberalization:Evidence on Poverty from India[J].American Economic Journal:Applied Economics,2010,2,(4):1-41.
[35]吴秋生,黄贤环.财务公司的职能配置与集团成员上市公司融资约束缓解[J].北京:中国工业经济,2017,(9):156-173.
[36]杨理强,陈少华,陈爱华.内部资本市场提升企业创新能力了吗?——作用机理与路径分析[J].北京:经济管理,2019,(4):175-192.
(1)例如,自2018年3月29日辉丰股份及子公司因涉环保问题接受环保部门开展专项督察的消息被曝光后,股价由3月初的每股5.35元下跌至最低2.36元。
(2)包括:B(采掘业)、C0(食品、饮料)、C1(纺织、服装、皮毛)、C3(造纸、印刷)、C4(石油、化学、塑胶、塑料)、C6(金属、非金属)、C8(医药、生物制品)、D(电力、煤气及水的生产与供应业)。
(3)包括:C2(木材、家具)、C5(电子)、C7(机械、设备、仪表)、C99(其他制造业)。
(4)之所以选择当期发生额是因为企业环保投资包括资产类与费用类支出,由于费用类支出需在期末结转,为了与费用类支出期间保持一致,资产类支出也选择当期发生额,故环保投资为当期发生额。
(5)之所以选择TQ作为模型(2)中成长性的衡量指标,是因为被解释变量用ln(本期营业收入/上期营业收入)衡量,此时继续采用营业收入增长率来衡量成长性容易产生多重共线性问题。
(6)为了更好地观察变化趋势,本文统计的是当期营业收入的自然对数随时间的变动。
(7)此外,本文还对被解释变量进行行业中位数调整,结果未发生变化,备索。
(8)在剔除产能过剩样本后,采用同样的方法对实验组配对,平衡性测试结果表明,匹配后实验组与控制组样本特征变量均无显著差异。由于篇幅所限,未予列示,备索。
(9)具体环境责任评分数据来源于和讯网。
(10)由于篇幅所限,本部分结果不予列示,备索。
(11)“十二五”规划末SO2实际减排率=(“十二五”规划末SO2实际排放量/“十一五”规划末SO2实际排放量)-1。
(12)通过手工搜集财务报表中与环保有关的政府补助汇总获得。
(13)此外,本文进一步将融资约束作为被解释变量,重新回归。借鉴已有研究(吴秋生和黄贤环,2017[35];杨理强等,2019[36]),采用SA指数衡量融资约束,SA=|-0.737×Size+0.043×Size2-0.04×Age|,Size=ln(企业资产总额/1000000)。回归分析发现Treat×Post的系数不显著,表明新《环保法》实施并未能显著缓解企业融资约束,导致企业缺乏环境治理投资的积极性。限于篇幅,未列示回归结果,备索。
(14)根据《中国统计年鉴》,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东、海南,中部地区包括山西、内蒙古、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南、广西,西部地区包括重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆。
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