财政分权与晋升激励下环境规制对产业结构升级的影响
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摘要
当前,中国经济发展面临严峻的资源环境约束瓶颈,依靠产业结构升级来实现经济可持续发展已成为学术界和政策制定者关注的重要议题。基于这一问题,利用2000—2015年中国31个省市自治区的面板数据,采用空间杜宾计量模型,基于财政分权和官员晋升激励的视角,检验环境规制对产业结构升级的影响。结果发现:(1)单独来看,环境规制能够显著促进区域产业结构升级;(2)在考虑财政分权这一制度背景的条件下,由于财政纵向失衡和地方官员"自利性"的行为方式,会导致环境治理政策的"缺位",进而不利于地区的产业结构升级;(3)在考虑"唯GDP论英雄"的晋升激励机制下,会出现环境规制的非完全执行,进而抑制地区的产业结构升级;(4)分区域来看,东部地区和中西部地区的环境规制能够显著促进地区产业结构升级。而且,东部地区与中西部地区财政分权与官员晋升激励的调节作用也呈现相反的特征。
Currently,China's economic development is facing a severe bottleneck of resource and environmental constraints.It has been an important issue for academic circles and policy makers to achieve sustainable economic development relying on the upgrading of industrial structure.So,from the viewpoint of fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive,this paper tests the influence of environmental regulations on upgrading industrial structure using panel data from 31 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions from 2000 to 2015 and spatial Dobbin metrological model.The results of this essay are as follows:(1)Separately,environmental regulations can significantly promote the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(2) Under the background of fiscal decentralization,the vertical imbalance of finance and the self-interest behavior of local officials,the environmental governance policies are deficient,which goes against the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(3)Under the promotion incentive mechanism of only considering GDP,the enforcement of environmental regulation will be incomplete,which will restrain the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(4)Regionally,the environmental regulations in the east,central and west China can significantly promote the upgrading of regional industrial structure.Moreover,the regulating effects of financial decentralization and promotion incentive of officials in the east,central and west China also present opposite characteristics.
Currently,China's economic development is facing a severe bottleneck of resource and environmental constraints.It has been an important issue for academic circles and policy makers to achieve sustainable economic development relying on the upgrading of industrial structure.So,from the viewpoint of fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive,this paper tests the influence of environmental regulations on upgrading industrial structure using panel data from 31 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions from 2000 to 2015 and spatial Dobbin metrological model.The results of this essay are as follows:(1)Separately,environmental regulations can significantly promote the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(2) Under the background of fiscal decentralization,the vertical imbalance of finance and the self-interest behavior of local officials,the environmental governance policies are deficient,which goes against the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(3)Under the promotion incentive mechanism of only considering GDP,the enforcement of environmental regulation will be incomplete,which will restrain the upgrading of regional industrial structure;(4)Regionally,the environmental regulations in the east,central and west China can significantly promote the upgrading of regional industrial structure.Moreover,the regulating effects of financial decentralization and promotion incentive of officials in the east,central and west China also present opposite characteristics.
引文
[1]JIN H H,QIAN Y Y,WEINGAST B R.Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:Federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9/10):1719-1742.
[2]XU C.The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2011,49(4):1076-1151.
[3]昌忠泽.财政分权促进了地方公共物品供给效率的提高吗?——以北京市为例的实证分析[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2017(1):31-39.
[4]PORTER M E,VAN DER LINDE C.Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):97-118.
[5]SIMPSON R D,BRADFORD III R L.Taxing Variable Cost:Environmental Regulation as Industrial Policy[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,1996,30(3):282-300.
[6]LANJOUW J O,MODY A.Innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology[J].Research Policy,1996,25(4):549-571.
[7]万建香.基于环境政策规制绩效的波特假说验证——以江西省重点调查产业为例[J].经济经纬,2013(1):115-119.
[8]张华,魏晓平.绿色悖论抑或倒逼减排——环境规制对碳排放影响的双重效应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014(9):21-29.
[9]原毅军,谢荣辉.环境规制与工业绿色生产率增长——对“强波特假说”的再检验[J].中国软科学,2016(7):144-154.
[10]钟茂初,李梦洁,杜威剑.环境规制能否倒逼产业结构调整——基于中国省际面板数据的实证检验[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(8):107-115.
[11]BARRETT S.Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements[J].Oxford Economic Papers,1994,46(46):878-894.
[12]FREDRIKSSON P,MILLIMET D L.Is there a'California Effect'in US Environmental Policymaking?[M]//Regional Science and Urban Economics,2002:737-764.
[13]TIEBOUT H M,BRUGGER K E.Ecological Risk Assessment of Pesticides for Terrestrial Vertebrates:Evaluation and Application of the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency's Quotient Model[J].Conservation Biology,2010,9(6):1605-1618.
[14]崔志坤,李菁菁.财政分权、政府竞争与产业结构升级[J].财政研究,2015(12):37-43.
[15]刘建民,胡小梅.财政分权、空间效应与产业结构升级——基于SDM模型的经验研究[J].财经理论与实践,2017(1):116-121.
[16]周黎安,陶婧.官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例[J].金融研究,2011(3):15-26.
[17]徐现祥,李郇,王美今.区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升[J].经济学(季刊),2007(4):1075-1096.
[18]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[19]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[20]乔坤元.我国官员晋升锦标赛机制的再考察——来自省、市两级政府的证据[J].财经研究,2013(4):123-133.
[21]COLE D W,COLE R,GAYDOS S J,et al.Aquaculture:Environmental,toxicological,and health issues[J].International Journal of Hygiene&Environmental Health,2009,212(4):369-377.
[22]张鹏,张靳雪,崔峰.工业化进程中环境污染、能源耗费与官员晋升[J].公共行政评论,2017(5):46-68.
[23]李鼎,赵文哲.财政分权与公共教育投入的研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(4):207-213.
[24]林光平,龙志和,吴梅.中国地区经济σ-收敛的空间计量实证分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(4):20.
[25]刘赢时,田银华,周定根,等.产业结构升级影响污染排放的空间计量分析[J].财经理论与实践,2017(2):99-104.
[26]徐德云.产业结构升级形态决定、测度的一个理论解释及验证[J].财政研究,2008(1):46-49.
[27]龚海林.环境规制促进产业结构优化升级的绩效分析[J].财经理论与实践,2013(5):86.
[28]COLE M A,ELLIOTT R J R.Determining the Tradeevvironment Composition Effect:The Role of Capital,Labor and Environment Regulations[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2003(46):368-370.
[29]LEVINSON A.Environment Regulation and Manufactures'Location Choice:Evidence from the Census of Manufactures[J].Journal of Public Economics,1996(62):10-12.
[30]张成,陆旸,郭路,等.环境规制强度和生产技术进步[J].经济研究,2011(2):118.
[31]赵细康.环境保护与产业国际竞争力[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003:207-209.
[32]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长[J].经济科学,2010(6):45.
[33]蒋勇.环境规制、环境规制竞争与就业——基于省际空间杜宾模型的分析[J].贵州财经大学学报,2017(5):86.
(1)经济规模缩减因子:(1-GDPprovince GDPnation),GDPnation和GDPprovince与分别表示国家GDP与各省GDP;过滤经济规模对指标的影响。当某省GDP占全国GDP总量的比例较高时,其缩减因子就相应较小,进而削弱了税基丰裕程度对实际分权程度的干扰。
[2]XU C.The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2011,49(4):1076-1151.
[3]昌忠泽.财政分权促进了地方公共物品供给效率的提高吗?——以北京市为例的实证分析[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2017(1):31-39.
[4]PORTER M E,VAN DER LINDE C.Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):97-118.
[5]SIMPSON R D,BRADFORD III R L.Taxing Variable Cost:Environmental Regulation as Industrial Policy[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,1996,30(3):282-300.
[6]LANJOUW J O,MODY A.Innovation and the international diffusion of environmentally responsive technology[J].Research Policy,1996,25(4):549-571.
[7]万建香.基于环境政策规制绩效的波特假说验证——以江西省重点调查产业为例[J].经济经纬,2013(1):115-119.
[8]张华,魏晓平.绿色悖论抑或倒逼减排——环境规制对碳排放影响的双重效应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014(9):21-29.
[9]原毅军,谢荣辉.环境规制与工业绿色生产率增长——对“强波特假说”的再检验[J].中国软科学,2016(7):144-154.
[10]钟茂初,李梦洁,杜威剑.环境规制能否倒逼产业结构调整——基于中国省际面板数据的实证检验[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(8):107-115.
[11]BARRETT S.Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements[J].Oxford Economic Papers,1994,46(46):878-894.
[12]FREDRIKSSON P,MILLIMET D L.Is there a'California Effect'in US Environmental Policymaking?[M]//Regional Science and Urban Economics,2002:737-764.
[13]TIEBOUT H M,BRUGGER K E.Ecological Risk Assessment of Pesticides for Terrestrial Vertebrates:Evaluation and Application of the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency's Quotient Model[J].Conservation Biology,2010,9(6):1605-1618.
[14]崔志坤,李菁菁.财政分权、政府竞争与产业结构升级[J].财政研究,2015(12):37-43.
[15]刘建民,胡小梅.财政分权、空间效应与产业结构升级——基于SDM模型的经验研究[J].财经理论与实践,2017(1):116-121.
[16]周黎安,陶婧.官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例[J].金融研究,2011(3):15-26.
[17]徐现祥,李郇,王美今.区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升[J].经济学(季刊),2007(4):1075-1096.
[18]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[19]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[20]乔坤元.我国官员晋升锦标赛机制的再考察——来自省、市两级政府的证据[J].财经研究,2013(4):123-133.
[21]COLE D W,COLE R,GAYDOS S J,et al.Aquaculture:Environmental,toxicological,and health issues[J].International Journal of Hygiene&Environmental Health,2009,212(4):369-377.
[22]张鹏,张靳雪,崔峰.工业化进程中环境污染、能源耗费与官员晋升[J].公共行政评论,2017(5):46-68.
[23]李鼎,赵文哲.财政分权与公共教育投入的研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(4):207-213.
[24]林光平,龙志和,吴梅.中国地区经济σ-收敛的空间计量实证分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(4):20.
[25]刘赢时,田银华,周定根,等.产业结构升级影响污染排放的空间计量分析[J].财经理论与实践,2017(2):99-104.
[26]徐德云.产业结构升级形态决定、测度的一个理论解释及验证[J].财政研究,2008(1):46-49.
[27]龚海林.环境规制促进产业结构优化升级的绩效分析[J].财经理论与实践,2013(5):86.
[28]COLE M A,ELLIOTT R J R.Determining the Tradeevvironment Composition Effect:The Role of Capital,Labor and Environment Regulations[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2003(46):368-370.
[29]LEVINSON A.Environment Regulation and Manufactures'Location Choice:Evidence from the Census of Manufactures[J].Journal of Public Economics,1996(62):10-12.
[30]张成,陆旸,郭路,等.环境规制强度和生产技术进步[J].经济研究,2011(2):118.
[31]赵细康.环境保护与产业国际竞争力[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003:207-209.
[32]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长[J].经济科学,2010(6):45.
[33]蒋勇.环境规制、环境规制竞争与就业——基于省际空间杜宾模型的分析[J].贵州财经大学学报,2017(5):86.
(1)经济规模缩减因子:(1-GDPprovince GDPnation),GDPnation和GDPprovince与分别表示国家GDP与各省GDP;过滤经济规模对指标的影响。当某省GDP占全国GDP总量的比例较高时,其缩减因子就相应较小,进而削弱了税基丰裕程度对实际分权程度的干扰。
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