民营上市公司董事会治理效率影响因素的研究
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摘要
随着中国市场经济的深化和民营化改革的推进，我国民营上市公司的数量呈现逐年递增的趋势，民营上市公司逐渐成为资本市场上日益引人注目的主体。与其他上市公司一样，我国民营上市公司在上市运作过程中也遇到诸多问题，其中许多问题均与民营上市公司独特的公司治理结构有着密切联系。
在国内外公司治理的实践中，董事会治理是公司治理的核心，在整个公司治理中起着非常重要的作用。它可以平衡公司利益相关者之间的利益冲突，降低公司的代理成本，提升公司经营业绩，并最终增加公司价值。
因此，我们对影响民营上市公司董事会治理效率的内在因素及其相关问题展开了实证研究。本文主要从董事会结构、董事会行为、董事会激励等三个方面，研究了影响民营上市公司董事会治理效率的主要因素，以及研究了这些影响因素与公司业绩和公司价值之间的关系。
我们主要以2005年我国262家民营上市公司的相关数据作为研究样本，运用因子分析、相关分析、回归分析等统计方法，对民营上市公司董事会治理效率影响因素进行了实证研究。通过建立董事会治理效率的影响因素与公司业绩和公司价值之间的多元线性回归模型和曲线估计模型，得到以下实证结果：董事会规模与公司业绩和公司价值均呈倒U型相关关系；独立董事比例与公司业绩呈显著负相关，与公司价值不存在显著相关关系；两职合一与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系，与公司价值无显著相关性；专业委员会设置和董事会会议次数与公司业绩存在显著负相关关系，二者与公司价值存在显著正相关关系；董事持股比例与公司业绩和公司价值均存在显著的正相关关系。
最后我们提出提高我国民营上市公司董事会治理效率的措施，如设置合理的董事会规模、保持适当的独立董事比例、董事长和总经理两职可以合一、完善专业委员会制度、减少被动召开董事会会议的次数、适当增加董事持股比例等。
Along with China market economy deepening and privately operated reform unceasing advancement,the quantity of the private listed companies increases progressively year by year. The private listed companies become the noticeable body of the capital market of our country gradually. The private listed companies in the process of operation meet many questions as well as other listed companies, some questions have close relation with these companies' unique corporate governance structure.
In practice of the domestic and foreign corporate governance, directorate governance is the core of corporate governance,which play a crucial role in the process of corporate governance.It may balance the benefit conflict between the benefit correlations of the company,and reduce the proxy cost of the company, and promote the performance of the company, and finally increase the value of the company.
This paper studies on influence factors of directorate efficiency of the private listed companies.Pay attention to how does the structure,the behavior and the drive of the board of directors affect the directorate efficiency.
Using a sample of 262 private listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period of 2005, and using statistical methods such as factor analysis, correlation analysis, regression analysis, this paper makes a empirical study on directorate efficiency of the private listed companies. The linear regression model and curve estimation model between influence factors of directorate efficiency and the company achievement and the company value are established. Results of this study show that, the board of directors scale with the company achievement and the company value present the anti-U correlational relations;the proportion of the independent trustee with the company achievement present remarkablly negative correlational relations,it does not have the remarkablly correlational relations with the company value; two duties gathered one with the company achievement present remarkablly positive correlational relations, it has not significant relations with the company value; the establishment of the specialized committee and the number of board of directors conference with the company achievement present remarkablly negative correlational relations,with the company value present remarkablly positive correlational relations; the proportion of holding the stock of the trustee with the company achievement and the company value have remarkablly positive correlational relations.
In the end, we propose the measure to enhance the directorate efficiency of the private listed companies. For instance,establish the reasonable scale of the board of directors,maintain a suitable proportion of the independent trustee, gather the two duties of the chairman and general manager to one, consummate the specialized committee system, avoid passively holding the board of directors conference, increase suitably the proportion of holding stock of the trustee.
在国内外公司治理的实践中，董事会治理是公司治理的核心，在整个公司治理中起着非常重要的作用。它可以平衡公司利益相关者之间的利益冲突，降低公司的代理成本，提升公司经营业绩，并最终增加公司价值。
因此，我们对影响民营上市公司董事会治理效率的内在因素及其相关问题展开了实证研究。本文主要从董事会结构、董事会行为、董事会激励等三个方面，研究了影响民营上市公司董事会治理效率的主要因素，以及研究了这些影响因素与公司业绩和公司价值之间的关系。
我们主要以2005年我国262家民营上市公司的相关数据作为研究样本，运用因子分析、相关分析、回归分析等统计方法，对民营上市公司董事会治理效率影响因素进行了实证研究。通过建立董事会治理效率的影响因素与公司业绩和公司价值之间的多元线性回归模型和曲线估计模型，得到以下实证结果：董事会规模与公司业绩和公司价值均呈倒U型相关关系；独立董事比例与公司业绩呈显著负相关，与公司价值不存在显著相关关系；两职合一与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系，与公司价值无显著相关性；专业委员会设置和董事会会议次数与公司业绩存在显著负相关关系，二者与公司价值存在显著正相关关系；董事持股比例与公司业绩和公司价值均存在显著的正相关关系。
最后我们提出提高我国民营上市公司董事会治理效率的措施，如设置合理的董事会规模、保持适当的独立董事比例、董事长和总经理两职可以合一、完善专业委员会制度、减少被动召开董事会会议的次数、适当增加董事持股比例等。
Along with China market economy deepening and privately operated reform unceasing advancement,the quantity of the private listed companies increases progressively year by year. The private listed companies become the noticeable body of the capital market of our country gradually. The private listed companies in the process of operation meet many questions as well as other listed companies, some questions have close relation with these companies' unique corporate governance structure.
In practice of the domestic and foreign corporate governance, directorate governance is the core of corporate governance,which play a crucial role in the process of corporate governance.It may balance the benefit conflict between the benefit correlations of the company,and reduce the proxy cost of the company, and promote the performance of the company, and finally increase the value of the company.
This paper studies on influence factors of directorate efficiency of the private listed companies.Pay attention to how does the structure,the behavior and the drive of the board of directors affect the directorate efficiency.
Using a sample of 262 private listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the period of 2005, and using statistical methods such as factor analysis, correlation analysis, regression analysis, this paper makes a empirical study on directorate efficiency of the private listed companies. The linear regression model and curve estimation model between influence factors of directorate efficiency and the company achievement and the company value are established. Results of this study show that, the board of directors scale with the company achievement and the company value present the anti-U correlational relations;the proportion of the independent trustee with the company achievement present remarkablly negative correlational relations,it does not have the remarkablly correlational relations with the company value; two duties gathered one with the company achievement present remarkablly positive correlational relations, it has not significant relations with the company value; the establishment of the specialized committee and the number of board of directors conference with the company achievement present remarkablly negative correlational relations,with the company value present remarkablly positive correlational relations; the proportion of holding the stock of the trustee with the company achievement and the company value have remarkablly positive correlational relations.
In the end, we propose the measure to enhance the directorate efficiency of the private listed companies. For instance,establish the reasonable scale of the board of directors,maintain a suitable proportion of the independent trustee, gather the two duties of the chairman and general manager to one, consummate the specialized committee system, avoid passively holding the board of directors conference, increase suitably the proportion of holding stock of the trustee.
引文
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[21] McMullen. Audit committee performance:an investigation of the consequences associated with audit committees[J].Auditing, 1996 ,15:87-103
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[23] David Yermack, Higher market valution of companies with a small board of directors [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 40:185—211.
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[25] Agrawal,Anup,and Knoeber, Charles R.Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders[J].Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,1996,31.
[26] Pi, L. and Timme, S. G.. Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency[J],Journal of Banking and Finance, 1993, 17: 515-530.
[27] Donaldson,L.,and Davis,J., Stewardship theory or agency theory:CEO govemance and shareholder retums[J],Australian Journal of Management, 1991,16 (1):49-64.
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[33] 邵少敏，吴沧澜，林伟．独立董事和童事会结构、股权结构研究[J]．世界经济．2004(2)
[34] 胡勤勤，沈艺锋．独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J]．世界经济．2002(7)
[35] 李斌，闰丽荣．董事会特征与公司业绩研究[J]．财贸经济．2005(12)：23-27
[36] 苏启林，朱文．上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J]．经济研究，2003，(8)：36-45．
[37] 张俊喜，张华．民营上市公司的经营绩效、市场价值和治理结构[J]．世界经济，2004(11)：1-13
[38] 李维安等．公司治理[M]．南开大学出版社2001年版
[39] 谷祺，于东智 公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J]．财经问题研究，2001，(1)
[40] 于东智，池国华．董事会规模、稳定性与公司业绩：理论与经验分析[J]．经济研究，2004，(4)：70-78．
[41] 孙永祥．所有权、融资结构与公司治理机制[J]．经济研究，2001，(1)．
[42] 孙永祥，章融．董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J]．企业经济，2000(6)
[43] 赵学彬，王立杰．中国上市公司董事会各类董事剖析[J]．煤炭经济研究．2003(10)：40-41
[44] 柴俊武，万迪昉．西安市民营企业股权结构与公司业绩的实证分析[J]．中国民营企业．2003(1)．
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[2] Boyd, B. K., CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingence Model[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1995, 16:301-312
[3] Williamsom,O.E.. Corporate governance[J]. Yale Law Journal, 1984,93:1197-1230.
[4] Jensen, M.C.. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and The Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. Journal of Finance,1993,48:831-880.
[5] Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J.W.. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J].The Business Lawyer, 1992,48:59-77
[6] Gilson, S.. Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27:355-387.
[7] Zahra, S. A. & Pearce II, J. A.. Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model[J]. Journal oj'Management,,1989, 15(2):291- 334.
[8] John, K., & Senbet, L.. Corporate governance and board effectiveness[J], Journal of Banking and Finance, 1998, 22:371- 403.
[9] Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L., & Jarrell, G. Leadership structure: separating the CEO and chairman of the board[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1997,3:189-220.
[10] Fam a, E.F.. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88:288-298.
[11] Fam a, E.F. & Jensen, M.C.. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983a, 26:301-325.
[12] Kaplan, S.N. & Reishus, D.. Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,27:389-410.
[13] Jensen, M.and Meckling, W.. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3:305-60.
[14] Jensen, M.C.and R.S. Ruback...The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1983,11: 5-50.
[15] Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R.W.. Vishny, Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1988, 20: 293-315.
[16] Pfeffer, J..Size, composition, and function of hospital boards of directors: the organization and its environment [J] .Administrative Science Quarterly, 1973,18:349-364.
[17] Daily,C. M. .Schwenk, C. Chief executive officers, top management teams, and boards of directors: congruent or countervailing forces[J]. Journal of Management, 1996,2:185-208.
[18] Donaldson, L..The ethereal hand: organizational economics and management theory[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1990 ,15(3):369-381.
[19] Mitchell ML, Lehn KM.. Do bad bidders make good targets? [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98: 273-398.
[20] Bartov, E., Radhakrishnan, S., Krinsky, I., Investor sophistication and patterns in stock returns after earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 2000 , 75:43-63
[21] McMullen. Audit committee performance:an investigation of the consequences associated with audit committees[J].Auditing, 1996 ,15:87-103
[22] Bhagat s.and B.Black, Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance,University of Colorado,working paper, 2000
[23] David Yermack, Higher market valution of companies with a small board of directors [J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 40:185—211.
[24] Weisbach, Michael S., The CEO and the Firm's Investment Decisions[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, 37:159-188.
[25] Agrawal,Anup,and Knoeber, Charles R.Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders[J].Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,1996,31.
[26] Pi, L. and Timme, S. G.. Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency[J],Journal of Banking and Finance, 1993, 17: 515-530.
[27] Donaldson,L.,and Davis,J., Stewardship theory or agency theory:CEO govemance and shareholder retums[J],Australian Journal of Management, 1991,16 (1):49-64.
[28] Baliga, Moyer and Rao. CEO Duality and Firmperformance: What's the Fuss? [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1996,1.
[29] Rechner, Dalton.CEO Duality and Organizational Performance:A Longitudinal Analysis[J].Strategic Management Journal, 1991.
[30] Dechow P.M,Sloan,R.G.Sweeney A.P.Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC[J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996,(13): 1-36.
[31] Eisenhardt, K. M.. Building Theories from Case Study Research[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1989,14 (4), 532-550.
[32] 于东智．董事会、公司治理与绩效[J]．中国社会科学．2003(3)
[33] 邵少敏，吴沧澜，林伟．独立董事和童事会结构、股权结构研究[J]．世界经济．2004(2)
[34] 胡勤勤，沈艺锋．独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J]．世界经济．2002(7)
[35] 李斌，闰丽荣．董事会特征与公司业绩研究[J]．财贸经济．2005(12)：23-27
[36] 苏启林，朱文．上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J]．经济研究，2003，(8)：36-45．
[37] 张俊喜，张华．民营上市公司的经营绩效、市场价值和治理结构[J]．世界经济，2004(11)：1-13
[38] 李维安等．公司治理[M]．南开大学出版社2001年版
[39] 谷祺，于东智 公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J]．财经问题研究，2001，(1)
[40] 于东智，池国华．董事会规模、稳定性与公司业绩：理论与经验分析[J]．经济研究，2004，(4)：70-78．
[41] 孙永祥．所有权、融资结构与公司治理机制[J]．经济研究，2001，(1)．
[42] 孙永祥，章融．董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J]．企业经济，2000(6)
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