我国企业集团资金集中管理研究
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摘要
企业集团源于50年代的日本,我国出现企业集团尚属一种新生事物。这种多元化的经济联合体,有利于发展专业化、社会化的生产协作,促使生产要素的优化组合以及资源的合理配置,从而形成有效的经济规模。这种形式更有利于企业内部的深化改革,以及经营机制的彻底转变,有利于企业发挥集团的整体优势,促使企业进一步开拓国际市场,参与世界经济大循环,推进企业向国际化方向发展。在市场经济迅猛发展的今天,尤其是我国加入WTO以后,来自国内外的竞争日趋激烈,如何加强集团公司的财务管理,提高经营管理水平,己成为促进集团公司发展的重要课题。而作为企业血液的资金管理则是财务管理的核心内容,管理能否深化更是关系企业生死攸关的大事。
随着市场竞争的加剧,集团企业向多元化、多地域化方向快速发展,现有分离的会计体系已很难满足集团企业的管理需要,财务集中管理就是这种需求与现代网络技术相结合的管理创新。资金管理又是财务管理的核心,加上资金的特殊性以及网络银行技术、金融产品等外界条件的支撑,越来越多的企业集团已将资金管理从财务管理中分离出来,向网络化、集成化改造,实行更专业的资金管理——企业集团资金集中管理。因此,研究我国企业集团的资金集中管理及与其相关的理论对于加强我国企业的财务管理,促进企业集团发展具有一定的实用价值。
随着我国改革的不断深入,企业集团理论探索研究的不断深化,也有一些文献开始研究企业集团的内部关系,主要集中企业集团市场战略、内部交易、财务管理和控制等。内部资本市场理论为我们研究企业集团提供了一个新视角。根据内部资本市场理论,内部资本市场的运作是借助于公司总部的作用而进行的。由于联合大企业(M型大企业)大多由不具有独立法人资格的部门(机构)组成,因而总部的权威可以在企业内部得到有效发挥,内部资本市场可以发挥其固有的优势。随着企业的不断扩张,企业集团内部结构在采用多分支机构的同时,分支机构的形式和性质往往采取的是独立法人结构。对应于这种变化和结构,企业内部资本市场中介就相应地也被独立出来,如财务公司,以专门实施公司总部的某些资本运作功能,与总部一起共同发挥内部资本市场的作用,其中公司总部依然行使作为权威的作用,协调和控制包括财务公司在内的资本配置,而财务公司则按照市场机制和总部要求来调节和管理企业内部不同利益主体的资本需求、促进企业的发展。我国许多企业集团所具有的内部结算中心、内部银行,尤其是为了发展企业集团而鼓励设立的财务公司,在某种意义上,其发挥的就是内部资本市场的功能。由于我国企业集团的大多是行政捏合的产物,在许多方面还不太成熟,而且我国企业集团的财务公司受到的管制也比较严格,发展空间受到影响,因而用内部资本市场的理论和经验来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资本的运作提供理论依据,并对我国企业集团特别是财务公司的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
本文主要分为四个部分:
第一部分,内部资本市场理论概述。首先介绍了企业集团的概念、基本特征和组织结构。接着阐述了内部资本市场的内涵,内外部资本市场的区别以及我国国有企业集团内部资本市场的融资优势。最后综述了国内外学者关于内部资本市场的研究观点,总结出用内部资本市场的理论来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资金集中管理制度的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
第二部分,企业集团资金集中管理的模式及特征。根据资金控制的集权程度,将企业集团资金集中管理和控制大致分为四种模式:报账中心、结算中心、内部银行和财务公司。然后详细介绍了各种模式的主要职能和运作特点,最后针对这些模式的适用情况和管理效果等做出横向对比。
第三部分,我国企业集团实行资金集中管理所面临的问题及对策。本部分在分析我国企业集团资金集中管理过程中存在的诸多问题的基础上,针对性地提出了资金集中管理制度的完善措施,特别是对我国一些企业集团存在的过度融资的问题提供了治理建议。
第四部分,X集团资金集中管理制度的借鉴分析。本部分选取了我国一个典型的大型企业集团——X钢铁集团作为案例,从内部资本市场的角度出发,详细介绍了X钢铁集团资金集中管理制度在各个不同阶段的特点以及实施后的效果,重点探讨了现阶段适合我国大型企业集团的资金集中管理模式——以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度,总结了X钢铁集团资金集中管理制度的发展变迁及成功经验。希望能为其他企业集团资金集中管理制度的选择和设计,提供一些借鉴。
本文的主要观点:
本文的主要观点是,我国大型企业集团适宜采用以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度,这样不仅理顺了企业集团内部不同法人之间的结算关系,保护了集团成员的经济利益,而且将结算制度与财务公司的金融功能进行了有机结合,加强了企业集团的资金集中管理制度,同时使企业集团的内部资本市场更加完善。
本文的主要贡献:
1、从内部资本市场视角来分析企业集团的资金集中管理制度。内部资本市场理论正是研究大型企业内部资金配置规律的最重要理论,在国外已经形成了许多可供借鉴的经验。用内部资本市场的理论和经验来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资本的运作提供理论依据,并对我国企业集团的资金集中管理制度特别是财务公司的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
2、为国有企业集团内部资本市场过度融资提出了治理建议。国有企业集团内部资本市场能够通过财务方面的协同效应和借贷的规模效应,在外部资本市场上获得更大规模的融资,但当企业存在着过度投资的倾向时,这种增强的融资能力将会带来不良的影响。本文提出了提高银行体系的资本配置效率,完善国有企业集团融资约束机制,明确红利政策,实现内外部资本市场互补等治理措施,以使企业集团内部资本市场的资源配置和价值发现功能更加有效的发挥作用。
3、我国大型企业集团适宜采用以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度。企业集团的不同发展阶段适用不同的资金集中管理模式,通过介绍X钢铁集团的二十多年资金管理的实践经验,深入探讨了财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度的优点,希望能为其他企业集团资金集中管理制度的选择和设计,提供一些借鉴。
Enterprise group originated in 1950s Japan is just a new thing in China. The diversified economical combination is conducive to the development of professional and social production cooperation, the optimized combination of production factors and the rational collocate of resources, so as to form an effective economical scale. This form is more beneficial to in-depth reform within enterprise and thorough change in management system, play the group's overall advantages. And it urges enterprise to exploit the international market further, participate in the world economy cycle, and develop to the internationalization. Nowadays, as rapid development of market economic, especially after China's accession to the WTO, along with increasingly fierce competition from home and abroad, how to enhance the group's financial management and heighten the management level has already become an important issue of the group's development. As the enterprise’s blood, cash management is the core content of financial management. Whether to strengthen cash management is a comparatively important thing related to the enterprise life.
The popular disjunctive account system cannot satisfy the need of enterprise group management under the circumstance that group grew faster in diversification and multi-region as result of fierce competition. In order to solve the aforesaid confliction, financial centralized management as innovated management tool has been invented under the background of modern network technology. The cash management as the core of financial centralized management has been separated from finance management in the condition of the specialty of cash, supported by technique of network bank and new financial tools. Meanwhile, the more professional cash management——cash centralized management (CCM) has appeared and show more networked and integrated. Therefore, as for strengthening enterprise financial management and promoting the development of enterprise groups, research on CCM and correlative theory has significant practical value in China.
Internal capital market theory(ICM), which has already formed many experiences to be referenced in foreign countries, is just the most important theory for researching the cash allocation within the large enterprise. As China is in the process of economic transformation and external capital market(ECM) is far from perfection, enterprise access to external financing are strongly restricted by funds. Under the circumstances, it has more significant meaning that the ICM relocate the limited resources among the projects effectively. Meanwhile, as cash is scarce, in pursuit of maximizing whole interests, enterprises needs to invest cash into higher marginal income development projects. In such circumstances, headquarters’role of collocate resources is quite important. Therefore, analyzing the enterprise group with the ICM can provides the theory basis for effective operation of the internal capital and meaningful reference for the CCM of enterprise group of our country, especially for the development of financial companies.
This paper is divided into four parts:
The first part is the outline of internal capital market theory. This part reviews research perspective of internal capital market by scholars at home and abroad, concludes that analyzing enterprise group by internal capital market theory, will be meaningful reference for the development of cash centralized management in China enterprise group
The second part is model and features of cash centralized management in enterprise groups. According to the centralized degree of funds control, cash centralized management of enterprise groups is roughly divided into four modes: control accounting center, balancing centers, internal banks and financial companies.
The third part is the problems and countermeasures faced by cash centralized management of our enterprise groups. Based on analyzing problems of cash centralized management of our enterprise groups, this part suggests some measures for cash centralized management system.
The fourth part is analysis of cash centralized management system in X Group. This part concludes the changes, development and successful experience of cash centralized management system in X Steel Group. And hopes that this part could provide some reference on selecting and designing cash centralized management for other enterprise groups.
The main point:
This paper's view is that funds balancing center system existing in financial company suits large enterprise groups in China. This model strengthens cash centralized management system of enterprise groups, at the same time makes the internal capital market of enterprise group more complete.
The main contributions:
1, Analyze the cash centralized management system from view of internal capital market. Analyzing enterprise group with internal capital market theory and experience, would be meaningful reference for the development of cash centralized management in China enterprise group.
2, Put forward management suggestions on excessive financing by internal capital for state-owned enterprise groups. This paper presents some measures that improving the financing constraint mechanism of state-owned enterprise groups and achieving cooperation of internal and external capital markets, so that the function of resources allocation and values discovery of the internal capital market in enterprise groups will play more effectively.
3, Funds balancing center system existing in financial company suits large enterprise groups in China. This paper discussed the funds balancing center system existing in financial company in depth, hoping to provide some reference for selection and management of cash centralized management system of other enterprise groups.
随着市场竞争的加剧,集团企业向多元化、多地域化方向快速发展,现有分离的会计体系已很难满足集团企业的管理需要,财务集中管理就是这种需求与现代网络技术相结合的管理创新。资金管理又是财务管理的核心,加上资金的特殊性以及网络银行技术、金融产品等外界条件的支撑,越来越多的企业集团已将资金管理从财务管理中分离出来,向网络化、集成化改造,实行更专业的资金管理——企业集团资金集中管理。因此,研究我国企业集团的资金集中管理及与其相关的理论对于加强我国企业的财务管理,促进企业集团发展具有一定的实用价值。
随着我国改革的不断深入,企业集团理论探索研究的不断深化,也有一些文献开始研究企业集团的内部关系,主要集中企业集团市场战略、内部交易、财务管理和控制等。内部资本市场理论为我们研究企业集团提供了一个新视角。根据内部资本市场理论,内部资本市场的运作是借助于公司总部的作用而进行的。由于联合大企业(M型大企业)大多由不具有独立法人资格的部门(机构)组成,因而总部的权威可以在企业内部得到有效发挥,内部资本市场可以发挥其固有的优势。随着企业的不断扩张,企业集团内部结构在采用多分支机构的同时,分支机构的形式和性质往往采取的是独立法人结构。对应于这种变化和结构,企业内部资本市场中介就相应地也被独立出来,如财务公司,以专门实施公司总部的某些资本运作功能,与总部一起共同发挥内部资本市场的作用,其中公司总部依然行使作为权威的作用,协调和控制包括财务公司在内的资本配置,而财务公司则按照市场机制和总部要求来调节和管理企业内部不同利益主体的资本需求、促进企业的发展。我国许多企业集团所具有的内部结算中心、内部银行,尤其是为了发展企业集团而鼓励设立的财务公司,在某种意义上,其发挥的就是内部资本市场的功能。由于我国企业集团的大多是行政捏合的产物,在许多方面还不太成熟,而且我国企业集团的财务公司受到的管制也比较严格,发展空间受到影响,因而用内部资本市场的理论和经验来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资本的运作提供理论依据,并对我国企业集团特别是财务公司的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
本文主要分为四个部分:
第一部分,内部资本市场理论概述。首先介绍了企业集团的概念、基本特征和组织结构。接着阐述了内部资本市场的内涵,内外部资本市场的区别以及我国国有企业集团内部资本市场的融资优势。最后综述了国内外学者关于内部资本市场的研究观点,总结出用内部资本市场的理论来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资金集中管理制度的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
第二部分,企业集团资金集中管理的模式及特征。根据资金控制的集权程度,将企业集团资金集中管理和控制大致分为四种模式:报账中心、结算中心、内部银行和财务公司。然后详细介绍了各种模式的主要职能和运作特点,最后针对这些模式的适用情况和管理效果等做出横向对比。
第三部分,我国企业集团实行资金集中管理所面临的问题及对策。本部分在分析我国企业集团资金集中管理过程中存在的诸多问题的基础上,针对性地提出了资金集中管理制度的完善措施,特别是对我国一些企业集团存在的过度融资的问题提供了治理建议。
第四部分,X集团资金集中管理制度的借鉴分析。本部分选取了我国一个典型的大型企业集团——X钢铁集团作为案例,从内部资本市场的角度出发,详细介绍了X钢铁集团资金集中管理制度在各个不同阶段的特点以及实施后的效果,重点探讨了现阶段适合我国大型企业集团的资金集中管理模式——以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度,总结了X钢铁集团资金集中管理制度的发展变迁及成功经验。希望能为其他企业集团资金集中管理制度的选择和设计,提供一些借鉴。
本文的主要观点:
本文的主要观点是,我国大型企业集团适宜采用以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度,这样不仅理顺了企业集团内部不同法人之间的结算关系,保护了集团成员的经济利益,而且将结算制度与财务公司的金融功能进行了有机结合,加强了企业集团的资金集中管理制度,同时使企业集团的内部资本市场更加完善。
本文的主要贡献:
1、从内部资本市场视角来分析企业集团的资金集中管理制度。内部资本市场理论正是研究大型企业内部资金配置规律的最重要理论,在国外已经形成了许多可供借鉴的经验。用内部资本市场的理论和经验来分析企业集团,可以为我国企业集团内部资本的运作提供理论依据,并对我国企业集团的资金集中管理制度特别是财务公司的发展提出有意义的借鉴和参考。
2、为国有企业集团内部资本市场过度融资提出了治理建议。国有企业集团内部资本市场能够通过财务方面的协同效应和借贷的规模效应,在外部资本市场上获得更大规模的融资,但当企业存在着过度投资的倾向时,这种增强的融资能力将会带来不良的影响。本文提出了提高银行体系的资本配置效率,完善国有企业集团融资约束机制,明确红利政策,实现内外部资本市场互补等治理措施,以使企业集团内部资本市场的资源配置和价值发现功能更加有效的发挥作用。
3、我国大型企业集团适宜采用以财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度。企业集团的不同发展阶段适用不同的资金集中管理模式,通过介绍X钢铁集团的二十多年资金管理的实践经验,深入探讨了财务公司为载体的资金结算中心制度的优点,希望能为其他企业集团资金集中管理制度的选择和设计,提供一些借鉴。
Enterprise group originated in 1950s Japan is just a new thing in China. The diversified economical combination is conducive to the development of professional and social production cooperation, the optimized combination of production factors and the rational collocate of resources, so as to form an effective economical scale. This form is more beneficial to in-depth reform within enterprise and thorough change in management system, play the group's overall advantages. And it urges enterprise to exploit the international market further, participate in the world economy cycle, and develop to the internationalization. Nowadays, as rapid development of market economic, especially after China's accession to the WTO, along with increasingly fierce competition from home and abroad, how to enhance the group's financial management and heighten the management level has already become an important issue of the group's development. As the enterprise’s blood, cash management is the core content of financial management. Whether to strengthen cash management is a comparatively important thing related to the enterprise life.
The popular disjunctive account system cannot satisfy the need of enterprise group management under the circumstance that group grew faster in diversification and multi-region as result of fierce competition. In order to solve the aforesaid confliction, financial centralized management as innovated management tool has been invented under the background of modern network technology. The cash management as the core of financial centralized management has been separated from finance management in the condition of the specialty of cash, supported by technique of network bank and new financial tools. Meanwhile, the more professional cash management——cash centralized management (CCM) has appeared and show more networked and integrated. Therefore, as for strengthening enterprise financial management and promoting the development of enterprise groups, research on CCM and correlative theory has significant practical value in China.
Internal capital market theory(ICM), which has already formed many experiences to be referenced in foreign countries, is just the most important theory for researching the cash allocation within the large enterprise. As China is in the process of economic transformation and external capital market(ECM) is far from perfection, enterprise access to external financing are strongly restricted by funds. Under the circumstances, it has more significant meaning that the ICM relocate the limited resources among the projects effectively. Meanwhile, as cash is scarce, in pursuit of maximizing whole interests, enterprises needs to invest cash into higher marginal income development projects. In such circumstances, headquarters’role of collocate resources is quite important. Therefore, analyzing the enterprise group with the ICM can provides the theory basis for effective operation of the internal capital and meaningful reference for the CCM of enterprise group of our country, especially for the development of financial companies.
This paper is divided into four parts:
The first part is the outline of internal capital market theory. This part reviews research perspective of internal capital market by scholars at home and abroad, concludes that analyzing enterprise group by internal capital market theory, will be meaningful reference for the development of cash centralized management in China enterprise group
The second part is model and features of cash centralized management in enterprise groups. According to the centralized degree of funds control, cash centralized management of enterprise groups is roughly divided into four modes: control accounting center, balancing centers, internal banks and financial companies.
The third part is the problems and countermeasures faced by cash centralized management of our enterprise groups. Based on analyzing problems of cash centralized management of our enterprise groups, this part suggests some measures for cash centralized management system.
The fourth part is analysis of cash centralized management system in X Group. This part concludes the changes, development and successful experience of cash centralized management system in X Steel Group. And hopes that this part could provide some reference on selecting and designing cash centralized management for other enterprise groups.
The main point:
This paper's view is that funds balancing center system existing in financial company suits large enterprise groups in China. This model strengthens cash centralized management system of enterprise groups, at the same time makes the internal capital market of enterprise group more complete.
The main contributions:
1, Analyze the cash centralized management system from view of internal capital market. Analyzing enterprise group with internal capital market theory and experience, would be meaningful reference for the development of cash centralized management in China enterprise group.
2, Put forward management suggestions on excessive financing by internal capital for state-owned enterprise groups. This paper presents some measures that improving the financing constraint mechanism of state-owned enterprise groups and achieving cooperation of internal and external capital markets, so that the function of resources allocation and values discovery of the internal capital market in enterprise groups will play more effectively.
3, Funds balancing center system existing in financial company suits large enterprise groups in China. This paper discussed the funds balancing center system existing in financial company in depth, hoping to provide some reference for selection and management of cash centralized management system of other enterprise groups.
引文
1 Alchian, A. Corporate Management and Property Rights [A]. Henry Manneed. Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities [C]. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1969.
2 Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
3Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.C. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, (13):187-222.
4 Stein, J.C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):111-133.
5 Alchian, A. Corporate Management and Property Rights [A]. Henry Manneed. Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities [C]. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1969.
6 Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
7 Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
8 Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
9 Gertner, R.H., D.S. Scharfstein, J.C. Stein. Internal versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, (109):1211—1230.
10 Matsusaka,J.,Nanda,V., Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing, The Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002
11梁磊,王洪涛等著.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003。
12姚小涛,席酉民著.环境变革中的企业与企业集团[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003。
13李小水.企业集团内部资本市场理论研究,[硕士学位论文],广州:中山大学,2003。
14周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究[J],管理世界,2003,(11):118—125。
15邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J],经济研究,2005.5,64-74
16蒋祥云,中国股市危机形成原因及改革发展建议,http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=7684,2005
1. Alchian, A. Corporate Management and Property Rights [A]. Henry Manneed. Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities [C]. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1969.
2. Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
3. Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.C. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, (13):187—222.
4. Gertner, R.H., D.S. Scharfstein, J.C. Stein. Internal versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, (109):1211—1230.
5. Stein, J.C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):111—133.
6. Stein, J.C. Agency, Information, and Corporate Investment [R]. NBER WP W8342, 2001.
7. Lamont, Owen. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets [J]. Journal of Finance,1997, (52):83—109.
8. Schnure, Calivin. Internal Capital Markets and Investment [Z]. Working Paper—US Federal Reserve Board's Finance & Economic Discussion Series, 1997.
9. Matsusaka,J.,Nanda,V., Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing, The Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002.
10. Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
11.郭复初.财务新论[M],上海:立信会计出版社,2000
12.张亦春.金融市场学[M],北京:高等教育出版社,2000
13.邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J],经济研究,2005,(5),64-74
14.王凤彬,陈高生,熊小彤.企业内部交易费用分析[J],中国工业经济,2005,(1),95-101
15.周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究[J],管理世界,2003,(11):118-125
16.曾亚敏,张俊生.中国上市公司股权收购动因研究[J],世界经济,2005,(2):60-68
17.冼国明,杨锐.跨国公司的内部资本市场[J],世界经济,2001,(5):29-37
18.梁磊,王洪涛等著.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003
19.姚小涛,席酉民著.环境变革中的企业与企业集团[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003
20.席酉民主编.企业集团治理[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2002
21.李小水.企业集团内部资本市场理论研究,[硕士学位论文],广州:中山大学,2003
22.朱元午.企业集团财务实证研究[M],大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999
23.王艳辉,罗静.试论钢铁企业集团资金管理模式的选择[J],冶金经济与管理,2002,(4):35-37
24.陆军荣.企业内部资本市场:替代与治理,[博士论文],上海,复旦大学,2005
25.蒋祥云,中国股市危机形成原因及改革发展建议, http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=7684,2005
26.卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述[J],中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(2):24-30
27.林非园.论我国企业集团财务公司存在的理论基础[J],集团经济研究,2007,(5):19-20
28.郑迎迎.内部资本市场及其对企业价值的影响:理论综述[J],经济评论,2007,(2):153-158
29.张瑞君,邹立,封雪.资金集中管理成功因素的实证研究[J],会计研究,2006,(11):69-75
30.吕洪雁.国有及国有控股企业集团内部资本市场运行机理探析[J],煤炭经济研究,2007,(9):63-65
31.李艳荣,金雪军.论内部资本市场中资源配置的效率[J],学术月刊,2007,(4):90-96
2 Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
3Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.C. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, (13):187-222.
4 Stein, J.C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):111-133.
5 Alchian, A. Corporate Management and Property Rights [A]. Henry Manneed. Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities [C]. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1969.
6 Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
7 Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
8 Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
9 Gertner, R.H., D.S. Scharfstein, J.C. Stein. Internal versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, (109):1211—1230.
10 Matsusaka,J.,Nanda,V., Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing, The Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002
11梁磊,王洪涛等著.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003。
12姚小涛,席酉民著.环境变革中的企业与企业集团[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003。
13李小水.企业集团内部资本市场理论研究,[硕士学位论文],广州:中山大学,2003。
14周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究[J],管理世界,2003,(11):118—125。
15邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J],经济研究,2005.5,64-74
16蒋祥云,中国股市危机形成原因及改革发展建议,http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=7684,2005
1. Alchian, A. Corporate Management and Property Rights [A]. Henry Manneed. Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities [C]. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1969.
2. Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication [M]. NewYork:FreePress, 1975.
3. Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.C. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, (13):187—222.
4. Gertner, R.H., D.S. Scharfstein, J.C. Stein. Internal versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, (109):1211—1230.
5. Stein, J.C. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):111—133.
6. Stein, J.C. Agency, Information, and Corporate Investment [R]. NBER WP W8342, 2001.
7. Lamont, Owen. Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets [J]. Journal of Finance,1997, (52):83—109.
8. Schnure, Calivin. Internal Capital Markets and Investment [Z]. Working Paper—US Federal Reserve Board's Finance & Economic Discussion Series, 1997.
9. Matsusaka,J.,Nanda,V., Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing, The Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002.
10. Giacinta Cestone, Chiara Fumagalli, Winner-picking or cross-subsidization? The strategic impact of resource flexibility in business groups, Universita Bocconi discussion paper,2003.
11.郭复初.财务新论[M],上海:立信会计出版社,2000
12.张亦春.金融市场学[M],北京:高等教育出版社,2000
13.邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J],经济研究,2005,(5),64-74
14.王凤彬,陈高生,熊小彤.企业内部交易费用分析[J],中国工业经济,2005,(1),95-101
15.周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究[J],管理世界,2003,(11):118-125
16.曾亚敏,张俊生.中国上市公司股权收购动因研究[J],世界经济,2005,(2):60-68
17.冼国明,杨锐.跨国公司的内部资本市场[J],世界经济,2001,(5):29-37
18.梁磊,王洪涛等著.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003
19.姚小涛,席酉民著.环境变革中的企业与企业集团[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2003
20.席酉民主编.企业集团治理[M],北京:机械工业出版社,2002
21.李小水.企业集团内部资本市场理论研究,[硕士学位论文],广州:中山大学,2003
22.朱元午.企业集团财务实证研究[M],大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999
23.王艳辉,罗静.试论钢铁企业集团资金管理模式的选择[J],冶金经济与管理,2002,(4):35-37
24.陆军荣.企业内部资本市场:替代与治理,[博士论文],上海,复旦大学,2005
25.蒋祥云,中国股市危机形成原因及改革发展建议, http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=7684,2005
26.卢建新.内部资本市场理论综述[J],中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(2):24-30
27.林非园.论我国企业集团财务公司存在的理论基础[J],集团经济研究,2007,(5):19-20
28.郑迎迎.内部资本市场及其对企业价值的影响:理论综述[J],经济评论,2007,(2):153-158
29.张瑞君,邹立,封雪.资金集中管理成功因素的实证研究[J],会计研究,2006,(11):69-75
30.吕洪雁.国有及国有控股企业集团内部资本市场运行机理探析[J],煤炭经济研究,2007,(9):63-65
31.李艳荣,金雪军.论内部资本市场中资源配置的效率[J],学术月刊,2007,(4):90-96
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