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中国系族集团内部资本市场效率研究
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摘要
随着企业集团的发展,内部资本市场的效率受到了越来越多的关注,特别是像我国这样的新兴市场经济国家。内部资本市场一直被认为具有良好的资源配置的功能,但由于代理问题、多元化折价等因素,内部资本市场的效率被削弱。为了探讨我国内部资本市场的效率性,本文以2005-2006年沪深两市的系族集团为研究对象,按照系族实际控制人属性进行分组,通过探讨分部间投资的关联度讨论内部资本市场的效率性。同时本文将多元化指标细化到上市公司子公司层面,探讨多元化对于内部资本市场效率的影响。在实证研究之后,本文对典型民营系族集团进行了案例研究,试图描述民营系族集团成立的原因、内部资本市场运作的模式,及内部资本市场的效率。通过以上研究,本文得出如下的结论:中国系族集团中存在内部资本市场,但内部资本市场的效率相对较低。中央直接控制的系族集团相对于地方控制和民营的系族集团来说内部资本市场配置效率更好;系族集团上市公司子公司层面的多元化程度在总体样本上影响了内部资本市场的效率。
With the development of enterprise groups, internal capital market efficiency attracts much attention, particularly in emerging markets. Internal capital market has always been considered a good resource allocation function, but because of agency problems, diversification discount and other factors, the internal capital market efficiency is being undermined. This paper studies internal capital market efficiency using Chinese data in 2005-2006. On the other hand, this paper discusses the relationship of diversification and internal capital market efficiency. After that, this paper has a case study about the private enterprise groups. Through these studies, I found that there is an internal capital market in Chinese groups. But the efficiency of internal capital markets is lower. The groups controlled by central government have higher internal capital market efficiency than the one controlled by local government and private ones. And diversification has a negative correlation with internal capital market efficiency.
引文
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