实验经济学兴起与发展的动力机制研究
摘要
实验经济学的兴起已经成为一个事实。目前,实验研究不仅已经深入到微观经济学的各个分支领域,也已在宏观经济学的诸多领域中生根发芽。经济学家已经越来越依赖于使用实验来解释并预测经济现象。不过回顾实验经济学兴起与发展可以发现,该进程一波三折。直到1980年代,主流经济学团体对实验经济学持有的态度更多是怀疑,甚至是拒绝。然而与自然科学实验兴起的历史类似,经济学最终还是在走向实验化。主流经济学团体也逐渐接受并转而支持实验研究。
在这种态度上的巨大转变背后潜藏着的缘由是什么呢?本文在回顾实验经济学主要工作的基础上,首先从科学史的视角对实验经济学的兴起过程进行了分析。围绕实验经济学科学团体如何成长壮大并最终为主流经济学科学团体所接受这一线索,我们分析了这个过程中实验研究主体、主体之间的活动,及其与非实验研究者、进而与环境因素之间的交互作用对实验经济学兴起与发展所起到的推动作用。
接着,我们从范式转变的视角分析了实验经济学为什么是在20世纪中叶前后而不是其他时间产生,并在1980年代开始出现融入主流经济学的征兆。我们认为,是博弈论的出现为实验经济学的兴起提供了肥沃的土壤。然而即使如此,由于1980年代之前经济学为一般均衡理论及其使用的计量方法所主导支配,因此实验经济学一开始只能在边缘勉力存活着。不过也正是因此,当主流框架遇到危机,替代性的理论如博弈论与替代性的方法如实验就获得了发展的契机。
尽管如此,我们认为这还不是故事的全部。毕竟任何一门学科不会总是处于一个范式的“革命性”变迁中,而更可能走出一条渐进演化的路径。因此在历史与范式分析之后,我们从实验经济学所特有的理论与实验的交互入手,说明了它如何沿着这么一条自演化的路径前行,并最终走向一种“供给创造需求”的模式。
在完成了所有这些历史的、范式的以及演化的分析之后,我们从一个一般的科学哲学命题出发对实验经济学的兴起做一个总体性的判断。我们认为,虽然实验经济学基于强大的方法力量而取得许多重要的成就,也提出许多重要的命题,但它仍旧还处在构建核心范式,包括行为模型、制度模型与环境模型的努力之中。基于此我们认为,作为可以与理论研究平行而互补的模型的一种,实验研究在传统的认识世界、改造世界以及课堂教学方面的重要性是毋庸置疑的。不过与理论研究不同之处在于,实验研究在研究构想与研究实施的过程中多了关键的一步：实验设计。因此,如何在实际研究中盯住问题并“经济性”地进行实验设计是实验研究实施过程中的第一要务。
更重要的是,与自然科学实验研究不同,实验研究在进入到社会科学领域当中之后必然需要回到价值与意义的问题上来。因此,研究者之前的价值关联将决定一个研究最终的价值所在。于是,研究者除了需要在研究实践之中寻找实验研究的合法性之外,还需要通过一些现象学的还原抑或者先验的“猜测”寻找社会科学实验研究的源泉与灵魂。
基于上述认识,我们认为实验研究对于我国而言具有特殊意义。这不仅是因为它可以在一般理论研究与实践领域之中有所作为,并基于实证研究过程的捕获研究的客观性,从而为我们在对话西方社会时提供一个无偏的平台,而且因为它可以帮助我们更好地理解建基于西方行为人一般模式的西方经济学中那些关于行为、环境与制度的一般理论以及基于这种理论而设计的制度是否适用于中国。
It has clearly become a fact that experimental economics has grown up rapidly. At present, experiments not only has penetrated into most fields of microeconomics, but also germinated in many fields of macroeconomics. Economists nowadays have come to increasingly rely on experiments to explain and predict economic phenomenon. However, if we take a look back to the rising of experimental economics, we will find that the process is full of twists and turns. The mainstream economists had explicitly shown a suspicion or even denial toward experimental economics till 1980s. Although it took a long time, economics has finally become an experimental science. The mainstream economists'attitudes toward experimentation change to accept and further support just as what happened in natural science.
Why did this happen? In this thesis, we will systematically analyze the driving forces behind this dramatic transition. First of all, based on a review of the achievements experimental economics has generated, this thesis sketches out a historical picture of the rising of experimental economics. Along with the development that how the scientific community of experimental economic grew and expended and finally incorperated into the community of mainstream economics, we firstly descripe how pioneers in this field strive hard and how their interactions between each other and with non-experimental researcheres as well as their interactions with outer factors faciliate the rising of experimental economics.
And then we discuss why did experimental economics just born in the midcentury but not sooner or later and why it was in 1980s that mainstream economists began to acknowledge the relevance of laboratory experiments from a perspective of paradigm shift. Typically, we investigate how the advent of game theory provided a fertile land for experimental work, and why experimentation did not make sense as economics after the World WarⅡwas dominated by an overarching framework, namely, general equilibrium theory and its allying empirical method, econometrics. Likewise, it's naturally to conjesture that once general equilibrium theory as well as econometrics ran into trouble, experimentation began to flourish. And that is the story in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Nevertheless, these are only parts of the story, as any discipline would not always invole in an "revolutionary" paradigm shift. Rather, it should be an evolutionary process since its first birth. Therefore, we then focus on the special growing routh of experimental economics, which is characterized by the interaction between theory and experiment. We propose a basic mechanism of how experimental economics has developed along this routh, and how it later comes to be token over by the "Law of J.B. Say"; namely, the supply creates its own demand. This suggests that the application of experiments generated a more intense use of experiments.
Finally, we try to made a judgment on the rising of experimental economics by answering a common question in philosophy of science; that is, has experimental economics generated a scientific revolution in economics? We suggest that, although it has made substantial progress in raising variuos propositions, there are still a lot of work to do, and of the first priority is to construct its core model.
To sum, we come to several conclusions:(1) as a parallel and complementary kind of model to theory, it is of no doubt that experimental research has been playing a significant role in understanding and reforming the world, and (2) in such process, it is of first importance to consider experimental design, which is the bridge connected research idea and experimentation, for this is the most distinguished difference between theory and experiment. We suggest two criterions for experimental design: "problem-orientation" and "economy". Moreover, (3) different from experiment researches conducted in natural sciences, once experiment comes into social sciences, it undoubtedly will embody with meaning reflection and value. Therefore, in addition to find its validity in the process of research, experimentists should go beyond this and find some supports from a priori "conjectures".
For these reasons, experimentation may make a special sence in China. This is not only reflected in the commonplaces of experimental economics, but also in the sense that as a method good at positive research, it provides us an impartial platform of dialogue with western countries. Furthermore, experiment will help us understand better about whether or not the theories of behavior, environment and institution as well as its applications in mechanism design of mainstream economics are applicable in China. All in all, we believe experimentation may cast a new light on economic researches in China in the future.
在这种态度上的巨大转变背后潜藏着的缘由是什么呢?本文在回顾实验经济学主要工作的基础上,首先从科学史的视角对实验经济学的兴起过程进行了分析。围绕实验经济学科学团体如何成长壮大并最终为主流经济学科学团体所接受这一线索,我们分析了这个过程中实验研究主体、主体之间的活动,及其与非实验研究者、进而与环境因素之间的交互作用对实验经济学兴起与发展所起到的推动作用。
接着,我们从范式转变的视角分析了实验经济学为什么是在20世纪中叶前后而不是其他时间产生,并在1980年代开始出现融入主流经济学的征兆。我们认为,是博弈论的出现为实验经济学的兴起提供了肥沃的土壤。然而即使如此,由于1980年代之前经济学为一般均衡理论及其使用的计量方法所主导支配,因此实验经济学一开始只能在边缘勉力存活着。不过也正是因此,当主流框架遇到危机,替代性的理论如博弈论与替代性的方法如实验就获得了发展的契机。
尽管如此,我们认为这还不是故事的全部。毕竟任何一门学科不会总是处于一个范式的“革命性”变迁中,而更可能走出一条渐进演化的路径。因此在历史与范式分析之后,我们从实验经济学所特有的理论与实验的交互入手,说明了它如何沿着这么一条自演化的路径前行,并最终走向一种“供给创造需求”的模式。
在完成了所有这些历史的、范式的以及演化的分析之后,我们从一个一般的科学哲学命题出发对实验经济学的兴起做一个总体性的判断。我们认为,虽然实验经济学基于强大的方法力量而取得许多重要的成就,也提出许多重要的命题,但它仍旧还处在构建核心范式,包括行为模型、制度模型与环境模型的努力之中。基于此我们认为,作为可以与理论研究平行而互补的模型的一种,实验研究在传统的认识世界、改造世界以及课堂教学方面的重要性是毋庸置疑的。不过与理论研究不同之处在于,实验研究在研究构想与研究实施的过程中多了关键的一步：实验设计。因此,如何在实际研究中盯住问题并“经济性”地进行实验设计是实验研究实施过程中的第一要务。
更重要的是,与自然科学实验研究不同,实验研究在进入到社会科学领域当中之后必然需要回到价值与意义的问题上来。因此,研究者之前的价值关联将决定一个研究最终的价值所在。于是,研究者除了需要在研究实践之中寻找实验研究的合法性之外,还需要通过一些现象学的还原抑或者先验的“猜测”寻找社会科学实验研究的源泉与灵魂。
基于上述认识,我们认为实验研究对于我国而言具有特殊意义。这不仅是因为它可以在一般理论研究与实践领域之中有所作为,并基于实证研究过程的捕获研究的客观性,从而为我们在对话西方社会时提供一个无偏的平台,而且因为它可以帮助我们更好地理解建基于西方行为人一般模式的西方经济学中那些关于行为、环境与制度的一般理论以及基于这种理论而设计的制度是否适用于中国。
It has clearly become a fact that experimental economics has grown up rapidly. At present, experiments not only has penetrated into most fields of microeconomics, but also germinated in many fields of macroeconomics. Economists nowadays have come to increasingly rely on experiments to explain and predict economic phenomenon. However, if we take a look back to the rising of experimental economics, we will find that the process is full of twists and turns. The mainstream economists had explicitly shown a suspicion or even denial toward experimental economics till 1980s. Although it took a long time, economics has finally become an experimental science. The mainstream economists'attitudes toward experimentation change to accept and further support just as what happened in natural science.
Why did this happen? In this thesis, we will systematically analyze the driving forces behind this dramatic transition. First of all, based on a review of the achievements experimental economics has generated, this thesis sketches out a historical picture of the rising of experimental economics. Along with the development that how the scientific community of experimental economic grew and expended and finally incorperated into the community of mainstream economics, we firstly descripe how pioneers in this field strive hard and how their interactions between each other and with non-experimental researcheres as well as their interactions with outer factors faciliate the rising of experimental economics.
And then we discuss why did experimental economics just born in the midcentury but not sooner or later and why it was in 1980s that mainstream economists began to acknowledge the relevance of laboratory experiments from a perspective of paradigm shift. Typically, we investigate how the advent of game theory provided a fertile land for experimental work, and why experimentation did not make sense as economics after the World WarⅡwas dominated by an overarching framework, namely, general equilibrium theory and its allying empirical method, econometrics. Likewise, it's naturally to conjesture that once general equilibrium theory as well as econometrics ran into trouble, experimentation began to flourish. And that is the story in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Nevertheless, these are only parts of the story, as any discipline would not always invole in an "revolutionary" paradigm shift. Rather, it should be an evolutionary process since its first birth. Therefore, we then focus on the special growing routh of experimental economics, which is characterized by the interaction between theory and experiment. We propose a basic mechanism of how experimental economics has developed along this routh, and how it later comes to be token over by the "Law of J.B. Say"; namely, the supply creates its own demand. This suggests that the application of experiments generated a more intense use of experiments.
Finally, we try to made a judgment on the rising of experimental economics by answering a common question in philosophy of science; that is, has experimental economics generated a scientific revolution in economics? We suggest that, although it has made substantial progress in raising variuos propositions, there are still a lot of work to do, and of the first priority is to construct its core model.
To sum, we come to several conclusions:(1) as a parallel and complementary kind of model to theory, it is of no doubt that experimental research has been playing a significant role in understanding and reforming the world, and (2) in such process, it is of first importance to consider experimental design, which is the bridge connected research idea and experimentation, for this is the most distinguished difference between theory and experiment. We suggest two criterions for experimental design: "problem-orientation" and "economy". Moreover, (3) different from experiment researches conducted in natural sciences, once experiment comes into social sciences, it undoubtedly will embody with meaning reflection and value. Therefore, in addition to find its validity in the process of research, experimentists should go beyond this and find some supports from a priori "conjectures".
For these reasons, experimentation may make a special sence in China. This is not only reflected in the commonplaces of experimental economics, but also in the sense that as a method good at positive research, it provides us an impartial platform of dialogue with western countries. Furthermore, experiment will help us understand better about whether or not the theories of behavior, environment and institution as well as its applications in mechanism design of mainstream economics are applicable in China. All in all, we believe experimentation may cast a new light on economic researches in China in the future.
引文
明显的反应包括Paul Samuelson在其新版的教科书中删除了上述说词。具体可见后文论述。
①如由Kreps(1990)所编的研究生教材《微观经济理论教程》特别关注了议价实验,而Varian(1990)的中级微观经济学教材也包含了一节由Glenn Harrison所写的课堂市场实验的内容。另外,Sriglitz(1993)甚至在其《微观经济学原理》中介绍了实验软件。
②见如Hey(1991),Davis与Holt(1993),Friedman与Sunder (1994).
③ Charles Plott与Vernon Smith也在2008年编辑了一本《实验经济学结果手册》,收录了涉及市场、博弈、个体选择与方法论四块的实验文章110多篇。
④这似乎意味着,实验比以往任何其他社会科学方法更容易获得自然科学界研究者们的认同与理解。事实上,Charles Plott进入到实验研究之中的一个重要的推动力就是在他转到Caltech后,他不得不经常用一些最简单的方式向他的自然科学与工程学同事们解释社会科学在做什么。不过本文在这一点上着墨不多。
⑤自1997年起,ESA每年会在欧洲与北美各举办一次年会；自2005年起,亚洲分会场设立。
①见如Knetsch与Sinden (1984), Kahneman等(1990)Kachelmeier与Shehata(1992)等。
①不是必要条件,是因为在实验中,被试仅知道自己的供求价格,但是成交价格却总能敛向理论均衡。不是充分条件,是因为当整个交易剩余都被买者占有、并且所有被试都知道这一信息时,人们出于公平的考虑,有时会阻止竞争均衡的出现。有趣的是,完全信息的出现甚至会阻止市场的出清。因为此时的供给曲线完全弹性的市场双向拍卖实验就将变成议价博弈,处于劣势的卖方并不会接受市场可出清但是对其而言“不公平”的市场价格(Smith,1962; Fouraker and Siegel,1963).这与博弈论中更多的信息会增加共谋的可能性(Shubik,1959)的观点是一致的。
②见如Shubik (1962), Friedman (1963), Murphy (1966)以及Friedman (1969)的综述。
③事实上,在早期实验中,Vernon Smith就试图通过变化各种制度来研究市场结果,虽然他当时还没有明确意识到这一点(见Smith,1962,1964,1967,以及参加其讨论班的一些人的工作,如Williams,1973).
①如Schmalensee (1976), Dwyer等(1993),Marimon与Sunder (1993,1994)。
②见如Williams (1987), Smith等(1988),以及Camerer(1995)与Ochs(1995)的综述。
①见如Seater (1993)。
②类似的实验研究还有Lombardelli等(2005)以及Engle-Warnick与Turdaliev (2006)。
① Smith自己也把这些交流看的与他和Sidney Siegel的讨论一样重要,见Smith (1992)。
②见Plott (2001a)的文集。
①以ESA的注册会员数目来看,其会员从1992年的500左右增长到了当前的近5000人。
②如《怪诞行为学》。
①如前所述.这可能是源于理论与实验研究的专业化分工(Dimand,2005).
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①如由Kreps(1990)所编的研究生教材《微观经济理论教程》特别关注了议价实验,而Varian(1990)的中级微观经济学教材也包含了一节由Glenn Harrison所写的课堂市场实验的内容。另外,Sriglitz(1993)甚至在其《微观经济学原理》中介绍了实验软件。
②见如Hey(1991),Davis与Holt(1993),Friedman与Sunder (1994).
③ Charles Plott与Vernon Smith也在2008年编辑了一本《实验经济学结果手册》,收录了涉及市场、博弈、个体选择与方法论四块的实验文章110多篇。
④这似乎意味着,实验比以往任何其他社会科学方法更容易获得自然科学界研究者们的认同与理解。事实上,Charles Plott进入到实验研究之中的一个重要的推动力就是在他转到Caltech后,他不得不经常用一些最简单的方式向他的自然科学与工程学同事们解释社会科学在做什么。不过本文在这一点上着墨不多。
⑤自1997年起,ESA每年会在欧洲与北美各举办一次年会；自2005年起,亚洲分会场设立。
①见如Knetsch与Sinden (1984), Kahneman等(1990)Kachelmeier与Shehata(1992)等。
①不是必要条件,是因为在实验中,被试仅知道自己的供求价格,但是成交价格却总能敛向理论均衡。不是充分条件,是因为当整个交易剩余都被买者占有、并且所有被试都知道这一信息时,人们出于公平的考虑,有时会阻止竞争均衡的出现。有趣的是,完全信息的出现甚至会阻止市场的出清。因为此时的供给曲线完全弹性的市场双向拍卖实验就将变成议价博弈,处于劣势的卖方并不会接受市场可出清但是对其而言“不公平”的市场价格(Smith,1962; Fouraker and Siegel,1963).这与博弈论中更多的信息会增加共谋的可能性(Shubik,1959)的观点是一致的。
②见如Shubik (1962), Friedman (1963), Murphy (1966)以及Friedman (1969)的综述。
③事实上,在早期实验中,Vernon Smith就试图通过变化各种制度来研究市场结果,虽然他当时还没有明确意识到这一点(见Smith,1962,1964,1967,以及参加其讨论班的一些人的工作,如Williams,1973).
①如Schmalensee (1976), Dwyer等(1993),Marimon与Sunder (1993,1994)。
②见如Williams (1987), Smith等(1988),以及Camerer(1995)与Ochs(1995)的综述。
①见如Seater (1993)。
②类似的实验研究还有Lombardelli等(2005)以及Engle-Warnick与Turdaliev (2006)。
① Smith自己也把这些交流看的与他和Sidney Siegel的讨论一样重要,见Smith (1992)。
②见Plott (2001a)的文集。
①以ESA的注册会员数目来看,其会员从1992年的500左右增长到了当前的近5000人。
②如《怪诞行为学》。
①如前所述.这可能是源于理论与实验研究的专业化分工(Dimand,2005).
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