人口老龄化的经济效应与中国养老保险制度选择
摘要
21世纪是人口老龄化的时代。目前,世界上所有的发达国家都已进入老龄化社会,许多发展中国家正在或即将进入老龄社会,中国则早在1999年进入老龄化社会,成为进入老龄化社会较早的国家之一,而且,中国是世界上老龄人口最多的国家,占到世界老龄人口的20%。老龄化快速、不可逆转的发展,对我国现行的养老保险制度提出严峻的挑战,养老保险基金缺口不断扩大成为制约我国养老保险制度维持和可持续发展的重要障碍。老龄化还对劳动力市场、资本积累从而对整个宏观经济产生应影响。养老保险制度作为老龄化与经济增长关系的一个媒介,其设计关系到老龄化背景下养老保险制度本身的可持续发展,也关系到经济增长的持续稳定。本文的写作正是在这一背景下进行的。
本文以生命周期模型和叠代模型为理论分析工具,基于老龄化对宏观经济产生的一般影响和对我国特殊影响的分析、基于老龄化对养老保险制度的一般和特殊分析、养老保险制度对宏观经济影响的分析,以养老保险为媒介,寻求能够在保险和保险造成的劳动力市场扭曲、保险与适度资本积累相平衡、激励与保险相容的我国最优的养老保险制度设计。论文结构如下：第一章是总论,阐述本文的研究背景与研究意义、文献综述、研究视角及研究方法；第二章对人口老龄化的发展、趋势及其成因进行了分析,是整篇论文的开篇,该章首先分析了老龄化的国际发展及趋势,然后对中国老龄化的发展进行了预测并总结了中国老龄化的特点；在第二章的基础上,引出第三章——老龄化对养老保险制度的挑战：首先分析了老龄化对养老保险制度的一般影响,然后针对我国老龄化的速度快、未富先老的现实,分析了老龄化对我国养老保险制度的特殊影响,并对现收现付制和基金积累制的特点和各自的风险进行了比较；论文的第四章分析了老龄化、养老保险制度的经济效应,该章是承前启后的一章,也是论文的核心一章。该章首先分析了老龄化的劳动力市场效应、然后是老龄化对储蓄和消费的影响,结论是老龄化导致劳动力供给的减少和劳动力年龄结构的上升,除非是技术有突破性的进步,劳动力的生产率将出现下降,老龄化在西方国家减少国民储蓄的总额,降低经济的增长速度,而在我国,实证研究的结论是老龄化对储蓄的影响为正,即随着老龄化的发展,储蓄率将会上升。其后分析了养老保险制度的宏观经济效应,利用生命周期模型和叠代模型的分析证明：现收现付的养老保险制度在人口老龄化的背景下,将产生对劳动力供给的负激励、诱使提前退休、劳动参与的积极性降低等扭曲劳动力市场的效应,而且长期中,进入重度老龄化社会后,人口的老龄化导致储蓄率的下降,基金积累制则能够克服老龄化对养老保险制度的可持续发展造成的威胁,消除养老保险制度对劳动力市场、储蓄、资本积累和经济增长的消极影响,基金积累进入资本市场必将对资本市场的发展和完善产生推动作用,政府也将更加有决心和压力完善市场规则和金融监督机制的建设,从而对宏观经济产生积极影响,但是完全的基金制将丧失养老保险的收入再分配功能,保险与其造成的经济扭曲间的平衡仍然是养老保险改革的主题；论文第五章首先介绍了我国养老保险制度的演进,然后对我国的已有的养老保险制度改革进行了评价,特别是关于个人账户做实的必要性与可行性,以及做实个人账户的公平和效率进行了分析,在此基础上,指出：现收现付制与基金积累制的结合是保险与激励相容的一种制度设计。论文最后一章是我国养老保险制度的选择,根据前面几章的论述,基于促进经济可持续发展目标的实现,提出人口结构变化、老龄化社会背景下,我国养老保险制度的设计原则、框架、及社保基金的管理和运作,并对全文进行了总结。
本文的研究方法主要有学科交叉法、宏观经济理论与微观个体经济行为理论分析法、规范与实证、定量与定性、历史与逻辑推演相结合的方法。论文的创新之处：(1)研究视角的创新,论文以养老社会保险制度为媒介,研究如何通过养老保险制度的完善弱化老龄化对经济造成的不良影响,并保持养老保险制度的可持续发展。(2)观点的创新,同样是面对老龄化,与西方国家通过制度转轨提高储蓄率刺激经济增长的改革目标不同,我国养老保险制度的改革目标之一是扩大养老保险的覆盖范围,刺激消费促进经济的增长。并且提出养老保险制度改革不是一个事件,而是一个漫长的过程,是与时俱进的。(3)研究方法的创新,采用动态的门限回归分析方法,而且分别以老龄化和经济增长本身为门限,从基本模型,即不包括其它控制变量的模型,到包括控制变量的结构模型,再到考察门限效应的门限模型,该方法克服了时间序列分析、截面数据分析以及面板数据分析的一些缺陷,并得出具有说服力的结论,资料翔实,内容丰富。
The 21st century is the era of population aging. Up until now, all of the developed nations have stepped into aging society and many developing countries are being or are about to enter aging society. As a developing country, China entered into aging society in 1999,becoming one of the countries which got into aging society faster than the speed of the economic development. Furthermore, China has the greatest number of aging population, which accounts for nearly 20% of old population all over the world. With the rapid increasing of old population and sustainable aging of population expected to occur in China over coming decades, the current pension system is facing rigorous challenge posed by aging. The growing gap between the need of pension funding and the supply restrict the development of pension systems and the sustainable development of economy. Pensions have the broadest coverage and frequently the largest cost of any program in the entire social security systems. With the development of aging, the pension systems have become a major burden of public finance. Aging has also a passive effect to the macroeconomics; it is clear that one of the most-if not the most important interaction between savings and ageing centeres on pensions. The design of the pension systems become the key point of the sustainable development of economics in an aging society, this is just the setting of why I chose this research topic.
Basing on theoretical analysis tools of life cycle theory and over lapping generations'model, this paper carries out a series of theoretical analysis. Such as basing on the general and special analysis of the impacts of aging on the macroeconomics, analysis of the effects of aging on pension schemes and analysis of the effects of pension schemes on saving and capital accumulation. This paper try to examine the channel through which aging will shape the main economic factors and in turn affect the potential growth, the answer is that it is the pension insurance systems, which act as the channel between aging and potential growth. If we design the pension insurance system properly, impetus to policy reform will temper the adverse effects of aging on economic. The purpose of the writing of this paper is seeking best old-age insurance system design that can bring about balance between insurance and minimizing the distortion of labor market, insurance and moderate accumulation of capital, at the same time, incentive-insurance are compatible.
This paper is structured as follows:chapterⅠremarks to explain the background of writing this dissertation including significance, literature review, writing perspective, and research methods. ChapterⅡbegins with a brief discussion of demographic issues. Analyzing the development of population aging, trends and their causes are, this chapter is the opening of the entire thesis. First, the author analyzes the international developments of aging and the trends, and then the author predictsed the development of China's aging trend and summarizes the character of aging. In this basis, leads to chapterⅢ, the challenges of aging on pension system. After the general analysis of the impact of aging on pension systems, the paper then analyze the impact of aging on pension system facing the fact of aging before rich in China. Then the author compares the characteristics of the two systems-pay-as-you-go system and the full funded system. ChapterⅣof this paper analyzes the impact of aging on macroeconomics, the impact of pension systems on capital accumulation and labor supply. This chapter is a chapter inheriting the former and indicating the latter and is the core chapter of the thesis. This chapter analyzes the effects of aging on labor market at first, followed by the impact of aging on savings and consumption, concluding that aging leads to reduction in labor supply and increase in the structure of labor force age. Unless a breakthrough of technology advances, the labor force productivity will decline. In western countries aging tend to reduce the total amount of national savings in turn the economic growth rate, while in China, the empirical results of the study is the impact of aging on savings is positive, that is, along with the development of aging, the savings rate will increase. Subsequent analysis is the macroeconomic effects of pension insurance system, using life-cycle model and over lapping generations model analysis has shown that:on the setting of aging, pay-as-you-go insurance system will give rise to the negative incentives to labor supply, leading to distortions effects of labor market, such as early retirement, less positive labor force participation and so on. And also in the long-term, aging of the population tend to lead decline in the savings rate, the funded system is able to overcome the threaten of aging on sustainable development pension systems, and eliminate the negative effects of pension insurance system on labor market, savings, capital accumulation in turn the economic growth. The accumulation of pension funds will play a stimulating role to develop and improve the capital market. Furthermore, the government will become more determined and pressure to improve the construction and financial supervision mechanisms that have a positive impact on the macro economy. However, the full funded pension system will lose the income redistribution function, the balance between insurance reduce the distorting effect is still the main point of pension insurance reform. Chapter V first introduces the evolution of China's pension insurance system, then give an economic evaluation to our existing pension system reform, particularly with regard to necessity and feasibility to do real of individual accounts. On this basis, equity and efficiency to do real the individual accounts were analyzed, conclusion is-integration of pay-as you go system and part funded insurance system is an incentive-compatible design. The last chapter is the polices recommendations of China's pension insurance system, pension insurance system in China put forward the design principles including the framework of the pension insurance system, the social security funding management and operation.
The study methods are mainly inter-disciplinary method, macro-economic analysis method, combination of normative and empirical, historical and logical. The main innovations of the paper are:(1) Innovation of research perspectives. The paper study how can we weaken the adverse impact of aging on the economy and maintain the sustainable development of the pension system with the pension system as a medium. (2) Innovation of point of view. China is facing the same demographic problem with the western countries-fast development of aging society. However different from the Western countries in transition through the system to rise the savings rate in turn stimulates economic growth.One of the objectives of pension reform is to expand the coverage of the system to stimulate consumption and economic growth. In addition, proposed pension system reform is not an event, but a long process. (3) Research method innovtion. Using aging and economic growth as the threshold respectively, this paper set out a dynamic threshold regression analysis. From the basic model, that does not include other control variables in the model, to the structural model including the control variables, and then to threshold model that examines threshold effects. The method overcomes shortcomings of the time-series analysis, cross-sectional data analysis, and panel data analysis, and arrives at a convincing conclusion, informative and rich in content.
本文以生命周期模型和叠代模型为理论分析工具,基于老龄化对宏观经济产生的一般影响和对我国特殊影响的分析、基于老龄化对养老保险制度的一般和特殊分析、养老保险制度对宏观经济影响的分析,以养老保险为媒介,寻求能够在保险和保险造成的劳动力市场扭曲、保险与适度资本积累相平衡、激励与保险相容的我国最优的养老保险制度设计。论文结构如下：第一章是总论,阐述本文的研究背景与研究意义、文献综述、研究视角及研究方法；第二章对人口老龄化的发展、趋势及其成因进行了分析,是整篇论文的开篇,该章首先分析了老龄化的国际发展及趋势,然后对中国老龄化的发展进行了预测并总结了中国老龄化的特点；在第二章的基础上,引出第三章——老龄化对养老保险制度的挑战：首先分析了老龄化对养老保险制度的一般影响,然后针对我国老龄化的速度快、未富先老的现实,分析了老龄化对我国养老保险制度的特殊影响,并对现收现付制和基金积累制的特点和各自的风险进行了比较；论文的第四章分析了老龄化、养老保险制度的经济效应,该章是承前启后的一章,也是论文的核心一章。该章首先分析了老龄化的劳动力市场效应、然后是老龄化对储蓄和消费的影响,结论是老龄化导致劳动力供给的减少和劳动力年龄结构的上升,除非是技术有突破性的进步,劳动力的生产率将出现下降,老龄化在西方国家减少国民储蓄的总额,降低经济的增长速度,而在我国,实证研究的结论是老龄化对储蓄的影响为正,即随着老龄化的发展,储蓄率将会上升。其后分析了养老保险制度的宏观经济效应,利用生命周期模型和叠代模型的分析证明：现收现付的养老保险制度在人口老龄化的背景下,将产生对劳动力供给的负激励、诱使提前退休、劳动参与的积极性降低等扭曲劳动力市场的效应,而且长期中,进入重度老龄化社会后,人口的老龄化导致储蓄率的下降,基金积累制则能够克服老龄化对养老保险制度的可持续发展造成的威胁,消除养老保险制度对劳动力市场、储蓄、资本积累和经济增长的消极影响,基金积累进入资本市场必将对资本市场的发展和完善产生推动作用,政府也将更加有决心和压力完善市场规则和金融监督机制的建设,从而对宏观经济产生积极影响,但是完全的基金制将丧失养老保险的收入再分配功能,保险与其造成的经济扭曲间的平衡仍然是养老保险改革的主题；论文第五章首先介绍了我国养老保险制度的演进,然后对我国的已有的养老保险制度改革进行了评价,特别是关于个人账户做实的必要性与可行性,以及做实个人账户的公平和效率进行了分析,在此基础上,指出：现收现付制与基金积累制的结合是保险与激励相容的一种制度设计。论文最后一章是我国养老保险制度的选择,根据前面几章的论述,基于促进经济可持续发展目标的实现,提出人口结构变化、老龄化社会背景下,我国养老保险制度的设计原则、框架、及社保基金的管理和运作,并对全文进行了总结。
本文的研究方法主要有学科交叉法、宏观经济理论与微观个体经济行为理论分析法、规范与实证、定量与定性、历史与逻辑推演相结合的方法。论文的创新之处：(1)研究视角的创新,论文以养老社会保险制度为媒介,研究如何通过养老保险制度的完善弱化老龄化对经济造成的不良影响,并保持养老保险制度的可持续发展。(2)观点的创新,同样是面对老龄化,与西方国家通过制度转轨提高储蓄率刺激经济增长的改革目标不同,我国养老保险制度的改革目标之一是扩大养老保险的覆盖范围,刺激消费促进经济的增长。并且提出养老保险制度改革不是一个事件,而是一个漫长的过程,是与时俱进的。(3)研究方法的创新,采用动态的门限回归分析方法,而且分别以老龄化和经济增长本身为门限,从基本模型,即不包括其它控制变量的模型,到包括控制变量的结构模型,再到考察门限效应的门限模型,该方法克服了时间序列分析、截面数据分析以及面板数据分析的一些缺陷,并得出具有说服力的结论,资料翔实,内容丰富。
The 21st century is the era of population aging. Up until now, all of the developed nations have stepped into aging society and many developing countries are being or are about to enter aging society. As a developing country, China entered into aging society in 1999,becoming one of the countries which got into aging society faster than the speed of the economic development. Furthermore, China has the greatest number of aging population, which accounts for nearly 20% of old population all over the world. With the rapid increasing of old population and sustainable aging of population expected to occur in China over coming decades, the current pension system is facing rigorous challenge posed by aging. The growing gap between the need of pension funding and the supply restrict the development of pension systems and the sustainable development of economy. Pensions have the broadest coverage and frequently the largest cost of any program in the entire social security systems. With the development of aging, the pension systems have become a major burden of public finance. Aging has also a passive effect to the macroeconomics; it is clear that one of the most-if not the most important interaction between savings and ageing centeres on pensions. The design of the pension systems become the key point of the sustainable development of economics in an aging society, this is just the setting of why I chose this research topic.
Basing on theoretical analysis tools of life cycle theory and over lapping generations'model, this paper carries out a series of theoretical analysis. Such as basing on the general and special analysis of the impacts of aging on the macroeconomics, analysis of the effects of aging on pension schemes and analysis of the effects of pension schemes on saving and capital accumulation. This paper try to examine the channel through which aging will shape the main economic factors and in turn affect the potential growth, the answer is that it is the pension insurance systems, which act as the channel between aging and potential growth. If we design the pension insurance system properly, impetus to policy reform will temper the adverse effects of aging on economic. The purpose of the writing of this paper is seeking best old-age insurance system design that can bring about balance between insurance and minimizing the distortion of labor market, insurance and moderate accumulation of capital, at the same time, incentive-insurance are compatible.
This paper is structured as follows:chapterⅠremarks to explain the background of writing this dissertation including significance, literature review, writing perspective, and research methods. ChapterⅡbegins with a brief discussion of demographic issues. Analyzing the development of population aging, trends and their causes are, this chapter is the opening of the entire thesis. First, the author analyzes the international developments of aging and the trends, and then the author predictsed the development of China's aging trend and summarizes the character of aging. In this basis, leads to chapterⅢ, the challenges of aging on pension system. After the general analysis of the impact of aging on pension systems, the paper then analyze the impact of aging on pension system facing the fact of aging before rich in China. Then the author compares the characteristics of the two systems-pay-as-you-go system and the full funded system. ChapterⅣof this paper analyzes the impact of aging on macroeconomics, the impact of pension systems on capital accumulation and labor supply. This chapter is a chapter inheriting the former and indicating the latter and is the core chapter of the thesis. This chapter analyzes the effects of aging on labor market at first, followed by the impact of aging on savings and consumption, concluding that aging leads to reduction in labor supply and increase in the structure of labor force age. Unless a breakthrough of technology advances, the labor force productivity will decline. In western countries aging tend to reduce the total amount of national savings in turn the economic growth rate, while in China, the empirical results of the study is the impact of aging on savings is positive, that is, along with the development of aging, the savings rate will increase. Subsequent analysis is the macroeconomic effects of pension insurance system, using life-cycle model and over lapping generations model analysis has shown that:on the setting of aging, pay-as-you-go insurance system will give rise to the negative incentives to labor supply, leading to distortions effects of labor market, such as early retirement, less positive labor force participation and so on. And also in the long-term, aging of the population tend to lead decline in the savings rate, the funded system is able to overcome the threaten of aging on sustainable development pension systems, and eliminate the negative effects of pension insurance system on labor market, savings, capital accumulation in turn the economic growth. The accumulation of pension funds will play a stimulating role to develop and improve the capital market. Furthermore, the government will become more determined and pressure to improve the construction and financial supervision mechanisms that have a positive impact on the macro economy. However, the full funded pension system will lose the income redistribution function, the balance between insurance reduce the distorting effect is still the main point of pension insurance reform. Chapter V first introduces the evolution of China's pension insurance system, then give an economic evaluation to our existing pension system reform, particularly with regard to necessity and feasibility to do real of individual accounts. On this basis, equity and efficiency to do real the individual accounts were analyzed, conclusion is-integration of pay-as you go system and part funded insurance system is an incentive-compatible design. The last chapter is the polices recommendations of China's pension insurance system, pension insurance system in China put forward the design principles including the framework of the pension insurance system, the social security funding management and operation.
The study methods are mainly inter-disciplinary method, macro-economic analysis method, combination of normative and empirical, historical and logical. The main innovations of the paper are:(1) Innovation of research perspectives. The paper study how can we weaken the adverse impact of aging on the economy and maintain the sustainable development of the pension system with the pension system as a medium. (2) Innovation of point of view. China is facing the same demographic problem with the western countries-fast development of aging society. However different from the Western countries in transition through the system to rise the savings rate in turn stimulates economic growth.One of the objectives of pension reform is to expand the coverage of the system to stimulate consumption and economic growth. In addition, proposed pension system reform is not an event, but a long process. (3) Research method innovtion. Using aging and economic growth as the threshold respectively, this paper set out a dynamic threshold regression analysis. From the basic model, that does not include other control variables in the model, to the structural model including the control variables, and then to threshold model that examines threshold effects. The method overcomes shortcomings of the time-series analysis, cross-sectional data analysis, and panel data analysis, and arrives at a convincing conclusion, informative and rich in content.
引文
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②民主社团制是这样一种制度安排：它可以保证工人在有关的社会和经济政策制定过程中有充分表达意见的权利,它要求工人放弃某些自由,但必须是自愿的,而且同时雇主一方也要求放弃他们的一些自由。这种民主社团制使得高度集中的工会组织、高度集中的雇主组织和政府体系能够较快的就有关的社会和经济政策达成一致。
③专权社团制则是一种国家结构,它通过保持国家对工人的控制来缓解工人和雇主的冲突,其结果是养老保险制度是基于消除独立的工会和社会主义团体的政治影响而建立的。
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②民主社团制是这样一种制度安排：它可以保证工人在有关的社会和经济政策制定过程中有充分表达意见的权利,它要求工人放弃某些自由,但必须是自愿的,而且同时雇主一方也要求放弃他们的一些自由。这种民主社团制使得高度集中的工会组织、高度集中的雇主组织和政府体系能够较快的就有关的社会和经济政策达成一致。
③专权社团制则是一种国家结构,它通过保持国家对工人的控制来缓解工人和雇主的冲突,其结果是养老保险制度是基于消除独立的工会和社会主义团体的政治影响而建立的。
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①尼古拉斯·巴尔：福利国家经济学,中国劳动社会保障出版社,2003。
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