公司治理与中小股东权益保护研究
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摘要
尽管我国证券市场自建立以来,在发展规模与发展速度上均取得了显著成就,但屡屡发生中小股东权益受损的现象,导致广大中小股东对市场信心不足,市场根基不稳。有鉴于此,本文首先利用代理理论、交易费用理论对中小股东权益受损的内因与外部条件进行解释,并对国内、外的中小股东权益保护研究进行综述;其次,本文概括了公司治理的实质与功能,深入分析了股权结构、董事会等公司内部治理机制及证券市场法律制度、信息披露制度、证券监管等公司外部治理机制与中小股东权益保护之间的密切联系。通过构建中小股东权益保护的公司内、外部治理结合模型,本文分别在单独采用公司内部或外部治理机制与公司内、外部治理机制相结合两种情况下,严密论证了公司内、外部治理机制相结合有助于改善中小股东权益保护。
接着,本文分别从公司内部治理、外部治理的角度分析我国证券市场中小股东权益保护的现状。探究控制权收益的结构与实质,阐释大股东获取控制权私人收益的途径,通过利用效用函数模型论证大股东掠夺的作用机理。同时,本文探析了证券欺诈、非法占用公司资金、非公允关联交易及不合理的股利分配等大股东侵害中小股东权益的主要途径。在对我国上市公司大股东的侵害程度进行实证分析后,本文通过对世界主要国家的大股东侵害度进行比较,认为我国上市公司大股东侵害度较深;进而,本文从公司内部治理、外部治理以及二者结合共三个层面,论证我国上市公司内部治理存在缺陷、外部治理仍旧缺失,并且在中小股东权益保护的不同阶段,公司内、外部治理缺乏紧密结合。
最后,本文得出结论:我国上市公司内、外部治理的缺陷与二者缺乏紧密结合导致中小股东权益受损。结合我国公司治理实践,本文从弥补公司内部治理、完善公司外部治理以及紧密结合公司内、外部治理的角度,有针对性地提出改善中小股东权益保护的政策建议。
Although many prominent achievements in developing scale and developing speed have beeen made since China Security Market was established,the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders have been usually expropriated by large shareholders in this market.As a result,a lot of small and medium-sized shareholders have nearly lost confidence in China Security Market and the base of the market has been seriously undermined.As regards the current situation,firstly,the author of this paper gives some therotical explaination on the intrinsic reason and the external condition of the damage of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders by using agency theory and the transaction cost theory. Moreover,the author summarizes the research of propection about the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders home and aborad.Secondly,the author of this paper generalizes the essence and the function of corporate governance.Then the author deeply analyses not only the tight relationship between the internal corporate governance mechanism(including the structure of shareholder's rights、the system of board) and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,but also the tight relationship between the external corporate governance mechanism(including the legal institution of stock market、the system of information disclosure、the regulation of stock market) and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.By constructing the founctional model connecting internal and external corporate governance on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,the author strictly proves that it is helpful for the connection of internal and external corporate governance to improve the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
Thirdly,from the viewpoint of internal and external corporate governance,the author analyzes the current state of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders in China Security Market.Then the author explores the structure and essence of private benefit of control,defines the route of snatching private benefit of control enforced by large shareholders.By using the utility function model,the author proves the intrinsic principle of the expropriation taken by large shareholders.At the same time,the author explores the main route of the expropriation taken by large shareholders,including security fraud、illegally occupying capital of listed company and unfair associated transaction.After empricially studying the extent of the expropriation taken by large shareholders in China listed companies,the author compares the extent of the expropriation among the main countries all over the world and draws a conclusion that the extent of the expropriation taken by large shareholders in China listed companies is severe.Subsequently,from the three layer including internal or external corporate governance and the connecting of internal and external corporate governance,the author demonstrates that internal corporate governance exists defects and external corporate governance still exists flaws.Moreover,internal and external corporate govemance don't connect tightly in different stage of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
Eventually,the author concludes that the defects of internal or external corporate governance and the disconnecting of internal and external corporate governance result in the damage of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. Combining the practice of China corporate governance,from the viewpoint of compensating internal corporate governance,improving external corporate governance and tightly connecting internal and external corporate governance,the author accordingly proposes some policy strategys on how to improve the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
接着,本文分别从公司内部治理、外部治理的角度分析我国证券市场中小股东权益保护的现状。探究控制权收益的结构与实质,阐释大股东获取控制权私人收益的途径,通过利用效用函数模型论证大股东掠夺的作用机理。同时,本文探析了证券欺诈、非法占用公司资金、非公允关联交易及不合理的股利分配等大股东侵害中小股东权益的主要途径。在对我国上市公司大股东的侵害程度进行实证分析后,本文通过对世界主要国家的大股东侵害度进行比较,认为我国上市公司大股东侵害度较深;进而,本文从公司内部治理、外部治理以及二者结合共三个层面,论证我国上市公司内部治理存在缺陷、外部治理仍旧缺失,并且在中小股东权益保护的不同阶段,公司内、外部治理缺乏紧密结合。
最后,本文得出结论:我国上市公司内、外部治理的缺陷与二者缺乏紧密结合导致中小股东权益受损。结合我国公司治理实践,本文从弥补公司内部治理、完善公司外部治理以及紧密结合公司内、外部治理的角度,有针对性地提出改善中小股东权益保护的政策建议。
Although many prominent achievements in developing scale and developing speed have beeen made since China Security Market was established,the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders have been usually expropriated by large shareholders in this market.As a result,a lot of small and medium-sized shareholders have nearly lost confidence in China Security Market and the base of the market has been seriously undermined.As regards the current situation,firstly,the author of this paper gives some therotical explaination on the intrinsic reason and the external condition of the damage of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders by using agency theory and the transaction cost theory. Moreover,the author summarizes the research of propection about the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders home and aborad.Secondly,the author of this paper generalizes the essence and the function of corporate governance.Then the author deeply analyses not only the tight relationship between the internal corporate governance mechanism(including the structure of shareholder's rights、the system of board) and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,but also the tight relationship between the external corporate governance mechanism(including the legal institution of stock market、the system of information disclosure、the regulation of stock market) and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.By constructing the founctional model connecting internal and external corporate governance on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,the author strictly proves that it is helpful for the connection of internal and external corporate governance to improve the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
Thirdly,from the viewpoint of internal and external corporate governance,the author analyzes the current state of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders in China Security Market.Then the author explores the structure and essence of private benefit of control,defines the route of snatching private benefit of control enforced by large shareholders.By using the utility function model,the author proves the intrinsic principle of the expropriation taken by large shareholders.At the same time,the author explores the main route of the expropriation taken by large shareholders,including security fraud、illegally occupying capital of listed company and unfair associated transaction.After empricially studying the extent of the expropriation taken by large shareholders in China listed companies,the author compares the extent of the expropriation among the main countries all over the world and draws a conclusion that the extent of the expropriation taken by large shareholders in China listed companies is severe.Subsequently,from the three layer including internal or external corporate governance and the connecting of internal and external corporate governance,the author demonstrates that internal corporate governance exists defects and external corporate governance still exists flaws.Moreover,internal and external corporate govemance don't connect tightly in different stage of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
Eventually,the author concludes that the defects of internal or external corporate governance and the disconnecting of internal and external corporate governance result in the damage of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. Combining the practice of China corporate governance,from the viewpoint of compensating internal corporate governance,improving external corporate governance and tightly connecting internal and external corporate governance,the author accordingly proposes some policy strategys on how to improve the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.
引文
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