软件企业治理评价及其实证研究
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摘要
软件企业作为高技术企业的典型代表,凸显研究与开发(R&D)人力资本价值,R&D人力资本的投入在经营成本中占很大比重,连续、高效、敏捷的R&D核心能力成为其生命线。实现企业价值最大化的支撑基础是R&D人力资本价值最大化。R&D人力资本是分析软件企业治理结构与机制的起点,R&D人力资本产权的认可与实现是对传统公司治理理论的巨大挑战,软件企业R&D人力资本持续升值导致主流公司治理理论向新企业治理理论拓展。软件企业典型特征决定了软件企业合约不同于传统企业合约的关键在于物质资本所有者不是被天然地授予了委托人资格。R&D人力资本的各种特征所隐含的不确定性对软件企业治理和成长起着核心作用,现有的公司治理结构与机制无法应对软件企业内生的不确定性,从而导致企业成长的不稳定;如果要协调软件企业成长和经济体系稳定,必须重新塑造治理结构与机制。由此产生了软件企业治理评价问题。
本文运用资产专用性理论、代理理论、利益相关者理论等公司治理经典理论与人力资本理论研究方法,紧密结合软件企业R&D人力资本典型特征,通过澄清“治理”本质及其与“管理”的区别,科学地界定了软件企业治理的概念与内涵、边界与结构,提出并论证了软件企业治理评价的对象与指标体系。
“软件企业治理”是通过一套正式及非正式的制度安排,优化软件企业“控制权与组织租金配置”,协调软件企业各个利益相关者(主要是以R&D人力资本所有者为核心)之间的权责关系,以实现R&D人力资本和软件企业价值最大化,从而最终维护软件企业各利益相关者的权益。软件企业治理的终极目的和基本出发点是“组织租金优化配置”,软件企业治理通过“控制权优化配置”来实现“组织租金优化配置”,控制权是软件企业治理的基础和工具,控制权配置状况受软件企业治理边界约束限制。
软件企业治理边界是指软件企业R&D活动中控制权与组织租金优化配置活动的范围与程度,是具体对软件企业治理工具与途径的约束和规范。高层权力制衡、知识产权配置、R&D绩效评价、R&D人员激励、信息披露等五大维度直接影响着软件企业治理活动的范围与程度。其制度设计与安排状况决定了各个治理主体的权力来源、运用和限制,定义了决策制定的内部程序以及不同主体在决策制定过程中的参与程度,从而构成了软件企业治理结构与评价对象。
我国现阶段软件企业面临的市场环境与英美国家相比有很大区别,外部治理环境不完善、市场体制不健全、信息不充分、透明度低,企业控制权市场难以对其形成强有力约束。因此,本文在设计软件企业治理评价指标体系时,更多地是从“制度是否完备、程序是否规范”角度展开指标设计与评价,针对已经制度化、规范化的比较成熟的治理准则,再从“制度运作是否有效”角度展开指标设计与评价,形成了由17项二级评价指标与112项三级评价指标组成的软件企业治理评价指标体系。
在实证研究方面,本文遴选出了国家发展和改革委员会、信息产业部、商务部、国家税务总局2002-2004年度联合认定的国家规划布局内的重点软件企业作为样本企业展开治理评价研究,探讨了当前我国重点软件企业治理现状及存在的主要问题;通过分组关联分析与回归关联分析,发现治理总体绩效对软件企业绩效具有一定程度的解释能力,软件企业治理水平越高,企业绩效也倾向于越优。
The typical character of software enterprises is to highlight R&D human capital value. The proportion of the R&D human capital investment to the operation cost is great. Continuous, efficient, swift R&D ability is critical for software enterprises’survival. The maximum of enterprise’s value mainly depends on the maximum of the R&D human capital value. Therefore, R&D human capital is the base for analyzing governance structure and mechanism of software enterprises. The authorization and realization of R&D human capital property rights would cause a great challenge for traditional corporate governance theory. The increase of R&D human capital value will cause the mainstream corporate governance theory develops into new enterprise governance theory. Real capital owner isn’t authorized principal qualification naturally. Human capital owner also has the principal qualification. The above typical character of software enterprises determines the difference between its contract and traditional enterprises’contract. Traditional corporate governance structure and mechanism can’t deal with these uncertainties, which result in the instability of software enterprise development. In order to maintain and promote the software enterprises’development, related governance structure and mechanism must be reshaped in software enterprise. This is the reason that governance evaluation of software enterprises is put forward.
The governance of software enterprises is defined as optimizing“the allocation of control rights and organization rents”in the R&D activities and harmonizing power and responsibility of the stakeholders (mainly including R&D human capital owners) through formal or informal institution. This will make the value maximum for R&D human capital and enterprises. Thus, the rights and interests of all stakeholders can be guaranteed. The final aim of the governance of software enterprise is optimizing“the allocation of organization rents”, which is realized by“optimizing the allocation of control rights”. Therefore, control rights are the base and tools of the governance of software enterprises. The allocation of control rights is restricted by the boundary of the governance of software enterprises.
The boundary of the governance of software enterprises is the range of the allocation of control rights and organization rents in R&D activities. It is specially also the restriction and criterion of the governance tools and ways. The five dimesions including power balance among top managers, intellectual property allocation, R&D performance evaluation, R&D employees’incentive, information disclosing would influence the range of the governance activities directly. The institution assignment of the five dimensions would determine power source, application and restriction of R&D governace subjects. The inside procedure of decision-making and the extent of participating decision for different subjects are also defined. This constitutes the stucture and evaluation objects of the governance of software enterprises.
The market environment Chinese software enterprises face is very different from that of British & American. In China, outside governance environment and market mechanisms aren’t perfect. Information isn’t sufficient and the extent of disclosing information is very low. The market of enterprise control rights couldn’t restrict the governance effectively. Therefore, this article mainly designed indicator system of the governance from the perspective“whether institution is perfect and procedure is standard”. For the governance mechanisms that are institutionalized and standard, this article mainly designed indicator system from the perspective“whether insitution operation is effective”. Finally, 17 secondary indicators and 112 tertiary indicators of the governance evaluation system were designed.
Four ministries of Chinese government including National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Information Industry and State Administration of Taxation jointly identified some key software enterprises in national plan in the period of 2002-2004, which key software enterprises were selected as empirical sample to investige their governance level. Through a series of correlative and regressive empirical analysis, the results show that the governance performance has rather significant explanation to the performance of software enterprise. the software enterprise performance is excellent accordingly when its government performance is outstanding.
本文运用资产专用性理论、代理理论、利益相关者理论等公司治理经典理论与人力资本理论研究方法,紧密结合软件企业R&D人力资本典型特征,通过澄清“治理”本质及其与“管理”的区别,科学地界定了软件企业治理的概念与内涵、边界与结构,提出并论证了软件企业治理评价的对象与指标体系。
“软件企业治理”是通过一套正式及非正式的制度安排,优化软件企业“控制权与组织租金配置”,协调软件企业各个利益相关者(主要是以R&D人力资本所有者为核心)之间的权责关系,以实现R&D人力资本和软件企业价值最大化,从而最终维护软件企业各利益相关者的权益。软件企业治理的终极目的和基本出发点是“组织租金优化配置”,软件企业治理通过“控制权优化配置”来实现“组织租金优化配置”,控制权是软件企业治理的基础和工具,控制权配置状况受软件企业治理边界约束限制。
软件企业治理边界是指软件企业R&D活动中控制权与组织租金优化配置活动的范围与程度,是具体对软件企业治理工具与途径的约束和规范。高层权力制衡、知识产权配置、R&D绩效评价、R&D人员激励、信息披露等五大维度直接影响着软件企业治理活动的范围与程度。其制度设计与安排状况决定了各个治理主体的权力来源、运用和限制,定义了决策制定的内部程序以及不同主体在决策制定过程中的参与程度,从而构成了软件企业治理结构与评价对象。
我国现阶段软件企业面临的市场环境与英美国家相比有很大区别,外部治理环境不完善、市场体制不健全、信息不充分、透明度低,企业控制权市场难以对其形成强有力约束。因此,本文在设计软件企业治理评价指标体系时,更多地是从“制度是否完备、程序是否规范”角度展开指标设计与评价,针对已经制度化、规范化的比较成熟的治理准则,再从“制度运作是否有效”角度展开指标设计与评价,形成了由17项二级评价指标与112项三级评价指标组成的软件企业治理评价指标体系。
在实证研究方面,本文遴选出了国家发展和改革委员会、信息产业部、商务部、国家税务总局2002-2004年度联合认定的国家规划布局内的重点软件企业作为样本企业展开治理评价研究,探讨了当前我国重点软件企业治理现状及存在的主要问题;通过分组关联分析与回归关联分析,发现治理总体绩效对软件企业绩效具有一定程度的解释能力,软件企业治理水平越高,企业绩效也倾向于越优。
The typical character of software enterprises is to highlight R&D human capital value. The proportion of the R&D human capital investment to the operation cost is great. Continuous, efficient, swift R&D ability is critical for software enterprises’survival. The maximum of enterprise’s value mainly depends on the maximum of the R&D human capital value. Therefore, R&D human capital is the base for analyzing governance structure and mechanism of software enterprises. The authorization and realization of R&D human capital property rights would cause a great challenge for traditional corporate governance theory. The increase of R&D human capital value will cause the mainstream corporate governance theory develops into new enterprise governance theory. Real capital owner isn’t authorized principal qualification naturally. Human capital owner also has the principal qualification. The above typical character of software enterprises determines the difference between its contract and traditional enterprises’contract. Traditional corporate governance structure and mechanism can’t deal with these uncertainties, which result in the instability of software enterprise development. In order to maintain and promote the software enterprises’development, related governance structure and mechanism must be reshaped in software enterprise. This is the reason that governance evaluation of software enterprises is put forward.
The governance of software enterprises is defined as optimizing“the allocation of control rights and organization rents”in the R&D activities and harmonizing power and responsibility of the stakeholders (mainly including R&D human capital owners) through formal or informal institution. This will make the value maximum for R&D human capital and enterprises. Thus, the rights and interests of all stakeholders can be guaranteed. The final aim of the governance of software enterprise is optimizing“the allocation of organization rents”, which is realized by“optimizing the allocation of control rights”. Therefore, control rights are the base and tools of the governance of software enterprises. The allocation of control rights is restricted by the boundary of the governance of software enterprises.
The boundary of the governance of software enterprises is the range of the allocation of control rights and organization rents in R&D activities. It is specially also the restriction and criterion of the governance tools and ways. The five dimesions including power balance among top managers, intellectual property allocation, R&D performance evaluation, R&D employees’incentive, information disclosing would influence the range of the governance activities directly. The institution assignment of the five dimensions would determine power source, application and restriction of R&D governace subjects. The inside procedure of decision-making and the extent of participating decision for different subjects are also defined. This constitutes the stucture and evaluation objects of the governance of software enterprises.
The market environment Chinese software enterprises face is very different from that of British & American. In China, outside governance environment and market mechanisms aren’t perfect. Information isn’t sufficient and the extent of disclosing information is very low. The market of enterprise control rights couldn’t restrict the governance effectively. Therefore, this article mainly designed indicator system of the governance from the perspective“whether institution is perfect and procedure is standard”. For the governance mechanisms that are institutionalized and standard, this article mainly designed indicator system from the perspective“whether insitution operation is effective”. Finally, 17 secondary indicators and 112 tertiary indicators of the governance evaluation system were designed.
Four ministries of Chinese government including National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Information Industry and State Administration of Taxation jointly identified some key software enterprises in national plan in the period of 2002-2004, which key software enterprises were selected as empirical sample to investige their governance level. Through a series of correlative and regressive empirical analysis, the results show that the governance performance has rather significant explanation to the performance of software enterprise. the software enterprise performance is excellent accordingly when its government performance is outstanding.
引文
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