劳动法主体体系研究
|
摘要
劳动法主体包括劳动者及其团体、雇主(即用人单位)及其团体、政府和劳动服务主体。它们以一定的方式组合成具有特殊结构和功能的主体体系。在其中,各主体各具特定的地位、作用并且彼此关联、相互影响。
劳动法主体体系的基本框架是由劳动者方(简称劳方)、雇主方(简称资方)、政府方所构成的“三角框架”,即劳资双方作为劳动关系主体,通过谈判和协商确定双方权益;政府作为公共利益和社会利益的代表者、劳动关系的相关人,通过一定的方式,影响劳资谈判,平衡和协调劳资双方利益,维护社会稳定。这一框架的实践基础是三方原则,而理论基础则是利益集团理论。三方原则是指劳动关系的各种问题,应当由劳、资、政三方通过一定的组织机构和运作机制共同处理,以实现劳方利益、资方利益和公共利益动态均衡的法益结构。其中,社会(公共)利益的归属主体是社会公众,由政府代表;劳资之间既是利益矛盾的双方,又是相互依存的利益共同体且其关系具有外部性。劳动法主体体系的法益结构一方面表现为政府对于劳资关系的利益平衡;另一方面则表现为国家立法、公共政策和行政干预对劳动关系的负外部性的抑制和调整。劳方和资方是两个既具排他性、又具相容性的利益集团,彼此间形成大集团和小集团、弱势集团和强势集团的关系。政府作为外在于劳动关系的主体,既是社会利益的代表者和维护者,又是劳资利益的居中协调者,与劳资利益集团之间的关系呈现出双向互动的状态。一方面,政府以其所代表的公共利益为出发点,干预、介入集体合同和劳动合同的运行,引导劳资利益团体之间的利益格局和关系运行的走向;另一方面,劳资利益团体通过制度化与非制度化、直接与间接的“游说”和“施压”以影响政府的劳动立法、公共政策和行政干预取向。但是,“三角框架”的不足在于,劳、资、政三方实际上都可以分为两个层次,即劳资双方各分别有个体和团体两个层次,政府方可分为劳动行政主体和公共服务主体两个层次。而在“三角框架”中,劳资双方个体层次的关系被团体层次的关系所掩盖。这就需要借助“三层框架”予以描述。
“三层框架”是指,在利益关系上呈现为三角结构的劳、资、政三方主体,根据“国家与社会关系”理论,从政治国家—市民社会—自由市场三元结构的角度分析,则呈现出政府——社会中间层主体——劳动力市场主体的结构。社会中间层主体包括劳资团体和公共劳动服务机构,而劳动力市场主体则为劳动者个人和雇主。在此框架中,呈现下述特点:(1)劳动力市场关系较之其他以私法自治为原则的、市场主体之间的交易关系存在特殊性,因此需要通过外部力量予以干预和协调。(2)干预和协调方式包括社会层面的劳资自治和国家层面的政府干预。劳资自治作为一种社会治理方式,对内实现“治理者与被治理者同一”,对外防止政府不当干预所导致的“政府失灵”。(3)公共劳动服务机构的发展状况和组成方式则是劳资团体之间以及国家与劳资团体之间合作、竞争、服务关系的集中反映。(4)政府与社会中间层之间的关系表现为自由多元主义和合作主义两种路径。
上述三层主体之间既直接互动,又间接互动,使市场机制、政府干预和社会干预在劳动法领域有机结合,具体表现为:(1)政府与社会中间层主体之间,彼此互补、双向制约。(2)社会中间层主体与市场主体之间,前者服务于后者,后者影响前者的服务方式和服务范围。(3)劳资团体与市场主体之间,前者约束后者的行为,抑制市场异化,同时反映和维护作为前者成员的市场主体的利益。(4)市场主体与政府之间,前者直接或间接影响后者的劳动立法和劳动政策;而后者通过劳动立法和劳动政策直接或间接干预雇主和劳动者之间的关系。
可见,“三角框架”同时呈现为国家层面、社会层面和市场层面三个层次的运行机制,因而“三层框架”制约着“三角框架”的运行。具体而言:(1)政府与社会中间层的定位及其关系决定着三角框架中政府干预与集体规制之间的职能分工。(2)劳资团体与政府的关系决定着三角框架的实质、影响政府的中立性。(3)劳资团体的组织化程度决定着集体劳动关系的运行效果、作用空间和国家直接干预个别劳动关系的程度和紧迫性。(4)市场主体的力量对比影响个别劳动关系运行状况和国家干预的必要性和方式。(5)社会中间层组织的发育程度制约劳动关系中自治与他治的选择、劳动服务主体的运行方式以及个别劳动关系的规制体系。
三层框架对于三角框架的上述制约机制对劳动法制的选择产生影响。(1)劳动法主体体系影响劳动立法的价值取向和经济功能和社会功能的配置,效率与公平的关系、公平正义的概念以及对于劳动力市场的理解很大程度上是由主导性社会中间层团体的价值观所决定的。(2)影响劳动关系协调制度体系的构成及其主导性协调机制的选择。国家协调劳动关系的制度体系由劳动合同、集体合同、劳动基准、劳动监察、劳动争议处理制度构成。其中:劳资团体的组织状况及其与国家的结构性关系,影响着国家对劳动关系协调制度体系的总体结构的安排和其中主导性制度的选择。劳资团体的覆盖面、独立性和组织状况影响着个别劳动关系规制与集体劳动关系规制的定位和组合,进而影响劳动合同、集体合同、劳动规章制度、劳动基准的地位和作用配置。(3)影响劳动法保护劳动者的方式和程度。不同的劳动法主体结构下,国家在做出上述劳动法律规制选择时,在保护劳动者的方式和程度上的选择会有所不同。上述“三层框架→三角框架运行机制→劳法制选择”的关系,不仅在典型国家的实践中得到了印证,而且在我国《劳动合同法》对劳务派遣实行从严规制的选择中得到了说明。
我国劳动法主体结构存在下述问题:强资本、弱劳动为基本格局,且与强政府、弱社会中间层的结构互为因果;劳资双方及其不同群体的政策影响力不均衡;劳动者分层化与工会组织一元化使利益代表机制存在内在冲突;雇主组织缺位与职能弱化并存;公共劳动服务的商业化倾向明显。面对上述问题,我国劳动法主体体系未来模式的构建,应当以社会利益衡平为原则构建主体利益关系,以劳资自治与社会分权为原则构建劳动法社会中间层主体,以国家积极、适度干预为原则构建政府主体定位,以合作主义为原则构建劳动法主体间关系。现阶段,由于处在转型期,应当以旨在加强工会和雇主组织作用的“国家合作主义”劳动法主体体系模式作为过渡模式,并以此为原则采取下列过渡性措施:逐步回复工会作为劳动者自治团体的社会定位;建立起有效的雇主组织;工会和雇主团体通过集体谈判逐步分担原来完全由政府承担的劳动关系规制责任;建立起具有公共性、独立性并受到有效监督的公共劳动服务主体;通过企业内劳雇主体合作,建立起劳动关系预防协调机制。
本文所论证的命题是:劳动法主体体系“三层框架”制约劳动法主体体系“三角框架”的运行机制,从而影响劳动法制选择。
The actors of labor law include employees and trade unions, employers and their associations, government and public labor market services providers. All the above actors compose the system of labor actors with special structure and function, in which each actor has certain functions and uses and they connect with and affect each other.
The basic frame of the system is the triangular framework composed by labors, employers and the government. In this framework, labors and employers as the parties of labor relationship negotiate their rights and interests and the government as the representative of social and public interests and the stakeholder of labor relations influence, balance and intermediate the bargains of labors and employers to maintain the social stabilization. The practice basis of this framework is tripartite principle and the theoretical basis is the theory of interest group. Tripartite principle refers to the mechanism that all issues involving labor relationships should be solved by the organization or consulting institutions composed by the three parties to realize the dynamic balance of the interests of labor, employer and the public which is represented by the government. The interests between labor and employer are both conflicting and consistent and labor relationship is of external effects. Labor group and employer group are both exclusive and inclusive groups and their relations are relations between big groups and small groups, vulnerable groups and strong groups. The government as the outsider of labor relationship is both representative and protector of social interests and the intermediator between labor and employer groups and is also influenced by them. In one hand, government intervenes and coordinates the operation of collective agreement and employment contract; on the other hand, the labor and employer groups influence labor legislation and policies through institutionalized or non- institutionalized, direct or indirect canvass and impressing. However, the defects of triangular framework is individual parties of labor relationship is covered by groups interests. To discover the relation between individual interests and groups interests should resort to three-layer framework.
Three-layer framework refers to the actors of labor law present the“government—social actors—parties of labor market”three-layer framework on the perspective of“political state—civil society—free market”state—society structure. Social actors here include the unions, employers’associations and public labor marker service providers, while the parties of labor market include individual employers and employees. Three-layer framework shows the following characteristics: (1)there are some specialties compared with other free market governed by private law, so it needs external intervention and coordination; (2)two ways of the external intervention and coordination: one is labor autonomy from the social labor associations and the other is government intervention from the state. (3) Organizing and development of public labor service provider reflects the relationship both between the labor associations and between the government and labor associations.(4)the two major theories on the relationship between government and social actors are liberalism and corporatism.
The above three layer actors influence each other directly and indirectly and organically combine market mechanism, government intervention and social autonomy in the field of labor law regulation in following aspects: (1)the government and social actor mutually mend and restrict;(2)social actor service the labor marker parties and the labor marker parties influence the way and scope of service providing;(3) unions and employers’association regulate their members activities and reflect and protect their members rights and interests at the same time; (4) labor marker parties directly and indirectly influence labor legislation and labor policies, while the government directly or indirectly intervenes the labor relationship between employers and employees.
Therefore, the operation of triangular framework is respectively on state, social and marker three layers and is conditioned by the three-layer framework as follows: (1)thee relationship between government and social actors decides the divide of function between collective regulation and government intervention;(2) the relationship between government and unions and employers association decides the true frame of triangular framework and neutrality of government;(3) the cover of union decides the operation effects, function space of collective bargaining and necessity and way of government intervention;(4)the power between labor market parties decides the operation of individual labor relationship and the scope of government intervention;(5) the development of social organizations decides the choice between labor autonomy and government intervention, the way of public labor service providing and regulation system of individual labor relationship.
On the basis of above elements, the choice of labor law system are conditioned in the following way: (1)the system of actors influences the orientation of labor legislation; (2) the system of actors influences the legal system of coordinating labor relationship;(3) the system of actors influences the ways and degrees of labor law in protecting employees. All the above is proved by the industrialized state practice and the strict regulation choice of labor dispatch in China Labor Contract Law.
In China the system of actors in labor law presents the basic structure of strong capital, vulnerable labor and weak social actors. At present, the state corporatism should be a practical choice by strengthening independency of labor union and employers’association with the aim of construct a social corporatism model of the system of actors in labor law.
劳动法主体体系的基本框架是由劳动者方(简称劳方)、雇主方(简称资方)、政府方所构成的“三角框架”,即劳资双方作为劳动关系主体,通过谈判和协商确定双方权益;政府作为公共利益和社会利益的代表者、劳动关系的相关人,通过一定的方式,影响劳资谈判,平衡和协调劳资双方利益,维护社会稳定。这一框架的实践基础是三方原则,而理论基础则是利益集团理论。三方原则是指劳动关系的各种问题,应当由劳、资、政三方通过一定的组织机构和运作机制共同处理,以实现劳方利益、资方利益和公共利益动态均衡的法益结构。其中,社会(公共)利益的归属主体是社会公众,由政府代表;劳资之间既是利益矛盾的双方,又是相互依存的利益共同体且其关系具有外部性。劳动法主体体系的法益结构一方面表现为政府对于劳资关系的利益平衡;另一方面则表现为国家立法、公共政策和行政干预对劳动关系的负外部性的抑制和调整。劳方和资方是两个既具排他性、又具相容性的利益集团,彼此间形成大集团和小集团、弱势集团和强势集团的关系。政府作为外在于劳动关系的主体,既是社会利益的代表者和维护者,又是劳资利益的居中协调者,与劳资利益集团之间的关系呈现出双向互动的状态。一方面,政府以其所代表的公共利益为出发点,干预、介入集体合同和劳动合同的运行,引导劳资利益团体之间的利益格局和关系运行的走向;另一方面,劳资利益团体通过制度化与非制度化、直接与间接的“游说”和“施压”以影响政府的劳动立法、公共政策和行政干预取向。但是,“三角框架”的不足在于,劳、资、政三方实际上都可以分为两个层次,即劳资双方各分别有个体和团体两个层次,政府方可分为劳动行政主体和公共服务主体两个层次。而在“三角框架”中,劳资双方个体层次的关系被团体层次的关系所掩盖。这就需要借助“三层框架”予以描述。
“三层框架”是指,在利益关系上呈现为三角结构的劳、资、政三方主体,根据“国家与社会关系”理论,从政治国家—市民社会—自由市场三元结构的角度分析,则呈现出政府——社会中间层主体——劳动力市场主体的结构。社会中间层主体包括劳资团体和公共劳动服务机构,而劳动力市场主体则为劳动者个人和雇主。在此框架中,呈现下述特点:(1)劳动力市场关系较之其他以私法自治为原则的、市场主体之间的交易关系存在特殊性,因此需要通过外部力量予以干预和协调。(2)干预和协调方式包括社会层面的劳资自治和国家层面的政府干预。劳资自治作为一种社会治理方式,对内实现“治理者与被治理者同一”,对外防止政府不当干预所导致的“政府失灵”。(3)公共劳动服务机构的发展状况和组成方式则是劳资团体之间以及国家与劳资团体之间合作、竞争、服务关系的集中反映。(4)政府与社会中间层之间的关系表现为自由多元主义和合作主义两种路径。
上述三层主体之间既直接互动,又间接互动,使市场机制、政府干预和社会干预在劳动法领域有机结合,具体表现为:(1)政府与社会中间层主体之间,彼此互补、双向制约。(2)社会中间层主体与市场主体之间,前者服务于后者,后者影响前者的服务方式和服务范围。(3)劳资团体与市场主体之间,前者约束后者的行为,抑制市场异化,同时反映和维护作为前者成员的市场主体的利益。(4)市场主体与政府之间,前者直接或间接影响后者的劳动立法和劳动政策;而后者通过劳动立法和劳动政策直接或间接干预雇主和劳动者之间的关系。
可见,“三角框架”同时呈现为国家层面、社会层面和市场层面三个层次的运行机制,因而“三层框架”制约着“三角框架”的运行。具体而言:(1)政府与社会中间层的定位及其关系决定着三角框架中政府干预与集体规制之间的职能分工。(2)劳资团体与政府的关系决定着三角框架的实质、影响政府的中立性。(3)劳资团体的组织化程度决定着集体劳动关系的运行效果、作用空间和国家直接干预个别劳动关系的程度和紧迫性。(4)市场主体的力量对比影响个别劳动关系运行状况和国家干预的必要性和方式。(5)社会中间层组织的发育程度制约劳动关系中自治与他治的选择、劳动服务主体的运行方式以及个别劳动关系的规制体系。
三层框架对于三角框架的上述制约机制对劳动法制的选择产生影响。(1)劳动法主体体系影响劳动立法的价值取向和经济功能和社会功能的配置,效率与公平的关系、公平正义的概念以及对于劳动力市场的理解很大程度上是由主导性社会中间层团体的价值观所决定的。(2)影响劳动关系协调制度体系的构成及其主导性协调机制的选择。国家协调劳动关系的制度体系由劳动合同、集体合同、劳动基准、劳动监察、劳动争议处理制度构成。其中:劳资团体的组织状况及其与国家的结构性关系,影响着国家对劳动关系协调制度体系的总体结构的安排和其中主导性制度的选择。劳资团体的覆盖面、独立性和组织状况影响着个别劳动关系规制与集体劳动关系规制的定位和组合,进而影响劳动合同、集体合同、劳动规章制度、劳动基准的地位和作用配置。(3)影响劳动法保护劳动者的方式和程度。不同的劳动法主体结构下,国家在做出上述劳动法律规制选择时,在保护劳动者的方式和程度上的选择会有所不同。上述“三层框架→三角框架运行机制→劳法制选择”的关系,不仅在典型国家的实践中得到了印证,而且在我国《劳动合同法》对劳务派遣实行从严规制的选择中得到了说明。
我国劳动法主体结构存在下述问题:强资本、弱劳动为基本格局,且与强政府、弱社会中间层的结构互为因果;劳资双方及其不同群体的政策影响力不均衡;劳动者分层化与工会组织一元化使利益代表机制存在内在冲突;雇主组织缺位与职能弱化并存;公共劳动服务的商业化倾向明显。面对上述问题,我国劳动法主体体系未来模式的构建,应当以社会利益衡平为原则构建主体利益关系,以劳资自治与社会分权为原则构建劳动法社会中间层主体,以国家积极、适度干预为原则构建政府主体定位,以合作主义为原则构建劳动法主体间关系。现阶段,由于处在转型期,应当以旨在加强工会和雇主组织作用的“国家合作主义”劳动法主体体系模式作为过渡模式,并以此为原则采取下列过渡性措施:逐步回复工会作为劳动者自治团体的社会定位;建立起有效的雇主组织;工会和雇主团体通过集体谈判逐步分担原来完全由政府承担的劳动关系规制责任;建立起具有公共性、独立性并受到有效监督的公共劳动服务主体;通过企业内劳雇主体合作,建立起劳动关系预防协调机制。
本文所论证的命题是:劳动法主体体系“三层框架”制约劳动法主体体系“三角框架”的运行机制,从而影响劳动法制选择。
The actors of labor law include employees and trade unions, employers and their associations, government and public labor market services providers. All the above actors compose the system of labor actors with special structure and function, in which each actor has certain functions and uses and they connect with and affect each other.
The basic frame of the system is the triangular framework composed by labors, employers and the government. In this framework, labors and employers as the parties of labor relationship negotiate their rights and interests and the government as the representative of social and public interests and the stakeholder of labor relations influence, balance and intermediate the bargains of labors and employers to maintain the social stabilization. The practice basis of this framework is tripartite principle and the theoretical basis is the theory of interest group. Tripartite principle refers to the mechanism that all issues involving labor relationships should be solved by the organization or consulting institutions composed by the three parties to realize the dynamic balance of the interests of labor, employer and the public which is represented by the government. The interests between labor and employer are both conflicting and consistent and labor relationship is of external effects. Labor group and employer group are both exclusive and inclusive groups and their relations are relations between big groups and small groups, vulnerable groups and strong groups. The government as the outsider of labor relationship is both representative and protector of social interests and the intermediator between labor and employer groups and is also influenced by them. In one hand, government intervenes and coordinates the operation of collective agreement and employment contract; on the other hand, the labor and employer groups influence labor legislation and policies through institutionalized or non- institutionalized, direct or indirect canvass and impressing. However, the defects of triangular framework is individual parties of labor relationship is covered by groups interests. To discover the relation between individual interests and groups interests should resort to three-layer framework.
Three-layer framework refers to the actors of labor law present the“government—social actors—parties of labor market”three-layer framework on the perspective of“political state—civil society—free market”state—society structure. Social actors here include the unions, employers’associations and public labor marker service providers, while the parties of labor market include individual employers and employees. Three-layer framework shows the following characteristics: (1)there are some specialties compared with other free market governed by private law, so it needs external intervention and coordination; (2)two ways of the external intervention and coordination: one is labor autonomy from the social labor associations and the other is government intervention from the state. (3) Organizing and development of public labor service provider reflects the relationship both between the labor associations and between the government and labor associations.(4)the two major theories on the relationship between government and social actors are liberalism and corporatism.
The above three layer actors influence each other directly and indirectly and organically combine market mechanism, government intervention and social autonomy in the field of labor law regulation in following aspects: (1)the government and social actor mutually mend and restrict;(2)social actor service the labor marker parties and the labor marker parties influence the way and scope of service providing;(3) unions and employers’association regulate their members activities and reflect and protect their members rights and interests at the same time; (4) labor marker parties directly and indirectly influence labor legislation and labor policies, while the government directly or indirectly intervenes the labor relationship between employers and employees.
Therefore, the operation of triangular framework is respectively on state, social and marker three layers and is conditioned by the three-layer framework as follows: (1)thee relationship between government and social actors decides the divide of function between collective regulation and government intervention;(2) the relationship between government and unions and employers association decides the true frame of triangular framework and neutrality of government;(3) the cover of union decides the operation effects, function space of collective bargaining and necessity and way of government intervention;(4)the power between labor market parties decides the operation of individual labor relationship and the scope of government intervention;(5) the development of social organizations decides the choice between labor autonomy and government intervention, the way of public labor service providing and regulation system of individual labor relationship.
On the basis of above elements, the choice of labor law system are conditioned in the following way: (1)the system of actors influences the orientation of labor legislation; (2) the system of actors influences the legal system of coordinating labor relationship;(3) the system of actors influences the ways and degrees of labor law in protecting employees. All the above is proved by the industrialized state practice and the strict regulation choice of labor dispatch in China Labor Contract Law.
In China the system of actors in labor law presents the basic structure of strong capital, vulnerable labor and weak social actors. At present, the state corporatism should be a practical choice by strengthening independency of labor union and employers’association with the aim of construct a social corporatism model of the system of actors in labor law.
引文
[1][意]贡塔·托依布纳.法律:一个自创生系统.张骐译.译者序言.北京:北京大学出版社,2005,8
[2] Kahn-Freund O. On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law. Modern Law Review, 1974, 37(1):1-27
[3]王全兴.劳动法.第二版.北京:法律出版社,2004,4
[4][英]艾伦·胡特.英国工会运动简史.朱立人,蔡汉敖译.北京:世界知识出版社,1954,13
[5]韦伯夫妇.英国工会运动史.陈建民译.北京:商务印书馆,1959,53
[6]资中筠.美国强盛之道. http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_project_ls.asp·id=232,2008-4-12
[7] ILO.The Constitution of ILO.www.ilo.org,2008-4-14
[8] Simon C.劳动关系的个别规制与集体规制.见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,371-380
[9] Highfield L.新西兰劳动法改革.见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,410
[10] Cooney S.澳大利亚劳动法:对正规工人和边缘工人的新发展,见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,399-409
[11]黄越钦.劳动法新论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003,319,330,345-346
[12]周贤奇.德国劳动,社会保障制度及有关争议案件的处理.北大法律信息网,2002-9-3
[13] Ryuichi Yamakawa.Strangers When We Met: The Influence Of Foreign Labor Relations Law and Its Domestication in Japan. Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 1995(May):363-394
[14]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益.吴敬琏.比较.第十四辑.北京:中信出版社,2004,1-14
[15]黄昆,王全兴.西方国家对劳动派遣放松规制的背景及其启示.上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007(4):40-47。
[16]马克思.资本论(第一卷).郭大力,王亚南译.1938年版影印本,上海:上海三联书店,2006,原著者第二版跋,11
[17] [英]W·桑巴特.为什么美国没有社会主义.赖海榕译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003,27
[18]王全兴.《劳动合同法》实施后的劳动关系走向.深圳大学学报,2008(2):35
[19]邓正来.国家与社会——中国市民社会研究的研究.见邓正来.市民社会理论的研究.北京:中国政法大学,2002,155
[20]孙文恺.社会学法学.北京:法律出版社,2005,3
[21]许国安.系统科学.上海:上海科技教育出版社,2000,17
[22] Dunlop J. Industrial Relations System. Revised Edition. Boston: Harvard Business School Press,1993,14-15,47-54
[23]陈平原.中国现代学术之建立.北京:北京大学出版社,1998,21
[24]王全兴.经济法基础理论专题研究.北京:中国检察出版社,2002,51-53
[25] Ruysseveldt J V, Visser J.Industrial Relations In Europe: Tradition and Transition. London: Sage Publications, 1996, 11
[26]弗朗茨·维亚克尔.近代私法史——以德意志的发展为观察重点.陈爱娥,黄建辉译.上海:上海三联书店,2006,462
[27]联合国劳工组织.社会保障基础.长春:吉林大学出版社,1989,2
[28] Biagi M. The Role of Social Partners in Europe: from Dialogue to Parnership.Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 1999(Spring):485-469
[29]刘帅.论欧盟社会伙伴及其社会对话: [河北师范大学硕士论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2005,31
[30]罗斯科·庞德.法理学(第三卷).廖德宇译.北京:法律出版社,2007,13 -14
[31] Hemerijck A C. Corporatism Immobility in the Netherlands. Organized Industrial Relation in Europe: What Future·. European Labor Relations. 163
[32]王全兴.我国劳动合同立法的基本取向.中国劳动,2005(7):11-14
[33]邹亚军.日本企业制度的特点及其对中国企业的启示.南京林业大学学报(人文社会科学版),2002(6):64-67
[34]王全兴.社会法学的双重关注:社会和经济.法商研究,2005(1):15-17
[35]王全兴.劳动合同立法争论中需要澄清的几个基本问题.法学, 2006(9):19-28
[36]乔·B·史蒂文森.集体选择经济学.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999,5
[37]陈尧.利益集团与政治过程.读书,2005(11):117-124
[38]戴维·杜鲁门.政治过程一一政治利益与公共舆论.陈尧译.天津:天津人民出版社,2005,72-115
[39]程浩,黄卫平,汪永成.中国社会利益集团研究.战略与管理,2003(4),63-74
[40]曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.陈郁,郭宇峰,李崇新译.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995,5-42
[41] [美]S·詹科夫,R·拉·波塔等.新比较经济学的新视角.载吴敬琏主编.比较(第四辑).北京:中信出版社,2002,69
[42]卢现祥,朱巧玲.论新制度经济学中国家的四大职能,湖北经济学院学报,2006(5):12-17
[43]柯武刚,史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策.北京:商务印书馆,2000,252
[44] [英]大卫·休谟.人性论.关文运译.北京:商务印书馆,1980,538
[45] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1991,119
[46] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.制度,制度变迁与经济绩效.上海:上海三联书店,1994,71
[47] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.国家经济角色的昨天,今天与明天.见斯蒂格利茨编.政府为什么干预经济——政府在市场经济中的角色.北京:中国物资出版社,1998,163
[48] [美]科斯,诺思等.制度,契约与组织:从新制度经济学角度的透视.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,246
[49] [英]马尔科姆·卢瑟福.经济学中的制度:老制度主义和新制度主义.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999,122
[50]常凯.劳权论一当代中国劳动关系的法律调整研究.北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2004,220
[51]黄程贯.劳动法.台北:国立空中大学印行,1997,146-147
[52]程延园.集体谈判制度研究.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,45
[53] [美]理查德·B·弗里曼.劳动经济学.刘东一,程为敏,周小一译.北京:商务印书馆,1987,211
[54] Clarke S,Lee Chang-hee. The Significance of Tripartite Consultation in China. Asia Pacific Business Review, 2002,9(2):61–80
[55]程延园.劳动关系.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002,160
[56] Pistor K, Xu Chenggang. Incomplete Law. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2003(Summer):注15,16。
[57] Ayres I,Gertner R. Strategic Contractual Infficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules. Yale Law Journal,1992(January):729-772。
[58] Ayres I,Gertner R. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: an Economic Theory of Default Rules. Yale Law Journal,1989(October): 87-130
[59] Maskin E,Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economics Study, 1999(66): 83
[60]史尚宽.债法总论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2000,14
[61] Morris G S, Fredman S. Is There A Public– Private Labour Law Divide·. Comparative Labor Law Journal,1993(Winter):115–137
[62]方晓波.论SA8000标准对企业人力资源管理变革的影响.湖北省社会主义学院学报,2005(6):72-73
[63] [日]星野英一.私法中的人.王闯译.北京:中国法制出版社,2004,34-39
[64] [德]拉德布鲁赫著.法哲学.王朴译.北京:法律出版社,2005,132-134
[65]俞可平.中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁.中国社会科学季刊,1999(秋)(总第27期):107
[66]邓正来.市民社会理论的研究.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2002
[67]邓正来,J.C.亚历山大.国家与市民社会.北京:中央编译出版社,1999,7
[68]郁建兴.马克思的市民社会概念.社会学研究,2002(1):31-39
[69]梁治平.“民间”,“民间社会”和CIVIL SOCIETY.云南大学学报(社科版),2003(1):56-68
[70] [德]哈贝马斯.在事实和规范之间——关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论.童世骏译.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2003,453
[71]张静.法团主义(修订版).北京:中国社会科学出版社,1998,74
[72]李拥军.论市民社会的权利——对个人,社会,国家权利关系的一种解析.华东政法学院学报,2005(4):20-27
[73] [德]哈贝马斯.公共领域的结构转型.曹卫东等译.上海:学林出版社,1999,34
[74]高峰.市民社会:当代中国社会学研究的主题.苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(2):41-45
[75]高峰.当代视野中的市民社会. [苏州大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006:18
[76]任平.当代视野中的马克思主义.南京:江苏人民出版社,2003,488-490
[77]郑秉文.跋:“合作主义”理论与现代福利制度.见[加]R·米什拉.资本主义社会的福利国家.郑秉文译.北京:法律出版社,2003:152-153
[78]顾昕.公民社会发展的法团主义之道.浙江学刊,2004(6):64-70
[79]郁建兴,吴宇.中国民间组织的兴起与国家——社会关系理论的转型.人文杂志,2003(4):142-148
[80] [英]菲利普·李维斯.雇员关系:解析雇佣关系.高嘉勇等译.大连:东北财经大学出版社,2005,58
[81] Fox A. Beyong Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: Faber & Faber,1974,14
[82] Lukes S. Power: A Radical View. London, Macmillan,1974,21-22
[83][德]马克思·韦伯.经济与社会(上卷).林荣远译.北京:商务印书馆,1997,81
[84]Finkin M W. Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee As A Person in Western Law. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 2002(Winter): 577-637。
[85]王平.民事合同与行政合同之比较及启示.武汉大学学报,2000(3):356-360
[86]王利明.统一合同法制订中的若干疑难问题探讨(上).政法论坛,1996(4):49-56
[87]史尚宽.劳动法原论.台北:正大印书馆,1978年重印,2
[88]林更盛.劳动契约之特征“从属性”.见林更盛.劳动法案例研究(一).台北:翰芦图书出版公司,2002,1-32
[89]林更盛.德国法上近来对劳工概念之讨论与立法.见劳动法裁判选辑(三).台北:元照出版公司,1999,12
[90]邱骏彦.劳动基准法上劳工之定义.见劳动法裁判选辑(二).台北:元照出版公司,1999,93-100
[91]刘志鹏.论劳动基准法上之“劳工”.见刘志鹏.劳动法理论与判决研究.台北:元照出版公司,2000,5 - 25,
[92]苏西刚.社团自治及其法律界限的基本原理.见罗豪才.行政法论丛(第8卷).北京:法律出版社2005,96-97
[93][美]康芒斯.制度经济学.于树生译.北京:商务印书馆,1983,433
[94] Marby B. Labour Relations and Collective Bargaining. New York:Ronald Press,1966,189.
[95]约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷).陈岱孙等译.北京:经济科学出版社,1996,521
[96] Davis K,Newstrom J. Human Behavior at Work:Organizational Behavior. 7th edition,New York:McGraw-Hill,379
[97] Chamberlain N,Kuhn J. Collective Bargaining,3rd edition,New York :McGraw-Hill,1986,121
[98][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约.段毅才,王伟译.北京:商务印书馆,2002,225-257
[99][加]R·米什拉.资本主义社会的福利国家.郑秉文译.北京:法律出版社,2003:50-71
[100]E·S·萨瓦斯.民营化和公私部门的伙伴关系.周志忍译.北京:中国人民大学出版,2002
[101] Barbier J,Hansen E,Samorodov A. Public-Private Partnerships inEmployment Services. Geneva: Internation Labor Office, 2003,2-7
[102] [美]曼库尔·奥尔森.国家兴衰探源:经济增长,滞胀与社会僵化.吕应中译.北京:商务印书馆,1993,48
[103] Crouch C. Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis. USA: Humanities Press, 1977,26-44
[104]郭悦.转型时期中国劳动关系问题研究.北京大军经济观察研究中心网站,http://www.dajun.com.cn/laodongguanxi.htm,2005-10-11
[105]王全兴.《劳动合同法》条文精解.北京:中国法制出版社,2007,5
[106]顾韬.日本“春斗”工资涨幅创历史新低.人民网日本版, http://japan.people.com.cn/2001/04/05/riben20010405_3989.html ,2008-4-16
[107]宋玉波.市民自治与社会和谐——美国地方自治考察.美国政治与法律网, http://www.ciapl.com/news.asp·Newsid=6701&type=1001,2005-8-11
[108] [法]托克维尔.论美国的民主(上卷).董果良译.北京:商务印书馆,1991,213
[109]陶坚.美国自由市场经济.北京:时事出版社,1995,8
[110]迈克尔·D·耶茨.美国工人失业和美国工会现状. http://www.comment-cn.net/data/2006/1206/article_25956.html ,2008-3-17
[111] Payne v. Western A R. R Co., 81 Tenn 507,1884
[112] Jesse Rudy. What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection. Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law, 2002(23):2,
[113]林德山.英国工党执政历史与现状. http://bjsdjyjh.bjdj.gov.cn/ShowArticle.asp·ArticleID=27961 ,2008-4-12
[114] Gall G. Labour's US catch-22. http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/gregor_gall/2008/01/labours_us_catch-22.html,2008-1-29
[115]孙炳耀.当代英国瑞典社会保障制度.北京:法律出版社,2000,14-36
[116]顾俊礼.德国的利益集团.德国研究,2000(1):7-13
[117]李培林.当代德国社会结构的变化. http://www.sociology.cass.cn/shxw/shgz/shgza/shgz9_fj/P020041010272373906157.pdf,2008-3-4
[118]何勤华.德国法律发达史.北京:法律出版社,2000,339
[119] Kahn-Freund O. Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain and West Germany. in:Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Lewis R, Clark J. Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1983,3-28
[120] Clegg H A. The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1979,2
[121]徐梅.试论日本放松规制.中国社会科学院日本研究所网站, http://ijs.cass.cn/files/geren/xumei/lw5.htm,2008-3-5
[122]武心波.试论日本大企业的“藩共同体”性格. http://ijs.cass.cn/files/xuekan/2004-5/rbdqy.htm,2008-3-5
[123]高增杰.日本企业的社会功能. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/EnterpriseFunction.htm,2008-3-5
[124]刘昌黎.论日本的主银行制度及其变化与改革. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/MainBank.htm,2008-3-5
[125] Takashi Araki. Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and the Role of Labour Law in Japan. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal,2007(Winter):251-281
[126] Haley J O. The Spirit of Japanese Law. The University of Georgia Press, Athens & London,1998,15.
[127]张季风.战后日本失业结构特征与就业机制. http://www.ijs.cn/files/xuekan/00-4.doc, 2008-3-5
[128]陈根发.论日本法的精神.北京:北京大学出版社,2005,199
[129]华迎放.日本的劳动关系调整. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/LaborUnion.htm,2008-3-5
[130]顾昕,王旭.从国家主义到法团主义—中国市场转型过程中国家与专业团体关系的演变.社会学研究,2005(2):155-175
[131] Frost S, Chiu C H. Labour Relation and Regulation in Singapore: Theory and Practice. http://www.sityu.edu.hk/searc,2007-6-7
[132]杨通轩.欧洲联盟劳动力派遣法制之研究——兼论德国之劳动力派遣法制.中原财经法学,2003:10,249-326
[133] Weiss M. European Emplyment and Industrial Relations Glossary. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, 34, 213, 802
[134] ILO. The Employment Relationship. Geneva: ILO Office, 2005, 42-49
[135] ILO. The Scope of the Employment Relationship. Geneva: ILO Office,2003, 37-52
[136]ILO. Fee-charging Employment Agence Convention (C34). 1933, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm,2008-4-16
[137]ILO. Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (Revised) (C96). 1949, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm, 2008-4-16
[138]ILO. Private Employment Agencies Convention (C181). 1997, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm,2008-4-16
[139]Vosko L F. Legitimizing the Trangular Employment Relationship: Emerging International Labour Standards From A Comparative Perspective. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal ,1997(Fall):43-77.
[140]Vosko L F.Temporary Work: the Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship. Toronto:University of Toronto Press,2000,17
[141]李佑婷.日本人才派遣业发展之考察. www.ctnbank.com.tw/ctb_4_5/upload/113_06.pdf, 2005-12-20
[142]Schüren P. Employee Leasing in Germany: the Hiring Out Of an Employee as a Temporary Worker. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 2001(Fall):67-80。
[143]Lo V I. Atypical Employment: A Comparison of Japan and The United States. Comparative Labor Law Journal,1996( Spring): 492-525。
[144]郑津津.派遣劳动之法律关系与相关法律问题之研究.中正大学法学集刊,1999:2,237-256
[145]李元隆.中国台湾人才派遣也现况之研究——以日本人才派遣业为比较基础.[中国台湾中山大学人力资源研究所硕士论文].台北:中山大学学位论文库,2000,15
[146]Auer P. Protected Mobility For Employment and Decent Work: Labour market security in a globalised world. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/esp2005-1.pdf,2006-2-13
[147]EU. Order in Council No. PC1028. www.coe.int,2008-4-16
[148]EU. Order in Council No. PC1064. www.coe.int,2008-4-16
[149]Blainpain R, Graham R (eds.). Temporary Agency Work and the Information Society. Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 2004,10-11
[150]Summers C W. Contigent Employment in the United States. Comparative Labor Law Journal, 1997, summer: 503,509.
[151]黄昆.劳动合同立法与劳动关系稳定性与流动性双重价值取向的实现.见:2005年度中国劳动法研究会年会暨劳动合同立法理论研讨会论文汇编,上海,2005,224-233
[152]李坤刚.论劳动关系的稳定性和流动性——兼论我国劳动合同制度的完善.法商研究,2000(6):94-99
[153]Blanpain R(ed.). Temporay Work and Labour Law of the European Community and Member States. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993,109-110
[154]张俊才,田阔川.我国迎来第三次就业高峰,高失业成主要社会风险.http://news.21cn.com/domestic/yaowen/2006/06/19/2618205.shtml,2008-4-16
[155]钟鞍钢.劳务派遣工维权遭遇法律难题. http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-06/20/content_3108717.htm,2008-4-16
[156]俞薇.浅议劳务派遣制度中存在的法律问题.见:全国部分城市劳动争议审判实务研讨会参会论文汇编,福州,2005,145-150
[157]Kahn-Freund O. Labour and the Law.in The Halyn Lectures 24th series(2nd edition),1977,106
[158][法]勒内·达维.英国法与法国法:一种实质性比较.潘华仿等译.北京:清华大学出版社,2002,214
[159]夏小林.经济增长的背后—解读浙江省的劳资关系与协调机制.经济研究参考,2004(44),2-7
[160]郭军.修正后的《工会法》解析与适用手册.北京:红旗出版社, 2001,63-64
[161]许宗力.国家机关的法人化——行政组织再造的另一种选择.月旦法学杂志,2000(2),32-33
[162]吴小龙.公共团体法研究.[中国政法大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006,59-60
[163]经济合作与发展组织.分散化的公共治理——代理机构,权力主体和其他政府实体.国家发展和改革委员会事业单位改革研究课题组译.北京:中信出版社,2007,3-17
[164]沈亚平.社会秩序及其转型研究.石家庄:河北大学出版社,2002,293
[165]康晓光.论合作主义国家. http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php·id=3569,2008-4-16
[166]郑秉文.合作主义:中国福利制度框架的重构.经济研究,2002(2),71-79
[167]UN China. Advancing Social Development in China. http://www. unchina.org/115p1an/english.pdf, 2008-4-16
[168]郑桥.没有工会,市场经济就不能正常运作.南方周末,2007-5-10
[169]佘云霞.西方市场经济国家工会运行模式及其启示. http://www.ciir.edu.cn/jxjf/ggxlw/syx-6.pdf,2007-6-27
[170]徐颖.从《经济,社会文化权利国际公约》的保留看中国工会改革的路径选择.[华东政法学院法学硕士研究生毕业论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2004,56
[171]陈义兴.中国大陆工会发展和变迁研究.[中山大学大陆研究所硕士论文],台北:中山大学学位论文库,2005,31
[172]龚基云.转型期中国劳动关系研究.[南京大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2004,110-112
[173]庞兰强.论社会行政主体.[苏州大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006,94-96
[174]王全兴.劳动关系协调机制建设策略的重大转变——“中美劳动法合作改善劳动关系项目”青岛试点的简评.中国劳动,2007(11):10-11
[175]Boyd S. Partnership Working: European Social Partnership Models ,http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/europe/pwespm.pdf. 2002-12-1
[176]Compston H. Policy Concerntation and Social Partnership in Western Europe: Lessons for the 21st. New York: Beghahn Books,2002,4
[177]Compston H, Greenwood J. Social Partnership in the European Union. New York: Palgrave,2001,1
[2] Kahn-Freund O. On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law. Modern Law Review, 1974, 37(1):1-27
[3]王全兴.劳动法.第二版.北京:法律出版社,2004,4
[4][英]艾伦·胡特.英国工会运动简史.朱立人,蔡汉敖译.北京:世界知识出版社,1954,13
[5]韦伯夫妇.英国工会运动史.陈建民译.北京:商务印书馆,1959,53
[6]资中筠.美国强盛之道. http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_project_ls.asp·id=232,2008-4-12
[7] ILO.The Constitution of ILO.www.ilo.org,2008-4-14
[8] Simon C.劳动关系的个别规制与集体规制.见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,371-380
[9] Highfield L.新西兰劳动法改革.见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,410
[10] Cooney S.澳大利亚劳动法:对正规工人和边缘工人的新发展,见叶静漪,周长征.社会正义的十年探索:中国与国外劳动法制改革比较研究.北京:北京大学出版社,2007,399-409
[11]黄越钦.劳动法新论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003,319,330,345-346
[12]周贤奇.德国劳动,社会保障制度及有关争议案件的处理.北大法律信息网,2002-9-3
[13] Ryuichi Yamakawa.Strangers When We Met: The Influence Of Foreign Labor Relations Law and Its Domestication in Japan. Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 1995(May):363-394
[14]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益.吴敬琏.比较.第十四辑.北京:中信出版社,2004,1-14
[15]黄昆,王全兴.西方国家对劳动派遣放松规制的背景及其启示.上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007(4):40-47。
[16]马克思.资本论(第一卷).郭大力,王亚南译.1938年版影印本,上海:上海三联书店,2006,原著者第二版跋,11
[17] [英]W·桑巴特.为什么美国没有社会主义.赖海榕译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003,27
[18]王全兴.《劳动合同法》实施后的劳动关系走向.深圳大学学报,2008(2):35
[19]邓正来.国家与社会——中国市民社会研究的研究.见邓正来.市民社会理论的研究.北京:中国政法大学,2002,155
[20]孙文恺.社会学法学.北京:法律出版社,2005,3
[21]许国安.系统科学.上海:上海科技教育出版社,2000,17
[22] Dunlop J. Industrial Relations System. Revised Edition. Boston: Harvard Business School Press,1993,14-15,47-54
[23]陈平原.中国现代学术之建立.北京:北京大学出版社,1998,21
[24]王全兴.经济法基础理论专题研究.北京:中国检察出版社,2002,51-53
[25] Ruysseveldt J V, Visser J.Industrial Relations In Europe: Tradition and Transition. London: Sage Publications, 1996, 11
[26]弗朗茨·维亚克尔.近代私法史——以德意志的发展为观察重点.陈爱娥,黄建辉译.上海:上海三联书店,2006,462
[27]联合国劳工组织.社会保障基础.长春:吉林大学出版社,1989,2
[28] Biagi M. The Role of Social Partners in Europe: from Dialogue to Parnership.Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 1999(Spring):485-469
[29]刘帅.论欧盟社会伙伴及其社会对话: [河北师范大学硕士论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2005,31
[30]罗斯科·庞德.法理学(第三卷).廖德宇译.北京:法律出版社,2007,13 -14
[31] Hemerijck A C. Corporatism Immobility in the Netherlands. Organized Industrial Relation in Europe: What Future·. European Labor Relations. 163
[32]王全兴.我国劳动合同立法的基本取向.中国劳动,2005(7):11-14
[33]邹亚军.日本企业制度的特点及其对中国企业的启示.南京林业大学学报(人文社会科学版),2002(6):64-67
[34]王全兴.社会法学的双重关注:社会和经济.法商研究,2005(1):15-17
[35]王全兴.劳动合同立法争论中需要澄清的几个基本问题.法学, 2006(9):19-28
[36]乔·B·史蒂文森.集体选择经济学.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1999,5
[37]陈尧.利益集团与政治过程.读书,2005(11):117-124
[38]戴维·杜鲁门.政治过程一一政治利益与公共舆论.陈尧译.天津:天津人民出版社,2005,72-115
[39]程浩,黄卫平,汪永成.中国社会利益集团研究.战略与管理,2003(4),63-74
[40]曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.陈郁,郭宇峰,李崇新译.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995,5-42
[41] [美]S·詹科夫,R·拉·波塔等.新比较经济学的新视角.载吴敬琏主编.比较(第四辑).北京:中信出版社,2002,69
[42]卢现祥,朱巧玲.论新制度经济学中国家的四大职能,湖北经济学院学报,2006(5):12-17
[43]柯武刚,史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策.北京:商务印书馆,2000,252
[44] [英]大卫·休谟.人性论.关文运译.北京:商务印书馆,1980,538
[45] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1991,119
[46] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.制度,制度变迁与经济绩效.上海:上海三联书店,1994,71
[47] [美]道格拉斯·C·诺思.国家经济角色的昨天,今天与明天.见斯蒂格利茨编.政府为什么干预经济——政府在市场经济中的角色.北京:中国物资出版社,1998,163
[48] [美]科斯,诺思等.制度,契约与组织:从新制度经济学角度的透视.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,246
[49] [英]马尔科姆·卢瑟福.经济学中的制度:老制度主义和新制度主义.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999,122
[50]常凯.劳权论一当代中国劳动关系的法律调整研究.北京:中国劳动社会保障出版社,2004,220
[51]黄程贯.劳动法.台北:国立空中大学印行,1997,146-147
[52]程延园.集体谈判制度研究.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,45
[53] [美]理查德·B·弗里曼.劳动经济学.刘东一,程为敏,周小一译.北京:商务印书馆,1987,211
[54] Clarke S,Lee Chang-hee. The Significance of Tripartite Consultation in China. Asia Pacific Business Review, 2002,9(2):61–80
[55]程延园.劳动关系.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002,160
[56] Pistor K, Xu Chenggang. Incomplete Law. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2003(Summer):注15,16。
[57] Ayres I,Gertner R. Strategic Contractual Infficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules. Yale Law Journal,1992(January):729-772。
[58] Ayres I,Gertner R. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: an Economic Theory of Default Rules. Yale Law Journal,1989(October): 87-130
[59] Maskin E,Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economics Study, 1999(66): 83
[60]史尚宽.债法总论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2000,14
[61] Morris G S, Fredman S. Is There A Public– Private Labour Law Divide·. Comparative Labor Law Journal,1993(Winter):115–137
[62]方晓波.论SA8000标准对企业人力资源管理变革的影响.湖北省社会主义学院学报,2005(6):72-73
[63] [日]星野英一.私法中的人.王闯译.北京:中国法制出版社,2004,34-39
[64] [德]拉德布鲁赫著.法哲学.王朴译.北京:法律出版社,2005,132-134
[65]俞可平.中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁.中国社会科学季刊,1999(秋)(总第27期):107
[66]邓正来.市民社会理论的研究.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2002
[67]邓正来,J.C.亚历山大.国家与市民社会.北京:中央编译出版社,1999,7
[68]郁建兴.马克思的市民社会概念.社会学研究,2002(1):31-39
[69]梁治平.“民间”,“民间社会”和CIVIL SOCIETY.云南大学学报(社科版),2003(1):56-68
[70] [德]哈贝马斯.在事实和规范之间——关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论.童世骏译.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2003,453
[71]张静.法团主义(修订版).北京:中国社会科学出版社,1998,74
[72]李拥军.论市民社会的权利——对个人,社会,国家权利关系的一种解析.华东政法学院学报,2005(4):20-27
[73] [德]哈贝马斯.公共领域的结构转型.曹卫东等译.上海:学林出版社,1999,34
[74]高峰.市民社会:当代中国社会学研究的主题.苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(2):41-45
[75]高峰.当代视野中的市民社会. [苏州大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006:18
[76]任平.当代视野中的马克思主义.南京:江苏人民出版社,2003,488-490
[77]郑秉文.跋:“合作主义”理论与现代福利制度.见[加]R·米什拉.资本主义社会的福利国家.郑秉文译.北京:法律出版社,2003:152-153
[78]顾昕.公民社会发展的法团主义之道.浙江学刊,2004(6):64-70
[79]郁建兴,吴宇.中国民间组织的兴起与国家——社会关系理论的转型.人文杂志,2003(4):142-148
[80] [英]菲利普·李维斯.雇员关系:解析雇佣关系.高嘉勇等译.大连:东北财经大学出版社,2005,58
[81] Fox A. Beyong Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: Faber & Faber,1974,14
[82] Lukes S. Power: A Radical View. London, Macmillan,1974,21-22
[83][德]马克思·韦伯.经济与社会(上卷).林荣远译.北京:商务印书馆,1997,81
[84]Finkin M W. Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee As A Person in Western Law. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 2002(Winter): 577-637。
[85]王平.民事合同与行政合同之比较及启示.武汉大学学报,2000(3):356-360
[86]王利明.统一合同法制订中的若干疑难问题探讨(上).政法论坛,1996(4):49-56
[87]史尚宽.劳动法原论.台北:正大印书馆,1978年重印,2
[88]林更盛.劳动契约之特征“从属性”.见林更盛.劳动法案例研究(一).台北:翰芦图书出版公司,2002,1-32
[89]林更盛.德国法上近来对劳工概念之讨论与立法.见劳动法裁判选辑(三).台北:元照出版公司,1999,12
[90]邱骏彦.劳动基准法上劳工之定义.见劳动法裁判选辑(二).台北:元照出版公司,1999,93-100
[91]刘志鹏.论劳动基准法上之“劳工”.见刘志鹏.劳动法理论与判决研究.台北:元照出版公司,2000,5 - 25,
[92]苏西刚.社团自治及其法律界限的基本原理.见罗豪才.行政法论丛(第8卷).北京:法律出版社2005,96-97
[93][美]康芒斯.制度经济学.于树生译.北京:商务印书馆,1983,433
[94] Marby B. Labour Relations and Collective Bargaining. New York:Ronald Press,1966,189.
[95]约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷).陈岱孙等译.北京:经济科学出版社,1996,521
[96] Davis K,Newstrom J. Human Behavior at Work:Organizational Behavior. 7th edition,New York:McGraw-Hill,379
[97] Chamberlain N,Kuhn J. Collective Bargaining,3rd edition,New York :McGraw-Hill,1986,121
[98][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约.段毅才,王伟译.北京:商务印书馆,2002,225-257
[99][加]R·米什拉.资本主义社会的福利国家.郑秉文译.北京:法律出版社,2003:50-71
[100]E·S·萨瓦斯.民营化和公私部门的伙伴关系.周志忍译.北京:中国人民大学出版,2002
[101] Barbier J,Hansen E,Samorodov A. Public-Private Partnerships inEmployment Services. Geneva: Internation Labor Office, 2003,2-7
[102] [美]曼库尔·奥尔森.国家兴衰探源:经济增长,滞胀与社会僵化.吕应中译.北京:商务印书馆,1993,48
[103] Crouch C. Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis. USA: Humanities Press, 1977,26-44
[104]郭悦.转型时期中国劳动关系问题研究.北京大军经济观察研究中心网站,http://www.dajun.com.cn/laodongguanxi.htm,2005-10-11
[105]王全兴.《劳动合同法》条文精解.北京:中国法制出版社,2007,5
[106]顾韬.日本“春斗”工资涨幅创历史新低.人民网日本版, http://japan.people.com.cn/2001/04/05/riben20010405_3989.html ,2008-4-16
[107]宋玉波.市民自治与社会和谐——美国地方自治考察.美国政治与法律网, http://www.ciapl.com/news.asp·Newsid=6701&type=1001,2005-8-11
[108] [法]托克维尔.论美国的民主(上卷).董果良译.北京:商务印书馆,1991,213
[109]陶坚.美国自由市场经济.北京:时事出版社,1995,8
[110]迈克尔·D·耶茨.美国工人失业和美国工会现状. http://www.comment-cn.net/data/2006/1206/article_25956.html ,2008-3-17
[111] Payne v. Western A R. R Co., 81 Tenn 507,1884
[112] Jesse Rudy. What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection. Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law, 2002(23):2,
[113]林德山.英国工党执政历史与现状. http://bjsdjyjh.bjdj.gov.cn/ShowArticle.asp·ArticleID=27961 ,2008-4-12
[114] Gall G. Labour's US catch-22. http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/gregor_gall/2008/01/labours_us_catch-22.html,2008-1-29
[115]孙炳耀.当代英国瑞典社会保障制度.北京:法律出版社,2000,14-36
[116]顾俊礼.德国的利益集团.德国研究,2000(1):7-13
[117]李培林.当代德国社会结构的变化. http://www.sociology.cass.cn/shxw/shgz/shgza/shgz9_fj/P020041010272373906157.pdf,2008-3-4
[118]何勤华.德国法律发达史.北京:法律出版社,2000,339
[119] Kahn-Freund O. Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain and West Germany. in:Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Lewis R, Clark J. Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1983,3-28
[120] Clegg H A. The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1979,2
[121]徐梅.试论日本放松规制.中国社会科学院日本研究所网站, http://ijs.cass.cn/files/geren/xumei/lw5.htm,2008-3-5
[122]武心波.试论日本大企业的“藩共同体”性格. http://ijs.cass.cn/files/xuekan/2004-5/rbdqy.htm,2008-3-5
[123]高增杰.日本企业的社会功能. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/EnterpriseFunction.htm,2008-3-5
[124]刘昌黎.论日本的主银行制度及其变化与改革. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/MainBank.htm,2008-3-5
[125] Takashi Araki. Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and the Role of Labour Law in Japan. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal,2007(Winter):251-281
[126] Haley J O. The Spirit of Japanese Law. The University of Georgia Press, Athens & London,1998,15.
[127]张季风.战后日本失业结构特征与就业机制. http://www.ijs.cn/files/xuekan/00-4.doc, 2008-3-5
[128]陈根发.论日本法的精神.北京:北京大学出版社,2005,199
[129]华迎放.日本的劳动关系调整. http://www.superist.com/growupgene/LaborUnion.htm,2008-3-5
[130]顾昕,王旭.从国家主义到法团主义—中国市场转型过程中国家与专业团体关系的演变.社会学研究,2005(2):155-175
[131] Frost S, Chiu C H. Labour Relation and Regulation in Singapore: Theory and Practice. http://www.sityu.edu.hk/searc,2007-6-7
[132]杨通轩.欧洲联盟劳动力派遣法制之研究——兼论德国之劳动力派遣法制.中原财经法学,2003:10,249-326
[133] Weiss M. European Emplyment and Industrial Relations Glossary. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, 34, 213, 802
[134] ILO. The Employment Relationship. Geneva: ILO Office, 2005, 42-49
[135] ILO. The Scope of the Employment Relationship. Geneva: ILO Office,2003, 37-52
[136]ILO. Fee-charging Employment Agence Convention (C34). 1933, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm,2008-4-16
[137]ILO. Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (Revised) (C96). 1949, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm, 2008-4-16
[138]ILO. Private Employment Agencies Convention (C181). 1997, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm,2008-4-16
[139]Vosko L F. Legitimizing the Trangular Employment Relationship: Emerging International Labour Standards From A Comparative Perspective. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal ,1997(Fall):43-77.
[140]Vosko L F.Temporary Work: the Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship. Toronto:University of Toronto Press,2000,17
[141]李佑婷.日本人才派遣业发展之考察. www.ctnbank.com.tw/ctb_4_5/upload/113_06.pdf, 2005-12-20
[142]Schüren P. Employee Leasing in Germany: the Hiring Out Of an Employee as a Temporary Worker. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 2001(Fall):67-80。
[143]Lo V I. Atypical Employment: A Comparison of Japan and The United States. Comparative Labor Law Journal,1996( Spring): 492-525。
[144]郑津津.派遣劳动之法律关系与相关法律问题之研究.中正大学法学集刊,1999:2,237-256
[145]李元隆.中国台湾人才派遣也现况之研究——以日本人才派遣业为比较基础.[中国台湾中山大学人力资源研究所硕士论文].台北:中山大学学位论文库,2000,15
[146]Auer P. Protected Mobility For Employment and Decent Work: Labour market security in a globalised world. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/esp2005-1.pdf,2006-2-13
[147]EU. Order in Council No. PC1028. www.coe.int,2008-4-16
[148]EU. Order in Council No. PC1064. www.coe.int,2008-4-16
[149]Blainpain R, Graham R (eds.). Temporary Agency Work and the Information Society. Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 2004,10-11
[150]Summers C W. Contigent Employment in the United States. Comparative Labor Law Journal, 1997, summer: 503,509.
[151]黄昆.劳动合同立法与劳动关系稳定性与流动性双重价值取向的实现.见:2005年度中国劳动法研究会年会暨劳动合同立法理论研讨会论文汇编,上海,2005,224-233
[152]李坤刚.论劳动关系的稳定性和流动性——兼论我国劳动合同制度的完善.法商研究,2000(6):94-99
[153]Blanpain R(ed.). Temporay Work and Labour Law of the European Community and Member States. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993,109-110
[154]张俊才,田阔川.我国迎来第三次就业高峰,高失业成主要社会风险.http://news.21cn.com/domestic/yaowen/2006/06/19/2618205.shtml,2008-4-16
[155]钟鞍钢.劳务派遣工维权遭遇法律难题. http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-06/20/content_3108717.htm,2008-4-16
[156]俞薇.浅议劳务派遣制度中存在的法律问题.见:全国部分城市劳动争议审判实务研讨会参会论文汇编,福州,2005,145-150
[157]Kahn-Freund O. Labour and the Law.in The Halyn Lectures 24th series(2nd edition),1977,106
[158][法]勒内·达维.英国法与法国法:一种实质性比较.潘华仿等译.北京:清华大学出版社,2002,214
[159]夏小林.经济增长的背后—解读浙江省的劳资关系与协调机制.经济研究参考,2004(44),2-7
[160]郭军.修正后的《工会法》解析与适用手册.北京:红旗出版社, 2001,63-64
[161]许宗力.国家机关的法人化——行政组织再造的另一种选择.月旦法学杂志,2000(2),32-33
[162]吴小龙.公共团体法研究.[中国政法大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006,59-60
[163]经济合作与发展组织.分散化的公共治理——代理机构,权力主体和其他政府实体.国家发展和改革委员会事业单位改革研究课题组译.北京:中信出版社,2007,3-17
[164]沈亚平.社会秩序及其转型研究.石家庄:河北大学出版社,2002,293
[165]康晓光.论合作主义国家. http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php·id=3569,2008-4-16
[166]郑秉文.合作主义:中国福利制度框架的重构.经济研究,2002(2),71-79
[167]UN China. Advancing Social Development in China. http://www. unchina.org/115p1an/english.pdf, 2008-4-16
[168]郑桥.没有工会,市场经济就不能正常运作.南方周末,2007-5-10
[169]佘云霞.西方市场经济国家工会运行模式及其启示. http://www.ciir.edu.cn/jxjf/ggxlw/syx-6.pdf,2007-6-27
[170]徐颖.从《经济,社会文化权利国际公约》的保留看中国工会改革的路径选择.[华东政法学院法学硕士研究生毕业论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2004,56
[171]陈义兴.中国大陆工会发展和变迁研究.[中山大学大陆研究所硕士论文],台北:中山大学学位论文库,2005,31
[172]龚基云.转型期中国劳动关系研究.[南京大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2004,110-112
[173]庞兰强.论社会行政主体.[苏州大学博士学位论文],北京:中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006,94-96
[174]王全兴.劳动关系协调机制建设策略的重大转变——“中美劳动法合作改善劳动关系项目”青岛试点的简评.中国劳动,2007(11):10-11
[175]Boyd S. Partnership Working: European Social Partnership Models ,http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/europe/pwespm.pdf. 2002-12-1
[176]Compston H. Policy Concerntation and Social Partnership in Western Europe: Lessons for the 21st. New York: Beghahn Books,2002,4
[177]Compston H, Greenwood J. Social Partnership in the European Union. New York: Palgrave,2001,1
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |