中国电力交易制度构建研究
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摘要
目前我国正在大力推进电力体制改革,以进一步适应市场经济深入发展的要求。如何构建科学合理的电力交易制度是我国电力体制改革的核心问题,而目前我国尚未建立真正意义上的电力交易制度,因此研究构建适合我国国情的电力交易制度具有重大的理论价值和现实意义。
本研究试图从内涵、动力与机制设计三个递进的视角对中国电力交易制度构建进行系统分析,具体研究层次及内容如下:
首先,是一个我国电力体制改革状况的概述,作为后继研究的一个基础,对本研究所涉及的相关研究对象、主体、关键概念进行科学和规范化的界定,尤其是关于电力体制改革、电力交易制度的概念与内容的阐述。尝试对电力体制改革进程下的我国电力交易制度构建的内涵进行经济学范式分析。其次,在初步解决了我国电力交易制度构建的内涵问题后,再从解除管制和电力竞争两个方面对电力交易制度构建的动力进行分析,针对我国电力交易制度构建的效率进行系统的论述。最后,在上述基础上对电力体制改革进程下的我国电力交易制度构建的制度设计进行规范性(Normative)分析,借助类似于路线图(Road Map)的分析范式,提出构建一个符合我国国情的电力交易制度的原则与构想。最后针对若干我国电力交易制度中全局性、战略性和前瞻性的关键问题进行进一步阐述。
全文共有九章,分为三部分:第一部分包括第1、2、3章,主要是研究的概述性部分;第二部分包括第4、5、6、7、8章:第4章主要对我国电力交易制度构建的内涵进行分析,第5、6章是对我国电力交易制度构建的动力进行分析,第7、8章是对我国电力交易制度进行制度设计;第三部分为第9章,主要是研究的总结、政策建议和展望。本文主要创新点和研究结论可归纳为内涵、动力与机制设计三个方面:
关于电力交易制度构建的内涵方面:
(1)本研究从系统经济学的分析范式出发,结合对我国电力体制改革和电力交易制度构建的理解,创新性地提出我国电力体制改革的四个发展元:社会元(S)、经济元(E)、环境元(H)、政治元(P),并指出电力交易制度构建在发展内涵上的双重兼容性,建立了对我国电力交易制度构建内涵的认识框架。基于电力发展目标的多元性,本研究建立一个考虑CO2排放约束的整合资源规划模型,来分析环保要求会对电力供给规划产生的影响。将电力交易制度构建与电力体制改革制度化关联的历时结构的演进机制理解为一种重叠嵌入,并分为过渡性嵌入和移植性嵌入两种方式分别进行解释,极为形象地揭示了本研究所要讨论的电力体制改革进程下我国电力交易制度构建的内涵;同时论证了我国电力交易制度构建会形成一个新的决策集。新的决策集形成的决策或者某种变异性决策,单独看并不合算,但如果一种具体制度以外已经有了一种互补性制度,或者参数发生了变化,那么两个制度之间的相互支持会使得新决策获得强大的推力。
关于电力交易制度构建的动力方面:
(2)将改革红利的共同诉求的理论引入对我国电力体制改革和电力交易制度构建的动力分析当中,论证我国电力体制改革动力可以归结为:各主体获得改革红利仍然是电力改革的主要动力;各主体对改革的激励构成电力改革的推动力;日益对外开放的中国对于电力改革产生外部压力;改革的法制化成为电力改革的内在张力。将电力交易制度改革理解为一种“共有信念的自我维系系统”。指出电力交易制度不是凝固的,不是一成不变的,它会随着我国电力工业的发展、电力市场的发展和消费者要求的提高,进行创新性的适应和构建。因此多样性的电力交易制度均衡也提供了相互学习、不断试验的机会和机遇等,从而保证了电力交易制度的构建保持创新能力。
(3)利用价值链理论、小生境理论进行产业层面的电力交易制度构建的动力分析,丰富了论证的理论深度和完整性。利用Panzar-Rosse模型对我国电力行业的竞争态势进行实证分析,Panzar-Rosse模型作为一种非结构性方法,无需事先知道每个企业在市场上的占有率就可以定量评价市场结构与竞争程度的高低。利用Translog生产函数,结合浙江样本数据,对我国配售电业的最小有效规模进行了分析。
(4)由于中国实际上并不存在真正的电力交易价格,因此从定价效率的角度论述我国电力制度构建的动力存在一定的难度,传统的文献分析中,大多是一种定性的概括论述。本研究的创新之处在于:避开具体价格数据的束缚,利用峰谷定价模型,通过构建四种市场竞争结构模型进行电力定价效率的博弈均衡分析,结论是:如果我国电力行业的售电侧市场不开放,仅仅开放发电侧市场,并不会有定价效率的提升和社会福利的提高,所以发电侧的开放能带来的改革红利甚少,这与我国的实际情况符合。如果逐步开放售电侧市场,随着市场竞争程度的不断增加,那么定价效率和社会福利水平都会有明显的改善,从而在理论上阐明了电力交易制度构建的动力源泉。
关于电力交易制度的机制方面:
(5)我国电力交易制度的构建一定是一个渐进的、分阶段推进的进程。我国电力交易制度构建的阶段性方案可以是:着力进行区域性与全国性电力市场体系的初步构建,全面开放发、输、配电业,允许电力代输以及直供电力等交易模式。在由原有国家电力公司继续承担电力最后供应义务和调度义务的前提下,开放民营公司进入各类电力业务经营。在阶段性目标得以实现的基础上,再进一步推进市场化和自由竞争的程度,最终将区域性和全国性的电力市场垂直分割为发电、输电、配电以及售电业四种电力企业,并采取类似电力池的交易模式或双向合约交易模式,成立集中交易的电力交易所PX及配以电力的场外交易,成立独立系统调度制度(ISO)。
(6)输电体制改革(假定已经将售电环节分离),应在已经基本完成的我国输电网络的功能性分割的基础上,继续进行结构性分割,可以要求电网公司在成立控股公司的安排下,将其业务作结构性的分割,分别成立输电与配电公司,其中输电公司负责电力调度与输电网络的规划、运转与维护,并且仍需建立公平的调度机制,而其它部门则回归市场竞争。
(7)国家三级电力市场是电力交易制度构建的重要目标之一,但是一直以来,没有文献系统地阐述电力市场的分层机理以及需要区域性电力市场作为一个多层次电力市场体系基石的理论问题。本研究利用古诺二期博弈模型的推理来分析形成不同层次电力市场的内涵,这就从理论上阐明了电力市场的分层机理以及需要区域性电力市场作为一个多层次电力市场体系基石的理论问题。
In conformity with the development of the market economy, China is promoting the electric power institutional reform. The core problem is how to construct the reasonable electric power trading system. As the state has not the actual trading system, the study on the suitable system is of significance and important theory value.
The research tries a systematic analysis on the Chinese electric power trading system from connotation, driving force and mechanism design three aspects, and specified as the following:
Firstly, the paper draws a summary of the Chinese electric power institutional reform situation, as a basis of later study. The paper gives scientific and normalized definitions on some subjects, key concepts, especially on the institutional reform, electric power trading system. The paper tries economics analysis on the connotation of the construction of the Chinese electric power trading system during the course of the Chinese electric power institutional reform. Secondly, after resolving the connotation of the Chinese electric power trading system construction, the paper analyzes the driving force of the Chinese electric power trading system construction from deregulation and electric power competition two aspects. At last, the paper has normative analysis on the system design of the Chinese electric power trading system during the course of the Chinese electric power institutional reform, proposing the principles and ideals of the electric power trading system according with our national condition by the tools similar to the Road Map method. Lastly, the paper describes further the key questions about the Chinese electric power trading system. These questions have a common characteristic, just be with certain research looking into the distance in the overall situation, strategy and certain ex-pose in mind.
The whole article includes nine chapters and can be divided into three parts. The first part includes No.1, No.2 and No.3 chapters, which is mainly some preparative works for later research. The second part includes No.4, No.5, No.6, No7 and No.8 chapters, which are the analysis on the connotation, driving force and mechanism designed of the Chinese electric power trading institution. The third part, No. 9 chapter, is the summary, corresponding policy suggestions and outlook. The main innovations and conclusions includes connotation, driving force and mechanism design.
Connotation of the construction of the electric power trading system:
(1) Using the system economics analysis and combining the understanding of the Chinese electric power institutional reform and the electric power trading system, the paper proposes the four development elements in the Chinese electric power institutional reform: Society(S), Economy (E), Environment (H) and Politics (P), then points out "double-compatibility" in the Chinese electric power trading system on developing connotation and forms the cognition frame to the Chinese electric power trading system. The structural evolution mechanism of systematic correlation between the electric power trading system structures and the electric power institutional reform must be understood as a kind of the implantation overlapping, which is divided into the transition implantation and transplanting implantation. It reveals the connotation of the construction of the electric power trading system, and proves that the construction of the Chinese electric power trading system may form a new decision-making collection. The decision-making or some special deviancy may be unreasonable, if seeing alone, but the parameter changes or there is another complementary system, then the support between these two systems may give strong propulsion to the new decision.
Driving force of the electric power trading system:
(2) Introducing the theory of the reforming bonus into the driving force analysis, the paper proves that the driving force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform can be summared up as: the reform bonus acquired by every subject is the main force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform; the excitation made by every subject forms the motive force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform; the pressure from the opening-up china on the Chinese electric power institutional reform makes necessary; the legalization of reform becomes the inherent tension of the Chinese electric power institutional reform. The electric power trading system reform is understood that one kind of "common belief holds together system ", pointing out electric power trading system is not stationary and changeless. It will make new adoption and construction, with development of electric power industry, electric power marketplace and consumer's higher demand. The balance of the diversity electric power trading system provides the chance and opportunity studying mutually. Therefore, it ensures an ability to innovate on the construction of the electric power trading system.
(3) Fully utilizing some analysis scopes, such as the value chain theory, the Niche Market theory and SCP method, the paper carries out the driving force analysis on the electric power trading system in industry level. These appear first in some early documents, improving the understanding of the industry characteristic and influence of the electric power trading system, and enriching theory depth and completeness. The paper uses the Panzar-Rosse model to analyze competition situation of the Chinese electric power industry. Although people have realized that the Chinese electric power industry market structure may be of the monopoly pattern, the Panzar-Rosse model is one kind of Non-parameter structure method, no needs to know every enterprise occupation ratio on the marketplace, which can appraise market structure and the degree of the competition.
(4) As the real electric power price does not exist in China, it is difficult to discuss the driving force of the Chinese electric power institution reform from pricing efficiency. The tradition documents analysis is mostly normative. The innovation of the paper is in its abandonment of the concrete data originally, using the peak and off-peak pricing model, analyze the game equilibrium that the four kinds market competition structural model. The conclusion is: there will be no pricing efficiency raise and social welfare enhancement with only the power generation market open and selling market not open to the outside world. The bonus brought with the only opening generation market is so small, and this is in conformity with our nation situation. With the market competitions increasing, from monopoly competition to complete competition, the pricing efficiency will sustain its uphill tendency and social welfare will improve as well, if we open the selling market step by step. Thus it expounds the driving sources of electric power trading system.
Mechanism of the electric power trading system:
(5) The Chinese electric power trading system is a course advancing gradually, moving forward by stages. The stage scheme that the Chinese electric power trading system structure may be: the first step is to make effort to carry out the regional and national electric power market system, and the fully opening to the outside world all round, such as generating, transmitting and distributing trading patterns, and providing straightly electric power, allowing electric power replace. On the premise of the final supplying duty and the dispatching duty bearded by the State Power Corporation, we open the electric power business to the private-owned companies. On the basis of carrying out stage goals, the degree of market-orientation and free competition will be further promoted, finally perpendicularly divided the regional and national electric power market ultimately into four kinds electric power enterprises. It will adopt the similar electric power pool business pattern or two-way contract business pattern, and set up electric power exchange PX concentrating business and the OTC trading with electric power, set up autonomous dispatching system (ISO).
(6) The reform of transmitting system (assume that the selling part is separated), it should continue the structural division on the basis of the functional division of transmitting network basically finished. It can demand the state grid company have its business structurally divided under the arrangement of the holding company, setting up the transmitting and distributing company respectively. The transmitting company is in charge of electric power dispatching and the network plan, running and maintenance. It is necessary to form fair dispatching mechanism, with other departments back to market competition.
(7) Always in the past, little documents systematic set forth the electric power marketplace delimitation mechanism and theory problem that requires that the regional electric power marketplace is a multiple echelons electric power market system foundation. Making use of the Cournot two-stage game model, it analyzes the connotation of the different level electric power marketplace. This sets forth the delimitation mechanism of the electric power marketplace and the theory of the regional electric power marketplace as the foundation of the multiple echelons electric power market system.
本研究试图从内涵、动力与机制设计三个递进的视角对中国电力交易制度构建进行系统分析,具体研究层次及内容如下:
首先,是一个我国电力体制改革状况的概述,作为后继研究的一个基础,对本研究所涉及的相关研究对象、主体、关键概念进行科学和规范化的界定,尤其是关于电力体制改革、电力交易制度的概念与内容的阐述。尝试对电力体制改革进程下的我国电力交易制度构建的内涵进行经济学范式分析。其次,在初步解决了我国电力交易制度构建的内涵问题后,再从解除管制和电力竞争两个方面对电力交易制度构建的动力进行分析,针对我国电力交易制度构建的效率进行系统的论述。最后,在上述基础上对电力体制改革进程下的我国电力交易制度构建的制度设计进行规范性(Normative)分析,借助类似于路线图(Road Map)的分析范式,提出构建一个符合我国国情的电力交易制度的原则与构想。最后针对若干我国电力交易制度中全局性、战略性和前瞻性的关键问题进行进一步阐述。
全文共有九章,分为三部分:第一部分包括第1、2、3章,主要是研究的概述性部分;第二部分包括第4、5、6、7、8章:第4章主要对我国电力交易制度构建的内涵进行分析,第5、6章是对我国电力交易制度构建的动力进行分析,第7、8章是对我国电力交易制度进行制度设计;第三部分为第9章,主要是研究的总结、政策建议和展望。本文主要创新点和研究结论可归纳为内涵、动力与机制设计三个方面:
关于电力交易制度构建的内涵方面:
(1)本研究从系统经济学的分析范式出发,结合对我国电力体制改革和电力交易制度构建的理解,创新性地提出我国电力体制改革的四个发展元:社会元(S)、经济元(E)、环境元(H)、政治元(P),并指出电力交易制度构建在发展内涵上的双重兼容性,建立了对我国电力交易制度构建内涵的认识框架。基于电力发展目标的多元性,本研究建立一个考虑CO2排放约束的整合资源规划模型,来分析环保要求会对电力供给规划产生的影响。将电力交易制度构建与电力体制改革制度化关联的历时结构的演进机制理解为一种重叠嵌入,并分为过渡性嵌入和移植性嵌入两种方式分别进行解释,极为形象地揭示了本研究所要讨论的电力体制改革进程下我国电力交易制度构建的内涵;同时论证了我国电力交易制度构建会形成一个新的决策集。新的决策集形成的决策或者某种变异性决策,单独看并不合算,但如果一种具体制度以外已经有了一种互补性制度,或者参数发生了变化,那么两个制度之间的相互支持会使得新决策获得强大的推力。
关于电力交易制度构建的动力方面:
(2)将改革红利的共同诉求的理论引入对我国电力体制改革和电力交易制度构建的动力分析当中,论证我国电力体制改革动力可以归结为:各主体获得改革红利仍然是电力改革的主要动力;各主体对改革的激励构成电力改革的推动力;日益对外开放的中国对于电力改革产生外部压力;改革的法制化成为电力改革的内在张力。将电力交易制度改革理解为一种“共有信念的自我维系系统”。指出电力交易制度不是凝固的,不是一成不变的,它会随着我国电力工业的发展、电力市场的发展和消费者要求的提高,进行创新性的适应和构建。因此多样性的电力交易制度均衡也提供了相互学习、不断试验的机会和机遇等,从而保证了电力交易制度的构建保持创新能力。
(3)利用价值链理论、小生境理论进行产业层面的电力交易制度构建的动力分析,丰富了论证的理论深度和完整性。利用Panzar-Rosse模型对我国电力行业的竞争态势进行实证分析,Panzar-Rosse模型作为一种非结构性方法,无需事先知道每个企业在市场上的占有率就可以定量评价市场结构与竞争程度的高低。利用Translog生产函数,结合浙江样本数据,对我国配售电业的最小有效规模进行了分析。
(4)由于中国实际上并不存在真正的电力交易价格,因此从定价效率的角度论述我国电力制度构建的动力存在一定的难度,传统的文献分析中,大多是一种定性的概括论述。本研究的创新之处在于:避开具体价格数据的束缚,利用峰谷定价模型,通过构建四种市场竞争结构模型进行电力定价效率的博弈均衡分析,结论是:如果我国电力行业的售电侧市场不开放,仅仅开放发电侧市场,并不会有定价效率的提升和社会福利的提高,所以发电侧的开放能带来的改革红利甚少,这与我国的实际情况符合。如果逐步开放售电侧市场,随着市场竞争程度的不断增加,那么定价效率和社会福利水平都会有明显的改善,从而在理论上阐明了电力交易制度构建的动力源泉。
关于电力交易制度的机制方面:
(5)我国电力交易制度的构建一定是一个渐进的、分阶段推进的进程。我国电力交易制度构建的阶段性方案可以是:着力进行区域性与全国性电力市场体系的初步构建,全面开放发、输、配电业,允许电力代输以及直供电力等交易模式。在由原有国家电力公司继续承担电力最后供应义务和调度义务的前提下,开放民营公司进入各类电力业务经营。在阶段性目标得以实现的基础上,再进一步推进市场化和自由竞争的程度,最终将区域性和全国性的电力市场垂直分割为发电、输电、配电以及售电业四种电力企业,并采取类似电力池的交易模式或双向合约交易模式,成立集中交易的电力交易所PX及配以电力的场外交易,成立独立系统调度制度(ISO)。
(6)输电体制改革(假定已经将售电环节分离),应在已经基本完成的我国输电网络的功能性分割的基础上,继续进行结构性分割,可以要求电网公司在成立控股公司的安排下,将其业务作结构性的分割,分别成立输电与配电公司,其中输电公司负责电力调度与输电网络的规划、运转与维护,并且仍需建立公平的调度机制,而其它部门则回归市场竞争。
(7)国家三级电力市场是电力交易制度构建的重要目标之一,但是一直以来,没有文献系统地阐述电力市场的分层机理以及需要区域性电力市场作为一个多层次电力市场体系基石的理论问题。本研究利用古诺二期博弈模型的推理来分析形成不同层次电力市场的内涵,这就从理论上阐明了电力市场的分层机理以及需要区域性电力市场作为一个多层次电力市场体系基石的理论问题。
In conformity with the development of the market economy, China is promoting the electric power institutional reform. The core problem is how to construct the reasonable electric power trading system. As the state has not the actual trading system, the study on the suitable system is of significance and important theory value.
The research tries a systematic analysis on the Chinese electric power trading system from connotation, driving force and mechanism design three aspects, and specified as the following:
Firstly, the paper draws a summary of the Chinese electric power institutional reform situation, as a basis of later study. The paper gives scientific and normalized definitions on some subjects, key concepts, especially on the institutional reform, electric power trading system. The paper tries economics analysis on the connotation of the construction of the Chinese electric power trading system during the course of the Chinese electric power institutional reform. Secondly, after resolving the connotation of the Chinese electric power trading system construction, the paper analyzes the driving force of the Chinese electric power trading system construction from deregulation and electric power competition two aspects. At last, the paper has normative analysis on the system design of the Chinese electric power trading system during the course of the Chinese electric power institutional reform, proposing the principles and ideals of the electric power trading system according with our national condition by the tools similar to the Road Map method. Lastly, the paper describes further the key questions about the Chinese electric power trading system. These questions have a common characteristic, just be with certain research looking into the distance in the overall situation, strategy and certain ex-pose in mind.
The whole article includes nine chapters and can be divided into three parts. The first part includes No.1, No.2 and No.3 chapters, which is mainly some preparative works for later research. The second part includes No.4, No.5, No.6, No7 and No.8 chapters, which are the analysis on the connotation, driving force and mechanism designed of the Chinese electric power trading institution. The third part, No. 9 chapter, is the summary, corresponding policy suggestions and outlook. The main innovations and conclusions includes connotation, driving force and mechanism design.
Connotation of the construction of the electric power trading system:
(1) Using the system economics analysis and combining the understanding of the Chinese electric power institutional reform and the electric power trading system, the paper proposes the four development elements in the Chinese electric power institutional reform: Society(S), Economy (E), Environment (H) and Politics (P), then points out "double-compatibility" in the Chinese electric power trading system on developing connotation and forms the cognition frame to the Chinese electric power trading system. The structural evolution mechanism of systematic correlation between the electric power trading system structures and the electric power institutional reform must be understood as a kind of the implantation overlapping, which is divided into the transition implantation and transplanting implantation. It reveals the connotation of the construction of the electric power trading system, and proves that the construction of the Chinese electric power trading system may form a new decision-making collection. The decision-making or some special deviancy may be unreasonable, if seeing alone, but the parameter changes or there is another complementary system, then the support between these two systems may give strong propulsion to the new decision.
Driving force of the electric power trading system:
(2) Introducing the theory of the reforming bonus into the driving force analysis, the paper proves that the driving force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform can be summared up as: the reform bonus acquired by every subject is the main force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform; the excitation made by every subject forms the motive force of the Chinese electric power institutional reform; the pressure from the opening-up china on the Chinese electric power institutional reform makes necessary; the legalization of reform becomes the inherent tension of the Chinese electric power institutional reform. The electric power trading system reform is understood that one kind of "common belief holds together system ", pointing out electric power trading system is not stationary and changeless. It will make new adoption and construction, with development of electric power industry, electric power marketplace and consumer's higher demand. The balance of the diversity electric power trading system provides the chance and opportunity studying mutually. Therefore, it ensures an ability to innovate on the construction of the electric power trading system.
(3) Fully utilizing some analysis scopes, such as the value chain theory, the Niche Market theory and SCP method, the paper carries out the driving force analysis on the electric power trading system in industry level. These appear first in some early documents, improving the understanding of the industry characteristic and influence of the electric power trading system, and enriching theory depth and completeness. The paper uses the Panzar-Rosse model to analyze competition situation of the Chinese electric power industry. Although people have realized that the Chinese electric power industry market structure may be of the monopoly pattern, the Panzar-Rosse model is one kind of Non-parameter structure method, no needs to know every enterprise occupation ratio on the marketplace, which can appraise market structure and the degree of the competition.
(4) As the real electric power price does not exist in China, it is difficult to discuss the driving force of the Chinese electric power institution reform from pricing efficiency. The tradition documents analysis is mostly normative. The innovation of the paper is in its abandonment of the concrete data originally, using the peak and off-peak pricing model, analyze the game equilibrium that the four kinds market competition structural model. The conclusion is: there will be no pricing efficiency raise and social welfare enhancement with only the power generation market open and selling market not open to the outside world. The bonus brought with the only opening generation market is so small, and this is in conformity with our nation situation. With the market competitions increasing, from monopoly competition to complete competition, the pricing efficiency will sustain its uphill tendency and social welfare will improve as well, if we open the selling market step by step. Thus it expounds the driving sources of electric power trading system.
Mechanism of the electric power trading system:
(5) The Chinese electric power trading system is a course advancing gradually, moving forward by stages. The stage scheme that the Chinese electric power trading system structure may be: the first step is to make effort to carry out the regional and national electric power market system, and the fully opening to the outside world all round, such as generating, transmitting and distributing trading patterns, and providing straightly electric power, allowing electric power replace. On the premise of the final supplying duty and the dispatching duty bearded by the State Power Corporation, we open the electric power business to the private-owned companies. On the basis of carrying out stage goals, the degree of market-orientation and free competition will be further promoted, finally perpendicularly divided the regional and national electric power market ultimately into four kinds electric power enterprises. It will adopt the similar electric power pool business pattern or two-way contract business pattern, and set up electric power exchange PX concentrating business and the OTC trading with electric power, set up autonomous dispatching system (ISO).
(6) The reform of transmitting system (assume that the selling part is separated), it should continue the structural division on the basis of the functional division of transmitting network basically finished. It can demand the state grid company have its business structurally divided under the arrangement of the holding company, setting up the transmitting and distributing company respectively. The transmitting company is in charge of electric power dispatching and the network plan, running and maintenance. It is necessary to form fair dispatching mechanism, with other departments back to market competition.
(7) Always in the past, little documents systematic set forth the electric power marketplace delimitation mechanism and theory problem that requires that the regional electric power marketplace is a multiple echelons electric power market system foundation. Making use of the Cournot two-stage game model, it analyzes the connotation of the different level electric power marketplace. This sets forth the delimitation mechanism of the electric power marketplace and the theory of the regional electric power marketplace as the foundation of the multiple echelons electric power market system.
引文
1 据统计,2006年我国电力总装机容量达到62200万千瓦,同比增长20.3%;年发电量达到28344亿千瓦时,同比增长13.5%,位居世界第二位,仅次于美国。资料来源于中国电力企业联合会网站,www.cec.gov.cn.
1 在电力行业经常出现一些模糊议论,例如:电力体制改革基本上处于停滞状态,处在高危险期;国务院的《电力体制改革方案》有三大缺点需要修改;“电力体制市场化改革方向很可能逆转”,甚至有一位电力企业的高层领导在一个半公开场合说“厂网分开的取向是错误的等等”(见电力决策参考2006年第1期)。
1 有关英国过去电力市场的相关探讨,参见John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,P14页。
2 依据英国气体燃料与电力管制局(OFGEM)规划,苏格兰电力行业市场化改革将采取与英格兰相同模式,于2000年11月开始实施,参见OFGEM网址:http://www.ofgas.gov.uk/public/pn/55a.htm。
1 除CEGB以外,英国还有若干非隶属于CEGB的独立发电厂存在,不过其中最大的两家为国营核能发电公司:英国原子能机构(UK Atomic Energy Authority,UKAEA)以及不列颠核能公司(British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.,BNFL),其发电量占独立发电厂三分之一以上,因此严格来说真正民营的独立发电厂的发电量可谓微不足道。
2 在英国原始规划中核电部门应一并随同移转民营,后独立成立Nucler Power公司并决定维持国营的因素很多,主要原因在于民间对于核能电厂废料处理以及电厂退役后关厂等后端营运风险的不确定性,导致中央发电局民营化不顺利,后方决定予以分割独立成立Nuclear Power公司并维持国营。不过Nucler Power 公司仍然于1995年顺利民营化。相关探讨,参阅John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,页139至163。
3 设置黄金股制度的目的是使国家继续保持对民营后的国营企业(以下简称民营化公司)的特定决策的控制力,以保障自由化后市场竞争秩序与国家政策能平顺稳定的速度下交接调整。
4 以英国为例,多为民营之日起五年。但也有因具有持续性国家利益存在而无时间限制的黄金股,例如改制为公司的英国航空站管理局(British Airport Authority,BAA)。
1 根据发电容量大小可分成四类:(1)Scheduled Generator指总发电容量大于等于30MW,并需由NEMMCO 排定电力供给的发电厂:(2)Non-Scheduled Generator指总发电容量小于30MW,不需由NEMMCO排定电力供给的发电厂。(3)Market Generator指电力不出售给当地的零售商或消费者,全部通过现货市场出售。(4)Non-Market Generator指电力直接出售给当地的零售商或消费者。
2 Council Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids。该指令内文详见下列网址:http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1990/en_390L0547.html
1 符合此条件之用户约占欧盟总体电力消费之33%,参见Michael Crookes,Risk Factors in Power Contracts,p.17. 公司等4家辅业集团公司同时挂牌。尤其是2002年3月,国务院正式批准了《电力体制改革方案》,将国家电力公司管理的电力资产按照发电和电网两类业务进行划分。发电环节按照现代企业制度要求,将国家电力公司管理的发电资产直接改组或重组为规模大致相当的5个全国性的独立发电公司,逐步实行“竞价上网”,开展公平竞争。电网环节分别设立国家电网公司和中国南方电网有限责任公司。国家电网公司下设华北、东北、华东、华中和西北5个区域电网公司。国家电网公司主要负责各区域电网之间的电力交易、调度,参与跨区域电网的投资与建设;区域电网公司负责经营管理电网,保证供电安全,规划区域电网发展,培育区域电力市场,管理电力调度交易中心,按市场规则进行电力调度。区域内的省级电力公司可改组为区域电网公司的分公司或子公司。
1 本文之所以没有采用电力市场自由化的提法,主要是因为事实上电力行业关系国计民生,任何一国政府都不会容许电力市场完全自由化,实际上都只是在不同的程度上解除一些过于严格的行业管制,而且出于电力行业自身的技术经济特性,完全自由化也只是一种理论而已。此外,自由化一词可分广义与狭义两种意义:广义的自由化是指解除一切国家规制行为,由市场机制决定交易秩序:而狭义的自由化,则是指解除对于市场进入及市场竞争的限制关于自由化与竞争的探讨,参见Mark Armstrong,Simon Cowan & John Vickers,Regulation Reform-Economic Analysis and British Experience,p.99-134.
2 所谓3E,是指英文中的效率(efficiency),有效(effectiveness)以及经济(economy)。有关英国从撒切尔夫人执政时代以来所推动的民营化政策(或是所谓撒切尔主义,Thatchernism)的相关探讨,参见John Vickers and George Yarrow.Privatization:an economic analysis。
3 准确的讲,民营化和市场化改革理应是相辅相成的,因为从根本上说,电力体制改革的目的是提高电力企业的运营效率和效益,改善服务,降低电价,减轻政府负担,增加政府收入。为了达到这一目的,世界各国的电力体制改革均采用了市场化和民营化的方式。民营化是电力行业实现政企分开和引入竞争机制的前提条件,它是指将国有、公营的电力行业的所有权或经营权转移到民间,以发挥企业家的作用,提高电 力行业的效率和效益。同时,民营化还可以增加国家财政收入,减少国家的债务;增加私人资本投资;减少政府的参与等作用。
1 Jane Roberts,David Elliott & Trevor Houghton,Privatization Electricity,页24。
2 关于我国电力行业垄断程度的更为深入的定量分析详见第5章的相关内容。
1 见于良春、赵西亮,《中国电力行业的改革与发展》,2000年。
2 例如,我国电力投资和电价控制权仍在发展改革委,绝大部分国有电力企业绩效管理职能在中央或地方国资委,电力环保监管职能在环保总局,电力安全和电力市场监管在电监会。这种横向职能的分散配置,看似各部门各负其责,互不影响,但从几年来的实践来看,这种多头、分散式监管,使得对电力企业的监管能力减弱,垄断电网企业进一步加强集约化管理,增强了电网的垄断势力;发电企业形成利益集团的割据局面,非公经济主体很难进入。
1 尤其是电的定价依据主要是被管制企业自报的成本,而不是合理的社会平均成本,这导致了“一厂一价”甚至“一机一价”的出现。企业不仅没有降低成本的压力,而且这还会诱使企业虚报成本,结果是成本涨多少价格也涨多少。其负面效应不仅在于损害了国内设备制造企业的利益,更严重的是,由于引导市场的价格信号失真,不能正确引导资金投向,导致新建一些不具备市场竞争优势的电厂,使发电和电网的效益扭曲,宝贵的电力投资资源被不合理配置。
2 值得一提的是,2003年以前我国电力施行“省为实体”的发展方针,在1980年代鼓励多家办电,解决全国范围内严重缺电起到过重大作用。但在电力供需平衡后,“省为实体”巳不能适应新的环境,成为阻碍市场竞争和跨省资源优化配置的主要原因。各省自己的电厂生产与建设,意味着税收、就业的增加,也是各级政府政绩的表现。因此,关闭电力市场成为必然。甚至出现了外省低价电也不要的现象。各省拒绝开放电力市场的原因不便直言,以峰谷差过大、电价还不够低廉和电力输送上有技术方面的限制等各种理由为借口。
3 例如著名的“二滩事件”。2000年四川投资近280亿元的二滩水电站所发的电,被四川省拒绝上网,从而造成的损失高达几十亿元。资料来源:《两种声音两大阵营:电荒到底是不是垄断惹的祸》,www.sconline.com.cn,2003-08-20.
1 价格钉(Price Spikes)是指电能价格随时间变化过程中出现的一种波动现象。
2 具体见 Vernon L.smith,Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks:Demand-side Bidding,Nobel centennial symposium Nov,4,2001:27.
3 行业租的概念是指电力行业能够利用其特殊地位和属性获得非生产性收益。见叶泽(2004),《电力竞争》,中国电力出版社,P143-147。
4 例如对2001年加州电力危机中的两家电力公司申请破产保护时,州政府和联邦政府都表示支持这两家电力公司对付财务危机,并且都采取了实质性措施,帮助公司顺利度过难关。其实,这样的做法在一些特殊的行业中较为普遍,如金融行业等。
5 其实,“行业租”与“道德风险”、“逆向选择”、“大则不倒”等问题的实质一样,本质上都是源于信息不对称与制度缺陷下的“本能冲动”。
1 在电力趸售市场中,发电业间、发电业与配电业间形成一个批发竞争市场,即配电业可直接向任一售价较便宜的发电业购买电力,并将电力通过输电网售给配电业。不过除了双边契约模式外,电力池模式也可。
2 电力的零售意味最终任何类型的用户(包含一般住家)均可拥有自由选择供电对象的权利。因此除了发电业的竞争外,配售电业也须形成区域竞争的态势,且可跨区供电。只是由于技术上的限制,客户端需要有电表量测和信息系统加以充分配合,所以先进国家一般均循序渐近性的阶段性的开放。以英国为例,其开放顺序系于1990年先开放IMW以上用户,1994年再开放100KW以上用户,最后于1999年4月24日完全开放所有用户。参阅Michael Crookes,Risk Factors in Power Contracts,p.24.
1 根据国家人口计划生育委员会发布的《国家人口发展战略研究报告》,2007年1月12日。
2 这也已被美日中三国的长期历史数据所证实,三国计算利用小时数长期保持在5000小时以下,有时甚至低于4000小时。
1 制度外卷(evolution)是制度经济学中的概念。又称制度进化,是指由于创新的推动,制度向更高级形式发展,即“有效率的增长”。制度内卷(involution)是指制度在演变过程中,由于其中复杂的对立力量,使制度无法向更高级形式发展,即“缺乏发展的增长”,甚至衰败的演变过程。(Geertz,1966)
1 在这种理解下,所谓经济管制的意义可以分为广义与狭义二种,前者认为凡涉及国家为达成特定经济政策目的,对于经济活动加以管制、变更、调整、形成或影响的一切措施和制度,即所谓“经济调整“或是“经济指导”。后者则指所谓的经济管制(economic regulation),其意义应为在以市场经济为基础下,针对特定产业,基于保障公共利益的原因,以公权力介入并替代私营企业的部分决策(如定价、产能、营业范围等)的法制。具体见Stephen Breyer,Regulation and De-regulation in the United States:Airlines,Telecom and Antitrust,p.7.
2 W.Boyes and M.Melvin,Ecomonics(4th edt.),p.112.
1 FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky,On the goals of antitrust law,内文详见http://www.ftc.gov/bc
1 技术小生境是指从新技术不断试验直到实现商业化的过程。
2 冯嘉,关于我国电力改革发展趋势的探讨[J].学术论坛,2006,(11):P41-42。
1 丁伟斌等,浙江电网负荷预测管理系统,农村电气化,2008,2。
1 梅森、贝思等人构造的市场结构(Structure)-企业行为(Conduct)-经济效率(Performance)的理论分析框架。
1 Barbara Casu,2005:Bank Competition.Concentration and Efficiency in the Single European Market。
2 韩立岩,2002:《我国资本配置效率及其与金融市场关系评价研究》,《管理世界》第1期。
3 见丁伟斌等,我国中小企业核心竞争力要素选择的实证分析,科学学研究,2005年10期。
1 曹勇:《中国生产率变动趋势之研究》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,1993年版,p327。
2 参见《企业经济的本质与效率》,熊维平,载《矿冶工程》,2000年3月第20卷第一期。
1 例如当年英国电力市场化改革时,还有若干非隶属于CEGB的独立发电厂存在,不过其中最大的两家为国营核能发电公司:英国原子能机构(UK Atomic Energy Authority,UKAEA)以及不列颠核能公司(British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.,BNFL),其发电量占独立发电厂三分之一以上,因此严格来说真正民营的独立发电厂的发电量当时可谓微不足道。在英国原始规划中核电部门应一并随同移转民营,后独立成立Nuclear Power公司并决定维持国营的因素很多,主要原因在于民间对于核能电厂废料处理以及电厂退役后关厂等后端营运风险的不确定性,导致中央发电局民营化不顺利,后方决定予以分割独立成立Nuclear Power公司并维持国营。不过Nuclear Power公司仍然于1995年顺利民营化。相关探讨,参阅John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,页139至163。
2 例如风能发电,各国在起步之初,都无一例外地得到了本国政府在政策上的大力扶持。美国联邦政府给予风电开发者的优惠政策是,不仅购买设备完全免税,而且投产后还减免部分生产税,每发电1千瓦时就减税1.5美分。德国也在颁布的新能源法律规定中特别提到了风电产业。其中规定,政府给风电以每千瓦时9.1欧分的补贴,至少保持5年。自2002年1月1日起,每年递减1.5%。即使高补贴率实施期满,风电投资商仍可享受每千瓦时6.19欧分的补贴。
3 关于电力商品若干特性的详细讨论,可以参见叶泽,《电力竞争》,中国电力出版社,2004年,P42-50。
1 发电竞价的一般操作过程为:在市场关闭前,由各发电厂以机组或者厂为单位向电力调度交易中心上报可交易容量以及交易价格,中调按照报价由低到高的顺序计划调度各机组一直到满足负荷侧(需求侧)的需要,最后一台被调度的机组的价格即为全网的购电价格,这个价格表示了当时的边际出清价格(MCP)。
2 国际能源总署(International Energy Agency,IEA),Electricity Market Reform:an IEA Handbook,页17。
1 丁伟斌等,委托代理的博弈随机模型研究,技术经济,2005年3期。
2 这样的假设条件并不是说一个电力交易主体进行了全国性电力市场交易就不能再进行区域性电力市场交易,而是说这两种交易不能同时进行。
1 丁伟斌等,我国期货市场价格稳定机制及影响因素分析,价格理论与实践,2005年8期。
2 最早引入电力期货交易的是美国的纽约商业交易所(NYMEX),2000年芝加哥交易所(CBOT)也开展电力期货交易。北欧的电力期货市场是世界上第一家跨国的电力期货市场,从1996年开始在Nord Pool中进行电力期货交易。在过去的3-4年里,电力期货交易发展的也非常快,从1998年的50TWh/月爆炸性地上升到2001年2月的350TWh/月。在2001年,电力期货市场中电力实物商品的交割量翻了一倍。在亚洲,新加坡的电力市场化改革走在了其它国家的前面。1998年4月1日,建立了电力供应批发市场,新加坡电力供应交易中心开始运做。开始于2002年的新一轮电力市场改革,新加坡把建立完善的电力衍生品市场,特别是电力期货和期权市场,作为主要任务。
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1 在电力行业经常出现一些模糊议论,例如:电力体制改革基本上处于停滞状态,处在高危险期;国务院的《电力体制改革方案》有三大缺点需要修改;“电力体制市场化改革方向很可能逆转”,甚至有一位电力企业的高层领导在一个半公开场合说“厂网分开的取向是错误的等等”(见电力决策参考2006年第1期)。
1 有关英国过去电力市场的相关探讨,参见John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,P14页。
2 依据英国气体燃料与电力管制局(OFGEM)规划,苏格兰电力行业市场化改革将采取与英格兰相同模式,于2000年11月开始实施,参见OFGEM网址:http://www.ofgas.gov.uk/public/pn/55a.htm。
1 除CEGB以外,英国还有若干非隶属于CEGB的独立发电厂存在,不过其中最大的两家为国营核能发电公司:英国原子能机构(UK Atomic Energy Authority,UKAEA)以及不列颠核能公司(British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.,BNFL),其发电量占独立发电厂三分之一以上,因此严格来说真正民营的独立发电厂的发电量可谓微不足道。
2 在英国原始规划中核电部门应一并随同移转民营,后独立成立Nucler Power公司并决定维持国营的因素很多,主要原因在于民间对于核能电厂废料处理以及电厂退役后关厂等后端营运风险的不确定性,导致中央发电局民营化不顺利,后方决定予以分割独立成立Nuclear Power公司并维持国营。不过Nucler Power 公司仍然于1995年顺利民营化。相关探讨,参阅John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,页139至163。
3 设置黄金股制度的目的是使国家继续保持对民营后的国营企业(以下简称民营化公司)的特定决策的控制力,以保障自由化后市场竞争秩序与国家政策能平顺稳定的速度下交接调整。
4 以英国为例,多为民营之日起五年。但也有因具有持续性国家利益存在而无时间限制的黄金股,例如改制为公司的英国航空站管理局(British Airport Authority,BAA)。
1 根据发电容量大小可分成四类:(1)Scheduled Generator指总发电容量大于等于30MW,并需由NEMMCO 排定电力供给的发电厂:(2)Non-Scheduled Generator指总发电容量小于30MW,不需由NEMMCO排定电力供给的发电厂。(3)Market Generator指电力不出售给当地的零售商或消费者,全部通过现货市场出售。(4)Non-Market Generator指电力直接出售给当地的零售商或消费者。
2 Council Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids。该指令内文详见下列网址:http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1990/en_390L0547.html
1 符合此条件之用户约占欧盟总体电力消费之33%,参见Michael Crookes,Risk Factors in Power Contracts,p.17. 公司等4家辅业集团公司同时挂牌。尤其是2002年3月,国务院正式批准了《电力体制改革方案》,将国家电力公司管理的电力资产按照发电和电网两类业务进行划分。发电环节按照现代企业制度要求,将国家电力公司管理的发电资产直接改组或重组为规模大致相当的5个全国性的独立发电公司,逐步实行“竞价上网”,开展公平竞争。电网环节分别设立国家电网公司和中国南方电网有限责任公司。国家电网公司下设华北、东北、华东、华中和西北5个区域电网公司。国家电网公司主要负责各区域电网之间的电力交易、调度,参与跨区域电网的投资与建设;区域电网公司负责经营管理电网,保证供电安全,规划区域电网发展,培育区域电力市场,管理电力调度交易中心,按市场规则进行电力调度。区域内的省级电力公司可改组为区域电网公司的分公司或子公司。
1 本文之所以没有采用电力市场自由化的提法,主要是因为事实上电力行业关系国计民生,任何一国政府都不会容许电力市场完全自由化,实际上都只是在不同的程度上解除一些过于严格的行业管制,而且出于电力行业自身的技术经济特性,完全自由化也只是一种理论而已。此外,自由化一词可分广义与狭义两种意义:广义的自由化是指解除一切国家规制行为,由市场机制决定交易秩序:而狭义的自由化,则是指解除对于市场进入及市场竞争的限制关于自由化与竞争的探讨,参见Mark Armstrong,Simon Cowan & John Vickers,Regulation Reform-Economic Analysis and British Experience,p.99-134.
2 所谓3E,是指英文中的效率(efficiency),有效(effectiveness)以及经济(economy)。有关英国从撒切尔夫人执政时代以来所推动的民营化政策(或是所谓撒切尔主义,Thatchernism)的相关探讨,参见John Vickers and George Yarrow.Privatization:an economic analysis。
3 准确的讲,民营化和市场化改革理应是相辅相成的,因为从根本上说,电力体制改革的目的是提高电力企业的运营效率和效益,改善服务,降低电价,减轻政府负担,增加政府收入。为了达到这一目的,世界各国的电力体制改革均采用了市场化和民营化的方式。民营化是电力行业实现政企分开和引入竞争机制的前提条件,它是指将国有、公营的电力行业的所有权或经营权转移到民间,以发挥企业家的作用,提高电 力行业的效率和效益。同时,民营化还可以增加国家财政收入,减少国家的债务;增加私人资本投资;减少政府的参与等作用。
1 Jane Roberts,David Elliott & Trevor Houghton,Privatization Electricity,页24。
2 关于我国电力行业垄断程度的更为深入的定量分析详见第5章的相关内容。
1 见于良春、赵西亮,《中国电力行业的改革与发展》,2000年。
2 例如,我国电力投资和电价控制权仍在发展改革委,绝大部分国有电力企业绩效管理职能在中央或地方国资委,电力环保监管职能在环保总局,电力安全和电力市场监管在电监会。这种横向职能的分散配置,看似各部门各负其责,互不影响,但从几年来的实践来看,这种多头、分散式监管,使得对电力企业的监管能力减弱,垄断电网企业进一步加强集约化管理,增强了电网的垄断势力;发电企业形成利益集团的割据局面,非公经济主体很难进入。
1 尤其是电的定价依据主要是被管制企业自报的成本,而不是合理的社会平均成本,这导致了“一厂一价”甚至“一机一价”的出现。企业不仅没有降低成本的压力,而且这还会诱使企业虚报成本,结果是成本涨多少价格也涨多少。其负面效应不仅在于损害了国内设备制造企业的利益,更严重的是,由于引导市场的价格信号失真,不能正确引导资金投向,导致新建一些不具备市场竞争优势的电厂,使发电和电网的效益扭曲,宝贵的电力投资资源被不合理配置。
2 值得一提的是,2003年以前我国电力施行“省为实体”的发展方针,在1980年代鼓励多家办电,解决全国范围内严重缺电起到过重大作用。但在电力供需平衡后,“省为实体”巳不能适应新的环境,成为阻碍市场竞争和跨省资源优化配置的主要原因。各省自己的电厂生产与建设,意味着税收、就业的增加,也是各级政府政绩的表现。因此,关闭电力市场成为必然。甚至出现了外省低价电也不要的现象。各省拒绝开放电力市场的原因不便直言,以峰谷差过大、电价还不够低廉和电力输送上有技术方面的限制等各种理由为借口。
3 例如著名的“二滩事件”。2000年四川投资近280亿元的二滩水电站所发的电,被四川省拒绝上网,从而造成的损失高达几十亿元。资料来源:《两种声音两大阵营:电荒到底是不是垄断惹的祸》,www.sconline.com.cn,2003-08-20.
1 价格钉(Price Spikes)是指电能价格随时间变化过程中出现的一种波动现象。
2 具体见 Vernon L.smith,Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks:Demand-side Bidding,Nobel centennial symposium Nov,4,2001:27.
3 行业租的概念是指电力行业能够利用其特殊地位和属性获得非生产性收益。见叶泽(2004),《电力竞争》,中国电力出版社,P143-147。
4 例如对2001年加州电力危机中的两家电力公司申请破产保护时,州政府和联邦政府都表示支持这两家电力公司对付财务危机,并且都采取了实质性措施,帮助公司顺利度过难关。其实,这样的做法在一些特殊的行业中较为普遍,如金融行业等。
5 其实,“行业租”与“道德风险”、“逆向选择”、“大则不倒”等问题的实质一样,本质上都是源于信息不对称与制度缺陷下的“本能冲动”。
1 在电力趸售市场中,发电业间、发电业与配电业间形成一个批发竞争市场,即配电业可直接向任一售价较便宜的发电业购买电力,并将电力通过输电网售给配电业。不过除了双边契约模式外,电力池模式也可。
2 电力的零售意味最终任何类型的用户(包含一般住家)均可拥有自由选择供电对象的权利。因此除了发电业的竞争外,配售电业也须形成区域竞争的态势,且可跨区供电。只是由于技术上的限制,客户端需要有电表量测和信息系统加以充分配合,所以先进国家一般均循序渐近性的阶段性的开放。以英国为例,其开放顺序系于1990年先开放IMW以上用户,1994年再开放100KW以上用户,最后于1999年4月24日完全开放所有用户。参阅Michael Crookes,Risk Factors in Power Contracts,p.24.
1 根据国家人口计划生育委员会发布的《国家人口发展战略研究报告》,2007年1月12日。
2 这也已被美日中三国的长期历史数据所证实,三国计算利用小时数长期保持在5000小时以下,有时甚至低于4000小时。
1 制度外卷(evolution)是制度经济学中的概念。又称制度进化,是指由于创新的推动,制度向更高级形式发展,即“有效率的增长”。制度内卷(involution)是指制度在演变过程中,由于其中复杂的对立力量,使制度无法向更高级形式发展,即“缺乏发展的增长”,甚至衰败的演变过程。(Geertz,1966)
1 在这种理解下,所谓经济管制的意义可以分为广义与狭义二种,前者认为凡涉及国家为达成特定经济政策目的,对于经济活动加以管制、变更、调整、形成或影响的一切措施和制度,即所谓“经济调整“或是“经济指导”。后者则指所谓的经济管制(economic regulation),其意义应为在以市场经济为基础下,针对特定产业,基于保障公共利益的原因,以公权力介入并替代私营企业的部分决策(如定价、产能、营业范围等)的法制。具体见Stephen Breyer,Regulation and De-regulation in the United States:Airlines,Telecom and Antitrust,p.7.
2 W.Boyes and M.Melvin,Ecomonics(4th edt.),p.112.
1 FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky,On the goals of antitrust law,内文详见http://www.ftc.gov/bc
1 技术小生境是指从新技术不断试验直到实现商业化的过程。
2 冯嘉,关于我国电力改革发展趋势的探讨[J].学术论坛,2006,(11):P41-42。
1 丁伟斌等,浙江电网负荷预测管理系统,农村电气化,2008,2。
1 梅森、贝思等人构造的市场结构(Structure)-企业行为(Conduct)-经济效率(Performance)的理论分析框架。
1 Barbara Casu,2005:Bank Competition.Concentration and Efficiency in the Single European Market。
2 韩立岩,2002:《我国资本配置效率及其与金融市场关系评价研究》,《管理世界》第1期。
3 见丁伟斌等,我国中小企业核心竞争力要素选择的实证分析,科学学研究,2005年10期。
1 曹勇:《中国生产率变动趋势之研究》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,1993年版,p327。
2 参见《企业经济的本质与效率》,熊维平,载《矿冶工程》,2000年3月第20卷第一期。
1 例如当年英国电力市场化改革时,还有若干非隶属于CEGB的独立发电厂存在,不过其中最大的两家为国营核能发电公司:英国原子能机构(UK Atomic Energy Authority,UKAEA)以及不列颠核能公司(British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.,BNFL),其发电量占独立发电厂三分之一以上,因此严格来说真正民营的独立发电厂的发电量当时可谓微不足道。在英国原始规划中核电部门应一并随同移转民营,后独立成立Nuclear Power公司并决定维持国营的因素很多,主要原因在于民间对于核能电厂废料处理以及电厂退役后关厂等后端营运风险的不确定性,导致中央发电局民营化不顺利,后方决定予以分割独立成立Nuclear Power公司并维持国营。不过Nuclear Power公司仍然于1995年顺利民营化。相关探讨,参阅John Surrey编,The British Electricity Experiment,页139至163。
2 例如风能发电,各国在起步之初,都无一例外地得到了本国政府在政策上的大力扶持。美国联邦政府给予风电开发者的优惠政策是,不仅购买设备完全免税,而且投产后还减免部分生产税,每发电1千瓦时就减税1.5美分。德国也在颁布的新能源法律规定中特别提到了风电产业。其中规定,政府给风电以每千瓦时9.1欧分的补贴,至少保持5年。自2002年1月1日起,每年递减1.5%。即使高补贴率实施期满,风电投资商仍可享受每千瓦时6.19欧分的补贴。
3 关于电力商品若干特性的详细讨论,可以参见叶泽,《电力竞争》,中国电力出版社,2004年,P42-50。
1 发电竞价的一般操作过程为:在市场关闭前,由各发电厂以机组或者厂为单位向电力调度交易中心上报可交易容量以及交易价格,中调按照报价由低到高的顺序计划调度各机组一直到满足负荷侧(需求侧)的需要,最后一台被调度的机组的价格即为全网的购电价格,这个价格表示了当时的边际出清价格(MCP)。
2 国际能源总署(International Energy Agency,IEA),Electricity Market Reform:an IEA Handbook,页17。
1 丁伟斌等,委托代理的博弈随机模型研究,技术经济,2005年3期。
2 这样的假设条件并不是说一个电力交易主体进行了全国性电力市场交易就不能再进行区域性电力市场交易,而是说这两种交易不能同时进行。
1 丁伟斌等,我国期货市场价格稳定机制及影响因素分析,价格理论与实践,2005年8期。
2 最早引入电力期货交易的是美国的纽约商业交易所(NYMEX),2000年芝加哥交易所(CBOT)也开展电力期货交易。北欧的电力期货市场是世界上第一家跨国的电力期货市场,从1996年开始在Nord Pool中进行电力期货交易。在过去的3-4年里,电力期货交易发展的也非常快,从1998年的50TWh/月爆炸性地上升到2001年2月的350TWh/月。在2001年,电力期货市场中电力实物商品的交割量翻了一倍。在亚洲,新加坡的电力市场化改革走在了其它国家的前面。1998年4月1日,建立了电力供应批发市场,新加坡电力供应交易中心开始运做。开始于2002年的新一轮电力市场改革,新加坡把建立完善的电力衍生品市场,特别是电力期货和期权市场,作为主要任务。
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