非审计服务对中国上市公司审计独立性的影响研究
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摘要
审计独立性是注册会计师的灵魂,是注册会计师行业得以存在和发展的前提。随着注册会计师行业服务市场的发展变化,非审计服务所得收入在会计师事务所利润中占有越来越重要的位置,非审计服务对审计独立性的影响亦成为审计理论与实证研究的核心内容之一。本文主要研究了上市公司非审计服务对审计独立性的影响。
首先重点就非审计服务对审计独立性的影响以时间为脉络,按损害审计独立性和不损害审计独立性两种观点进行回顾和评述。并分析了我国转型经济时期注册会计师行业与其所提供非审计服务的发展现状以及相关法律背景,从而为后续理论与实证分析奠定基础。
其次用企业契约理论、委托代理理论、知识溢出效应与经济寻租理论刻画非审计服务对审计独立性的影响。非审计服务的存在改变了企业现有契约关系,使原有的单向委托变成了双向委托,从形式上打破了原有审计架构的均衡。同时,审计与非审计服务之间存在的知识溢出效应为契约各方追逐经济租提供了可能与动因。理论分析说明:非审计服务是审计独立性重要的影响因素,完善的约束机制使非审计服务有助于审计独立性的提高。
再次用实证研究的方法检验了非审计服务对审计形式独立性的影响。本文以报表使用者对非审计服务的反应与行动衡量审计形式独立性,通过研究样本和控制样本的一一配对,并运用均值检验、Wilcoxon符号等级检验以及多元回归方法检验发现:在我国,购买非审计服务的上市公司和未购买非审计服务的上市公司在代理成本方面没有显著差异;除管理层持股外,其他代理成本变量与非审计费用不具有显著相关性,报表使用者并没有认为非审计服务的存在降低了审计独立性;审计费用的大小与非审计服务费用显著正相关,没有发现审计费用通过非审计费用转移的证据。研究结果说明没有显著证据证明非审计服务损害审计形式上的独立性。
然后用实证研究的方法检验了非审计服务对审计实质独立性的影响。根据本文所收集的上市公司数据,在未发现行业因素和宏观政策因素影响的基础上,通过研究样本和控制样本的一一配对,并运用均值检验、Wilcoxon符号等级检验以及多元回归检验和Logistic回归方法检验发现:是否购买非审计服务对操控性应计数和审计意见类型影响不明显;非审计费用的绝对金额的大小或者比重大小与操控性应计数的大小、方向都不具有显著相关性,非审计服务的存在并没有使注册会计师容忍管理当局有更大的盈余管理空间;非审计费用的绝对金额的大小,比重大小以及未预期非审计费用与审计意见均不显著相关,非审计服务并没有负向影响审计意见的类型。总之,没有发现非审计服务损害审计实质独立性的显著证据。
最后在上述理论分析与实证检验的基础上,提出我国应当大力发展非审计服务,但是必须从上市公司层面、监管层面以及注册会计师行业层面进行规范的政策建议。
本文的主要创新之处表现在:系统运用经济学观点解释非审计服务对审计独立性的影响;用一定的替代变量衡量审计形式独立性和实质独立性并对其进行实证检验,证实在中国,上市公司向会计师事务所同时购买审计与非审计服务时,无论是形式上还是实质上,非审计服务均不损害审计独立性。
Audit independence is the soul of Certified Public Accountants (CPA) and it is also the prerequisite for the existence and development of the CPA industry. With the progress of CPA industry service for market, the revenue from non-audit service is more and more important in the operation of the accounting firm, and the impact of non-audit service on audit independence has also become the core content of audit theoretical and empirical study. The impact of that the listed company purchases audit and non-audit service simultaneously on the audit independence is mainly studied in this paper.
Firstly, according to the impact of non-audit service on audit independence based on time sequence, the literature on two different view is reviewed separately. Then, the development and correlative legal background of the CPA industry and the non-audit service offered by the CPA industry during China’s economic transition period are analyzed, which lays the foundation for the follow-up theoretical and empirical studies.
Secondly, Based on the introduction & review of the theoretic controvers among enterprise contract theory, principal-agent theory, knowledge spillover effects and the economic rent-seeking theory, the relationship among above mentioned theories and the effect of non-audit services on audit independence are discussed. The existence of non-audit services has changed the existing contract relationship between the enterprises, which transformed the original one-way commission into a two-way commission and formally broken the balance of the original audit structure. The knowledge spillover effects between the audit and non-audit service provides the possibility and cause for the parties who buy or sale non-audit services to pursue economic rent. Non-audit services is the important factor for affectively audit independence, If there is a effective constraints mechanism in the capital marcket , the non-audit services not only will not damage the independence of the audit, but also will help to improve the independence of the audit.
And then, the effect of non-audit services on the formal audit independence is examined by empirical study method. Through matching the research and control samples one by one, and using of means test, Wilcoxon test and multivariate regression, the research find: in China, there is no significant difference in the agency costs between the listed companies for having purchased non-audit services and not; in addition to the shareholdings of management, other variables of agent costs do not have significant correlation with the non-audit fees, the users of financial statement don’t think that the non-audit services impare the independence of auditor; the size of audit costs significantly positively correlate with the pricing of non-audit services,which means that the audit fees don’t be transfered through the non-audit fees. There is no evidence that non-audit services will damage the formal independence of the audit.
After that the impact of non-audit services on the substantial audit independence is examined by empirical study method. according to the collected data of listed companies, After matching the research and control samples one by one, by methods of the means test, Wilcoxon test, multivariate regression and Logistic regression , the research based on the environment that inexistence of industry factors and macroeconomic policies factors finds that: in china, purchasing non-audit services whether or not have no significant relevant on the discretionary accruals and type of audit opinions; absolute amount and proportion of non-audit fees do not have significant correlation with the discretionary accruals,which reveals that the CPA dosen’t let the client who buy both audit services and non-audit services have more large room of earning manangement; the absolute amount and proportion of non-audit fees as well as unexpected non-audit fees are not significantly related with audit opinions, non-audit fees doesn’t negatively affect the process of the audit opinion. There is no significant evidence that non-audit services will damage the substantial independence of the audit.
At last, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical study, some policy advices is brought forword about non-audit services: our country should develop non-audit services with great exertion, but must regulate it from the level of listed companies, supervisor and CPA’industry.
The innovations of this paper are: The effect of non-audit services on audit independence is systemic analysised. Based on useing the variables that alnatives the substantial independence and formal independence, the result that non-audit services will not damage the audit independence that not only formal but also formal is tested by the empirical study with the data from listed companies in china.
首先重点就非审计服务对审计独立性的影响以时间为脉络,按损害审计独立性和不损害审计独立性两种观点进行回顾和评述。并分析了我国转型经济时期注册会计师行业与其所提供非审计服务的发展现状以及相关法律背景,从而为后续理论与实证分析奠定基础。
其次用企业契约理论、委托代理理论、知识溢出效应与经济寻租理论刻画非审计服务对审计独立性的影响。非审计服务的存在改变了企业现有契约关系,使原有的单向委托变成了双向委托,从形式上打破了原有审计架构的均衡。同时,审计与非审计服务之间存在的知识溢出效应为契约各方追逐经济租提供了可能与动因。理论分析说明:非审计服务是审计独立性重要的影响因素,完善的约束机制使非审计服务有助于审计独立性的提高。
再次用实证研究的方法检验了非审计服务对审计形式独立性的影响。本文以报表使用者对非审计服务的反应与行动衡量审计形式独立性,通过研究样本和控制样本的一一配对,并运用均值检验、Wilcoxon符号等级检验以及多元回归方法检验发现:在我国,购买非审计服务的上市公司和未购买非审计服务的上市公司在代理成本方面没有显著差异;除管理层持股外,其他代理成本变量与非审计费用不具有显著相关性,报表使用者并没有认为非审计服务的存在降低了审计独立性;审计费用的大小与非审计服务费用显著正相关,没有发现审计费用通过非审计费用转移的证据。研究结果说明没有显著证据证明非审计服务损害审计形式上的独立性。
然后用实证研究的方法检验了非审计服务对审计实质独立性的影响。根据本文所收集的上市公司数据,在未发现行业因素和宏观政策因素影响的基础上,通过研究样本和控制样本的一一配对,并运用均值检验、Wilcoxon符号等级检验以及多元回归检验和Logistic回归方法检验发现:是否购买非审计服务对操控性应计数和审计意见类型影响不明显;非审计费用的绝对金额的大小或者比重大小与操控性应计数的大小、方向都不具有显著相关性,非审计服务的存在并没有使注册会计师容忍管理当局有更大的盈余管理空间;非审计费用的绝对金额的大小,比重大小以及未预期非审计费用与审计意见均不显著相关,非审计服务并没有负向影响审计意见的类型。总之,没有发现非审计服务损害审计实质独立性的显著证据。
最后在上述理论分析与实证检验的基础上,提出我国应当大力发展非审计服务,但是必须从上市公司层面、监管层面以及注册会计师行业层面进行规范的政策建议。
本文的主要创新之处表现在:系统运用经济学观点解释非审计服务对审计独立性的影响;用一定的替代变量衡量审计形式独立性和实质独立性并对其进行实证检验,证实在中国,上市公司向会计师事务所同时购买审计与非审计服务时,无论是形式上还是实质上,非审计服务均不损害审计独立性。
Audit independence is the soul of Certified Public Accountants (CPA) and it is also the prerequisite for the existence and development of the CPA industry. With the progress of CPA industry service for market, the revenue from non-audit service is more and more important in the operation of the accounting firm, and the impact of non-audit service on audit independence has also become the core content of audit theoretical and empirical study. The impact of that the listed company purchases audit and non-audit service simultaneously on the audit independence is mainly studied in this paper.
Firstly, according to the impact of non-audit service on audit independence based on time sequence, the literature on two different view is reviewed separately. Then, the development and correlative legal background of the CPA industry and the non-audit service offered by the CPA industry during China’s economic transition period are analyzed, which lays the foundation for the follow-up theoretical and empirical studies.
Secondly, Based on the introduction & review of the theoretic controvers among enterprise contract theory, principal-agent theory, knowledge spillover effects and the economic rent-seeking theory, the relationship among above mentioned theories and the effect of non-audit services on audit independence are discussed. The existence of non-audit services has changed the existing contract relationship between the enterprises, which transformed the original one-way commission into a two-way commission and formally broken the balance of the original audit structure. The knowledge spillover effects between the audit and non-audit service provides the possibility and cause for the parties who buy or sale non-audit services to pursue economic rent. Non-audit services is the important factor for affectively audit independence, If there is a effective constraints mechanism in the capital marcket , the non-audit services not only will not damage the independence of the audit, but also will help to improve the independence of the audit.
And then, the effect of non-audit services on the formal audit independence is examined by empirical study method. Through matching the research and control samples one by one, and using of means test, Wilcoxon test and multivariate regression, the research find: in China, there is no significant difference in the agency costs between the listed companies for having purchased non-audit services and not; in addition to the shareholdings of management, other variables of agent costs do not have significant correlation with the non-audit fees, the users of financial statement don’t think that the non-audit services impare the independence of auditor; the size of audit costs significantly positively correlate with the pricing of non-audit services,which means that the audit fees don’t be transfered through the non-audit fees. There is no evidence that non-audit services will damage the formal independence of the audit.
After that the impact of non-audit services on the substantial audit independence is examined by empirical study method. according to the collected data of listed companies, After matching the research and control samples one by one, by methods of the means test, Wilcoxon test, multivariate regression and Logistic regression , the research based on the environment that inexistence of industry factors and macroeconomic policies factors finds that: in china, purchasing non-audit services whether or not have no significant relevant on the discretionary accruals and type of audit opinions; absolute amount and proportion of non-audit fees do not have significant correlation with the discretionary accruals,which reveals that the CPA dosen’t let the client who buy both audit services and non-audit services have more large room of earning manangement; the absolute amount and proportion of non-audit fees as well as unexpected non-audit fees are not significantly related with audit opinions, non-audit fees doesn’t negatively affect the process of the audit opinion. There is no significant evidence that non-audit services will damage the substantial independence of the audit.
At last, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical study, some policy advices is brought forword about non-audit services: our country should develop non-audit services with great exertion, but must regulate it from the level of listed companies, supervisor and CPA’industry.
The innovations of this paper are: The effect of non-audit services on audit independence is systemic analysised. Based on useing the variables that alnatives the substantial independence and formal independence, the result that non-audit services will not damage the audit independence that not only formal but also formal is tested by the empirical study with the data from listed companies in china.
引文
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