上市公司投资行为与控制权配置研究
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摘要
公司投资一直是现代公司金融理论的核心问题之一。自Modigliani和Miller(1958)在新古典范式下提出著名的公司投融资决策无关的MM定理以来,西方学者逐渐放宽MM定理的新古典假设,修正“无关性”命题的使用范围成为微观金融学研究的热点问题之一。企业契约理论(Coase,1937)、委托代理理论(Jensen and Meckling,1976)、信息非对称理论(Myers and Majluf,1984)和公司治理理论(Berle and Means,1932)在公司金融领域的应用,为探索公司投资行为机理开拓了新的视角和研究方法。然而,这些研究大多建立在存在相对成熟、完善和规范的市场制度和资本市场之上,与之相反,我国正处于转轨经济的社会主义市场经济的初级阶段,其市场制度呈现出不成熟、不规范和不完善的特点。因此,有必要根据我国转轨经济时期的现状,探索我国公司的投资行为。
本文在充分借鉴国内外公司投资最新研究成果的基础上,立足于我国上市公司特有的股权结构安排、控制权结构特征和公司负债结构特点,从信息非对称、委托代理理论和公司治理理论相融合的分析方法和框架,以反映公司投资行为的投资与现金流的敏感性为切入点,从理论推导和实证检验两个方面,对我国上市公司的投资行为从控制权配置的角度进行系统、深入的研究。
论文首先通过理论推导构建了基于控制权的公司投资一般模型,推导出在不同控制权配置下的公司投资水平及其决定因素,通过与完全资本市场条件下的最佳投资额比较,得出公司非效率投资的决定因素。在此基础上,利用我国上市公司的面板数据对公司的投资行为进行全面、深入的实证研究,与理论推导相互印证。实证研究包括四个部分,首先利用长时间、大样本的面板数据,对我国上市公司的投资行为进行了再研究,通过动因检验得出上市公司同时存在因融资约束导致的投资不足和因代理冲突引致的过度投资行为;其次,结合我国转轨经济时期特有的股权结构特征和控制权配置情况,通过引入衡量管理者与股东之间代理冲突的管理费率、反映大小股东代理冲突的第一大股东持股比例和股权制衡比例,对不同控制权配置下的公司投资行为进行检验;再次,针对我国上市公司大股东控制的普遍性,从终极控股股东超额控制权的角度,对上市公司投资行为展开研究,得出控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求导致过度投资,其中,终极控股股东的超额控制权加剧了这种过度投资倾向,但随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加,大小股东利益趋于一致,公司过度投资问题得到一定缓解;最后,应用公司负债水平、反映公司自主意愿的借款结构,实证检验了债务对投资影响的融资效应和相机治理机制效应,得出无论是公司债务水平、长短期借款对公司投资的影响都是有限的。
本文的创新或特色主要体现在以下几方面:
①综合运用委托代理、信息不对称和公司治理等理论构建了基于控制权的公司投资行为一般模型,推导出不同控制权配置下公司投资水平,并与完全资本市场假设下的最佳投资水平进行比较,分析不同控制权配置下影响公司投资的主要因素;
②通过观察公司内源资金的使用,从投资与现金流敏感性这个统一的视角,系统地对我国上市公司不同控制权配置下的公司投资行为进行实证检验,与理论推导的基于控制权的公司投资模型相互印证,检验不同控制权配置下的上市公司投资行为。
③直接从终极控股股东超额控制权的角度,通过引入现金流权、控制权与现金流权的分离系数,对上市公司投资行为进行检验,得出终极控股股东的超额控制权加剧了我国上市公司的过度投资行为,但随着现金流权的增加,这种过度投资行为得到一定程度缓解。
Analysis of the corporate investment decisions occupies a important prominent place in corporate finance. From M-M theorem which was put forward by Modigliani and Miller(1958), basing on the neo-classical paradigm, many western scholars began to relax the Neo-classical assumption of M-M theorem gradually, and the application to modify the scope of“irrelevancy”proposition became to be the focus field in corporate finance. With development of principal-agent theory (Jensen&Meckling, 1976), information asymmetry theory (Myers&Majluf, 1984), contract theory (Coase, 1937), and the corporate governance theory (Berle and Means,1932), these theories have shown up a new viewpoint of research on mechanism of the acts of corporate investment, and expanded the corporate investment theory. But most of researches are set up on comparatively capital market with strong economic free, abundant information flow, and reliable contracts. On the contrary, because our country lacks these basic system quality characteristics of all or the part, its market system demonstrates not standard, not perfect characteristic. So, it is necessary to probe the investment behaviors of Chinese listed corporations based on the current situation of economic transition of our country.
Therefore, this paper uses the newest research achievements of corporate investment theory, based on the characteristic of shareholders arrangement, control rights allocations, and the debt structure which are unique by listed corporations in China, according to related theory of Investment and financing, and make the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow as cut-into point, using the combinative method of information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, and corporate governance theory, this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed corporations deeply and systematically in our transition period.
The paper structures the corporate investment decision model based on control rights allocation,through comparing with investment criterion in completely market, this model gives the corporate investment level and the main factors under different control rights; then, the dissertation tests empirically the corporate investment behavior deeply and systematically using penal date of Chinese listed companies. The empirical evidence of corporate investment behavior includes four parts. The first part is using penal date sets of china’s 410 listed companies from 1999 to 2006, to test the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow in order to investigate investment behavior, the empirical shows that there are both over-investment and under-investment simultaneity because of the imperfect information and agency issue. The second empirical part is to test the corporate investment under different control rights, based on the characteristic of shareholders arrangement, control rights allocations which are unique by listed corporations. Because of the controlling of large shareholder widely, the third part is about corporate investment behavior empirical research under the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, the empirical shows that there are over-investment because of the private income of control rights, and, the over-investment problem becomes serious because of the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, but the over-investment problem will alleviate along with the increase of cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders. The last part of empirical test is research on the relationship of debt structure and corporate investment behavior, the empirical shows that the financing effects and governance effects of debt are limited in Chinese listed companies, its influence on corporate investment are small.
Several following jobs and innovation points of this dissertation has been done mainly:
①This paper structures the corporate investment decision model based on control rights allocation. Through comparing with investment criterion in completely market, this model gives the corporate investment level and the main factors under different control rights;
②Based on panel date set of Chinese listed companies, this dissertation test the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow in order to investigate investment behavior deeply and systematically under different control rights;
③In the view of excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, this paper investigates corporate investment of Chinese listed companies, by using cash flow rights, control rights ,the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights at the first time, the empirical result shows that there are over-investment because of the private income of control rights, and the over-investment problem becomes serious because of the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, but the over-investment problem will alleviate along with the increase of cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders.
本文在充分借鉴国内外公司投资最新研究成果的基础上,立足于我国上市公司特有的股权结构安排、控制权结构特征和公司负债结构特点,从信息非对称、委托代理理论和公司治理理论相融合的分析方法和框架,以反映公司投资行为的投资与现金流的敏感性为切入点,从理论推导和实证检验两个方面,对我国上市公司的投资行为从控制权配置的角度进行系统、深入的研究。
论文首先通过理论推导构建了基于控制权的公司投资一般模型,推导出在不同控制权配置下的公司投资水平及其决定因素,通过与完全资本市场条件下的最佳投资额比较,得出公司非效率投资的决定因素。在此基础上,利用我国上市公司的面板数据对公司的投资行为进行全面、深入的实证研究,与理论推导相互印证。实证研究包括四个部分,首先利用长时间、大样本的面板数据,对我国上市公司的投资行为进行了再研究,通过动因检验得出上市公司同时存在因融资约束导致的投资不足和因代理冲突引致的过度投资行为;其次,结合我国转轨经济时期特有的股权结构特征和控制权配置情况,通过引入衡量管理者与股东之间代理冲突的管理费率、反映大小股东代理冲突的第一大股东持股比例和股权制衡比例,对不同控制权配置下的公司投资行为进行检验;再次,针对我国上市公司大股东控制的普遍性,从终极控股股东超额控制权的角度,对上市公司投资行为展开研究,得出控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求导致过度投资,其中,终极控股股东的超额控制权加剧了这种过度投资倾向,但随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加,大小股东利益趋于一致,公司过度投资问题得到一定缓解;最后,应用公司负债水平、反映公司自主意愿的借款结构,实证检验了债务对投资影响的融资效应和相机治理机制效应,得出无论是公司债务水平、长短期借款对公司投资的影响都是有限的。
本文的创新或特色主要体现在以下几方面:
①综合运用委托代理、信息不对称和公司治理等理论构建了基于控制权的公司投资行为一般模型,推导出不同控制权配置下公司投资水平,并与完全资本市场假设下的最佳投资水平进行比较,分析不同控制权配置下影响公司投资的主要因素;
②通过观察公司内源资金的使用,从投资与现金流敏感性这个统一的视角,系统地对我国上市公司不同控制权配置下的公司投资行为进行实证检验,与理论推导的基于控制权的公司投资模型相互印证,检验不同控制权配置下的上市公司投资行为。
③直接从终极控股股东超额控制权的角度,通过引入现金流权、控制权与现金流权的分离系数,对上市公司投资行为进行检验,得出终极控股股东的超额控制权加剧了我国上市公司的过度投资行为,但随着现金流权的增加,这种过度投资行为得到一定程度缓解。
Analysis of the corporate investment decisions occupies a important prominent place in corporate finance. From M-M theorem which was put forward by Modigliani and Miller(1958), basing on the neo-classical paradigm, many western scholars began to relax the Neo-classical assumption of M-M theorem gradually, and the application to modify the scope of“irrelevancy”proposition became to be the focus field in corporate finance. With development of principal-agent theory (Jensen&Meckling, 1976), information asymmetry theory (Myers&Majluf, 1984), contract theory (Coase, 1937), and the corporate governance theory (Berle and Means,1932), these theories have shown up a new viewpoint of research on mechanism of the acts of corporate investment, and expanded the corporate investment theory. But most of researches are set up on comparatively capital market with strong economic free, abundant information flow, and reliable contracts. On the contrary, because our country lacks these basic system quality characteristics of all or the part, its market system demonstrates not standard, not perfect characteristic. So, it is necessary to probe the investment behaviors of Chinese listed corporations based on the current situation of economic transition of our country.
Therefore, this paper uses the newest research achievements of corporate investment theory, based on the characteristic of shareholders arrangement, control rights allocations, and the debt structure which are unique by listed corporations in China, according to related theory of Investment and financing, and make the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow as cut-into point, using the combinative method of information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, and corporate governance theory, this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed corporations deeply and systematically in our transition period.
The paper structures the corporate investment decision model based on control rights allocation,through comparing with investment criterion in completely market, this model gives the corporate investment level and the main factors under different control rights; then, the dissertation tests empirically the corporate investment behavior deeply and systematically using penal date of Chinese listed companies. The empirical evidence of corporate investment behavior includes four parts. The first part is using penal date sets of china’s 410 listed companies from 1999 to 2006, to test the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow in order to investigate investment behavior, the empirical shows that there are both over-investment and under-investment simultaneity because of the imperfect information and agency issue. The second empirical part is to test the corporate investment under different control rights, based on the characteristic of shareholders arrangement, control rights allocations which are unique by listed corporations. Because of the controlling of large shareholder widely, the third part is about corporate investment behavior empirical research under the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, the empirical shows that there are over-investment because of the private income of control rights, and, the over-investment problem becomes serious because of the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, but the over-investment problem will alleviate along with the increase of cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders. The last part of empirical test is research on the relationship of debt structure and corporate investment behavior, the empirical shows that the financing effects and governance effects of debt are limited in Chinese listed companies, its influence on corporate investment are small.
Several following jobs and innovation points of this dissertation has been done mainly:
①This paper structures the corporate investment decision model based on control rights allocation. Through comparing with investment criterion in completely market, this model gives the corporate investment level and the main factors under different control rights;
②Based on panel date set of Chinese listed companies, this dissertation test the sensitivity between the corporate investment and cash flow in order to investigate investment behavior deeply and systematically under different control rights;
③In the view of excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, this paper investigates corporate investment of Chinese listed companies, by using cash flow rights, control rights ,the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights at the first time, the empirical result shows that there are over-investment because of the private income of control rights, and the over-investment problem becomes serious because of the excess control of ultimate controlling shareholders, but the over-investment problem will alleviate along with the increase of cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders.
引文
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