企业经营者人力资本定价与激励机制研究
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摘要
现代企业中经营权与所有权的分离,使经营者在企业中的地位得到了空前的提高。两权分离,一方面为人力资本和物质资本的最优配置提供了可能,有利于提高企业的经济效益,另一方面也导致了委托代理问题的产生,从而不利于企业经济效益的提高。解决这一矛盾的关键在于,调动经营者的积极性和解决委托代理问题。调动经营者的积极性和解决委托代理问题的途径主要有两条:其一是对经营者人力资本进行适当的定价,使经营者人力资本得到合理的报酬;其二是建立经营者人力资本科学合理的激励机制,对经营者进行激励,尤其是应该让经营者通过一定的途径拥有企业的所有权。
本文认为,现代企业是人力资本和物质资本组成的利益结合体,其核心是利益问题,包括利益创造和利益分配问题。利益创造问题的关键在于企业人力资本和物质资本的构成和结合方式,主要涉及到人力资本和物质资本的配置比例,以及人力资本和物质资本在企业中的地位问题;而利益分配问题的关键在于如何将企业创造的利益在各利益主体之间进行分配。应该平等地看待人力资本和物质资本,它们都是企业资本不可或缺的组成部分,因此都有权参与企业的剩余分配。让经营者人力资本通过一定的方式部分拥有企业股权既是一种定价措施,也是一种激励措施。
经营者人力资本定价就是确定经营者人力资本的价值,人力资本定价可以是确定一定时期内人力资本的价值,也可以是确定全部时期人力资本价值。其中确定一定时期内人力资本的价值就是人力资本定酬问题,而全部时期人力资本价值可以看成是各个时期人力资本价值的现值之和。相对来说,经营者人力资本定酬问题更有现实意义,所以本文以经营者人力资本定酬作为研究重点,探讨了经营者人力资本的定价方法和薪酬契约的选择。
经营者人力资本价值的确定,首先应该研究人力资本价值的构成。本文认为,人力资本价值可以分为内在价值和外在价值,外在价值包括使用价值和交换价值。其中,内在价值是人力资本价值的基础,而外在价值是人力资本价值的外在表现。经营者人力资本的内在价值主要通过一系列的评价指标确定,使用价值主要通过企业业绩加以确定,而交换价值主要由经营者人才市场确定。
经营者人力资本的激励问题的研究重点是如何设计经营者的激励契约,使经营者为企业努力工作。在激励契约的设计是既要采用物质激励措施,也要采用非物质激励措施,应该将两种方式结合起来。本文认为,激励契约的设计与企业掌握的经营者信息特征有关,应该根据不同的情况,制定相应的激励契约。
授予经营者股票期权是一种长期的激励契约,同时也是经营者人力资本定价方式。本文对股票期权的有关问题进行了探讨,主要包括股票期权激励计划的设计问题,以及我国股票期权制度在实践中存在的问题,如股票期权的性质认定问题和税收问题,同时针对这些问题提出了相应的改进措施。
The separation of management right and the property rights of modern enterprise, enable operator's to obtain the unprecedented enhancement in enterprise status. At the same time, this kind of two rights separation has provided the possibility for the human capital and the material capital most superior configuration, which is propitious to improve the economic benefit of the firm, on the other hand, also has caused the principal-agent problem,which makes against the economic benefit of the firm. The key of settlement the problem rest with, how arouses operator's positivity and solves principal-agent question,which is a hot topic of the modern enterprise research,and the paper will deploy enclosing the main body,too.
This article figure that there are two main modes to arouse operator's enthusiasm and solve principal-agent problem, First,pricing suitably to the operator human capital causes reward which the operator human capital obtains should be; second, establishing reasonable incentive system of the operator human capital arouses operator's positivity.
Modern enterprise is composed of the human capital and the material capital, the benefit is its core, namely benefit creation and benefit assignment. Key question of Benefit creation is conjunct model of the human capital and the material capital which mainly involves to the human capital and the material capital configuration proportion as well as the human capital and the material capital in enterprise's status. In different enterprise, the human capital and the material capital configuration proportion are different, as well as the human capital and the material capital in enterprise's status. Therefore there are differences in the form and the share of enterprise benefit assignment. The paper figure that we should equally look on the the human capital and the material capital, they all are the enterprise carry on the production management to move the indispensable capital, and the human capital function has the tendency which increases, therefore the human capital also should have enterprise's property rights through certain way.
The human capital price question is a theory difficult problem, at present does not have to solve completely. This article believed that, the relations of the human capital pricing and the human capital reward is very close, may decide the reward of the human capitale in the foundation to study the human capital pricing, because the human capital value might express by the present value of its future income . Because operator human capital and enterprise achievement close correlation, therefore the operator human capital decides the reward to be possible through the enterprise achievement level determination.
To make sure the value of operator human capital should study firstly the constitutes of the value of it. The value of operator human capital can plot the inherence value and explicit value, and explicit value include use value and exchange value,and inherence value is the bedrock of the human capital value,and explicit value is the behave of the human capital value.The inherence value of the operator human capital value is made sure by a series of evaluate index, and the use value is made sure by the performance of the firm,and exchange value is made sure by the operator resource market.
The keystone of the incentive system is how to project the compensation contract, in order to let operator wiring in for the firm. The paper figure the compensation contract should consistent to the information character.
Awards the operator the stock option is one kind of incentive measure, simultaneously also is the operator human capital pricing mode, therefore this article has carried on the discussion to the stock option related question, in particular our country stock option system in reality related question, such as the nature recognizes and the tax revenue question, at the same time, the paper bring forward some mend step in allusion to the problem above.
本文认为,现代企业是人力资本和物质资本组成的利益结合体,其核心是利益问题,包括利益创造和利益分配问题。利益创造问题的关键在于企业人力资本和物质资本的构成和结合方式,主要涉及到人力资本和物质资本的配置比例,以及人力资本和物质资本在企业中的地位问题;而利益分配问题的关键在于如何将企业创造的利益在各利益主体之间进行分配。应该平等地看待人力资本和物质资本,它们都是企业资本不可或缺的组成部分,因此都有权参与企业的剩余分配。让经营者人力资本通过一定的方式部分拥有企业股权既是一种定价措施,也是一种激励措施。
经营者人力资本定价就是确定经营者人力资本的价值,人力资本定价可以是确定一定时期内人力资本的价值,也可以是确定全部时期人力资本价值。其中确定一定时期内人力资本的价值就是人力资本定酬问题,而全部时期人力资本价值可以看成是各个时期人力资本价值的现值之和。相对来说,经营者人力资本定酬问题更有现实意义,所以本文以经营者人力资本定酬作为研究重点,探讨了经营者人力资本的定价方法和薪酬契约的选择。
经营者人力资本价值的确定,首先应该研究人力资本价值的构成。本文认为,人力资本价值可以分为内在价值和外在价值,外在价值包括使用价值和交换价值。其中,内在价值是人力资本价值的基础,而外在价值是人力资本价值的外在表现。经营者人力资本的内在价值主要通过一系列的评价指标确定,使用价值主要通过企业业绩加以确定,而交换价值主要由经营者人才市场确定。
经营者人力资本的激励问题的研究重点是如何设计经营者的激励契约,使经营者为企业努力工作。在激励契约的设计是既要采用物质激励措施,也要采用非物质激励措施,应该将两种方式结合起来。本文认为,激励契约的设计与企业掌握的经营者信息特征有关,应该根据不同的情况,制定相应的激励契约。
授予经营者股票期权是一种长期的激励契约,同时也是经营者人力资本定价方式。本文对股票期权的有关问题进行了探讨,主要包括股票期权激励计划的设计问题,以及我国股票期权制度在实践中存在的问题,如股票期权的性质认定问题和税收问题,同时针对这些问题提出了相应的改进措施。
The separation of management right and the property rights of modern enterprise, enable operator's to obtain the unprecedented enhancement in enterprise status. At the same time, this kind of two rights separation has provided the possibility for the human capital and the material capital most superior configuration, which is propitious to improve the economic benefit of the firm, on the other hand, also has caused the principal-agent problem,which makes against the economic benefit of the firm. The key of settlement the problem rest with, how arouses operator's positivity and solves principal-agent question,which is a hot topic of the modern enterprise research,and the paper will deploy enclosing the main body,too.
This article figure that there are two main modes to arouse operator's enthusiasm and solve principal-agent problem, First,pricing suitably to the operator human capital causes reward which the operator human capital obtains should be; second, establishing reasonable incentive system of the operator human capital arouses operator's positivity.
Modern enterprise is composed of the human capital and the material capital, the benefit is its core, namely benefit creation and benefit assignment. Key question of Benefit creation is conjunct model of the human capital and the material capital which mainly involves to the human capital and the material capital configuration proportion as well as the human capital and the material capital in enterprise's status. In different enterprise, the human capital and the material capital configuration proportion are different, as well as the human capital and the material capital in enterprise's status. Therefore there are differences in the form and the share of enterprise benefit assignment. The paper figure that we should equally look on the the human capital and the material capital, they all are the enterprise carry on the production management to move the indispensable capital, and the human capital function has the tendency which increases, therefore the human capital also should have enterprise's property rights through certain way.
The human capital price question is a theory difficult problem, at present does not have to solve completely. This article believed that, the relations of the human capital pricing and the human capital reward is very close, may decide the reward of the human capitale in the foundation to study the human capital pricing, because the human capital value might express by the present value of its future income . Because operator human capital and enterprise achievement close correlation, therefore the operator human capital decides the reward to be possible through the enterprise achievement level determination.
To make sure the value of operator human capital should study firstly the constitutes of the value of it. The value of operator human capital can plot the inherence value and explicit value, and explicit value include use value and exchange value,and inherence value is the bedrock of the human capital value,and explicit value is the behave of the human capital value.The inherence value of the operator human capital value is made sure by a series of evaluate index, and the use value is made sure by the performance of the firm,and exchange value is made sure by the operator resource market.
The keystone of the incentive system is how to project the compensation contract, in order to let operator wiring in for the firm. The paper figure the compensation contract should consistent to the information character.
Awards the operator the stock option is one kind of incentive measure, simultaneously also is the operator human capital pricing mode, therefore this article has carried on the discussion to the stock option related question, in particular our country stock option system in reality related question, such as the nature recognizes and the tax revenue question, at the same time, the paper bring forward some mend step in allusion to the problem above.
引文
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