公司控制的价值效应及其影响因素研究
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摘要
无论在经济发达国家还是在经济转型国家,公司控制在公司治理和公司财务,甚至是资本市场价格行为中的重要作用,正在成为理论、实务界,以及政府监管部门关注的焦点。公司的实际控制者基于公司控制私人收益最大化目标而作出的各种财务决策,无疑会在股票市场中引发一定的价值效应,这种价值效应不仅取决于控制权的结构和状态,同时还取决于与公司控制有关的一系列制度安排和机制。本文从我国上市公司公司控制的股票市场反应入手,系统深入地研究了我国上市公司公司控制的价值效应及其影响因素,所作的工作主要包括以下四个部分:
论文第二章全面回顾了经济理论、企业理论、公司财务与公司治理理论中与企业和公司控制有关的理论观点,为全文的研究奠定了理论基础,并为后续章节对公司控制价值效应的研究建立了逻辑分析框架;第三章对兼并收购等传统公司控制机制下有关价值创造问题的理论与实证研究文献进行了全面综述,并对照有关公司内部控制者私人收益攫取行为的最新理论与实证研究成果,确立了本文的分析视角。论文的第四章到第六章分别选取公司首次公开上市发行股票、配股再融资和现金股利支付决策作为重要的公司财务事件,采用定量方法考察其中公司控制的价值效应并发现,公司内部控制者的控制私利攫取行为是造成上市公司股票首次公开上市抑价发行现象的重要原因,同时,控制者的私人收益攫取也是造成配股再融资与现金股利支付事件中公司股票价格超常累计回报(CAR)负面效应的重要因素。第三,论文的第七章用实证方法分析了股权结构等公司内部因素和法律保护力度等公司外部因素对上市公司控制私利攫取水平的影响。最后,论文根据实证研究结论,针对我国上市公司应采取什么样的措施抑制控制私利的攫取行为,从而提高公司控制和公司治理活动价值创造的效率和水平提出了相应的政策建议。
No matter in developed countries or in transitiona l countries , the core functionof corporate control in corporate governance, corporate fina nce and even securitiesprice behavior in stock market are becoming the focus concentrated on by scholars,investors ,and regulatory departments of government. The fina ncia l decisions madeby actual controller of listed corporate according to their private control benefitsma ximizing object will bring about certain value effect in stock market. The valueeffect is not only dependent upon the control right structure and control situation ofcorporate, but also dependent upon the institutiona l arrangement and mecha nismrelated to corporate control. Based on the market reaction of China’s listed corporate’scontrol event, this dissertation deeply and systematica lly analyzes the value effect ofcorporate control and its decisive factors. The ma in works I have done are as follows:
First, this dissertation reviews the preva iling view points about corporatecontrol in economic theory, firm theory, corporate fina nce theory and corporategovernance theory in chapter two, build ing a theoretica l basis for the wholecorporate and constructing the logica l framework for empirica l studies of valueeffect of corporate control. In chapter three, this dissertation summa rize s thetheoretic and empirica l literatures on value creation topics under traditiona lcorporate control transaction mecha nisms such as merger and acquisition, and findsanalysis perspective and study approach by contrasting with the lately conclusionson private control benefit extracting behavior of inside controller. Secondly, thisdissertation chooses initia l public offerings ,right offerings, and dividend paying askey fina ncia l event, and applies quantitative method to study the value effect ofcorporate control in chapter four to chapter six respectively, and finds that theprivate benefit extracting behavior of controlling shareholders are the importantfactors that cause underpricing phenomenon among IPOs. At the mea n time, theprivate benefit extracting behaviors of controlling shareholders are also the importantfactors that lead to negative abnorma l accumulative return (CAR) among SEOs anddividend payout. In chapter seven, this dissertation adopts empirica l method toanalyze the influence on controller’s private benefit extracting behaviors of corporateinternal factors such as ownership structure and corporate external factors such aslaw protection level. Fina lly, based on the conclusions obtained by empirica l studies,this dissertation brings forward some policy proposals on reducing private controlbenefit and promoting value creation level of corporate control for China’s listed corporates.
论文第二章全面回顾了经济理论、企业理论、公司财务与公司治理理论中与企业和公司控制有关的理论观点,为全文的研究奠定了理论基础,并为后续章节对公司控制价值效应的研究建立了逻辑分析框架;第三章对兼并收购等传统公司控制机制下有关价值创造问题的理论与实证研究文献进行了全面综述,并对照有关公司内部控制者私人收益攫取行为的最新理论与实证研究成果,确立了本文的分析视角。论文的第四章到第六章分别选取公司首次公开上市发行股票、配股再融资和现金股利支付决策作为重要的公司财务事件,采用定量方法考察其中公司控制的价值效应并发现,公司内部控制者的控制私利攫取行为是造成上市公司股票首次公开上市抑价发行现象的重要原因,同时,控制者的私人收益攫取也是造成配股再融资与现金股利支付事件中公司股票价格超常累计回报(CAR)负面效应的重要因素。第三,论文的第七章用实证方法分析了股权结构等公司内部因素和法律保护力度等公司外部因素对上市公司控制私利攫取水平的影响。最后,论文根据实证研究结论,针对我国上市公司应采取什么样的措施抑制控制私利的攫取行为,从而提高公司控制和公司治理活动价值创造的效率和水平提出了相应的政策建议。
No matter in developed countries or in transitiona l countries , the core functionof corporate control in corporate governance, corporate fina nce and even securitiesprice behavior in stock market are becoming the focus concentrated on by scholars,investors ,and regulatory departments of government. The fina ncia l decisions madeby actual controller of listed corporate according to their private control benefitsma ximizing object will bring about certain value effect in stock market. The valueeffect is not only dependent upon the control right structure and control situation ofcorporate, but also dependent upon the institutiona l arrangement and mecha nismrelated to corporate control. Based on the market reaction of China’s listed corporate’scontrol event, this dissertation deeply and systematica lly analyzes the value effect ofcorporate control and its decisive factors. The ma in works I have done are as follows:
First, this dissertation reviews the preva iling view points about corporatecontrol in economic theory, firm theory, corporate fina nce theory and corporategovernance theory in chapter two, build ing a theoretica l basis for the wholecorporate and constructing the logica l framework for empirica l studies of valueeffect of corporate control. In chapter three, this dissertation summa rize s thetheoretic and empirica l literatures on value creation topics under traditiona lcorporate control transaction mecha nisms such as merger and acquisition, and findsanalysis perspective and study approach by contrasting with the lately conclusionson private control benefit extracting behavior of inside controller. Secondly, thisdissertation chooses initia l public offerings ,right offerings, and dividend paying askey fina ncia l event, and applies quantitative method to study the value effect ofcorporate control in chapter four to chapter six respectively, and finds that theprivate benefit extracting behavior of controlling shareholders are the importantfactors that cause underpricing phenomenon among IPOs. At the mea n time, theprivate benefit extracting behaviors of controlling shareholders are also the importantfactors that lead to negative abnorma l accumulative return (CAR) among SEOs anddividend payout. In chapter seven, this dissertation adopts empirica l method toanalyze the influence on controller’s private benefit extracting behaviors of corporateinternal factors such as ownership structure and corporate external factors such aslaw protection level. Fina lly, based on the conclusions obtained by empirica l studies,this dissertation brings forward some policy proposals on reducing private controlbenefit and promoting value creation level of corporate control for China’s listed corporates.
引文
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