中国电煤可应用基准价格研究
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摘要
近几年,煤电之间的矛盾愈演愈烈,尽管政府已经出台了一系列调控措施,但是问题仍然没有得到根本解决。特别是2006年的煤电衔接会,已经演变成为煤电企业的一场大争论,煤炭企业宣称由于成本的上升,现行的电煤价格不能弥补企业成本,所以一定要涨价;电力企业却称不能接受电煤涨价,其居民电价依然受到政府规制,没有完全市场化,电煤价格上涨以后,自身无法消化上游的成本上升,价格也不能从下游得到补偿,企业将陷入亏本,所以绝对不能接受电煤涨价,甚至宁愿停产也不接受涨价。
展望未来,可以预见,在今后相当长的时期内电煤价格仍然是煤电争执的焦点,电煤价格已经成为急待解决的问题。
于立宏和郁义鸿(2006)给出了社会合意的理论电煤基准价格。但是在实际应用中,绝不能简单套用,必须结合现实因素加以分析。本文认为,要想确定合理的电煤价格,必须首先确定电煤价格的合理构成,然后探讨价格中质的结合和量的比例关系。
电煤的不可再生特性决定了全文的分析以动态为基础。本文首先在理论回顾的基础上,得出了全文的理论研究框架。然后具体分析各个价格组成对价格的影响。首先根据环境规制理论,从社会福利最大化角度出发,将环境成本纳入价格合理构成体系之中,构建考虑环境成本的动态模型,求出社会最优价格路径和开采路径。并进一步分析不同市场结构下的价格路径和开采路径的偏离。然后,在此基础上,将模型进一步扩展,考察了五种资源税和环境成本叠加对电煤价格路径和开采路径的影响,全面分析我国电煤的税收政策体系。再次,研究了位于煤电产业链上游的电煤企业和下游的电力企业的合理利润应该如何确定的课题。最后根据具体的计算方法,得出电煤的可应用基准价格。
本文的主要结论如下。
首先,从社会福利最大化的角度出发,环境成本必须在价格中得到体现。与社会最优价格路径相比,需求富有弹性时,垄断下的价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓,减少资源耗竭到来的时间。需求缺乏弹性时,垄断下的价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭。单位弹性下,垄断与竞争下的情形一致。
其次,本文以社会最优价格和开采路径作为基准,考虑模型中共同加入资源成本和环境成本对价格和开采路径的偏离。本文发现,在竞争市场下,总收入税、产量税、财产税和意外利润税都会导致资源价格路径和开采路径偏离社会最优路径,产生扭曲。其中,总收入税和产量税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓,财产税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭。如果意外利润税的起征点高于边际开采成本和环境成本之和,那么意外利润税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭,反之使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓。净利润税不改变资源价格路径和开采路径,不产生扭曲。
在垄断市场下,总收入税、产量税、财产税、意外利润税与市场结构一起作用,对资源价格路径和开采路径产生双重扭曲。但是,只要恰当设计税收,双重扭曲都可以同时消除。不过,在需求富有弹性情况下总收入税变成补贴,而产量税则不分弹性均要求按照产量进行补贴。在垄断市场下,由于利润税不进入价格路径方程,无法利用净利润税来纠正垄断市场结构对价格路径的扭曲,扭曲效应不可避免。
最后,利用平均利润率和CAPM模型对利润的计量结果有较大的差异,但电煤和电力的基准利润率应该一样。随着资本市场的成熟,计量的准确度将会提高。同时,生产成本应该采取最劣成本定价的方式,并且反映安全成本。由此即得出了本文的最终目标—电煤的可应用基准价格。
In the recent years, the conflict between the coal industry and the power industry has becoming more and more worse. In spite of a series of adjustment and controlling measures from the government, the conflict has not been solved. The contracting meeting between the coal industry and the power industry in 2006 turned to be a moot. The coal industry declared that due to the increasing cost, the current sales price of coal is too low to cover all the costs and the sales price of coal should be higher. To the contrary, the power industry claimed that higher price of coal could not be accepted because the sales price of power is regulated by the government. Should the price of coal be increased, the power industry would not make profit. The power industry said that they preferred to shut down than to buy coal at a higher price.
Without enough knowledge of the cost of the coal industry, the government can't regulate the price properly and the power industry cannot judge whether the variation of the price of coal is acceptable or not. It is anticipated that the price of coal shall still be a conflict between the coal industry and the power industry. This paper argues that enough knowledge of the cost of the coal industry would be helpful to the solving of the conflict.
Yu and Yu (2006) put forward a theoretical benchmark price of coal optimal to the society. The theoretical price, if to be applicable, must be analyzed basing on the reality of China. This paper argues that to get a reasonable and applicable coal price, we must first decide the reasonable elements of price. With this knowledge, we can further discuss both the quality and quantity aspects of the price.
The exhaustibility of the coal determines that we should adopt dynamic analysis as a basic method. On the basis of the reasonable elements of the coal price, according to the environmental regulation theory, this paper first includes the environmental cost in the elements of the coal price and develops a dynamic model which is optimal to the society. Then, this paper extends the above model in two aspects. One is to discuss the influence of the market structure on the efficiency, and the other is to review the five methods of collecting resource rent. Then, from the angle of the industry chain of the coal and power industry, this paper discusses how to determine the reasonable profit of the coal and power industry. Finally, this paper concludes with an applicable benchmark price of coal.
The main conclusions of this paper are as followed:
First, from the view of the society, the environmental cost must be accounted to the coal price. Compared to the socially optimal price path, it'll change the price path of coal according to the elasticity of the demand under monopoly. If the demand elasticity is greater than one in absolute value, it'll make the price and production path flatter under monopoly, which means the exhausting date would be postponed. If the demand elasticity is less than one in absolute value, it'll make the price and production path sharper under monopoly, which means the exhausting date would be brought forward. If the elasticity is unity, there would be no difference under monopoly and competition.
Secondly, we shall add five methods of collecting rent into the basic model to discuss the influence of rent-collecting on the price and production path. We find that under competitive market, the gross yield tax, the unit tax, the property tax, and the windfall profit tax should deviate the price and production path from the socially optimal path. Among them, the gross yield tax and the unit tax make the path flatter while the property tax makes it sharper. The effect of the windfall profit tax depends on its tax base. If the tax base is higher than the production and environmental cost, the tax will make the path sharper and vice versa. The net profit tax does not change the path.
Under monopoly, the gross yield tax, the unit tax, the property tax, and the windfall profit tax should deviate the price and production path further from the socially optimal path together with the distortion of market structure. If tax is designed properly, the dual distortion would be eliminated at the same time. When the demand elasticity is greater than one in absolute value, the gross yield tax will be a sort of subsidy. The unit tax will be a subsidy too despite the elasticity of the demand. The net profit can't be designed properly to alleviate the distortion. So under monopoly and with a net profit tax, the distortion is unavoidable.
Finally, this paper shall give two methods to compute the reasonable profit. One is the method of average profit margin and the other is the method of CAPM. We should refer to both methods and their results accordingly. With the development of China stock market, the method of CAPM will become more and more applicable. Beside the above-mentioned costs, we finally include safety cost in the elements of price and give the applicable benchmark price of coal.
展望未来,可以预见,在今后相当长的时期内电煤价格仍然是煤电争执的焦点,电煤价格已经成为急待解决的问题。
于立宏和郁义鸿(2006)给出了社会合意的理论电煤基准价格。但是在实际应用中,绝不能简单套用,必须结合现实因素加以分析。本文认为,要想确定合理的电煤价格,必须首先确定电煤价格的合理构成,然后探讨价格中质的结合和量的比例关系。
电煤的不可再生特性决定了全文的分析以动态为基础。本文首先在理论回顾的基础上,得出了全文的理论研究框架。然后具体分析各个价格组成对价格的影响。首先根据环境规制理论,从社会福利最大化角度出发,将环境成本纳入价格合理构成体系之中,构建考虑环境成本的动态模型,求出社会最优价格路径和开采路径。并进一步分析不同市场结构下的价格路径和开采路径的偏离。然后,在此基础上,将模型进一步扩展,考察了五种资源税和环境成本叠加对电煤价格路径和开采路径的影响,全面分析我国电煤的税收政策体系。再次,研究了位于煤电产业链上游的电煤企业和下游的电力企业的合理利润应该如何确定的课题。最后根据具体的计算方法,得出电煤的可应用基准价格。
本文的主要结论如下。
首先,从社会福利最大化的角度出发,环境成本必须在价格中得到体现。与社会最优价格路径相比,需求富有弹性时,垄断下的价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓,减少资源耗竭到来的时间。需求缺乏弹性时,垄断下的价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭。单位弹性下,垄断与竞争下的情形一致。
其次,本文以社会最优价格和开采路径作为基准,考虑模型中共同加入资源成本和环境成本对价格和开采路径的偏离。本文发现,在竞争市场下,总收入税、产量税、财产税和意外利润税都会导致资源价格路径和开采路径偏离社会最优路径,产生扭曲。其中,总收入税和产量税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓,财产税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭。如果意外利润税的起征点高于边际开采成本和环境成本之和,那么意外利润税使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为陡峭,反之使得资源价格路径和开采路径变得更为平缓。净利润税不改变资源价格路径和开采路径,不产生扭曲。
在垄断市场下,总收入税、产量税、财产税、意外利润税与市场结构一起作用,对资源价格路径和开采路径产生双重扭曲。但是,只要恰当设计税收,双重扭曲都可以同时消除。不过,在需求富有弹性情况下总收入税变成补贴,而产量税则不分弹性均要求按照产量进行补贴。在垄断市场下,由于利润税不进入价格路径方程,无法利用净利润税来纠正垄断市场结构对价格路径的扭曲,扭曲效应不可避免。
最后,利用平均利润率和CAPM模型对利润的计量结果有较大的差异,但电煤和电力的基准利润率应该一样。随着资本市场的成熟,计量的准确度将会提高。同时,生产成本应该采取最劣成本定价的方式,并且反映安全成本。由此即得出了本文的最终目标—电煤的可应用基准价格。
In the recent years, the conflict between the coal industry and the power industry has becoming more and more worse. In spite of a series of adjustment and controlling measures from the government, the conflict has not been solved. The contracting meeting between the coal industry and the power industry in 2006 turned to be a moot. The coal industry declared that due to the increasing cost, the current sales price of coal is too low to cover all the costs and the sales price of coal should be higher. To the contrary, the power industry claimed that higher price of coal could not be accepted because the sales price of power is regulated by the government. Should the price of coal be increased, the power industry would not make profit. The power industry said that they preferred to shut down than to buy coal at a higher price.
Without enough knowledge of the cost of the coal industry, the government can't regulate the price properly and the power industry cannot judge whether the variation of the price of coal is acceptable or not. It is anticipated that the price of coal shall still be a conflict between the coal industry and the power industry. This paper argues that enough knowledge of the cost of the coal industry would be helpful to the solving of the conflict.
Yu and Yu (2006) put forward a theoretical benchmark price of coal optimal to the society. The theoretical price, if to be applicable, must be analyzed basing on the reality of China. This paper argues that to get a reasonable and applicable coal price, we must first decide the reasonable elements of price. With this knowledge, we can further discuss both the quality and quantity aspects of the price.
The exhaustibility of the coal determines that we should adopt dynamic analysis as a basic method. On the basis of the reasonable elements of the coal price, according to the environmental regulation theory, this paper first includes the environmental cost in the elements of the coal price and develops a dynamic model which is optimal to the society. Then, this paper extends the above model in two aspects. One is to discuss the influence of the market structure on the efficiency, and the other is to review the five methods of collecting resource rent. Then, from the angle of the industry chain of the coal and power industry, this paper discusses how to determine the reasonable profit of the coal and power industry. Finally, this paper concludes with an applicable benchmark price of coal.
The main conclusions of this paper are as followed:
First, from the view of the society, the environmental cost must be accounted to the coal price. Compared to the socially optimal price path, it'll change the price path of coal according to the elasticity of the demand under monopoly. If the demand elasticity is greater than one in absolute value, it'll make the price and production path flatter under monopoly, which means the exhausting date would be postponed. If the demand elasticity is less than one in absolute value, it'll make the price and production path sharper under monopoly, which means the exhausting date would be brought forward. If the elasticity is unity, there would be no difference under monopoly and competition.
Secondly, we shall add five methods of collecting rent into the basic model to discuss the influence of rent-collecting on the price and production path. We find that under competitive market, the gross yield tax, the unit tax, the property tax, and the windfall profit tax should deviate the price and production path from the socially optimal path. Among them, the gross yield tax and the unit tax make the path flatter while the property tax makes it sharper. The effect of the windfall profit tax depends on its tax base. If the tax base is higher than the production and environmental cost, the tax will make the path sharper and vice versa. The net profit tax does not change the path.
Under monopoly, the gross yield tax, the unit tax, the property tax, and the windfall profit tax should deviate the price and production path further from the socially optimal path together with the distortion of market structure. If tax is designed properly, the dual distortion would be eliminated at the same time. When the demand elasticity is greater than one in absolute value, the gross yield tax will be a sort of subsidy. The unit tax will be a subsidy too despite the elasticity of the demand. The net profit can't be designed properly to alleviate the distortion. So under monopoly and with a net profit tax, the distortion is unavoidable.
Finally, this paper shall give two methods to compute the reasonable profit. One is the method of average profit margin and the other is the method of CAPM. We should refer to both methods and their results accordingly. With the development of China stock market, the method of CAPM will become more and more applicable. Beside the above-mentioned costs, we finally include safety cost in the elements of price and give the applicable benchmark price of coal.
引文
1 陈岱孙.从古典经济学派到马克思.上海人民出版社.1981.
2 李金昌等.资源经济新论.重庆大学出版社.1995
3 这里的分析主要参考王舒曼等.自然资源定价方法研究.生态经济.2000.
4 参考姜文来.水资源价值模型研究.资源科学.1998.
5 张帆.环境与自然经济学.上海人民出版社.1998.
6 后世对李嘉图租金理论的扩展研究颇多。Barreto(1990)对形成的李嘉图租金的竞争条件进行了研究,并据此解释了美国理发师行业的摊位租(Booth Rental)问题。他写道,理发师因为手艺高低不同而获得的收入也差别,特别是好手艺理发师拥有稳定、忠实的客户群,因而拥有李嘉图租金收入。传统上,理发店主雇用理发师,给予固定工资或者提成。好手艺理发师索要的提成份额相当高,但是仍然不能获取自己手艺的全部李嘉图租金,因而并不满足。理发店主为了留住这些理发师而想出了出租摊位的办法,理发师交了固定费用之后盈亏自负。这样理发师就变成个体户。由于理发店之间的竞争,好手艺理发师的摊位租金相当便宜。此时,理发店就像农民,而好手艺理发师因为手艺特别就像地主因而拥有攫取租金的能力。为了改善这种情况,理发店主就联合起来,采取种种手段来阻止自相残杀、互相竞争,包括用税务局审计和罚款来恐吓可能出租摊位的潜在理发店主,鼓动通过禁止理发店出租摊位的法律,开连锁店试图说服消费者所有理发师都是使用标准化的方法,因而技艺水平都是同质的。这种做法将会摧毁好手艺理发师获取差别收入,也就是李嘉图租金。详见"Ricardian Rent Theory Revisited:A Modern Application and Extension",Atlantic Economic Society Conference,October 11-14.1990。
7 Terkla(1984),Lee and Misiolek(1986),Ballard and Medema(1993),Oates(1993),Poterba(1993),Goulder(1994),Oates(1995)。
1 资源来源:中国神华能源股份有限公司2005年第三季度主要运营数据.http://www.csec.com.
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4 例如,据2004年3月29日的《中国经济时报》报道,因铁路运力不足,山东东部地区部分以山西煤炭为主要燃料的电厂缺煤停机.
5 资源来源:中国神华能源股份有限公司网站.http://www.shenhuagroup.com.cn..
6 郭云涛.《中国煤炭中长期供需分析与预测》.《中国煤炭》.2004年10月.
7 本处的价格扭曲指电煤价格总水平对煤炭平均价格的偏离,正值为偏高,负值为偏低.
8 国家物价局.《生产资料价格双轨制问题研究》(1991年内部资料).第49-50页.
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6 后世对李嘉图租金理论的扩展研究颇多。Barreto(1990)对形成的李嘉图租金的竞争条件进行了研究,并据此解释了美国理发师行业的摊位租(Booth Rental)问题。他写道,理发师因为手艺高低不同而获得的收入也差别,特别是好手艺理发师拥有稳定、忠实的客户群,因而拥有李嘉图租金收入。传统上,理发店主雇用理发师,给予固定工资或者提成。好手艺理发师索要的提成份额相当高,但是仍然不能获取自己手艺的全部李嘉图租金,因而并不满足。理发店主为了留住这些理发师而想出了出租摊位的办法,理发师交了固定费用之后盈亏自负。这样理发师就变成个体户。由于理发店之间的竞争,好手艺理发师的摊位租金相当便宜。此时,理发店就像农民,而好手艺理发师因为手艺特别就像地主因而拥有攫取租金的能力。为了改善这种情况,理发店主就联合起来,采取种种手段来阻止自相残杀、互相竞争,包括用税务局审计和罚款来恐吓可能出租摊位的潜在理发店主,鼓动通过禁止理发店出租摊位的法律,开连锁店试图说服消费者所有理发师都是使用标准化的方法,因而技艺水平都是同质的。这种做法将会摧毁好手艺理发师获取差别收入,也就是李嘉图租金。详见"Ricardian Rent Theory Revisited:A Modern Application and Extension",Atlantic Economic Society Conference,October 11-14.1990。
7 Terkla(1984),Lee and Misiolek(1986),Ballard and Medema(1993),Oates(1993),Poterba(1993),Goulder(1994),Oates(1995)。
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5 资源来源:中国神华能源股份有限公司网站.http://www.shenhuagroup.com.cn..
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