我国公共服务财政支出效率研究
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摘要
公共财政是实现服务型政府的重要保障。论文研究的公共服务是指社会性公共服务。从财政支出结构看,是以教育、医疗卫生和社会保障为主的社会性支出。政府公共服务财政支出的范围与结构、成绩与效果、方式与手段构成公共服务财政支出研究的三大内容。从效率的角度看,是政府公共服务财政支出的配置效率、技术效率和制度效率的问题。
论文第一部分从公共服务支出的增长效应与影响因素方面研究公共服务支出的配置效率问题。首先对我国财政支出结构与经济增长的关系进行了回归分析,结果表明社会性的公共服务支出对经济增长具有正效应。而不论从混合产品理论的规范角度,还是从与同等发展水平国家的比较角度,我国公共服务支出都存在很大缺口。论文将财政支出看作一种不完全合约,借助行为经济学的展望理论,论证了我国政府在财政赤字的约束下,具有增加经济性支出、减少公共服务性支出的偏好。并通过政府心理账户分析,界定了政府财政支出的优先次序。
利用系统动力学模型和VENSIM建模软件,进一步分析公共服务支出系统各要素与经济增长的相互关系,并对支出政策进行模拟。研究表明我国公共服务支出的增加是一个渐进过程,更应注重支出结构的调整,近期教育投入的增长速度应大于科技投入的增长速度。
论文第二部分从纵向政府间结构和横向地区间结构来研究公共服务支出的配置效率。利用统计数据分析表明我国实际上存在着公共服务支出责任集中于基层政府,而财力财权集中于上层政府的政府间公共服务支出配置的失衡状况。同时也存在着横向地区间公共服务非均等化的现状,而真正起均等化效应的一般性转移支付比重只有11.3%。
论文第三部分用逻辑分析法初选出公共服务财政支出评价的指标体系,并对整体评价指标体系进行冗余度和辨识度检测后,采用数据包络分析(DEA)的C2 R模型和LINDO软件对我国31个省公共服务支出的技术效率进行了相对有效性评价。研究表明,其中有17个省的公共服务支出是相对有效率的,北京和贵州为弱DEA有效,其余省份为非DEA有效。通过投入冗余额、产出不足额和影子价格的计算,提出了弱DEA有效和非DEA有效省份效率改进的对策。并利用投影法计算出这些省份达到DEA有效的投入产出调整值。
论文第四部分从预算管理的目标、预算信息和预算参与者及其权力三个维度构造出公共预算治理模式的基本框架,利用交易成本理论,实证分析我国在预算的不确定性、预算信息的不对称性和资产的专用性程度都较大的预算环境下,选择控制取向的预算治理模式是治理成本最小、制度效率最大的预算组织形式。这种控制包括内部行政控制、外部政治控制和产出控制。
Public Finance has been an important safeguard to achieve the service-oriented government. Public service in this dissertation was social public service, mainly including education, health care and social security expenditure in the structure of fiscal expenditure. Research content was consisted of the scope and structure, performance and effectiveness, ways and means of public service fiscal expenditure, which were locative efficiency and technical efficiency and institution efficiency from the point of view of efficiency.
The first part of the dissertation researched allocative efficiency of public service fiscal expenditure from the total and proportion of expenditure. The regression relationship between China's fiscal expenditure structure and economic growth was analyzed. The results indicated that social expenditure has positive effects of economic growth. Regardless of theoretical perspective of mixed goods theory, or comparative perspective with the country of same development level, China's public service expenditure had a big gap. Regarding the fiscal expenditure as an incomplete contract, the inherent cause was revealed using the prospect theory of behavioral economics. It has been shown that government has preferences of increasing economic expenditure and reducing public service expenditure in the budget deficit constraints. Government's fiscal expenditure priorities were defined through the psychological accounts analysis.
The system dynamics model and VENSIM software was introduced to analyze the mutual relations of public service expenditure system elements and simulate expenditure policy. It has been found that the increasing of public service expenditure is a gradual process and public service expenditure structural adjustment should be focused on. Education expenditure growth rate should be greater than science and technology expenditure growth rate in recent years.
The second part of the dissertation researched allocative efficiency of public service fiscal expenditure from the vertical intergovernmental structure and the horizontal regional structure. The analysis of statistical data shows that in fact the public service expenditure allocation exists an imbalances status, which public service expenditure responsibilities focus on the grass-roots government, but fiscal authorities concentrate in the upper government. At the same time the non-equal public service exists in region, while the general transfer payment that is the genuine equal effect form of transfer payment is only 11.3%.
In the third part of the dissertation, the relative efficiency of China's 31 provincial public service expenditure was evaluated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) C2 R model and LINDO software after primary electing the indicator system using logic analysis method and detecting redundancy and identification of overall indicator system. The results showed that 17 provincial public service expenditures are relatively efficient, Beijing and Guizhou are weak DEA effective, and the remaining provinces are non-DEA effective. Input redundancy ratio, output inefficiency ratio and the shadow price were calculated to improve the efficiency of the weak DEA and non-DEA provinces. The input-output adjusted values of these provincial DEA effective were also calculated using projection method.
In the fourth part of the dissertation, three dimensions of budget Objectives, budget information, participants and their powers formed the basic framework of public budget governance patters. By transaction cost theory, empirical analysis showed that the choice of control-oriented budget governance patter is the smallest transaction cost, the most institution efficient budget form under the budgetary environment that the budget uncertainty, the budget information symmetry and the assets specificity are greater. The control included internal administrative controls, external political control and output control.
论文第一部分从公共服务支出的增长效应与影响因素方面研究公共服务支出的配置效率问题。首先对我国财政支出结构与经济增长的关系进行了回归分析,结果表明社会性的公共服务支出对经济增长具有正效应。而不论从混合产品理论的规范角度,还是从与同等发展水平国家的比较角度,我国公共服务支出都存在很大缺口。论文将财政支出看作一种不完全合约,借助行为经济学的展望理论,论证了我国政府在财政赤字的约束下,具有增加经济性支出、减少公共服务性支出的偏好。并通过政府心理账户分析,界定了政府财政支出的优先次序。
利用系统动力学模型和VENSIM建模软件,进一步分析公共服务支出系统各要素与经济增长的相互关系,并对支出政策进行模拟。研究表明我国公共服务支出的增加是一个渐进过程,更应注重支出结构的调整,近期教育投入的增长速度应大于科技投入的增长速度。
论文第二部分从纵向政府间结构和横向地区间结构来研究公共服务支出的配置效率。利用统计数据分析表明我国实际上存在着公共服务支出责任集中于基层政府,而财力财权集中于上层政府的政府间公共服务支出配置的失衡状况。同时也存在着横向地区间公共服务非均等化的现状,而真正起均等化效应的一般性转移支付比重只有11.3%。
论文第三部分用逻辑分析法初选出公共服务财政支出评价的指标体系,并对整体评价指标体系进行冗余度和辨识度检测后,采用数据包络分析(DEA)的C2 R模型和LINDO软件对我国31个省公共服务支出的技术效率进行了相对有效性评价。研究表明,其中有17个省的公共服务支出是相对有效率的,北京和贵州为弱DEA有效,其余省份为非DEA有效。通过投入冗余额、产出不足额和影子价格的计算,提出了弱DEA有效和非DEA有效省份效率改进的对策。并利用投影法计算出这些省份达到DEA有效的投入产出调整值。
论文第四部分从预算管理的目标、预算信息和预算参与者及其权力三个维度构造出公共预算治理模式的基本框架,利用交易成本理论,实证分析我国在预算的不确定性、预算信息的不对称性和资产的专用性程度都较大的预算环境下,选择控制取向的预算治理模式是治理成本最小、制度效率最大的预算组织形式。这种控制包括内部行政控制、外部政治控制和产出控制。
Public Finance has been an important safeguard to achieve the service-oriented government. Public service in this dissertation was social public service, mainly including education, health care and social security expenditure in the structure of fiscal expenditure. Research content was consisted of the scope and structure, performance and effectiveness, ways and means of public service fiscal expenditure, which were locative efficiency and technical efficiency and institution efficiency from the point of view of efficiency.
The first part of the dissertation researched allocative efficiency of public service fiscal expenditure from the total and proportion of expenditure. The regression relationship between China's fiscal expenditure structure and economic growth was analyzed. The results indicated that social expenditure has positive effects of economic growth. Regardless of theoretical perspective of mixed goods theory, or comparative perspective with the country of same development level, China's public service expenditure had a big gap. Regarding the fiscal expenditure as an incomplete contract, the inherent cause was revealed using the prospect theory of behavioral economics. It has been shown that government has preferences of increasing economic expenditure and reducing public service expenditure in the budget deficit constraints. Government's fiscal expenditure priorities were defined through the psychological accounts analysis.
The system dynamics model and VENSIM software was introduced to analyze the mutual relations of public service expenditure system elements and simulate expenditure policy. It has been found that the increasing of public service expenditure is a gradual process and public service expenditure structural adjustment should be focused on. Education expenditure growth rate should be greater than science and technology expenditure growth rate in recent years.
The second part of the dissertation researched allocative efficiency of public service fiscal expenditure from the vertical intergovernmental structure and the horizontal regional structure. The analysis of statistical data shows that in fact the public service expenditure allocation exists an imbalances status, which public service expenditure responsibilities focus on the grass-roots government, but fiscal authorities concentrate in the upper government. At the same time the non-equal public service exists in region, while the general transfer payment that is the genuine equal effect form of transfer payment is only 11.3%.
In the third part of the dissertation, the relative efficiency of China's 31 provincial public service expenditure was evaluated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) C2 R model and LINDO software after primary electing the indicator system using logic analysis method and detecting redundancy and identification of overall indicator system. The results showed that 17 provincial public service expenditures are relatively efficient, Beijing and Guizhou are weak DEA effective, and the remaining provinces are non-DEA effective. Input redundancy ratio, output inefficiency ratio and the shadow price were calculated to improve the efficiency of the weak DEA and non-DEA provinces. The input-output adjusted values of these provincial DEA effective were also calculated using projection method.
In the fourth part of the dissertation, three dimensions of budget Objectives, budget information, participants and their powers formed the basic framework of public budget governance patters. By transaction cost theory, empirical analysis showed that the choice of control-oriented budget governance patter is the smallest transaction cost, the most institution efficient budget form under the budgetary environment that the budget uncertainty, the budget information symmetry and the assets specificity are greater. The control included internal administrative controls, external political control and output control.
引文
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