村镇银行差异化监管制度研究
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摘要
村镇银行作为具有中国特色的金融机构,自2007年在四川仪陇创设全国第一家以来,发展非常迅速。截止2013年底,全国已开设1071家村镇银行,资产规模达到6289亿元,成为近年来我国银行体系中发展最快的一类机构。虽然村镇银行作为我国一项重要的金融创新取得了令世人瞩目的成就,但近几年也开始显现一些问题,因而在即将推行对中小银行具有较强负面效应的利率市场化改革举措之前,对村镇银行存在的问题从监管制度的视角进行梳理和检视,无疑是合适和必要的。正基于此,本文拟以村镇银行差异化监管的制度创新为中心和视角,全面审视我国村镇银行的发展现状和路径,并在此基础上,提出完善我国村镇银行差异化监管的制度设计和对策建议。
全文分为导论和6章,主要包括以下内容。
在导论部分,首先提出本文将要研究和尝试解决的问题——为什么要对村镇银行进行差异化监管,如何在现有统一监管框架下构建差异化监管制度。问题的产生源于三个方面：统一监管规则与村镇银行独特性的冲突,村镇银行监管的稳定性、效率性和公平性多元化目标的平衡和冲突,东西部村镇银行经营环境差异与统一监管规则的矛盾。并通过对国内外村镇银行已有研究成果的梳理,找到相对比较薄弱并且适合本文切入的研究方向——村镇银行差异化监管制度。
第一章是对农村金融监管实践的回顾和理论评析。通过对我国农村金融发展沿革的梳理和我国农村金融体系现状的剖析,辨明我国农村金融二元结构产生的原因和不断强化的机理。对比分析了我国农村金融需求限制和供给限制及两者共同作用下的供给总量不足和供求结构错位,为村镇银行主要定位于农户和农村小微企业的功能设计找到现实支撑。将农村金融发展理论和农村金融审慎监管理论结合起来,由农村金融市场的特殊性导出农村金融监管的特殊性,在前人已有丰富实践经验与理论总结的基础上,探寻如何动态地选择适当的政府干预特别是监管干预政策,最大限度地平衡金融市场失灵和政府规制失灵问题,为后续对村镇银行差异化监管制度设计的研究提供总体性的理论基石和制度导引。
第二章是对村镇银行运行现状及村镇银行监管制度安排的实证调研与剖析。对现行监管政策指引和相关配套政策中最不利于村镇银行实现稳健经营和增加农村金融供给的部分进行了检讨,表述了在财政、货币等相关政策不配套的情况下,银监会单极突进推动新生的村镇银行以商业性金融支农的无奈。并以全国首批村镇银行试点省份之一的S省36家村镇银行监管效果为样本,首次采用相关数据和图表直观地展示了村镇银行偏离市场定位的行为及与监管要求的矛盾冲突。
第三章首次透过被广为诟病和质疑的村镇银行“不村镇”现象,对监管效果偏离的成因进行了较为深入的分析。笔者从村镇银行监管目标偏离的实例导入,以博弈论混合均衡模型分析了村镇银行“使命漂移”的原因,对制度设计中对其草根性和为农村提供金融服务自觉性的假定提出了质疑,运用监管博弈模型解构了监管与村镇银行之间的目标冲突及其行为博弈,指出不适当的监管标准设置和监管资源的匮乏,使得监管无力去改变个体的有限理性导致集体非理性的现象,无法抑制村镇银行的机会主义行为。
第四章通过对美国社区银行、印度小额信贷机构和拉美国家微型金融机构的经营发展和监管制度的比较,借鉴其在采取具有针对性和差异化的监管制度,构建完备的法律体系,多种配套措施的协同创新,建立健全存款保险制度等扶持型监管政策、财政政策、货币政策和法律制度保障等方面促进本国小微金融机构发展,从而推动其为弱势群体提供均等化金融服务的良好做法和经验教训。笔者认为,规模较小的村镇银行与拉美的微型金融机构更相似,规模较大的村镇银行则与美国社区银行更贴近。因此用了较大篇幅详细介绍了这两类不同的机构及其监管模式。但在具体内容上,对美国社区银行的监管侧重于对监管架构和差异化监管政策的分析,对拉美国家微型金融机构的监管则侧重于贯穿整个监管流程的各类监管指标的设计和审慎监管标准的确定。而同为农业大国和发展中国家的印度的小额信贷机构与我国小额信贷公司有相似之处,其小额信贷危机及监管矛盾和困难对我国将来可能出现的小额公司转制村镇银行有前瞻性的启示。
第五章是对村镇银行差异化监管的合理性分析。从村镇银行具有微型金融的特征出发,指出用基于传统商业银行的监管规则去要求村镇银行这类具有典型微型金融特征的机构是不适当的,用全国统一的村镇银行监管标准去对应因处于不同经济区域而具有不同业务结构和客户群体的村镇银行也是不适当的。同一监管规则要么导致村镇银行不断突破监管设定的底线,要么导致与其他商业银行同质化发展,要么退出规则设定的游戏,结果都是偏离社会目标。因此,应当对不同服务对象、不同区域、不同业务模式、不同发展阶段、不同风险偏好的银行机构实行差异化监管。
第六章是本文的重点和结论——建立差异化的村镇银行监管制度。这种差异化主要体现在几个方面：一是根据村镇银行介于政策性银行与商业银行之间的特殊金融机构的法律性质,制定村镇银行的专项法律；并通过村镇银行法律体系的建立和健全,完善村镇银行监管权法律配置,确立银监会对村镇银行的核心监管地位,将对村镇银行的倾斜性扶持政策法律化,以保持政策稳定性与连续性。二是秉持有效监管的理念,合理确定村镇银行稳定性、效率性和公平性三大监管目标及目标顺序,关照参与者的决策集合,建立与村镇银行这一特殊金融机构相适应的监管框架和监管组织体系,使这一特殊监管客体的商业性经营行为与政策性目标相一致,从而以最低成本推动监管目标的实现。三是设计差异化的监管规则,从市场准入、公司治理到持续监管,都需要根据村镇银行的经营特征和风险特征制定宽严适度的监管规则,特别是在市场准入阶段,该严的必须严。通过建立村镇银行差异化监管制度,达到合理减轻村镇银行监管成本,促进村镇银行金融创新,推动农村金融市场结构升级的目的。本章也回应了村镇银行股权结构、公司治理、有限牌照、市场退出等当下热点问题。
Rapid development has been made in village and township banks, a financial instituition with Chinese characteristics since its first presence in Sichuan Yilong. As of end-2013,1071village and township banks commenced business across the country, holding a total of RMB628.9billion of asset. Village and township banks has become one of the fastest growing institutions in Chinese banking sector in recent years. Being an important financial innovation, village and township banks in China has made achievements that attracted worldwide attention. However, a number of drawbacks and problems have been gradulally revealed in recent years. Therefore, it is undoubtedly appropriate and necessary to review and re-examine problems of village and township banks from the perspective of supervisory and regulatory system against the backdrop of the impending marketization reform of interest rate, which will exert strong negative effects on small and medium-sized banks. The thesis intends to take a comprehensive view of the current development and paths of village and township banks from the vision of differentiated supervision of village and township banks as institutional innovation. On this basis, the paper proposes system design and suggestions about improvement of village and township banks regulation.
The body of this thesis consists of introduction and six chapters.
The introductory part discusses the main concern of the thesis:the justification for differentiated regulation of village and township banks and establishement of differentiated regulatory system under the existing unified regulatory framework. Problems stem from three aspects:the conflict between unified regulatory rules and the uniqueness of village and township banks, the equilibrium and conflict of diversified goals of the stability, efficiency and fairness of village and township banks regulation as well as the contradiction of the differences between eastern and western village and township banks'operating environment and unified supervision. By carding reseach of village and township banks home and abroad, the author finds out the research direction that is relatively weak and suitable to go to the core:the differentiated regulation of village and township banks.
Chapter I retrospects and analyzes practises of rural financial institutions. It identifies the reasons for the dual structure of China's rural finance and its strengthening mechanism by carding the evolution of Chinese rural financial development and analyzing the status quo of Chinese rural financial system. It makes comparative analysis on constraints on Chineses rurual financial supply as well as demand. This chapter also discusses inefficient supply and derangement of supply and demand structure under the common action of these constraints. Thus, this chapter demonstrates why village and township banks are mainly oriented toward small farmers and rural micro-enterprise. Combining the rural finance development theory and prudential supervision theory, this chapter explains the particularity of rural financial regulation deriving from the distinctivenss of rural financial markets. Based on previous practical experience and theoretical summary, it explores how to dynamically select the appropriate government intervention, especially regulatory intervention policy and how to balance market failure and government regulation failure to the fullest extent. The thesis aims at provding theoretical foundation and overarching guidance system for the study of the subsequent differentiation of rural bank regulatory system design.
The second chapter centers upon the empirical research and analysis on the regulation arrangement of village and township banks and their current situation. It reflects existing regulatory guidelines and related policies which are mostly unfavourable for the stable operation of village and township banks and the increase of the supply of rural finance. It also presents the inappropriatensss of the relative fiscal, monetary policies and policies related as well as the vaguenss of superversiory power allocation. Under such situation, the CBRC meets frustration in the process of promoting the newborn village and township banks to provide commercial financial support for agriculture. Taking the regulatory effect of36village and township banks in one of the pilot provinces(S province) as a sample, this chapter visually shows the conflict between village and township banks's deviation from market orientation and regulatory requirements with datas and charts for the first time.
Chapter III makes in-depth analysis on the causes of deviation of regulatory target through the widely criticized and questioned phenomenon:village and township banks diverge from the market orientation. The author examines the reasons for "mission drift " of village and township banks with game theory mixed-equilibrium model,taking the deviation from village and township banks regulatory effect as instance. This chapter also challenges the assumption about village and township banks's grass-roots spirit and its self-consciousness of providing financial services to the rural areas in the framework of system design. It deconstructs goal conflict between regulation and the banks as well as the game of their behavior based on principal-agent model, pointing out the inappropriateness of regulatory standards setting and lack of regulatory resources. Therefore, supervisors are unable to change the phenomenon that limited individual rationality might lead to collective irrationality and unable to suppress opportunistic behavior of the banks.
Chapter IV makes comparative study on business development and regulatory systems of U.S. community banks, micro-credit institutions in India and Latin American MFIs (micro-finance institutions), drawing on good practices and learning from lessons. The above-mentioned countries utilize targeted and differentiated regulatory system and upbuild mature legal system on the basis of collaborative innovation of supporting measures. For example, in order to promote the development of MFIs, they establish and perfect supporting regulatory, fiscal policy and monetary policies such as deposit insurance system as well as legal system warranty, so as to promote the equalization of financial services providing for disadvantaged groups. Smaller village and township banks are more similar to MFIs in Latin America while larger ones bear resemblance to community banks in the U.S. Therefore, most of the chapter addresses elaboration on these two different types of institutions and their supervisory approach. To be specific, the supervision of U.S. community banks emphasizes on the analysis on supervisory framework and differentiated supervisory policies. The supervision of MFIs in Latin American countries is focused on the design of regulatory indicators throughout the supervisory process and consideration of prudential supervision criteria. As Inida and China are both large agricultural and developing countries, MFIs in these two countries bear much resembalance. The micro-credit crisis, supervisory contradiciton and difficulties in India might provide prospective revelation for micro-credit companies transfomation into village and township banks.
Chapter V demonstrates rationality analysis on differentiated supervision of village and township banks. Since these banks embody the attributes of microfinance, it is inappropriate to require their compliance with regulatory rules oriented towards traditional commercial banks. It is also inappropriate if regulators appraise the performance of village and township banks with a unified national regulatory standards by ignoring the fact that village and township banks have different business structure and customer base due to the variety of corresponding economic regions. The unified regulatory rules might lead to the following results. Village and township banks keep breaking the bottom line set by regulation. They might operate in a manner homogenous with commercial banks. Village and township banks exit the game set by the rules. And these results actually deviate from social objectives. Therefore, differentiated supervision should be implemented in banking institutions which vary in target customers, locations, business models, stages of development and different risk preferences.
Chapter VI is the focus and conclusion of the thesis:the establishment of differentiated regulatory system of village and township banks. The difference is mainly embodied in several aspects. First, special laws should be promulgated for village and township banks since they are unique financial instituitions between policy banks and commercial banks in legal nature. Try to perfect legal custody configuration of the right to supervise village and township banks through the establishment and improvment of village and township banks legal system. It is necessary to estabish the CBRC as the core to supervise village and township banks and legalize preferential supporting policies for these banks so as to maintain the stability and continuity of policies. Second is to reasonably figure out the three supervisory goals concerning stability, efficiency and fairness of village and township banks and their sequence, upholding the concept of effective supervison. It requires the care of decesion-set of participants and establishment of regulatory framework and regulatory organization system commensurate with this particular financial institution. In consequence, the commercial business practice of this special regulatory object will be consistent with objectives of policy.
Accordingly, regulatory objectives can be achieved at the lowest cost. Last but not the least, differentiated regulatory rules must be stipulated. It is of great importance to setting moderately strict or relaxed requriment corresponding to operating peculiarities and risk characteristics of village and township banks in the aspects of licensing, corporate governance and ongoing regulation. Supervisors must set high standards and insist that be met especially in the licensing stage. This chapter also responds to hot issues such as ownership structure, corporate governance, limited license and market exit mechanism related to village and township banks.
全文分为导论和6章,主要包括以下内容。
在导论部分,首先提出本文将要研究和尝试解决的问题——为什么要对村镇银行进行差异化监管,如何在现有统一监管框架下构建差异化监管制度。问题的产生源于三个方面：统一监管规则与村镇银行独特性的冲突,村镇银行监管的稳定性、效率性和公平性多元化目标的平衡和冲突,东西部村镇银行经营环境差异与统一监管规则的矛盾。并通过对国内外村镇银行已有研究成果的梳理,找到相对比较薄弱并且适合本文切入的研究方向——村镇银行差异化监管制度。
第一章是对农村金融监管实践的回顾和理论评析。通过对我国农村金融发展沿革的梳理和我国农村金融体系现状的剖析,辨明我国农村金融二元结构产生的原因和不断强化的机理。对比分析了我国农村金融需求限制和供给限制及两者共同作用下的供给总量不足和供求结构错位,为村镇银行主要定位于农户和农村小微企业的功能设计找到现实支撑。将农村金融发展理论和农村金融审慎监管理论结合起来,由农村金融市场的特殊性导出农村金融监管的特殊性,在前人已有丰富实践经验与理论总结的基础上,探寻如何动态地选择适当的政府干预特别是监管干预政策,最大限度地平衡金融市场失灵和政府规制失灵问题,为后续对村镇银行差异化监管制度设计的研究提供总体性的理论基石和制度导引。
第二章是对村镇银行运行现状及村镇银行监管制度安排的实证调研与剖析。对现行监管政策指引和相关配套政策中最不利于村镇银行实现稳健经营和增加农村金融供给的部分进行了检讨,表述了在财政、货币等相关政策不配套的情况下,银监会单极突进推动新生的村镇银行以商业性金融支农的无奈。并以全国首批村镇银行试点省份之一的S省36家村镇银行监管效果为样本,首次采用相关数据和图表直观地展示了村镇银行偏离市场定位的行为及与监管要求的矛盾冲突。
第三章首次透过被广为诟病和质疑的村镇银行“不村镇”现象,对监管效果偏离的成因进行了较为深入的分析。笔者从村镇银行监管目标偏离的实例导入,以博弈论混合均衡模型分析了村镇银行“使命漂移”的原因,对制度设计中对其草根性和为农村提供金融服务自觉性的假定提出了质疑,运用监管博弈模型解构了监管与村镇银行之间的目标冲突及其行为博弈,指出不适当的监管标准设置和监管资源的匮乏,使得监管无力去改变个体的有限理性导致集体非理性的现象,无法抑制村镇银行的机会主义行为。
第四章通过对美国社区银行、印度小额信贷机构和拉美国家微型金融机构的经营发展和监管制度的比较,借鉴其在采取具有针对性和差异化的监管制度,构建完备的法律体系,多种配套措施的协同创新,建立健全存款保险制度等扶持型监管政策、财政政策、货币政策和法律制度保障等方面促进本国小微金融机构发展,从而推动其为弱势群体提供均等化金融服务的良好做法和经验教训。笔者认为,规模较小的村镇银行与拉美的微型金融机构更相似,规模较大的村镇银行则与美国社区银行更贴近。因此用了较大篇幅详细介绍了这两类不同的机构及其监管模式。但在具体内容上,对美国社区银行的监管侧重于对监管架构和差异化监管政策的分析,对拉美国家微型金融机构的监管则侧重于贯穿整个监管流程的各类监管指标的设计和审慎监管标准的确定。而同为农业大国和发展中国家的印度的小额信贷机构与我国小额信贷公司有相似之处,其小额信贷危机及监管矛盾和困难对我国将来可能出现的小额公司转制村镇银行有前瞻性的启示。
第五章是对村镇银行差异化监管的合理性分析。从村镇银行具有微型金融的特征出发,指出用基于传统商业银行的监管规则去要求村镇银行这类具有典型微型金融特征的机构是不适当的,用全国统一的村镇银行监管标准去对应因处于不同经济区域而具有不同业务结构和客户群体的村镇银行也是不适当的。同一监管规则要么导致村镇银行不断突破监管设定的底线,要么导致与其他商业银行同质化发展,要么退出规则设定的游戏,结果都是偏离社会目标。因此,应当对不同服务对象、不同区域、不同业务模式、不同发展阶段、不同风险偏好的银行机构实行差异化监管。
第六章是本文的重点和结论——建立差异化的村镇银行监管制度。这种差异化主要体现在几个方面：一是根据村镇银行介于政策性银行与商业银行之间的特殊金融机构的法律性质,制定村镇银行的专项法律；并通过村镇银行法律体系的建立和健全,完善村镇银行监管权法律配置,确立银监会对村镇银行的核心监管地位,将对村镇银行的倾斜性扶持政策法律化,以保持政策稳定性与连续性。二是秉持有效监管的理念,合理确定村镇银行稳定性、效率性和公平性三大监管目标及目标顺序,关照参与者的决策集合,建立与村镇银行这一特殊金融机构相适应的监管框架和监管组织体系,使这一特殊监管客体的商业性经营行为与政策性目标相一致,从而以最低成本推动监管目标的实现。三是设计差异化的监管规则,从市场准入、公司治理到持续监管,都需要根据村镇银行的经营特征和风险特征制定宽严适度的监管规则,特别是在市场准入阶段,该严的必须严。通过建立村镇银行差异化监管制度,达到合理减轻村镇银行监管成本,促进村镇银行金融创新,推动农村金融市场结构升级的目的。本章也回应了村镇银行股权结构、公司治理、有限牌照、市场退出等当下热点问题。
Rapid development has been made in village and township banks, a financial instituition with Chinese characteristics since its first presence in Sichuan Yilong. As of end-2013,1071village and township banks commenced business across the country, holding a total of RMB628.9billion of asset. Village and township banks has become one of the fastest growing institutions in Chinese banking sector in recent years. Being an important financial innovation, village and township banks in China has made achievements that attracted worldwide attention. However, a number of drawbacks and problems have been gradulally revealed in recent years. Therefore, it is undoubtedly appropriate and necessary to review and re-examine problems of village and township banks from the perspective of supervisory and regulatory system against the backdrop of the impending marketization reform of interest rate, which will exert strong negative effects on small and medium-sized banks. The thesis intends to take a comprehensive view of the current development and paths of village and township banks from the vision of differentiated supervision of village and township banks as institutional innovation. On this basis, the paper proposes system design and suggestions about improvement of village and township banks regulation.
The body of this thesis consists of introduction and six chapters.
The introductory part discusses the main concern of the thesis:the justification for differentiated regulation of village and township banks and establishement of differentiated regulatory system under the existing unified regulatory framework. Problems stem from three aspects:the conflict between unified regulatory rules and the uniqueness of village and township banks, the equilibrium and conflict of diversified goals of the stability, efficiency and fairness of village and township banks regulation as well as the contradiction of the differences between eastern and western village and township banks'operating environment and unified supervision. By carding reseach of village and township banks home and abroad, the author finds out the research direction that is relatively weak and suitable to go to the core:the differentiated regulation of village and township banks.
Chapter I retrospects and analyzes practises of rural financial institutions. It identifies the reasons for the dual structure of China's rural finance and its strengthening mechanism by carding the evolution of Chinese rural financial development and analyzing the status quo of Chinese rural financial system. It makes comparative analysis on constraints on Chineses rurual financial supply as well as demand. This chapter also discusses inefficient supply and derangement of supply and demand structure under the common action of these constraints. Thus, this chapter demonstrates why village and township banks are mainly oriented toward small farmers and rural micro-enterprise. Combining the rural finance development theory and prudential supervision theory, this chapter explains the particularity of rural financial regulation deriving from the distinctivenss of rural financial markets. Based on previous practical experience and theoretical summary, it explores how to dynamically select the appropriate government intervention, especially regulatory intervention policy and how to balance market failure and government regulation failure to the fullest extent. The thesis aims at provding theoretical foundation and overarching guidance system for the study of the subsequent differentiation of rural bank regulatory system design.
The second chapter centers upon the empirical research and analysis on the regulation arrangement of village and township banks and their current situation. It reflects existing regulatory guidelines and related policies which are mostly unfavourable for the stable operation of village and township banks and the increase of the supply of rural finance. It also presents the inappropriatensss of the relative fiscal, monetary policies and policies related as well as the vaguenss of superversiory power allocation. Under such situation, the CBRC meets frustration in the process of promoting the newborn village and township banks to provide commercial financial support for agriculture. Taking the regulatory effect of36village and township banks in one of the pilot provinces(S province) as a sample, this chapter visually shows the conflict between village and township banks's deviation from market orientation and regulatory requirements with datas and charts for the first time.
Chapter III makes in-depth analysis on the causes of deviation of regulatory target through the widely criticized and questioned phenomenon:village and township banks diverge from the market orientation. The author examines the reasons for "mission drift " of village and township banks with game theory mixed-equilibrium model,taking the deviation from village and township banks regulatory effect as instance. This chapter also challenges the assumption about village and township banks's grass-roots spirit and its self-consciousness of providing financial services to the rural areas in the framework of system design. It deconstructs goal conflict between regulation and the banks as well as the game of their behavior based on principal-agent model, pointing out the inappropriateness of regulatory standards setting and lack of regulatory resources. Therefore, supervisors are unable to change the phenomenon that limited individual rationality might lead to collective irrationality and unable to suppress opportunistic behavior of the banks.
Chapter IV makes comparative study on business development and regulatory systems of U.S. community banks, micro-credit institutions in India and Latin American MFIs (micro-finance institutions), drawing on good practices and learning from lessons. The above-mentioned countries utilize targeted and differentiated regulatory system and upbuild mature legal system on the basis of collaborative innovation of supporting measures. For example, in order to promote the development of MFIs, they establish and perfect supporting regulatory, fiscal policy and monetary policies such as deposit insurance system as well as legal system warranty, so as to promote the equalization of financial services providing for disadvantaged groups. Smaller village and township banks are more similar to MFIs in Latin America while larger ones bear resemblance to community banks in the U.S. Therefore, most of the chapter addresses elaboration on these two different types of institutions and their supervisory approach. To be specific, the supervision of U.S. community banks emphasizes on the analysis on supervisory framework and differentiated supervisory policies. The supervision of MFIs in Latin American countries is focused on the design of regulatory indicators throughout the supervisory process and consideration of prudential supervision criteria. As Inida and China are both large agricultural and developing countries, MFIs in these two countries bear much resembalance. The micro-credit crisis, supervisory contradiciton and difficulties in India might provide prospective revelation for micro-credit companies transfomation into village and township banks.
Chapter V demonstrates rationality analysis on differentiated supervision of village and township banks. Since these banks embody the attributes of microfinance, it is inappropriate to require their compliance with regulatory rules oriented towards traditional commercial banks. It is also inappropriate if regulators appraise the performance of village and township banks with a unified national regulatory standards by ignoring the fact that village and township banks have different business structure and customer base due to the variety of corresponding economic regions. The unified regulatory rules might lead to the following results. Village and township banks keep breaking the bottom line set by regulation. They might operate in a manner homogenous with commercial banks. Village and township banks exit the game set by the rules. And these results actually deviate from social objectives. Therefore, differentiated supervision should be implemented in banking institutions which vary in target customers, locations, business models, stages of development and different risk preferences.
Chapter VI is the focus and conclusion of the thesis:the establishment of differentiated regulatory system of village and township banks. The difference is mainly embodied in several aspects. First, special laws should be promulgated for village and township banks since they are unique financial instituitions between policy banks and commercial banks in legal nature. Try to perfect legal custody configuration of the right to supervise village and township banks through the establishment and improvment of village and township banks legal system. It is necessary to estabish the CBRC as the core to supervise village and township banks and legalize preferential supporting policies for these banks so as to maintain the stability and continuity of policies. Second is to reasonably figure out the three supervisory goals concerning stability, efficiency and fairness of village and township banks and their sequence, upholding the concept of effective supervison. It requires the care of decesion-set of participants and establishment of regulatory framework and regulatory organization system commensurate with this particular financial institution. In consequence, the commercial business practice of this special regulatory object will be consistent with objectives of policy.
Accordingly, regulatory objectives can be achieved at the lowest cost. Last but not the least, differentiated regulatory rules must be stipulated. It is of great importance to setting moderately strict or relaxed requriment corresponding to operating peculiarities and risk characteristics of village and township banks in the aspects of licensing, corporate governance and ongoing regulation. Supervisors must set high standards and insist that be met especially in the licensing stage. This chapter also responds to hot issues such as ownership structure, corporate governance, limited license and market exit mechanism related to village and township banks.
引文
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3 同3
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4 同上
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1 Robert De Young, Denise Duffy. The Challenges Facing Community Banks In their Own Words. Economic Porspectives. No.2002,2, pp.5-21.
2 Ben Bernanke. Community Banking and CommunityBanking Supervision in the Twenty-First Century. TheBanker.2006,5, pp.20-25.
1 于丽红,博士论文,《中国农村二元金融结构研究》,2008
1 周其仁,《产权与制度变迁：中国改革的经验研究》(增订本),北京大学出版社,2004,p58
1 刘玲玲：中国农村金融发展研究2007年度调查报告,清华大学出版社,2007年
1 张杰：中国农村金融制度调整的绩效：金融需求视角,中国人民大学出版社,2007年,第104页
1 中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组：中国农村金融服务报告(2012),中国金融出版社。
1 中国人民银行农村金融服务研究小组,中国农村金融服务报告(2012),中国金融出版社。
1 姚耀军：农村金融理论的演变及其在我国的实践,金融教学与研究,2005年第5期。
1 约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨,市场与监管要有完美平衡,财经界,2004年第5期
1 约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨,2009年五大教训,南方周末/2010年/1月/7日/第D18版政府与市场之大家展望。
2 2008年10月,美联储前主席阿兰·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)在国会听证会上首次承认自己在贯彻不干涉主义监管哲学方面出了问题,错误地认为银行有能力评估其所面临的风险。而实际上华尔街的金融衍生产品在高额利润诱导下早已经演变为一场无拘无束的狂热资本游戏。
3转引自丹尼尔.F.史普博：管制与市场,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1999年,P37。
1 新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷),Q-Z第一线37页,经济科学出版社。
2 George J-Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. Vol.2, No.1 (Spring 1971),3-21.
3 潘伟杰,《制度、制度变迁与政府规制研究》,上海三联书店出版,2005年,P32
1 蒂米奇·威斯塔：金融规管——变化中的游戏规则,上海财经大学出版社,2000年,第204页
1 托马斯·赫尔曼,凯文·穆尔多克,约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨.金融约束：一个新的分析框架,经济导刊,1997年第5期。
1 巴塞尔委员会,有效银行监管核心原则,2006年
2 James R. Barth, Gerard. Caprio and Ross Levine, Bank regulation and supervision:what works best?Journal of Financial Intermediation 13 (2004) 205-248
3 Goodhart, C.A.E. etc. Hartmann, Philip Llewellyn, David Rojas-Suarez, Liliana, Financial Regulation: Why,How,and Where now? Routledge,1998
1 中国银监会,中国银行业监管有效性评估报告——FSAP评估相关观点与建议。
1 道格拉斯·C·诺斯,张五常：制度变革的经验研究,经济科学出版社,2003年,P29。
1 孟建华,金融企业性质、法人治理与贷款定价——对农村信用社贷款定价浮动政策执行效果的实证分析,金融研究,2006年第4期。
1 道格拉斯.C.诺斯：制度、制度变迁与经济绩效,格致出版社,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2008年,P27。
1 JAMES COPESTAKE,University of Bath, UK, Mainstreaming Microfinance:Social Performance Management or Mission Drift? World Development Vol.35, No.10, pp.1721-1738,2007.
1 道格拉斯·C·诺斯,张五常,《制度变革的经验研究》,经济科学出版社,2003年,P267。
1 哈尔.R·范里安：微观经济学：现代观点(第七版),费方域等译,格致出版社,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2009年7月。
2 道格拉斯.C.诺斯：制度、制度变迁与经济绩效,格致出版社,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2008年,P29。
1 赵世勇,香伶,美国社区银行的优势与绩效,经济学动态,2010年第6期。
2 银监会,美国社区银行监管实践对我国农村中小金融机构差异化监管的启示,监管工作信息,2009
3 Chairman Ben S. BemankeAt the Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention and Tech world, Nashville, Tennessee (via prerecorded video)March 14,2012
1 Governor Elizabeth A. Duke, At the Southeastern Bank Management and Directors Conference, University of Georgia, Terry College of Business, Duluth, Georgia, February 5,2013 The Future of Community Banking。 2Dean F. Amel and Robin A. Prager (2010), "Performance of Community Banks in Good Times and Bad Times,"
3 同3
1 截至2011年末,FDIC直接监管的商业银行为4150家,储蓄机构448家,占整个美国银行总数的62%,这些银行中大部分为社区银行(FDIC,2012)。
2 消费者金融保护局(CFPB)系2008年金融危机之后,由美国国会于2011年7月根据《多德.弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and ConsumerProtection Act of 2010)设立的。
1 王婉婷,美国大、小商业银行资本监管差异化分析,财经科学,2012年第10期
1 本·伯南克,银行监管：成本与收益的平衡,2006年]()月16日在美国银行瘃协会及关国社区银行协会年会上的讲话。
1 Quantifying the Costs of Additional Regulation on Community Banks. Ron J. Feldman-Senior Vice PresidentKen Heinecke-Assistant Vice PresidentJason Schmidt-Financial EconomistPublished May 30, 2013
1 范璟,股权回报高达40%,印度微型金融的赚钱神话,21世纪经济报道,2010-11-11
IMarguerite BergerLara GoldmarkTomds Miller-Sanabria, An Inside Viewof Latin AmericanMicrofinance, 2006, Inter-American Development Bank
1 资料来源：根据Otero and Rhyne(1994)and Berger,Beck Yonas,and Lloreda(2003)整理
1 Marguerite BergerLara GoldmarkTomas Miller-Sanabria, An Inside Viewof Latin AmericanMicrofinance, 2006, Inter-American Development Bank, P109
2 此表数据来自MIX对拉美和加勒比地区58家微型金融机构2007-2012年的样本分析,这些机构借款人总数和贷款总额分别占整个MIX报告机构的59%和62%。
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1 Mario La Torre, Microfinance,2006. P2
2 根据CGAP (2003)定义。
3 Financial Sector Assessment:A Handbook, Chapter 7, Rural and Microfinance Institutions: Regulatory and Supervisory Issues
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1 Honohan, Patrick. Financial Sector Policy and the Poor:Selected Findings and Issues.World Bank Working Paper No.43, World Bank, Washington, DC.2004.
2 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; HENNIE VAN GREUNING ET AL.,A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS (Dec.1998),http://www.mfc.org.pl/doc/backgroundmaterials/A_Framework_for_Regulating.pdf.
1 Greuning, Gallardo and Randhawa:A framework for regulating microfinance institutions" World Bank (1998)
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4 同上
1 Elliehausen,G(1998). The Cost of Bank Regulation:A Review of the Evidence, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Study 171, April.
2 Draft CGAP guidelines on regulation and supervision of microfinance.
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1 Llewellyn, D. The Economic rationale for financial regulation. Occasional Paper 1. London:Financial Services Authority. (1999)
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