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横向并购纵向传染机制研究
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摘要
摘要:在产业关联复杂网络中,并购活动往往不是孤立的行为,某个产业发生集中大量的横向并购常常会诱发关联产业企业的并购动机,形成动态并购现象和并购潮特征。动态并购影响产业关联复杂网络结构的演变,也影响企业之间的竞争互动策略的选择,而产业关联复杂网络结构又是影响并购互动和传染扩散的重要变量。因此,研究关联产业之间的并购互动与传染扩散问题,在中国目前大规模产业结构调整与淘汰落后产能背景下具有重要的理论与实践意义。
     当前,中国汽车、钢铁、水泥、机械制造等一系列关联产业发生了大量横向并购活动。国内外关于企业并购和并购浪潮的研究成果也很多,.但是已有研究主要是针对单个并购事件(如并购双方的绩效、战略匹配、并购后的整合研究等),或特定产业内的并购潮问题(如银行业、啤酒产业)。鲜有针对不同产业和区域间企业并购互动和传染扩散问题的研究成果。
     因此,本文尝试综合运用复杂网络理论、产业关联理论和抗衡势力理论等相关理论,提出横向并购在不同产业和区域间的传染机制的理论模型,并以中国企业并购事件为例,综合运用案例研究、实证研究和复杂网络分析等方法,分析某个产业或区域内企业A并购企业B,为什么会诱发其关联产业或区域内企业C并购企业D、企业E并购企业F等一连串的动态级联并购效应,最终形成整个经济层面的并购潮现象。
     具体而言,本文首先构建了横向并购纵向传染机制理论模型。其次,采用案例研究的方法,对中国家电制造与连锁零售企业间横向并购纵向传染案例进行了深入分析,进一步验证了本文提出的理论模型。接着,以2002—2012年期间中国135个产业的横向并购数据为样本,对横向并购在纵向产业链上的传染规律进行了实证研究。然后,利用2002—2012年期间中国企业12648个并购样本(本文选取的企业并购样本数量较以往国内企业并购研究的样本量都大)和2007年中国投入产出表数据,构建了两个双层网络模型。其中,第一个是“产业关联关系——兼并重组关系”双层复杂网络模型,并计算了网络的拓扑结构属性指标,分析了产业关联关系与企业并购之间的相关性。第二个是“两个纵向关联产业的并购关系”双层网络模型,对两个纵向关联产业(有色金属冶炼及合金制造业和金属制品业)的并购关系网络结构的相似性和横向并购数量之间的相关性进行了分析。随后,对产业关联网络中企业并购传染效应影响因素进行了实证研究。最后,利用中国企业并购数据,构建了跨区域并购复杂网络,研究了企业并购在不同区域之间传染扩散规律。
     通过上述研究,本文发现:(1)横向并购在纵向产业链条上呈现了“并联式并购”的传染模式。表明,某些企业横向并购可能是其他企业横向并购的动机和结果,即“企业并购是其他企业并购的驱动力”,丰富了企业并购动机理论,同时也支持了抗衡势力假说。(2)构建的“产业关联关系——兼并重组关系”双层网络和跨区域并购网络的大部分统计特性,都与复杂网络的无标度、小世界等特性相符。研究发现在“产业关联关系——兼并重组关系”双层网络中产业关联网络结构与企业并购之间存在显著相关性。(3)构建的“两个纵向关联产业的并购关系”双层网络模型,对分析横向并购纵向传染机制具有重要价值。研究发现两个纵向关联产业的并购关系网络呈现出一定的相似性、两个纵向关联产业的企业横向并购数量具有一定的相关性,研究表明,横向并购在关联产业之间进行了纵向传染。(4)研究发现,在产业关联网络中,其他关联产业的并购规模和产业节点间的距离是影响企业并购传染效应的两个重要因素。产业节点之间的距离越近、并购冲击越大,被并购感染的几率就越高。(5)研究发现,在跨区域并购复杂网络中,中国不同的省市的资源控制能力存在较大差异,大部分省市并不具有控制资源的能力,只有较少的经济发达的省市具有比较高的控制资源的能力。
The merger is usually not an isolated activity in the industries linkage complex networks (IO Networks). The launch of a firm's merger will usually induce a linkage firm's motivation of merger, which forms the phenomenon of dynamic merger, and macro to presents the characteristic of merger waves. Dynamic mergers will not only influence the evolution of the industry linkage structure, but also influence the firm's competitive interaction tactic. Simultaneously, industry linkage structure is a very important variable on firm's merger motive. Thus, the research on the model of dynamic merger between different industries by using of linkage structure variables appears to be extraordinary important on theory and reality, under the background of Chinese high speed development and large scale industrial structure adjustment and restructure.
     At present, we can find a great deal of horizontal mergers in a series of related industries, such as automobile, iron, steel, cement, machinery manufacturing in China. However, there are many achievements in the researches of merger waves. But authors are mainly aimed at a single M&A events (such as M&A performance, strategic matching, the integration after M&A, etc.), or M&A in the specific industry (e.g., banking industry, beer industry),which makes us know little about the M&As contagious mechanism.
     Therefore, this document attempt to utilize the method of complex network analysis to build the theory model of M&A contagious between different industries (regions). Take all industries and regions of our country as an example, to study the vertical contagious mechanism in horizontal mergers, which means to analyze why the merger of firm A to B in one industry (region), will induce the merger of firm C to D in other industries (regions), firm E merger firm F,and series of cascade merger effect in the structure evolution of industries (regions) linkage networks, and ultimately forming the phenomenon of dynamic M&As.
     This dissertation firstly builds the theoretical model of vertical contagious mechanism in horizontal mergers. Then we select one case to test the formation mechanism of M&A contagious between the appliance manufacturing and the retail chain enterprises in China. Secondly, empirical analysis of mergers propagation between different industries and regions. Thirdly we construct two layer networks model. The first two layer networks is M&As network and industries linkage complex networks(IO Networks).The first layer (M&A complex network)is built by using the data of Chinese strategic mergers in2002-2012.The second layer (IO Networks)is built by using the data of Chinese input-output tables in2007.The second two layer networks is the M&As networks of two vertical linkage industries(such as Non-ferrous metal smelting&alloy manufacturing and metal products manufacturing).Then we calculate the attribute indexes of two networks'topological structure, and analyze the relativity of industry linkage structure variables and merger action variables. Fourthly, we analyze the M&A contagious effecting influence factors in IO Networks. Finally, build the Complex Networks of cross-region M&A(CRMAs),and analyze the spread rules of M&A contagious in different regions.
     The mainly conclusion of this dissertation:(1)Through researching on the horizontal mergers propagate in vertical industry chains,we found that horizontal mergers propagate between customers and suppliers by parallel M&As, which indicates that some enterprises'horizontal mergers are more likely to be the motivation and results of its customers or suppliers'horizontal mergers, namely "M&A is a driving force of the M&A. and which further enrich M&A motivation theory and also support the countervailing power hypothesis.(2)the statistical property of the double layer complex networks and cross-region M&A complex networks(CRMAs) which built in this document corresponded to the complex network's character of scale free, small world.(3) the double layer complex networks has significant values in the analysis of the firms'M&As contagious actions, through the research we found the remarkable relativity between industries linkage structure and merger action.(4) Based on the M&A contagious model in10networks, we found two important factors that influence M&A contagious. One is the distance between different nodes in IO networks, another is the mergers scale of other related industries. The closer the distance between the nodes is, and the greater be impacted by mergers from other industries, the higher possibility of M&A contagious is.(5) we found that the resource control ability is very different in different Chinese provinces and cities of the cross-region M&A complex networks. The majority of provinces and cities do not have the capacity to control resources, only a few developed provinces has high resource control ability.
引文
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