论技术资本与公司治理的关系
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摘要
我国“改革开放三十年”之后，企业创新的重心开始由制度创新转向技术创新。而管理创新则是制度创新和技术创新得以实现的保障。目前，在世界经济全球化的中国，制度创新和管理创新的首要任务是推动技术创新。技术转化为现实生产力的桥梁是技术资本。市场经济中只有资本才创造价值。在资本雇佣劳动制度下，货币资本和人力资本协助物质资本创造价值。但在信息技术普及和“新经济”制度条件下，企业收益由技术资本、人力资本、货币资本和物质资本共同创造，技术逐渐成为核心资本。技术资本承担直接创造价值的任务。既然技术资本同企业的货币资本、人力资本等生产要素资本共同创造价值，那么，技术资本所有者就应同企业货币资本所有者和人力资本所有者一样，参与企业所有权的分享和企业剩余收益及剩余资产的分配。并且直接参与企业内部治理结构的构建。所以，研究企业技术资本及其引发的公司治理结构的变化，将成为财务学理论研究的重大课题。重要的是，虽然我国的经济总量指标跃居世界前列，但我国的关键技术自给率却很低，企业产品生产的对外技术依存度达50%以上，美国和日本则在5%左右。不仅如此，我国高科技含量的关键性机器设备也主要依靠从国外进口来解决。如何提升技术创新能力，扩大自主技术拥有量，将自主技术研发、技术引进和消化吸收结合起来，并尽快使技术转变为技术资本，已经成为我国未来工业化进程中必须解决的一个重要现实问题。因此，本文选择技术资本及其与公司治理结构的关系作为论文题目，试图从理论和实践两个方面展开研究，并力争在财务理论研究上有所突破和创新。
本文主要采取规范分析的研究方法，以理论分析为主要研究方式。由于研究问题的复杂性，本文在研究能够获得相关数据的问题时运用了实证分析研究方法。根据研究设计，论文主要解决的问题依次是：（1）介绍本文的研究背景，提出所研究的问题，阐述研究问题的方法和思路；（2）综述前人对公司治理、公司治理与创新、技术创新、技术资本以及技术资本和公司治理相关性等问题的研究，解决“已经做了什么”的问题；（3）分析技术资本的产权机制和会计特征，解决了“应该是什么”的问题；（4）采集可靠数据，采用案例分析和回归分析方法，从单样本和多样本的角度讨论了“现在怎么样”的问题；（5）采用仿真分析方法，确定技术资本价格，解决了“应该怎么做”的问题；（6）应用优化理论探讨分析了“还应该怎么做”的问题。
本论文的研究意义：（1）理论价值：创建技术资本机制理论，解释技术资本直接创造收益的基本原理，丰富了马克思主义资本理论，实现理论突破；为技术资本配置和参与公司治理的结构优化提供了极为重要的理论依据。（2）现实方面：为公司治理和技术资本之间搭建联系的桥梁；为企业提供技术转化为现实生产力的系统方案和操作机制；推行技术财务管理，实现财务方法创新。
技术虽然是人们生产和生活中的常用概念，但我国人民更热衷于文化建设。人们对技术的理解往往并不十分准确。实际上，技术与知识、文化、信息等，属于不同的概念。技术是人类生产活动中的技巧、技能和术用，其主要形式是人工制品（软件、工艺机件）、工作文件（图纸、论文或报告）和人的特别行为（操作方法、技巧和平衡术等）。技术与知识、文化相对独立。技术创新是一个从产生新产品或新工艺的设想到研究、开发、商业化生产的一系列活动。企业创新技术通过新产业或新生活的出现、生产过程、生产成果产权化，交易过程，以及再投入经济活动等五个步骤形成技术资本。
目前，中国经济下行的压力和产能过剩的矛盾加剧，生产经营成本急剧上升与创新能力不足并存，城乡之间、区域之间发展不均衡，分配收入差距过大。依靠技术创新创造新的经济增长点和新的发展方式，是摆脱危机和持续发展的根本出路，技术创新已成为中国转变经济增长方式过程中的重要战略议题。很多企业的专利技术拥有量急剧增长，但专利技术没有转化为技术资本，使专利技术闲置浪费，并且技术资产没有进入会计核算系统，技术资本没有发挥资本的功能和作用。以技术资本为核心，适当增加知识资本，是我国经济转变增长方式的有效途径。在现有的公司财务理论的基础上，引入技术资本建立可行的要素资本平衡表，并分析与公司治理水平向适应的技术，优化公司治理结构，是理论界所急需解决的问题。
技术资本和公司治理的关系是本文研究的重点。在理论分析部分，基于新制度经济学，利用产权理论和会计理论对技术资本的产权机制和会计特征进行分析讨论。我国长期以来技术落后，其重要原因之一在于技术发明人未获得技术所有权。技术产权在我国市场经济中的制度创新是技术进步的基础。当人们解决了技术产权的制度创新之后，技术进步的关键就在于技术的管理创新，即在理论和实践上解决技术转化为技术资本的问题。技术是一种比较高级的劳动产品。同其他原材料和机器设备等产品一样，当这种产品在人民的生活中消费了，那么该产品就变成人们的生活费用。如果这种产品不是用在人们的日常生活被消费掉，而是被投入再生产过程变成生产要素之一，并且，该产品被登记产权之后，在企业的生产过程里创造价值。那么，该产品就成为企业创造价值的资本。同理，技术转化为技术资本就是这样的过程。技术资本机制是本文理论分析的重心。
在实证分析部分，采用案例研究和回归分析方法，从单样本的显著特征和多样本的共同特征查找技术资本与公司治理结构的关系，以及他们对企业核心竞争力的协同作用。研究表明，董事会结构变量中两职合一以外的因素均对技术资本投入具有负面影响。说明目前战略性新兴产业上市公司的董事会结构基本与技术资本投入不适应，在控制董事会成员数量方面应采取以质量代替数量的方法，适当缩小董事会规模，会对公司经营战略有利；引入独立董事基本与建立上市公司独立董事制度初衷不一致，应当对独立董事的业绩进行公开，使独立董事发挥其应有的作用，抑制独立董事为迎合公司决策层的表面意图而损害公司长远利益的行为。战略规划委员会不是市场分析委员会，它不应局限于当期或近期公司业绩，应当从长远发展的角度规划和引导公司短期行为。两职合一很大程度上抑制了以上负面影响，促进了技术资本投入。以上四种情况之间存在因果关系，由于董事会成员不负责任或不能胜任本职工作，从而扩大董事会成员或引入外部董事，导致人数增加，职能（职责）也分开，从而设置了战略规划委员会等国外先进的治理制度，但这些人都抱着“搭便车”心里，揣摩着董事长意图行事。可见，董事长的工作强度没有下降，但这些人的信息汇总到一个人手时，降低了信息不对称情况发生的概率，因此两职合一者能够从战略的眼光正确分析处理问题，支持未来业绩的技术资本投入。在以上条件下，扭转不利局面，想降低两职合一者的工作强度，并不影响战略决策的正确性，可以引入各种会议制度和会议纪要公开制度。
在仿真分析部分中，应用蒙特卡洛仿真模拟分析方法，对技术资本进行定价，为包含技术资本的要素资本平衡表的建立提供定量数据。笔者建立模型时统筹考虑了复杂程度和贴近现实两方面因素。案例研究对象仅仅是单项R&D项目，本研究为一个公司的多种项目或多个公司的多项项目的技术资本价值评估方面打下了坚实的基础。Crystal ball软件是复杂情况下的期权研究配备专用插件，只要把多种技术资本投入项目逐一输入后，运行优化插件就获得相关结果。该模型的一个重要缺陷是需要输入方差和市场份额，该数据不像加权平均资本成本一样能够从公司数据中获取，如果人为确定该值时容易引起有偏估计，因此对模型起到较大的约束作用，笔者建议使用以往项目的历史数据或行业数据来克服此约束。
最后，在包含要素资本的公司治理结构的优化问题方面进行探索性研究。在Benhabib的研究的基础上，扩展引入了非最新技术资本的投资，并在动态框架中研究了典型公司的投资行为。引入以上扩展时忽略了内生性报废问题，要考虑内生性报废时，需要资本存量的非负约束，但在最大化原则中无法处理非负约束。通过数据分析本章主要回答了一下三个问题：一、新技术为什么常常被采用的缓慢？二、显然优越的技术可获得的情况下，人们为什么投资与旧技术？三、更新的技术即将来临的预期下，人们如何决策应用现在的新技术？
本文的研究结论是，（1）证明了技术资本的独立产权机制与技术资本的存在性。技术拥有独立的产权和价值，同其它生产要素一样，技术也是现代生产要素之一，其商品化和资本化已经成为现实。并解释了技术资本创造价值的财务规则、技术的可见性和货币计量性会计特征，技术资本可以同货币资本一起参与企业收益分享。（2）得到了以资产负债表为基础的公司治理结构研究框架、公司治理与技术创新的相关关系表，证明了技术资本参与公司治理的必要性、可行性和有效性。大幅度提升了企业财务管理工作的实践水平。有力地促进了企业管理创新。（3）证明了技术资本价格与R&D项目价值之间的区别，获得了技术资本价格的定量数据。结合现有会计学的货币计量假设，把技术资本引入到要素资本平衡表，向优化资本结构、优化公司治理结构、完善绩效激励机制提供了量化基础。
研究表明，技术资本和公司治理结构具有较强关联性，以要素资本平衡表为基础向现有的会计体系中引入技术资本可行有效，与公司治理水平向适应的技术资本的优化配置，已成为公司财务实践活动的发展方向。
After the reform and opening-up policy which has been executed for30years inChina, the focus of enterprise innovation has started to change from systeminnovation to technology innovation. The same time, management innovation is theguarantee of both system and technological innovation. With the economyglobalization, the urgent task of system innovation and management innovation is topromote the technology innovation. The technology capital is the media fortechnology to transfer into the real productivity, while only the capital can createvalue in the market economy. Under the system of labor wage capital, both moneycapital and human capital assist material capital to create value. However, as thepopularization of information technology and the system of "new economy",corporate profit is made up by not only the human capital, money capital and materialcapital but also the technology capital which gradually becoming the core.Technology capital creates the value directly. Since technology capital together withthe other factors of production such as money capital and human capital creates thevalue, technology capital owners should have the equal right as the monetary capitalowners and human capital owners in sharing the stock of enterprises and thedistribution of the residual assets and profits. Moreover, they should also be involvedin the construction of corporate internal governance directly. Therefore, research onenterprise technology capital and by which induced the change of the corporategovernance structure will become an important subject of financial theory. Moreimportantly, although our country's total economy is ranked second in the world, butthe self-sufficiency rate of the key technology is very low in china. The foreigntechnology dependence of Chinese enterprise is more than50%, which of UnitedStates and Japan’s is around5%. Besides that, Chinese high-tech key equipments alsomainly rely on import from abroad. How to promote the technology innovationability, to expand independent technology, to combine the independent technologyresearch, technology import and adoption, and to make technology into capital assoon as possible, has become an important issue which must be solved in the processof industrialization of our country in the future. Therefore, this article choosestechnology capital and its relationship with corporate governance structure as thethesis topic, not only trying to analyze from two aspects as theory and practice, butalso striving for a big breakthrough and an innovation on the financial theoryresearch.
This paper adopts the normative analysis as the main research method andtheoretical analysis as the main study way. Because of the complexity of the researchproblem, this paper also uses empirical analysis research methods when relevant datacan be obtained. According to the research design, this paper mainly analyzes thesetopics as follows. The first section is the introduction, which proposes the researchbackground, the research topic, the research approaches. Section2is meant to reviewthe literatures about corporate governance, corporate governance and innovation, technology innovation, technology capital and the related issues between technologycapital and corporate governance, by which solved the problem of "what has beendone”. Section3analyses the property right mechanism and accountingcharacteristics of technology capital, solved the problem of "what should be”. Insection4and section5, from the view of the single sample and diversity sample,collecting reliable data, using the case analysis and regression analysis method,discuses the problems of “what is now”. In section6, uses the method of simulationanalysis to determine the price of technology capital, solved the problem of the "howto do”. Section7applies optimization theory to the analyze of the problem of " how todo further".
The research significance of this paper lies in:(1) from the point of theory view:created technology capital mechanism theory, explained the basic principles of howtechnology capital generates revenues directly, and enriched the Marxist theory ofcapital, which result in a breakthrough in theory. Further more, it also provides animportant theoretical basis for technology capital allocation and corporate governancestructure optimization.(2) from the point of reality view: built the bridge link betweencorporate governance and technology capital, provided enterprises with systems andoperating mechanisms to transfer technology into practical productivity, carried outtechnology financial management and realized the innovation of financial methods.
Although technology is a wildly used concept in people's normal life, Chinesepeople are far more interested in cultural construction, which easily leading to aninaccurate understanding of technology. In fact, technology is “skills”“knowhow”,which are used during the human production activities, with a form ofartificial products (software), working documents (drawings, articles or reports) andspecial behaviors (operating methods, techniques and balancing act, etc.). Technologyinnovation is a series of activities starting from the idea of new products or newprocess to the research, development and commercial production. Enterprisetechnology innovation develops into technology capital through5steps: theemergence of new industries or new life style, production process, porpertification ofproduct, transaction process and reinvestment in economic activities, etc.
At present, China is not only in the pressure of economic downward and excessproduction capacity, but also has to face the problems of a rising costs of production,a lack of innovation, uneven development between urban and rural, and a largedistribution gap of income. In order to get rid of the crisis and to obtain a sustainabledevelopment, relying on technological innovation to create a new economic growthand a new way of development is the only solution, as technology innovation has alsobecome an important strategic issue in the process of transformation of economicgrowth in China. Many companies own a large number of patent, but the patent doesnot transform into capital, which brings a big waste, and there is no technology assetsadopted into the accounting system resulting technology capital played a limitedeffect as role of capital. To take the technology capital as the core and to increase theknowledge capital properly is an effective way to change the economic growth patternin our country. On the basis of the current corporate financial theory, one of the urgentproblems to be solved in the theoretical circle is to establish a feasible factors capital balance sheet which involved technology capital, and then analysis technology whichis adapted into the corporate governance, on which optimize the structure of thecorporate governance.
The relation between technology capital and corporate governance is the keypoint of this study. The theoretical analysis part uses the theory of property rights andaccounting theory to analyze the property right mechanism and accountingcharacteristics of technology capital, which is based on the neoinstitutional economics.For a long time, China technology fall behind, for which important reason is thattechnology inventor did not owned the property of the technology. The innovation oftechnology property right system in Chinese market economy is the foundation oftechnological advancement. When people achieved the innovation of technologyproperty right system, the key to the technology improvement is the managementinnovation, which is meant to turn technology into technology capital in both theoryand practice. Technology is a kind of more advanced product of labor. As with otherraw materials, equipment, this kind of products will become one of the living costs forpeople when it is consumed in people's life. If the product is not consumed in people'sdaily lives, but rather become one of factors in reproduction process, and create valuein the production process of enterprises, then the product would become the capital ofenterprises. Similarly, the technology turning into technology capital is such a sameprocess. The mechanism of technology capital is the key point of this paper intheoretical analysis.
In the empirical analysis part, we use the case study and regression analysismethod to search for the correlation between technology capital and corporategovernance structure from the characteristic of single sample and the commonfeatures of multi-sample, as well as their synergistic effect on enterprise corecompetitiveness. Research shows that factors of Board Structure of variable other thanCEO duality have a negative influence on technology capital investment, whichexplains the fact that the board structure of strategic emerging industries listedcompanies rejects the technology capital investment basically. In order to control theboard size, we should put a higher value on quality instead of quantity since anappropriate reduce on the board size will be greatly beneficial for the company'sbusiness strategy; The introduction of independent board basically disagrees with theestablishment of the independent board system of listed company, which indicates thatthe performance of the independent board should be exposed in public to control theindependent board taking action to cater the BS-B; Unlike market analysis committee,strategic planning committee should not be confined to the company’s current orrecent performance, but be responsible for guiding the company’s short-term behaviorfrom the perspective of long-term development planning. The CEO duality has greatlyinhibited the above negative effects, promoting the technology capital investment aswell. There is a causal relationship among those four circumstances that incompetentof members of the board of directors leading to enlarge the scale of the board ofdirectors, then increased the number of board and decentralized function, then set upStrategic Planning Committee, but these people are holding "free rider" mentality,trying to figure out the intent of chief executive to take appropriate action. Thus it can be seen that the working strength of chief executive does not decrease, but collectingall kinds of information to one person could reduce the probability of asymmetricinformation, so CEO duality is not only analysis the problem strategically but alsosupport technology capital investment which affects the future performance. Underthe above conditions, in order to reverse the adverse situation, to reduce the intensityof the CEO duality and do no effect the validity of the strategic decision, we couldintroduce the system of meetings and institution of disclosing minutes.
In the simulation analysis part, we adopt the method of the monte carlosimulation to price the technology capital and provide quantitative data to theestablishment of factors capital balance sheet which contains technology capital. Inthe establishment of the model, we considered the complexity and reality. While theobject of case study is just single technology capital project, this study has laid a solidfoundation on technology capital value evaluation for the various technology capitalprojects of a company or companies.
Finally, we make an exploratory study in the optimization of corporategovernance structure which contains factors capital. This paper based on Benhabib’sresearch introduces an investment on old technology capital equipments and studiesinvestment behaviors of typical companies on the dynamic framework.
The research’s conclusion is that (1) proved the independent property mechanismof technology capital and the existence of technology capital. Technology hasindependent property rights and values, and just like the other factors of production, itis also one of the major factors of modern production with a reality of its finishedcommercialization and capitalization. In addition, this paper also explains thefinancial rules of how technology capital create value, and the accounting features ofvisibility and currency measurability of technology, which reaches the point thattechnology capital could participate in sharing corporate earnings together with themonetary capital.(2) Based on the balance sheet we worked out the corporategovernance research structure and the relation between corporate governance andtechnology innovation, proved the necessity, feasibility and effectiveness oftechnology capital participating in corporate governance, promoted the practice levelof enterprise financial management work and the enterprise managementinnovation.(3) proved the difference between technology capital price and value ofR&D project, obtained the quantitative data of technology capital price. Combinedwith the monetary measurement assumptions of accounting, provided quantitativebasis to optimize the capital structure and the corporate governance structure byintroduced technology capital into factors capital balance sheet.
The study shows a strong relation between the technology capital and corporategovernance structure, besides that, the introduction of technology capital into theexisting accounting system based on the factors capital balance sheet is also feasibleand effective. As a result, the optimization of technology capital which is adapted tothe corporate governance has become the development direction of the company'sfinancial activities.
本文主要采取规范分析的研究方法，以理论分析为主要研究方式。由于研究问题的复杂性，本文在研究能够获得相关数据的问题时运用了实证分析研究方法。根据研究设计，论文主要解决的问题依次是：（1）介绍本文的研究背景，提出所研究的问题，阐述研究问题的方法和思路；（2）综述前人对公司治理、公司治理与创新、技术创新、技术资本以及技术资本和公司治理相关性等问题的研究，解决“已经做了什么”的问题；（3）分析技术资本的产权机制和会计特征，解决了“应该是什么”的问题；（4）采集可靠数据，采用案例分析和回归分析方法，从单样本和多样本的角度讨论了“现在怎么样”的问题；（5）采用仿真分析方法，确定技术资本价格，解决了“应该怎么做”的问题；（6）应用优化理论探讨分析了“还应该怎么做”的问题。
本论文的研究意义：（1）理论价值：创建技术资本机制理论，解释技术资本直接创造收益的基本原理，丰富了马克思主义资本理论，实现理论突破；为技术资本配置和参与公司治理的结构优化提供了极为重要的理论依据。（2）现实方面：为公司治理和技术资本之间搭建联系的桥梁；为企业提供技术转化为现实生产力的系统方案和操作机制；推行技术财务管理，实现财务方法创新。
技术虽然是人们生产和生活中的常用概念，但我国人民更热衷于文化建设。人们对技术的理解往往并不十分准确。实际上，技术与知识、文化、信息等，属于不同的概念。技术是人类生产活动中的技巧、技能和术用，其主要形式是人工制品（软件、工艺机件）、工作文件（图纸、论文或报告）和人的特别行为（操作方法、技巧和平衡术等）。技术与知识、文化相对独立。技术创新是一个从产生新产品或新工艺的设想到研究、开发、商业化生产的一系列活动。企业创新技术通过新产业或新生活的出现、生产过程、生产成果产权化，交易过程，以及再投入经济活动等五个步骤形成技术资本。
目前，中国经济下行的压力和产能过剩的矛盾加剧，生产经营成本急剧上升与创新能力不足并存，城乡之间、区域之间发展不均衡，分配收入差距过大。依靠技术创新创造新的经济增长点和新的发展方式，是摆脱危机和持续发展的根本出路，技术创新已成为中国转变经济增长方式过程中的重要战略议题。很多企业的专利技术拥有量急剧增长，但专利技术没有转化为技术资本，使专利技术闲置浪费，并且技术资产没有进入会计核算系统，技术资本没有发挥资本的功能和作用。以技术资本为核心，适当增加知识资本，是我国经济转变增长方式的有效途径。在现有的公司财务理论的基础上，引入技术资本建立可行的要素资本平衡表，并分析与公司治理水平向适应的技术，优化公司治理结构，是理论界所急需解决的问题。
技术资本和公司治理的关系是本文研究的重点。在理论分析部分，基于新制度经济学，利用产权理论和会计理论对技术资本的产权机制和会计特征进行分析讨论。我国长期以来技术落后，其重要原因之一在于技术发明人未获得技术所有权。技术产权在我国市场经济中的制度创新是技术进步的基础。当人们解决了技术产权的制度创新之后，技术进步的关键就在于技术的管理创新，即在理论和实践上解决技术转化为技术资本的问题。技术是一种比较高级的劳动产品。同其他原材料和机器设备等产品一样，当这种产品在人民的生活中消费了，那么该产品就变成人们的生活费用。如果这种产品不是用在人们的日常生活被消费掉，而是被投入再生产过程变成生产要素之一，并且，该产品被登记产权之后，在企业的生产过程里创造价值。那么，该产品就成为企业创造价值的资本。同理，技术转化为技术资本就是这样的过程。技术资本机制是本文理论分析的重心。
在实证分析部分，采用案例研究和回归分析方法，从单样本的显著特征和多样本的共同特征查找技术资本与公司治理结构的关系，以及他们对企业核心竞争力的协同作用。研究表明，董事会结构变量中两职合一以外的因素均对技术资本投入具有负面影响。说明目前战略性新兴产业上市公司的董事会结构基本与技术资本投入不适应，在控制董事会成员数量方面应采取以质量代替数量的方法，适当缩小董事会规模，会对公司经营战略有利；引入独立董事基本与建立上市公司独立董事制度初衷不一致，应当对独立董事的业绩进行公开，使独立董事发挥其应有的作用，抑制独立董事为迎合公司决策层的表面意图而损害公司长远利益的行为。战略规划委员会不是市场分析委员会，它不应局限于当期或近期公司业绩，应当从长远发展的角度规划和引导公司短期行为。两职合一很大程度上抑制了以上负面影响，促进了技术资本投入。以上四种情况之间存在因果关系，由于董事会成员不负责任或不能胜任本职工作，从而扩大董事会成员或引入外部董事，导致人数增加，职能（职责）也分开，从而设置了战略规划委员会等国外先进的治理制度，但这些人都抱着“搭便车”心里，揣摩着董事长意图行事。可见，董事长的工作强度没有下降，但这些人的信息汇总到一个人手时，降低了信息不对称情况发生的概率，因此两职合一者能够从战略的眼光正确分析处理问题，支持未来业绩的技术资本投入。在以上条件下，扭转不利局面，想降低两职合一者的工作强度，并不影响战略决策的正确性，可以引入各种会议制度和会议纪要公开制度。
在仿真分析部分中，应用蒙特卡洛仿真模拟分析方法，对技术资本进行定价，为包含技术资本的要素资本平衡表的建立提供定量数据。笔者建立模型时统筹考虑了复杂程度和贴近现实两方面因素。案例研究对象仅仅是单项R&D项目，本研究为一个公司的多种项目或多个公司的多项项目的技术资本价值评估方面打下了坚实的基础。Crystal ball软件是复杂情况下的期权研究配备专用插件，只要把多种技术资本投入项目逐一输入后，运行优化插件就获得相关结果。该模型的一个重要缺陷是需要输入方差和市场份额，该数据不像加权平均资本成本一样能够从公司数据中获取，如果人为确定该值时容易引起有偏估计，因此对模型起到较大的约束作用，笔者建议使用以往项目的历史数据或行业数据来克服此约束。
最后，在包含要素资本的公司治理结构的优化问题方面进行探索性研究。在Benhabib的研究的基础上，扩展引入了非最新技术资本的投资，并在动态框架中研究了典型公司的投资行为。引入以上扩展时忽略了内生性报废问题，要考虑内生性报废时，需要资本存量的非负约束，但在最大化原则中无法处理非负约束。通过数据分析本章主要回答了一下三个问题：一、新技术为什么常常被采用的缓慢？二、显然优越的技术可获得的情况下，人们为什么投资与旧技术？三、更新的技术即将来临的预期下，人们如何决策应用现在的新技术？
本文的研究结论是，（1）证明了技术资本的独立产权机制与技术资本的存在性。技术拥有独立的产权和价值，同其它生产要素一样，技术也是现代生产要素之一，其商品化和资本化已经成为现实。并解释了技术资本创造价值的财务规则、技术的可见性和货币计量性会计特征，技术资本可以同货币资本一起参与企业收益分享。（2）得到了以资产负债表为基础的公司治理结构研究框架、公司治理与技术创新的相关关系表，证明了技术资本参与公司治理的必要性、可行性和有效性。大幅度提升了企业财务管理工作的实践水平。有力地促进了企业管理创新。（3）证明了技术资本价格与R&D项目价值之间的区别，获得了技术资本价格的定量数据。结合现有会计学的货币计量假设，把技术资本引入到要素资本平衡表，向优化资本结构、优化公司治理结构、完善绩效激励机制提供了量化基础。
研究表明，技术资本和公司治理结构具有较强关联性，以要素资本平衡表为基础向现有的会计体系中引入技术资本可行有效，与公司治理水平向适应的技术资本的优化配置，已成为公司财务实践活动的发展方向。
After the reform and opening-up policy which has been executed for30years inChina, the focus of enterprise innovation has started to change from systeminnovation to technology innovation. The same time, management innovation is theguarantee of both system and technological innovation. With the economyglobalization, the urgent task of system innovation and management innovation is topromote the technology innovation. The technology capital is the media fortechnology to transfer into the real productivity, while only the capital can createvalue in the market economy. Under the system of labor wage capital, both moneycapital and human capital assist material capital to create value. However, as thepopularization of information technology and the system of "new economy",corporate profit is made up by not only the human capital, money capital and materialcapital but also the technology capital which gradually becoming the core.Technology capital creates the value directly. Since technology capital together withthe other factors of production such as money capital and human capital creates thevalue, technology capital owners should have the equal right as the monetary capitalowners and human capital owners in sharing the stock of enterprises and thedistribution of the residual assets and profits. Moreover, they should also be involvedin the construction of corporate internal governance directly. Therefore, research onenterprise technology capital and by which induced the change of the corporategovernance structure will become an important subject of financial theory. Moreimportantly, although our country's total economy is ranked second in the world, butthe self-sufficiency rate of the key technology is very low in china. The foreigntechnology dependence of Chinese enterprise is more than50%, which of UnitedStates and Japan’s is around5%. Besides that, Chinese high-tech key equipments alsomainly rely on import from abroad. How to promote the technology innovationability, to expand independent technology, to combine the independent technologyresearch, technology import and adoption, and to make technology into capital assoon as possible, has become an important issue which must be solved in the processof industrialization of our country in the future. Therefore, this article choosestechnology capital and its relationship with corporate governance structure as thethesis topic, not only trying to analyze from two aspects as theory and practice, butalso striving for a big breakthrough and an innovation on the financial theoryresearch.
This paper adopts the normative analysis as the main research method andtheoretical analysis as the main study way. Because of the complexity of the researchproblem, this paper also uses empirical analysis research methods when relevant datacan be obtained. According to the research design, this paper mainly analyzes thesetopics as follows. The first section is the introduction, which proposes the researchbackground, the research topic, the research approaches. Section2is meant to reviewthe literatures about corporate governance, corporate governance and innovation, technology innovation, technology capital and the related issues between technologycapital and corporate governance, by which solved the problem of "what has beendone”. Section3analyses the property right mechanism and accountingcharacteristics of technology capital, solved the problem of "what should be”. Insection4and section5, from the view of the single sample and diversity sample,collecting reliable data, using the case analysis and regression analysis method,discuses the problems of “what is now”. In section6, uses the method of simulationanalysis to determine the price of technology capital, solved the problem of the "howto do”. Section7applies optimization theory to the analyze of the problem of " how todo further".
The research significance of this paper lies in:(1) from the point of theory view:created technology capital mechanism theory, explained the basic principles of howtechnology capital generates revenues directly, and enriched the Marxist theory ofcapital, which result in a breakthrough in theory. Further more, it also provides animportant theoretical basis for technology capital allocation and corporate governancestructure optimization.(2) from the point of reality view: built the bridge link betweencorporate governance and technology capital, provided enterprises with systems andoperating mechanisms to transfer technology into practical productivity, carried outtechnology financial management and realized the innovation of financial methods.
Although technology is a wildly used concept in people's normal life, Chinesepeople are far more interested in cultural construction, which easily leading to aninaccurate understanding of technology. In fact, technology is “skills”“knowhow”,which are used during the human production activities, with a form ofartificial products (software), working documents (drawings, articles or reports) andspecial behaviors (operating methods, techniques and balancing act, etc.). Technologyinnovation is a series of activities starting from the idea of new products or newprocess to the research, development and commercial production. Enterprisetechnology innovation develops into technology capital through5steps: theemergence of new industries or new life style, production process, porpertification ofproduct, transaction process and reinvestment in economic activities, etc.
At present, China is not only in the pressure of economic downward and excessproduction capacity, but also has to face the problems of a rising costs of production,a lack of innovation, uneven development between urban and rural, and a largedistribution gap of income. In order to get rid of the crisis and to obtain a sustainabledevelopment, relying on technological innovation to create a new economic growthand a new way of development is the only solution, as technology innovation has alsobecome an important strategic issue in the process of transformation of economicgrowth in China. Many companies own a large number of patent, but the patent doesnot transform into capital, which brings a big waste, and there is no technology assetsadopted into the accounting system resulting technology capital played a limitedeffect as role of capital. To take the technology capital as the core and to increase theknowledge capital properly is an effective way to change the economic growth patternin our country. On the basis of the current corporate financial theory, one of the urgentproblems to be solved in the theoretical circle is to establish a feasible factors capital balance sheet which involved technology capital, and then analysis technology whichis adapted into the corporate governance, on which optimize the structure of thecorporate governance.
The relation between technology capital and corporate governance is the keypoint of this study. The theoretical analysis part uses the theory of property rights andaccounting theory to analyze the property right mechanism and accountingcharacteristics of technology capital, which is based on the neoinstitutional economics.For a long time, China technology fall behind, for which important reason is thattechnology inventor did not owned the property of the technology. The innovation oftechnology property right system in Chinese market economy is the foundation oftechnological advancement. When people achieved the innovation of technologyproperty right system, the key to the technology improvement is the managementinnovation, which is meant to turn technology into technology capital in both theoryand practice. Technology is a kind of more advanced product of labor. As with otherraw materials, equipment, this kind of products will become one of the living costs forpeople when it is consumed in people's life. If the product is not consumed in people'sdaily lives, but rather become one of factors in reproduction process, and create valuein the production process of enterprises, then the product would become the capital ofenterprises. Similarly, the technology turning into technology capital is such a sameprocess. The mechanism of technology capital is the key point of this paper intheoretical analysis.
In the empirical analysis part, we use the case study and regression analysismethod to search for the correlation between technology capital and corporategovernance structure from the characteristic of single sample and the commonfeatures of multi-sample, as well as their synergistic effect on enterprise corecompetitiveness. Research shows that factors of Board Structure of variable other thanCEO duality have a negative influence on technology capital investment, whichexplains the fact that the board structure of strategic emerging industries listedcompanies rejects the technology capital investment basically. In order to control theboard size, we should put a higher value on quality instead of quantity since anappropriate reduce on the board size will be greatly beneficial for the company'sbusiness strategy; The introduction of independent board basically disagrees with theestablishment of the independent board system of listed company, which indicates thatthe performance of the independent board should be exposed in public to control theindependent board taking action to cater the BS-B; Unlike market analysis committee,strategic planning committee should not be confined to the company’s current orrecent performance, but be responsible for guiding the company’s short-term behaviorfrom the perspective of long-term development planning. The CEO duality has greatlyinhibited the above negative effects, promoting the technology capital investment aswell. There is a causal relationship among those four circumstances that incompetentof members of the board of directors leading to enlarge the scale of the board ofdirectors, then increased the number of board and decentralized function, then set upStrategic Planning Committee, but these people are holding "free rider" mentality,trying to figure out the intent of chief executive to take appropriate action. Thus it can be seen that the working strength of chief executive does not decrease, but collectingall kinds of information to one person could reduce the probability of asymmetricinformation, so CEO duality is not only analysis the problem strategically but alsosupport technology capital investment which affects the future performance. Underthe above conditions, in order to reverse the adverse situation, to reduce the intensityof the CEO duality and do no effect the validity of the strategic decision, we couldintroduce the system of meetings and institution of disclosing minutes.
In the simulation analysis part, we adopt the method of the monte carlosimulation to price the technology capital and provide quantitative data to theestablishment of factors capital balance sheet which contains technology capital. Inthe establishment of the model, we considered the complexity and reality. While theobject of case study is just single technology capital project, this study has laid a solidfoundation on technology capital value evaluation for the various technology capitalprojects of a company or companies.
Finally, we make an exploratory study in the optimization of corporategovernance structure which contains factors capital. This paper based on Benhabib’sresearch introduces an investment on old technology capital equipments and studiesinvestment behaviors of typical companies on the dynamic framework.
The research’s conclusion is that (1) proved the independent property mechanismof technology capital and the existence of technology capital. Technology hasindependent property rights and values, and just like the other factors of production, itis also one of the major factors of modern production with a reality of its finishedcommercialization and capitalization. In addition, this paper also explains thefinancial rules of how technology capital create value, and the accounting features ofvisibility and currency measurability of technology, which reaches the point thattechnology capital could participate in sharing corporate earnings together with themonetary capital.(2) Based on the balance sheet we worked out the corporategovernance research structure and the relation between corporate governance andtechnology innovation, proved the necessity, feasibility and effectiveness oftechnology capital participating in corporate governance, promoted the practice levelof enterprise financial management work and the enterprise managementinnovation.(3) proved the difference between technology capital price and value ofR&D project, obtained the quantitative data of technology capital price. Combinedwith the monetary measurement assumptions of accounting, provided quantitativebasis to optimize the capital structure and the corporate governance structure byintroduced technology capital into factors capital balance sheet.
The study shows a strong relation between the technology capital and corporategovernance structure, besides that, the introduction of technology capital into theexisting accounting system based on the factors capital balance sheet is also feasibleand effective. As a result, the optimization of technology capital which is adapted tothe corporate governance has become the development direction of the company'sfinancial activities.
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