以“县”为承接基础的财政转移支付制度绩效研究
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摘要
中央与地方关系是一个国家政治社会中最为重要的关系之一,财政关系则是这种关系的核心问题。如何构建我国中央与地方的良好关系,对于一个拥有960万平方公里、13亿人口的大国至关重要。1994年之前,在“放权让利”为改革动力的背景下,“财政包干”制度使地方政府拥有较大的财政自主权,与“放权让利”相伴随的是全国财政收入占GDP的比重以及中央预算收入占全部预算收入的比重的逐年下降,“两个比重”在1993年分别降到为11.2%和22%,逐步危及中央政府财政。中央与地方的财政能力差距直接影响到政府间的协调关系,为了扭转这种财政局面,我国在1994年推行了旨在重新调整中央与地方财政分配关系的“分税制改革”,通过此次改革,随着“两个比重”的迅速上升,中央财政地位也迅速得到了提升,中央政府在政府间关系上重回主导地位。
县级政府承担了我国绝大部分基本公共服务的供给责任,县级也是我国政府间转移支付的最终落脚点。1994年以来,规模庞大的财政转移支付已成为县级政府重要的财政收入来源,1995年至2008年,县级政府获得的财政转移支付总规模从2932.37亿元增长到21475.22亿元,年均增长率11.6%。财政转移支付制度所产生的政策效应与政府间管理体制息息相关,近年来,我国各地先后推行了“省直管县”改革试点,这一体制变革必将对县级地区的经济社会发展产生深远影响。正是在这样的制度背景下,本文实证考察了中央对县级财政转移支付的影响因素；并以地处中国西部地区、推行“省直管县”改革试点的四川省70个县(市)为分析样本,实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域经济增长、县域公共服务供给的影响。本文的主要研究内容和结论如下：
首先,本文实证检验了中央对县级财政转移支付的影响因素,利用中国县级面板数据的研究发现,那些财政自给能力弱、财政努力程度低的县级地区获得更多的财政转移支付,表明分税制改革以来,促进财政均等化是中央向地方财政转移支付的基本目标；2002—2009年期间,那些教育供给水平低的县级地区获得了更多的财政转移支付,表明相比于分税制初期,近年来中央政府开始关注基本公共服务均等化因素。研究还发现,县级经济发展水平、政府人员规模与财政转移支付正相关,表明“经济效率”和维持地方政府的正常运转也是中央政府在转移支付分配过程考虑的因素。
其次,本文实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域经济增长的影响。以推行“省直管县”改革试点的四川省70个县(市)的面板数据对比研究发现,财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革都显著促进了试点县(市)的经济增长。
再次,本文实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域公共服务供给的影响。本文区分了“经济性”和“非经济性”公共服务,基于四川省70个县(市)的面板数据的对比研究发现,财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革都显著促进了试点县(市)的交通基础设施、医疗卫生服务供给水平,但却显著降低了试点县(市)基础教育的供给水平。
本文的研究不仅为考察我国财政转移支付制度的政策导向及其政策绩效提供了一个县级样本的证据,同时也为我国进一步推进“省直管县”体制改革提供了实证支撑。基于全文的实证研究结果,本文认为未来改革还需从制度设计入手,具体政策建议有：(1)构建以“县”为承接基础、“中央—省—县(市)”财政转移支付制度；(2)调整中央转移支付资金分配结构以强化其均等化效应；(3)改革政绩考核制度以调整地方财政支出结构；(4)建立财政监管机制以强化地方财政约束。
How to build a central government and local governments a good relationship, has9.6million square kilometers for a1.3billion population, is crucial to China. Before1994, in the "decentralization" as the momentum for reform in the context of "fiscal responsibility" system so that local governments have greater financial autonomy, and the "decentralization" is accompanied by the national fiscal revenue to GDP and the central budget revenues accounted for the proportion of total budget revenues declining, the "two proportions" in1993were reduced to11.2%and22%, and gradually endangering the central government finances. Central and local fiscal capacity disparities directly affect the coordination of intergovernmental relations, in order to reverse this financial situation, which began in1994of the "tax reform" aims to re-adjust the distribution relationship between the central and local governments, through this reform, with the "two proportions," the rapid rise in the central financial position has improved rapidly, the central government in intergovernmental relations back on dominance.
County government is China's basic public services supplied directly mainstay intergovernmental fiscal transfer payments ultimate point. Since1994, large-scale fiscal transfers county governments have become an important source of revenue, from1995to2008, the county government received higher transfer payments from the total size of293.237billion yuan increased to2.147522trillion yuan, an average annual growth rate of11.6%. Financial transfer payment policy effects that can be played with intergovernmental management system is closely related, in recent years, our country has implemented a "provincial governing county" system reform is bound to be the county's economic and social development have a profound impact. It was against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the county level data samples examined China's fiscal transfer payment system factors; and is located in the western region of China's Sichuan province,"provincial governing county" reform as a case study, From the county's economic growth and the county public service supply two aspects, the financial transfer payments and "provincial governing county" reform policy effect empirical analysis. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, This article uses the county-level social economic data during1994to2009of china. Meanwhile, it establishes econometric model to testify on the factors. They affect the transfer payment policy in China. The study suggests that those county regions with poor self financing ability and low fiscal effort degree have gained more financial transfer payment. It indicates that since our country was conducted the tax sharing system reform, promoting fiscal equalization had been the basic goal of conducting transfer payment from the central to local regions; during the years between2002and2009, those county regions with low level of education supply had obtained more financial transfer payment. It indicates that when comparing to the early period of the tax sharing system reform, the central government has started to focus on the effect on equalization of basic public service. The research also shows that the county economic development level and the scale of government personnel are positively related to financial transfer payment, which indicates that "economic efficiency" and maintaining the normal operation of local governments are factors remained to be taken into consideration by the central government during the transfer payment allocation process.
Secondly, we will study the Chinese perspective on the implementation of "provincial governing county" reform of the county area, empirical tests of the financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform on the county's economic growth. Sichuan Province,70counties use panel data comparison study found that due to the reduced level of financial management and decentralization of economic management authority, increasing the county government's fiscal autonomy and to mobilize the enthusiasm of its economic development, fiscal transfers and "province straight county "reform were significantly promoted the pilot counties (city) economic development.
Finally, the paper distinguishes between "economic" and "non-economic" public service, empirical tests of the financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform of the county of public service provision.70counties in Sichuan Province Based on Panel Data of comparative studies have found that financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform were significantly promoted the pilot counties (cities) of the transport infrastructure, health services supply level, but significantly reduced pilot counties (city) supply level of basic education.
This study evaluated not only for China's fiscal transfer payment system and the effects of policy-oriented sample provides a county-level evidence, but also for "provincial governing county" full implementation of reform in the country provides empirical support. The empirical analysis based on the conclusion that the future reform of this article needs to start from the design of the system, specific policy recommendations include:(1) to build a "county" as the basis to undertake financial transfer payment system;(2) to adjust the allocation of funds transfer payment structure to strengthen its equalizing effect;(3) performance appraisal system reform to achieve the positive effects of fiscal transfers;(4) establishment of financial regulatory mechanisms to strengthen the county government's fiscal constraints.
县级政府承担了我国绝大部分基本公共服务的供给责任,县级也是我国政府间转移支付的最终落脚点。1994年以来,规模庞大的财政转移支付已成为县级政府重要的财政收入来源,1995年至2008年,县级政府获得的财政转移支付总规模从2932.37亿元增长到21475.22亿元,年均增长率11.6%。财政转移支付制度所产生的政策效应与政府间管理体制息息相关,近年来,我国各地先后推行了“省直管县”改革试点,这一体制变革必将对县级地区的经济社会发展产生深远影响。正是在这样的制度背景下,本文实证考察了中央对县级财政转移支付的影响因素；并以地处中国西部地区、推行“省直管县”改革试点的四川省70个县(市)为分析样本,实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域经济增长、县域公共服务供给的影响。本文的主要研究内容和结论如下：
首先,本文实证检验了中央对县级财政转移支付的影响因素,利用中国县级面板数据的研究发现,那些财政自给能力弱、财政努力程度低的县级地区获得更多的财政转移支付,表明分税制改革以来,促进财政均等化是中央向地方财政转移支付的基本目标；2002—2009年期间,那些教育供给水平低的县级地区获得了更多的财政转移支付,表明相比于分税制初期,近年来中央政府开始关注基本公共服务均等化因素。研究还发现,县级经济发展水平、政府人员规模与财政转移支付正相关,表明“经济效率”和维持地方政府的正常运转也是中央政府在转移支付分配过程考虑的因素。
其次,本文实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域经济增长的影响。以推行“省直管县”改革试点的四川省70个县(市)的面板数据对比研究发现,财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革都显著促进了试点县(市)的经济增长。
再次,本文实证检验了财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革对县域公共服务供给的影响。本文区分了“经济性”和“非经济性”公共服务,基于四川省70个县(市)的面板数据的对比研究发现,财政转移支付和“省直管县”改革都显著促进了试点县(市)的交通基础设施、医疗卫生服务供给水平,但却显著降低了试点县(市)基础教育的供给水平。
本文的研究不仅为考察我国财政转移支付制度的政策导向及其政策绩效提供了一个县级样本的证据,同时也为我国进一步推进“省直管县”体制改革提供了实证支撑。基于全文的实证研究结果,本文认为未来改革还需从制度设计入手,具体政策建议有：(1)构建以“县”为承接基础、“中央—省—县(市)”财政转移支付制度；(2)调整中央转移支付资金分配结构以强化其均等化效应；(3)改革政绩考核制度以调整地方财政支出结构；(4)建立财政监管机制以强化地方财政约束。
How to build a central government and local governments a good relationship, has9.6million square kilometers for a1.3billion population, is crucial to China. Before1994, in the "decentralization" as the momentum for reform in the context of "fiscal responsibility" system so that local governments have greater financial autonomy, and the "decentralization" is accompanied by the national fiscal revenue to GDP and the central budget revenues accounted for the proportion of total budget revenues declining, the "two proportions" in1993were reduced to11.2%and22%, and gradually endangering the central government finances. Central and local fiscal capacity disparities directly affect the coordination of intergovernmental relations, in order to reverse this financial situation, which began in1994of the "tax reform" aims to re-adjust the distribution relationship between the central and local governments, through this reform, with the "two proportions," the rapid rise in the central financial position has improved rapidly, the central government in intergovernmental relations back on dominance.
County government is China's basic public services supplied directly mainstay intergovernmental fiscal transfer payments ultimate point. Since1994, large-scale fiscal transfers county governments have become an important source of revenue, from1995to2008, the county government received higher transfer payments from the total size of293.237billion yuan increased to2.147522trillion yuan, an average annual growth rate of11.6%. Financial transfer payment policy effects that can be played with intergovernmental management system is closely related, in recent years, our country has implemented a "provincial governing county" system reform is bound to be the county's economic and social development have a profound impact. It was against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the county level data samples examined China's fiscal transfer payment system factors; and is located in the western region of China's Sichuan province,"provincial governing county" reform as a case study, From the county's economic growth and the county public service supply two aspects, the financial transfer payments and "provincial governing county" reform policy effect empirical analysis. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, This article uses the county-level social economic data during1994to2009of china. Meanwhile, it establishes econometric model to testify on the factors. They affect the transfer payment policy in China. The study suggests that those county regions with poor self financing ability and low fiscal effort degree have gained more financial transfer payment. It indicates that since our country was conducted the tax sharing system reform, promoting fiscal equalization had been the basic goal of conducting transfer payment from the central to local regions; during the years between2002and2009, those county regions with low level of education supply had obtained more financial transfer payment. It indicates that when comparing to the early period of the tax sharing system reform, the central government has started to focus on the effect on equalization of basic public service. The research also shows that the county economic development level and the scale of government personnel are positively related to financial transfer payment, which indicates that "economic efficiency" and maintaining the normal operation of local governments are factors remained to be taken into consideration by the central government during the transfer payment allocation process.
Secondly, we will study the Chinese perspective on the implementation of "provincial governing county" reform of the county area, empirical tests of the financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform on the county's economic growth. Sichuan Province,70counties use panel data comparison study found that due to the reduced level of financial management and decentralization of economic management authority, increasing the county government's fiscal autonomy and to mobilize the enthusiasm of its economic development, fiscal transfers and "province straight county "reform were significantly promoted the pilot counties (city) economic development.
Finally, the paper distinguishes between "economic" and "non-economic" public service, empirical tests of the financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform of the county of public service provision.70counties in Sichuan Province Based on Panel Data of comparative studies have found that financial transfer payments and the "provincial governing county" reform were significantly promoted the pilot counties (cities) of the transport infrastructure, health services supply level, but significantly reduced pilot counties (city) supply level of basic education.
This study evaluated not only for China's fiscal transfer payment system and the effects of policy-oriented sample provides a county-level evidence, but also for "provincial governing county" full implementation of reform in the country provides empirical support. The empirical analysis based on the conclusion that the future reform of this article needs to start from the design of the system, specific policy recommendations include:(1) to build a "county" as the basis to undertake financial transfer payment system;(2) to adjust the allocation of funds transfer payment structure to strengthen its equalizing effect;(3) performance appraisal system reform to achieve the positive effects of fiscal transfers;(4) establishment of financial regulatory mechanisms to strengthen the county government's fiscal constraints.
引文
② 相关讨论详见：Hoechle D. Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-sectional Dependence[J]. The Stata Journal,2007,7(3):281-312.
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