基于企业成长的中国上市公司高管薪酬结构研究
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摘要
薪酬制度是现代公司治理的重要内容。现代企业两权分离的特点决定了经理行为与股东利益之间存在相悖之处,因此设计有效的高管薪激励机制,将高管行为、个人绩效目标引导到与企业利益一致的方向上,成为现代企业管理要解决的核心问题。薪酬是激励企业管理者最直接最有效的方式,而建立有效的薪酬激励制度,不仅要重视薪酬绝对水平的公平性,更要关注薪酬结构的合理性,薪酬结构比薪酬水平对管理者的激励效应更强。薪酬结构是否合理有效,是影响企业成长的重要因素,最优的高管薪酬结构应当使高管的人力资本使用价值最大化并最终促进企业成长。
近年来,社会对于高管高薪的关注和批评不断加剧,对此,中外学者们进行了诸多研究,但研究的问题主要集中于高管的薪酬水平及其与企业绩效的关系方面,而对高管薪酬结构的研究则较为薄弱,研究结论也存在很大差异性甚至相互矛盾。薪酬结构所要做的基础工作是确定合理的薪酬形式及其构成比例,平衡薪酬的短期激励和长期激励,激励高管实现最大人力资本使用价值,促进企业目标的实现,促使企业稳定成长。近年来,随着我国上市公司股权激励的增强,高管的薪酬结构的内容变得更为丰富了,构成方式也变得更加多元化,但由于多种原因造成了我国高管薪酬制度的扭曲发展,薪酬结构的设计暴露出许多缺陷,缺乏有效的薪酬结构确定机制,在确定高管薪酬构成及其比例时,多数公司是依据高管岗位等级进行分配,即实行“按级排辈”确定基本工资和无偿赠予股份数量,而没有考虑高管本身的人力资本价值和企业绩效,实际上造成了管理者坐收其利,使激励薪酬福利化,致使薪酬激励的难以替代性与其设计本身的缺陷之间的矛盾日益突出,形成了高管薪酬结构确定的无序混乱、低效的状态,薪酬结构本身应有的激励性作用没有得到有效发挥。而且对高管薪酬结构是否会影响企业成长,如何进一步优化上市公司高管薪酬结构体系等方面缺乏深入研究。因而现阶段,有必要重新审视高管薪酬结构的内容、特点,深入探讨我国高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响,并构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制及体系,增强薪酬结构的有效性与激励性,这对于进一步丰富和完善高管薪酬的激励理论,指导上市公司高管薪酬制度改革实践具有重要理论和现实意义。
本文结合我国上市公司的治理实践,以人力资本理论、薪酬激励理论、公司成长理论等为研究基础,总结国内外上市公司高管薪酬激励的特点,运用理论研究与实证研究相结合的方法,提出以企业成长为目标,人力资本价值为核心,公司治理制度为基础,市场竞争环境为前提,外部监管机制为约束条件,构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制。并深入分析高管薪酬结构的影响因素,研究高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响作用,探索高管薪酬结构的最佳激励效应,设计平衡风险分担与激励强度的薪酬结构体系,强化高管薪酬结构的激励作用,为充分发挥高管的人力资本使用价值、使企业持续稳定发展提供理论与实践依据。
本文的主要研究成果如下：
第一,构建了高管人力资本价值实现、薪酬分配与企业成长关系模型。借鉴以往学者的研究成果,本文将高管人力资本价值形态分为基本价值、产出价值和社会价值三种形态,阐述了三种价值形态的关系,并揭示了高管人力资本价值实现的过程及其与薪酬确定及企业成长之间的作用机理,即高管薪酬分配的确定机制应以高管异质性人力资本价值为核心,使高管的人力资本价值得到合理体现与补偿,从而激励高管通过自身努力提升个人绩效,并促进企业获得持续发展与成长。
第二,基于国际比较分析了我国上市公司高管薪酬结构的现状和特点,揭示我国上市公司高管薪酬结构存在着形式较单一,比例不平衡,薪酬差距过大,薪酬制度不完善等问题。并通过对英国和欧洲其他国家、美国、日本等不同地区高管薪酬结构的总结对比,借鉴国外发达国家的经验,为我国上市公司管理者薪酬结构与激励模式的实践,为今后的薪酬管理改革提供有益的启示。
第三,人力资本价值对高管薪酬结构的确定发挥重要影响作用。在公司实践中,高管薪酬结构并非作为一个独立的整体而单独存在,在薪酬结构设计的过程中,要受到多方面因素的影响,包括人力资本特征因素,公司内部治理因素,以及公司治理的外部约束因素。本文主要研究了高管人力资本特征和公司内部治理因素对高管薪酬结构的影响。其中,人力资本因素包括内在性人力资本、产出性人力资本和社会性人力资本价值。公司内部治理因素主要包括股权结构、公司治理特征和企业特征因素。通过构建结构方程,实证分析高管人力资本特征和公司内部治理因素对高管薪酬确定的影响。在高管人力资本价值中,产出价值与高管薪酬相关性较强,内在价值中,高管受教育程度、职业经历等与高管薪酬正相关,而社会价值的相关性较弱,其中社会关系与高管薪酬负相关。在公司内部治理因素中,股权集中度、董事会规模、公司规模、总资本结构等因素是决定高管薪酬结构的最重要的内部治理因素。
第四,高管薪酬结构对企业成长发挥着重要影响作用,二者呈现出非线性关系。评判高管薪酬结构是否合理的最高原则应该是其能否最大限度促进企业成长。因此,本文基于2008-2012年我国上市公司的相关数据,分析高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响,结果表明：单纯固定薪酬的增加不能有效促进企业成长；风险薪酬水平对企业成长有着积极的影响；股权激励强度能显著促进企业发展与成长；合理的薪酬差距有利于激励经理人；高管薪酬结构与企业成长呈现非线性关系,高管薪酬结构存在最佳区间激励效应,即高管风险薪酬比例位于30%-50%之间时,最有利于企业成长。
第五,以企业成长为目标,构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制模型,并提出了进一步强化薪酬结构确定系统有效性的措施。高管薪酬结构的确定机制并不是单一因素决定的结果,而是既要从企业微观层面又要充分结合各种环境的变化特点,在全面、动态、立体情景层次下构建具有合理性、适用性、平衡性、激励性和持续性等特征的现代企业高管薪酬结构。即根据高管薪酬结构实现的动态过程,打破高管薪酬分配按级排辈的方式,强化高管薪酬结构确定与人力资本价值之间的关联性,以及企业成长为目标,以人力资本价值为核心,以公司治理结构为基础,以公司外部监管机制前提,以外部市场竞争机制为约束,将高管薪酬结构确定的依据具体化,确定合理有效的高管薪酬结构,并采取各种有效措施,使薪酬结构的确定系统能真正发挥其应有的激励与约束功能。
第六,设计上市公司高管的激励性薪酬结构模式。本文认为,高管薪酬结构设计机制,要以人力资本价值及产权为核心,根据高管人力资本的基本价值确定基本薪酬,根据高管人力资本产出价值和社会价值确定短期绩效薪酬与长期风险薪酬。高管薪酬结构的优化体系,包括薪酬组合模式、薪酬构成比例和薪酬差距等。高管薪酬应实行多种形式的组合,应包括固定薪酬、短期激励性薪酬、风险性薪酬以及福利等主要形式,其中,固定薪酬包括基本工资、津贴和补贴；短期激励性薪酬主要是绩效薪酬,包括年度、季度和月度奖金以及特殊绩效奖励计划；风险性薪酬主要指股权激励,包括现股、期股、期权、虚拟股票等收益。福利包括保障性福利和激励性福利。在设计高管薪酬构成体系时,增加激励性薪酬的形式。在高管薪酬构成比例上,我国目前情况下,上市公司高管风险性薪酬占总薪酬的比例应位于30%-50%区间。并综合考虑公司内部治理和市场竞争等各种条件,将薪酬差距控制在合理的范围内,不能无限扩大。
The compensation system is an important part of modern corporate governance. The characteristics of separation of ownership and control of the modern enterprise determines the inconsistent between manager acts with the shareholder interests, so designing effective executives pay incentive mechanisms, lead executive behavior, personal performance goals and business interests to consistent direction, become a core issue that modern enterprise management to resolve. The compensation is the most direct and effective way for executives incentive, and establishing an effective compensation motivation system, focus not only on absolute levels of pay equity, but pay more attention to the rationality of the pay structure, the incentive effect of pay structure is stronger than that of the pay level. Whether the pay structure reasonable or not is an important factor affecting the development of the enterprise. Optimal contract theory is to recognize the substance of linking executive pay to performance, and getting the two aspects increasingly connected, so to solve the conflict of principal-agent, executive compensation structures should enable executives to maximize the incentive mechanism to promote business growth.
The basic job of pay structure to do is to determine a reasonable pay form and their composition, balancing the short-term incentives and long-term incentives of compensation, encourages executives to achieve best human capital value, promote the achievement of corporate goals and stable growth. But for a long time, both at home and abroad for the theoretical study of the executive pay structure and corporate practice was highlighted many problems, especially in China, research on executive compensation system is still at an early stage. In recent years, due to variety causes led executives pay to distorted development, pay structure design exposed out many defects, led the contradictions of difficult alternative of compensation incentive and its design defects increasingly highlight, that caused low effect and distorted phenomenon of executive pay contract arrangements, and led to social concern and criticized constantly increased for executive paid, on this, scholars has many research, but researching problems are too concentrated on executive pay level and relationship of executive pay and enterprise performance, study on executive pay structure was relatively weak, existing research has mainly focused on the form of the executive pay structure, pay structure impact on business performance, and so on, and there is a big difference, even contradictory study conclusion. Along with the enhancement of China's listed company shares inspiration, Executive pay structure became more diversified, thus as theory researchers, practitioners and policy makers, there is a need to re-examine executive compensation structure features, deeply study into executive compensation structures determining mechanism and the effectiveness of its design. There will be of great theoretical and practical significance to further enriched and improved executive compensation theory of motivation, guiding the enterprises to build a rational and effective executive pay system.
This article combines governance practice of listed company of China, take human capital theory, property incentive theory, delegate agent theory, and entrepreneurs theory as research base, to analyze the latest research trend both at home and abroad, summary listed company's development status and the executives pay incentive features both at home and abroad, combines theory research and empirical research phase, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, using scientific mathematical statistics method, to discuss the integrated factors that decide executives pay structure, analyze effects role that executives pay structure play on enterprise growth, and to explore the best incentives of executive pay structure<, Take the human capital value as the core, building a pay structure optimization system of balanced risk-sharing and incentive strength, and put forward policy proposals to make a perfect executive pay structure mechanism and strengthen executive pay incentive, and theory and practice basis to improve the enterprise pay incentive system and bring into executive human capital value, and make enterprise to get sustainable and stable development.
This article's main findings are as follows:
The first, constructed the model of the relationship of executive human capital value realization, compensation distribution and enterprises growth. Reference past scholars research results, this article divided executives human capital value into three forms of basic value,output value and social value, described the relationship of them and revealed the role mechanism of executives human capital value achieving process, compensation determine and the enterprise growth, that executives pay distribution of determines mechanism should to take executives different quality human capital value for core, makes executives of human capital value to get reasonable reflected and compensation, so as to motivate executives pay own efforts to improve their performance, and to promote enterprises to get sustainable development and growth.
The Second, analysed the executive compensation structure situation of listed componies in our country, resveled that there are still many unreasonable problems of the executive pay structure in China, such as form single, unbalanced, the pay gap is too large, pay system is not perfect etc., and by summary contrast different area executives pay structure of United Kingdom and European other countries, United States, and Japan etc., to reference the experience of developed countries for providing useful lessons for China's enterprise executive pay structures and incentive mode of practice and the future reform of pay management.
The third, human capital value plays an important role on the determination of executive pay structure. The determination of the executive pay structure is the result of several factors combined effects. Executive compensation structure is not a separate existence as an independent whole in the corporate practice, in the design process of pay structure, under the influence of various factors, including its underlying factors of human capital characteristics, internal governance, external constraints, and corporate governance, by the moderating effect of these factors to make executive pay structures have a positive effect on business growth. Due to space limitations and the availability of data, this paper mainly studies the influence on the executive pay structure of characteristics of executive human capital and corporate governance factors. Which human capital factors include inherent human capital, utility human capital and social human capital. Inherent human capital stock takes senior age, knowledge, professional background, business know-how for the analysis variables. Utility human capital take corporate performance as the variable, social human capital take the executive reputation and social networks-social as analysis variables. Corporate governance factors primarily include ownership structure, corporate governance and enterprise characteristics. By constructing a structural equation, to make an empirical analysis of effects that human capital characteristics and corporate governance factors of executives played on executive compensation determine. Results displayed, the base role of executives human capital value to executives pay structure determines is no full to play, it only explained17.7%of pay structure determine; in executives human capital value, utility value is strong related with executive pay structure, in the inner value, executive education level, and career experience are positive related with executives pay structure, and social value of relevance weaker, which social relations and executives pay structure is negative related. This shows that in the practice of enterprise pay distribution in our country, and executives pay distribution is not based primarily on the value of human capital, and more under the influence of other factors. Corporate governance, ownership concentration and the size of the Board, the Board of supervisors, company size and scale, the five factors are the most important internal governance factors to decide executive pay structure.
The forth, the executive compensation structure plays an important role on firm growth, both showing a linear relationship. The highest principle to judge the reasonableness of the corporate executive pay structure is whether it can best promote business growth. So, this article take listed company of related data of2008-2012, to analyze the impact of executives pay structure to enterprise growth, results suggests that:simple fixed pay of increased cannot promote enterprise growth effectively; risk pay level has active of impact to enterprise growth; equity incentive strength can significantly promote enterprise development and growth; reasonable pay gap is conducive to incentive managers; executive pay structure and enterprise growth rendering nonlinear relationship, executives pay structure exists best interval incentive effect. When executive risk pay ratio lies between30%-50%, it is most conducive to enterprise growth. When risks pay ratio is50%, enterprise growth is to the highest value. When it is higher than50%, enterprise growth has a large drop, when it at70%, enterprise growth is the lowest, when the risk pay ratio is greater than70%, enterprise growth began to increase, but growth was much lower than the increase of the risk pay ratio in the10%-50%area.
The fifth, built a mechanism determining model for executive pay structure and proposed measures to strengthen the effectiveness of determine system of executive pay structure. Based on empirical analysis, to take the human capital value and it's the property right as basis, enhance business growth for the purpose to proposed determining mechanism of executive pay structure. Determining mechanism of the executive pay structure is not the single factor results, but from both micro-level enterprises and the external environment changing features, building a fitness, balance, motivation and persistence characteristics of modern enterprises executive pay structure based comprehensive, dynamic and solid story with rationality. That according to executives pay structure achieved of dynamic process, take human capital value for core, company governance structure for base, company external regulatory mechanism for premise, external market competition mechanism for constraint, to make pursuant of executives pay structure determines materialized, determines reasonable, effective executives pay structure, and take various effective measures to make pay structure of determines system to really play its due of incentive and constraint features.
The sixth, optimized the corporate executive pay structure model. Design mechanism of executive pay structure should take the value of human capital as the core, according to executive fundamental value of human capital to determine the basic pay, the productand volue and social value determine the short-term performance-related pay and long-term risk pay. Optimization system of executive pay structures should includ pay patterns, pay component and the pay gap. Executive pay should combine variety pay forms, including main forms of fixed pay, short-term incentive pay and long-term risk pay and welfare. Which fixed pay includ basic pay, allowances and subsides; short-term incentive pay main is performance pay, including annual, quarter and monthly bonus and special performance award plans; long-term risk pay main refers to equity incentive, includ stock, period stock, option, and virtual stock.Welfare includ guaranteed and incentive welfare. When the enterprises desige executive pay structure system, they should further increase the incentive pay forms. As to the ratio of executive pay forms, under China's current situation, the ratio of executive risk pay in total compensation should be in the30%-50%range. And consider various conditions such as corporate governance and market competition, the pay gap should be within reasonable range, not allowed to extend indefinitely.
近年来,社会对于高管高薪的关注和批评不断加剧,对此,中外学者们进行了诸多研究,但研究的问题主要集中于高管的薪酬水平及其与企业绩效的关系方面,而对高管薪酬结构的研究则较为薄弱,研究结论也存在很大差异性甚至相互矛盾。薪酬结构所要做的基础工作是确定合理的薪酬形式及其构成比例,平衡薪酬的短期激励和长期激励,激励高管实现最大人力资本使用价值,促进企业目标的实现,促使企业稳定成长。近年来,随着我国上市公司股权激励的增强,高管的薪酬结构的内容变得更为丰富了,构成方式也变得更加多元化,但由于多种原因造成了我国高管薪酬制度的扭曲发展,薪酬结构的设计暴露出许多缺陷,缺乏有效的薪酬结构确定机制,在确定高管薪酬构成及其比例时,多数公司是依据高管岗位等级进行分配,即实行“按级排辈”确定基本工资和无偿赠予股份数量,而没有考虑高管本身的人力资本价值和企业绩效,实际上造成了管理者坐收其利,使激励薪酬福利化,致使薪酬激励的难以替代性与其设计本身的缺陷之间的矛盾日益突出,形成了高管薪酬结构确定的无序混乱、低效的状态,薪酬结构本身应有的激励性作用没有得到有效发挥。而且对高管薪酬结构是否会影响企业成长,如何进一步优化上市公司高管薪酬结构体系等方面缺乏深入研究。因而现阶段,有必要重新审视高管薪酬结构的内容、特点,深入探讨我国高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响,并构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制及体系,增强薪酬结构的有效性与激励性,这对于进一步丰富和完善高管薪酬的激励理论,指导上市公司高管薪酬制度改革实践具有重要理论和现实意义。
本文结合我国上市公司的治理实践,以人力资本理论、薪酬激励理论、公司成长理论等为研究基础,总结国内外上市公司高管薪酬激励的特点,运用理论研究与实证研究相结合的方法,提出以企业成长为目标,人力资本价值为核心,公司治理制度为基础,市场竞争环境为前提,外部监管机制为约束条件,构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制。并深入分析高管薪酬结构的影响因素,研究高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响作用,探索高管薪酬结构的最佳激励效应,设计平衡风险分担与激励强度的薪酬结构体系,强化高管薪酬结构的激励作用,为充分发挥高管的人力资本使用价值、使企业持续稳定发展提供理论与实践依据。
本文的主要研究成果如下：
第一,构建了高管人力资本价值实现、薪酬分配与企业成长关系模型。借鉴以往学者的研究成果,本文将高管人力资本价值形态分为基本价值、产出价值和社会价值三种形态,阐述了三种价值形态的关系,并揭示了高管人力资本价值实现的过程及其与薪酬确定及企业成长之间的作用机理,即高管薪酬分配的确定机制应以高管异质性人力资本价值为核心,使高管的人力资本价值得到合理体现与补偿,从而激励高管通过自身努力提升个人绩效,并促进企业获得持续发展与成长。
第二,基于国际比较分析了我国上市公司高管薪酬结构的现状和特点,揭示我国上市公司高管薪酬结构存在着形式较单一,比例不平衡,薪酬差距过大,薪酬制度不完善等问题。并通过对英国和欧洲其他国家、美国、日本等不同地区高管薪酬结构的总结对比,借鉴国外发达国家的经验,为我国上市公司管理者薪酬结构与激励模式的实践,为今后的薪酬管理改革提供有益的启示。
第三,人力资本价值对高管薪酬结构的确定发挥重要影响作用。在公司实践中,高管薪酬结构并非作为一个独立的整体而单独存在,在薪酬结构设计的过程中,要受到多方面因素的影响,包括人力资本特征因素,公司内部治理因素,以及公司治理的外部约束因素。本文主要研究了高管人力资本特征和公司内部治理因素对高管薪酬结构的影响。其中,人力资本因素包括内在性人力资本、产出性人力资本和社会性人力资本价值。公司内部治理因素主要包括股权结构、公司治理特征和企业特征因素。通过构建结构方程,实证分析高管人力资本特征和公司内部治理因素对高管薪酬确定的影响。在高管人力资本价值中,产出价值与高管薪酬相关性较强,内在价值中,高管受教育程度、职业经历等与高管薪酬正相关,而社会价值的相关性较弱,其中社会关系与高管薪酬负相关。在公司内部治理因素中,股权集中度、董事会规模、公司规模、总资本结构等因素是决定高管薪酬结构的最重要的内部治理因素。
第四,高管薪酬结构对企业成长发挥着重要影响作用,二者呈现出非线性关系。评判高管薪酬结构是否合理的最高原则应该是其能否最大限度促进企业成长。因此,本文基于2008-2012年我国上市公司的相关数据,分析高管薪酬结构对企业成长的影响,结果表明：单纯固定薪酬的增加不能有效促进企业成长；风险薪酬水平对企业成长有着积极的影响；股权激励强度能显著促进企业发展与成长；合理的薪酬差距有利于激励经理人；高管薪酬结构与企业成长呈现非线性关系,高管薪酬结构存在最佳区间激励效应,即高管风险薪酬比例位于30%-50%之间时,最有利于企业成长。
第五,以企业成长为目标,构建高管薪酬结构的确定机制模型,并提出了进一步强化薪酬结构确定系统有效性的措施。高管薪酬结构的确定机制并不是单一因素决定的结果,而是既要从企业微观层面又要充分结合各种环境的变化特点,在全面、动态、立体情景层次下构建具有合理性、适用性、平衡性、激励性和持续性等特征的现代企业高管薪酬结构。即根据高管薪酬结构实现的动态过程,打破高管薪酬分配按级排辈的方式,强化高管薪酬结构确定与人力资本价值之间的关联性,以及企业成长为目标,以人力资本价值为核心,以公司治理结构为基础,以公司外部监管机制前提,以外部市场竞争机制为约束,将高管薪酬结构确定的依据具体化,确定合理有效的高管薪酬结构,并采取各种有效措施,使薪酬结构的确定系统能真正发挥其应有的激励与约束功能。
第六,设计上市公司高管的激励性薪酬结构模式。本文认为,高管薪酬结构设计机制,要以人力资本价值及产权为核心,根据高管人力资本的基本价值确定基本薪酬,根据高管人力资本产出价值和社会价值确定短期绩效薪酬与长期风险薪酬。高管薪酬结构的优化体系,包括薪酬组合模式、薪酬构成比例和薪酬差距等。高管薪酬应实行多种形式的组合,应包括固定薪酬、短期激励性薪酬、风险性薪酬以及福利等主要形式,其中,固定薪酬包括基本工资、津贴和补贴；短期激励性薪酬主要是绩效薪酬,包括年度、季度和月度奖金以及特殊绩效奖励计划；风险性薪酬主要指股权激励,包括现股、期股、期权、虚拟股票等收益。福利包括保障性福利和激励性福利。在设计高管薪酬构成体系时,增加激励性薪酬的形式。在高管薪酬构成比例上,我国目前情况下,上市公司高管风险性薪酬占总薪酬的比例应位于30%-50%区间。并综合考虑公司内部治理和市场竞争等各种条件,将薪酬差距控制在合理的范围内,不能无限扩大。
The compensation system is an important part of modern corporate governance. The characteristics of separation of ownership and control of the modern enterprise determines the inconsistent between manager acts with the shareholder interests, so designing effective executives pay incentive mechanisms, lead executive behavior, personal performance goals and business interests to consistent direction, become a core issue that modern enterprise management to resolve. The compensation is the most direct and effective way for executives incentive, and establishing an effective compensation motivation system, focus not only on absolute levels of pay equity, but pay more attention to the rationality of the pay structure, the incentive effect of pay structure is stronger than that of the pay level. Whether the pay structure reasonable or not is an important factor affecting the development of the enterprise. Optimal contract theory is to recognize the substance of linking executive pay to performance, and getting the two aspects increasingly connected, so to solve the conflict of principal-agent, executive compensation structures should enable executives to maximize the incentive mechanism to promote business growth.
The basic job of pay structure to do is to determine a reasonable pay form and their composition, balancing the short-term incentives and long-term incentives of compensation, encourages executives to achieve best human capital value, promote the achievement of corporate goals and stable growth. But for a long time, both at home and abroad for the theoretical study of the executive pay structure and corporate practice was highlighted many problems, especially in China, research on executive compensation system is still at an early stage. In recent years, due to variety causes led executives pay to distorted development, pay structure design exposed out many defects, led the contradictions of difficult alternative of compensation incentive and its design defects increasingly highlight, that caused low effect and distorted phenomenon of executive pay contract arrangements, and led to social concern and criticized constantly increased for executive paid, on this, scholars has many research, but researching problems are too concentrated on executive pay level and relationship of executive pay and enterprise performance, study on executive pay structure was relatively weak, existing research has mainly focused on the form of the executive pay structure, pay structure impact on business performance, and so on, and there is a big difference, even contradictory study conclusion. Along with the enhancement of China's listed company shares inspiration, Executive pay structure became more diversified, thus as theory researchers, practitioners and policy makers, there is a need to re-examine executive compensation structure features, deeply study into executive compensation structures determining mechanism and the effectiveness of its design. There will be of great theoretical and practical significance to further enriched and improved executive compensation theory of motivation, guiding the enterprises to build a rational and effective executive pay system.
This article combines governance practice of listed company of China, take human capital theory, property incentive theory, delegate agent theory, and entrepreneurs theory as research base, to analyze the latest research trend both at home and abroad, summary listed company's development status and the executives pay incentive features both at home and abroad, combines theory research and empirical research phase, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, using scientific mathematical statistics method, to discuss the integrated factors that decide executives pay structure, analyze effects role that executives pay structure play on enterprise growth, and to explore the best incentives of executive pay structure<, Take the human capital value as the core, building a pay structure optimization system of balanced risk-sharing and incentive strength, and put forward policy proposals to make a perfect executive pay structure mechanism and strengthen executive pay incentive, and theory and practice basis to improve the enterprise pay incentive system and bring into executive human capital value, and make enterprise to get sustainable and stable development.
This article's main findings are as follows:
The first, constructed the model of the relationship of executive human capital value realization, compensation distribution and enterprises growth. Reference past scholars research results, this article divided executives human capital value into three forms of basic value,output value and social value, described the relationship of them and revealed the role mechanism of executives human capital value achieving process, compensation determine and the enterprise growth, that executives pay distribution of determines mechanism should to take executives different quality human capital value for core, makes executives of human capital value to get reasonable reflected and compensation, so as to motivate executives pay own efforts to improve their performance, and to promote enterprises to get sustainable development and growth.
The Second, analysed the executive compensation structure situation of listed componies in our country, resveled that there are still many unreasonable problems of the executive pay structure in China, such as form single, unbalanced, the pay gap is too large, pay system is not perfect etc., and by summary contrast different area executives pay structure of United Kingdom and European other countries, United States, and Japan etc., to reference the experience of developed countries for providing useful lessons for China's enterprise executive pay structures and incentive mode of practice and the future reform of pay management.
The third, human capital value plays an important role on the determination of executive pay structure. The determination of the executive pay structure is the result of several factors combined effects. Executive compensation structure is not a separate existence as an independent whole in the corporate practice, in the design process of pay structure, under the influence of various factors, including its underlying factors of human capital characteristics, internal governance, external constraints, and corporate governance, by the moderating effect of these factors to make executive pay structures have a positive effect on business growth. Due to space limitations and the availability of data, this paper mainly studies the influence on the executive pay structure of characteristics of executive human capital and corporate governance factors. Which human capital factors include inherent human capital, utility human capital and social human capital. Inherent human capital stock takes senior age, knowledge, professional background, business know-how for the analysis variables. Utility human capital take corporate performance as the variable, social human capital take the executive reputation and social networks-social as analysis variables. Corporate governance factors primarily include ownership structure, corporate governance and enterprise characteristics. By constructing a structural equation, to make an empirical analysis of effects that human capital characteristics and corporate governance factors of executives played on executive compensation determine. Results displayed, the base role of executives human capital value to executives pay structure determines is no full to play, it only explained17.7%of pay structure determine; in executives human capital value, utility value is strong related with executive pay structure, in the inner value, executive education level, and career experience are positive related with executives pay structure, and social value of relevance weaker, which social relations and executives pay structure is negative related. This shows that in the practice of enterprise pay distribution in our country, and executives pay distribution is not based primarily on the value of human capital, and more under the influence of other factors. Corporate governance, ownership concentration and the size of the Board, the Board of supervisors, company size and scale, the five factors are the most important internal governance factors to decide executive pay structure.
The forth, the executive compensation structure plays an important role on firm growth, both showing a linear relationship. The highest principle to judge the reasonableness of the corporate executive pay structure is whether it can best promote business growth. So, this article take listed company of related data of2008-2012, to analyze the impact of executives pay structure to enterprise growth, results suggests that:simple fixed pay of increased cannot promote enterprise growth effectively; risk pay level has active of impact to enterprise growth; equity incentive strength can significantly promote enterprise development and growth; reasonable pay gap is conducive to incentive managers; executive pay structure and enterprise growth rendering nonlinear relationship, executives pay structure exists best interval incentive effect. When executive risk pay ratio lies between30%-50%, it is most conducive to enterprise growth. When risks pay ratio is50%, enterprise growth is to the highest value. When it is higher than50%, enterprise growth has a large drop, when it at70%, enterprise growth is the lowest, when the risk pay ratio is greater than70%, enterprise growth began to increase, but growth was much lower than the increase of the risk pay ratio in the10%-50%area.
The fifth, built a mechanism determining model for executive pay structure and proposed measures to strengthen the effectiveness of determine system of executive pay structure. Based on empirical analysis, to take the human capital value and it's the property right as basis, enhance business growth for the purpose to proposed determining mechanism of executive pay structure. Determining mechanism of the executive pay structure is not the single factor results, but from both micro-level enterprises and the external environment changing features, building a fitness, balance, motivation and persistence characteristics of modern enterprises executive pay structure based comprehensive, dynamic and solid story with rationality. That according to executives pay structure achieved of dynamic process, take human capital value for core, company governance structure for base, company external regulatory mechanism for premise, external market competition mechanism for constraint, to make pursuant of executives pay structure determines materialized, determines reasonable, effective executives pay structure, and take various effective measures to make pay structure of determines system to really play its due of incentive and constraint features.
The sixth, optimized the corporate executive pay structure model. Design mechanism of executive pay structure should take the value of human capital as the core, according to executive fundamental value of human capital to determine the basic pay, the productand volue and social value determine the short-term performance-related pay and long-term risk pay. Optimization system of executive pay structures should includ pay patterns, pay component and the pay gap. Executive pay should combine variety pay forms, including main forms of fixed pay, short-term incentive pay and long-term risk pay and welfare. Which fixed pay includ basic pay, allowances and subsides; short-term incentive pay main is performance pay, including annual, quarter and monthly bonus and special performance award plans; long-term risk pay main refers to equity incentive, includ stock, period stock, option, and virtual stock.Welfare includ guaranteed and incentive welfare. When the enterprises desige executive pay structure system, they should further increase the incentive pay forms. As to the ratio of executive pay forms, under China's current situation, the ratio of executive risk pay in total compensation should be in the30%-50%range. And consider various conditions such as corporate governance and market competition, the pay gap should be within reasonable range, not allowed to extend indefinitely.
引文
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