董事网络供求分析与投融资决策研究
|
摘要
关系是所有经济行为的基本特征,是人与人之问、组织与组织之间相互支持、影响以及信息流动的重要渠道。它犹如一张蛛网覆盖了整个社会,进而社会便成了各类关系的集合。在中国,“关系至上”或人情社会的观点已为社会公众所接受。对于企业而言,关系网络是企业成功的重要因素,因为企业可以借助关系网络获取高价值信息和稀缺资源,制定风险小收益大的投融资决策。但是,个人关系网络只是企业所拥有的一种潜在资源,只有通过自身吸收能力将个人社会资本转化为企业社会资本才能将个人关系资源转变为企业获取资源的能力。而企业中一个重要的关系网络就是董事网络,董事网络是企业之间可靠和低成本的交流渠道,通过与联结企业的沟通可以实现相互间的资源获取和信息共享。
目前,国外董事网络研究集中于因校友、职业以及民间组织等形成的公司内部关系和因董事形成的公司外部关系对并购、投资以及创新等公司行为的影响；相比之下,国内董事网络研究在研究内容、研究方法等方面尚处于起步状态,仅有少数学者运用特殊类型公司或董事形成的董事网络考察其对并购、薪酬激励以及绩效等方面的影响,尚未形成一致的、完整的理论框架。中国特殊的人情社会背景决定了本文无法照搬国外研究方法和结论,而国内相对匮乏的董事网络研究无法为现阶段董事网络的构建与优化提供丰富的借鉴和指导,这恰恰为本文提供了研究动机。本文以社会网络理论为理论基础,以国内人情社会为现实背景,探究具有中国特色的董事网络形成机理及其影响渠道具有重要的现实意义和理论意义。在理论上,基于上市公司董事网络的分析推动了社会网络理论和网络治理理论的进一步融合,从而有助于形成相对完善的董事网络理论；在指标上,不拘泥于中心位置指标,首次尝试运用剔除冗余关系的结构洞方法检验网络节点位置的影响,从而提出更加科学合理的结论；在研究内容上,.首次从供给和需求角度分析董事网络的成因,并进一步从投融资角度考察其资源特性,从而构建了相对完整的董事网络形成与影响框架。
在形成机理方面,本文主要从市场层面和公司层面入手。在市场层面上,通过构建董事市场供给指数,首次量化了董事资源的市场供给程度,并从地理位置角度对独立董事选聘来源进行空间分析,在整体上揭开了独立董事选聘过程的“黑箱”。研究发现,本地和辐射中心的董事供给市场均对上市公司董事会独立性产生正向作用,但是董事选聘的市场化并不非常显著。然而,本地市场供给对非国有控股、竞争行业的上市公司董事会独立影响显著大于国有控股和垄断行业；辐射效应分析却显示中心市场供给的影响恰恰与此相反。在剔除强制性需求之后,本文发现本地市场供给和中心市场供给对公司独立董事自主性需求的影响与对总需求的影响一致。因此,本文推断,独立董事的选择已基本实现市场化,但是这种市场化的选择机制更多的是基于本地市场。
在公司层面,本文从整体角度而不拘泥于单个理论的角度通过考察董事网络的构建目的并分析其对公司绩效的溢出效应作用渠道的方式提供网络构建动机的直接证据。本文首次引入结构洞指标从绩效和薪酬激励角度考察董事网络的构建动机。研究发现,在公司绩效方面,连锁董事网络能够显著改善公司绩效,即网络构建是出于组织目的,而非个人目的；在薪酬激励方面,董事中心位置和结构洞位置的加强反而显著降低本期薪酬激励,只有当本期公司绩效增加时,董事才会在未来获得较高薪酬,与此相伴的是绩效的进一步提升。因此,董事网络的构建是出于组织目的而非个人目的,并且在组织目的实现之后,公司可以采取“投之以桃,报之以李”的方式延期支付高薪酬的方式奖励董事在网络构建中的贡献。
在作用机理方面,本文考察了董事网络的资源特性和信息特性对投融资决策的影响。对于融资决策,本文首次分离出董事网络对融资决策的两种效应,即董事网络如何通过信息效应和资源效应缓解融资约束。研究发现,董事网络能够提高信息披露质量,当分解出信息效应之后,董事网络的资源效应显著缓解了融资约束,进而确认了董事网络的信息效应和资源效应；对于所有制差异的企业中,国有控股企业中的信息效应和资源效应均不明显,非国有控股企业中信息效应和资源效应发挥显著积极作用。
对于投资决策,遵循“董事网络→融资决策→投资决策”的传导路径,本文分析了董事网对投资决策进而公司绩效的影响。本文尝试性地考察了董事网络对投资过度和投资不足两种非效率投资行为的影响,并进一步探究其在所有制存在差异的企业中的发挥的差异性作用。研究发现,上市公司越处于董事网络中心位置,投资效率越低；上市公司处于结构洞位置可以有效抑制非效率投资进而提高投资效率。进一步区分过度投资和投资不足：中心位置加剧了上市公司的过度投资和投资不足行为,结构洞位置抑制了上市公司的过度投资和投资不足行为；中心位置会同时增加国有和非国有控股企业的非效率投资,并且均会体现在过度投资的增加和投资不足的恶化,结构洞位置会同时减少国有和非国有控股企业的非效率投资,同样体现在抑制过度投资和减少投资不足,但非国有控股企业的作用更显著。
本文以董事网络成因为起点从市场供给和公司需求两方面入手,从投融资角度考察了董事网络的资源特性影响,构建了相对完善的董事网络理论框架,有助于加深理论界和实践界对董事网络的形成机理及其作用机制的认识,从而为公司与个人构建董事网络以及监管当局限制董事兼职现象提供借鉴。
Guanxi is the essential feature of all economic behaviors, being an important channel for support, influence and information flow among individuals or organizations. Network of relationships just as spiderwebs cover the whole society, thus the whole society becoming the set of all kinds of relationships. In China, the relationships oriented principle has been accepted by the social public. Social network plays important roles to success for enterprises, because enterprises can be access to valuable information and fund resources, thus contributing to make investment and financing decision with low risks and high rewards. However, individuals'social network is one kind of valuable potential resources, only when converting individuals'social capital into enterprises'social capital with themselves absorbing capacity individuals' relation resources can be translated into enterprises'available resources. As a reliable and low-cost flow channel among enterprises, Interlock directors network is an important social network, which contributes to strengthening information communications and resources acquisition among connected enterprises.
So far, researches on board networks aboard mainly focus on kinds of internal social network (such as current employment, past employment, education, nongovernmental organization) and external network(such as interlock directors, business network) which exert great effects on corporate behaviors(such as M&A, finance policies, innovation). By contrast, researches on board networks at home are at its initial stage reflected in both research contents and methods, a few of scholars have explored how interlock directors in certain types of enterprises influence M&A, compensation incentives and performance. Under the unique background of human relationship in China, we cannot copy foreign researches methods and conclusions blindly or mechanically; contrary to foreign researches, scarce domestic studies about board networks are unable to provide guidance for network construction and optimization, which offers a moment for this paper. Based on social network theory, exploring formation and Function mechanisms of board networks with Chinese features has great theoretical significance and practical significance, in terms of theory, this paper contributes to further integrations of social network theory and network governance theory, thus making for relatively perfect board network theory; this paper does not only adhere rigidly to centrality indicators adopted by existing researches, but adopt structure holes eliminating redundancy relations at first attempt so as to verify board network effects, thus making more scientific and reasonable conclusions; in the context, this paper firstly analyzes the formation motivation of director networks from aspects of supply and demand, and then verifies its impacts on investment and financing decisions, thereby constructing relatively complete formation and function mechanisms for board network.
This paper primarily proceeds to analyze the formation mechanism from perspectives of labor markets and corporates. In terms of labor markets, this paper creatively quantifies the supply of director labor market by way of creating the director market supply index, we find that the market supply has important effects on independence of the board. Compared with state-owned and monopoly companies, the local director markets exert greater influence on non-state-owned and competitive companies; on the contrary, the effects of the center director markets on the state-owned, monopoly and larger companies are greater. After excluding the mandatory demand, the market supply has similar effects on the need for autogenic.
In terms of corporate-level, this paper explores the purpose of network construction from an overall point of view and then analyzes its'spillover effects on performance in order to provide direct evidence for constructions of board network. This paper creatively brings structure holes into analysis of interlock directors'effects on performance and compensation incentives in order to explore the purpose of construction of board network. This paper finds that, directors networks improve performance significantly; the central position and structure holes position exert negative effects on compensation incentives in current period, only when performance has been improved in current period, directors can obtain much more compensation in the next period, followed by performance improvement. Therefore, the purpose of construction of board network is not motivated by individual's needs but motivated by enterprise's needs, when enterprise's needs have been satisfied, directors can obtain great rewards in return.
In terms of function mechanism, this paper explores how both information effects and resource effects influence investment and financing decisions. From perspective of finance policies, this paper firstly separate information effects from resource effects, that is, each of effects plays what roles in coping with financial constraints. This paper finds that, board network have significantly positive impacts on quality of information disclosure, after information effects decomposed, resource effects plays also positive effects on financial constraints, thus verifying both of effects; however, in sub-samples, both of effects do not exert significant effects on financial constraints in state-owned enterprises, while both of effects give full play to financial constraints in non-state-owned enterprises.
With regard to investment decision-making, following transmission routes of board network from finance policies to investment policies, this paper examines how board network play roles in investment decisions and then performance. This paper tentatively analyzes board network effects on investment efficiency including overinvestment and underinvestment, and then explores the difference of impacts between distinguished types of enterprises with diverse forms of ownership. This paper finds that, the listed companies are closer to the kernel of board network, investment efficiency is much lower; by contrast, when the public companies locate in the structure holes positions, their investment efficiency gets improved and will be higher. After distinguishing overinvestment from underinvestment, the central position stimulates the companies'overinvestment and underinvestment behaviors, and the structure holes position curbs the overinvestment and underinvestment behaviors. In subsamples, the central position plays significantly positive roles in both state-owned and non-state-owned companies'inefficient investment, reflected in aggravation of overinvestment and underinvestment; the structure holes position can decrease both state-owned and non-state-owned companies' inefficient investment, that is, inhibiting overinvestment behaviors and reducing underinvestment behaviors with more significant roles in non-state-owned companies.
目前,国外董事网络研究集中于因校友、职业以及民间组织等形成的公司内部关系和因董事形成的公司外部关系对并购、投资以及创新等公司行为的影响；相比之下,国内董事网络研究在研究内容、研究方法等方面尚处于起步状态,仅有少数学者运用特殊类型公司或董事形成的董事网络考察其对并购、薪酬激励以及绩效等方面的影响,尚未形成一致的、完整的理论框架。中国特殊的人情社会背景决定了本文无法照搬国外研究方法和结论,而国内相对匮乏的董事网络研究无法为现阶段董事网络的构建与优化提供丰富的借鉴和指导,这恰恰为本文提供了研究动机。本文以社会网络理论为理论基础,以国内人情社会为现实背景,探究具有中国特色的董事网络形成机理及其影响渠道具有重要的现实意义和理论意义。在理论上,基于上市公司董事网络的分析推动了社会网络理论和网络治理理论的进一步融合,从而有助于形成相对完善的董事网络理论；在指标上,不拘泥于中心位置指标,首次尝试运用剔除冗余关系的结构洞方法检验网络节点位置的影响,从而提出更加科学合理的结论；在研究内容上,.首次从供给和需求角度分析董事网络的成因,并进一步从投融资角度考察其资源特性,从而构建了相对完整的董事网络形成与影响框架。
在形成机理方面,本文主要从市场层面和公司层面入手。在市场层面上,通过构建董事市场供给指数,首次量化了董事资源的市场供给程度,并从地理位置角度对独立董事选聘来源进行空间分析,在整体上揭开了独立董事选聘过程的“黑箱”。研究发现,本地和辐射中心的董事供给市场均对上市公司董事会独立性产生正向作用,但是董事选聘的市场化并不非常显著。然而,本地市场供给对非国有控股、竞争行业的上市公司董事会独立影响显著大于国有控股和垄断行业；辐射效应分析却显示中心市场供给的影响恰恰与此相反。在剔除强制性需求之后,本文发现本地市场供给和中心市场供给对公司独立董事自主性需求的影响与对总需求的影响一致。因此,本文推断,独立董事的选择已基本实现市场化,但是这种市场化的选择机制更多的是基于本地市场。
在公司层面,本文从整体角度而不拘泥于单个理论的角度通过考察董事网络的构建目的并分析其对公司绩效的溢出效应作用渠道的方式提供网络构建动机的直接证据。本文首次引入结构洞指标从绩效和薪酬激励角度考察董事网络的构建动机。研究发现,在公司绩效方面,连锁董事网络能够显著改善公司绩效,即网络构建是出于组织目的,而非个人目的；在薪酬激励方面,董事中心位置和结构洞位置的加强反而显著降低本期薪酬激励,只有当本期公司绩效增加时,董事才会在未来获得较高薪酬,与此相伴的是绩效的进一步提升。因此,董事网络的构建是出于组织目的而非个人目的,并且在组织目的实现之后,公司可以采取“投之以桃,报之以李”的方式延期支付高薪酬的方式奖励董事在网络构建中的贡献。
在作用机理方面,本文考察了董事网络的资源特性和信息特性对投融资决策的影响。对于融资决策,本文首次分离出董事网络对融资决策的两种效应,即董事网络如何通过信息效应和资源效应缓解融资约束。研究发现,董事网络能够提高信息披露质量,当分解出信息效应之后,董事网络的资源效应显著缓解了融资约束,进而确认了董事网络的信息效应和资源效应；对于所有制差异的企业中,国有控股企业中的信息效应和资源效应均不明显,非国有控股企业中信息效应和资源效应发挥显著积极作用。
对于投资决策,遵循“董事网络→融资决策→投资决策”的传导路径,本文分析了董事网对投资决策进而公司绩效的影响。本文尝试性地考察了董事网络对投资过度和投资不足两种非效率投资行为的影响,并进一步探究其在所有制存在差异的企业中的发挥的差异性作用。研究发现,上市公司越处于董事网络中心位置,投资效率越低；上市公司处于结构洞位置可以有效抑制非效率投资进而提高投资效率。进一步区分过度投资和投资不足：中心位置加剧了上市公司的过度投资和投资不足行为,结构洞位置抑制了上市公司的过度投资和投资不足行为；中心位置会同时增加国有和非国有控股企业的非效率投资,并且均会体现在过度投资的增加和投资不足的恶化,结构洞位置会同时减少国有和非国有控股企业的非效率投资,同样体现在抑制过度投资和减少投资不足,但非国有控股企业的作用更显著。
本文以董事网络成因为起点从市场供给和公司需求两方面入手,从投融资角度考察了董事网络的资源特性影响,构建了相对完善的董事网络理论框架,有助于加深理论界和实践界对董事网络的形成机理及其作用机制的认识,从而为公司与个人构建董事网络以及监管当局限制董事兼职现象提供借鉴。
Guanxi is the essential feature of all economic behaviors, being an important channel for support, influence and information flow among individuals or organizations. Network of relationships just as spiderwebs cover the whole society, thus the whole society becoming the set of all kinds of relationships. In China, the relationships oriented principle has been accepted by the social public. Social network plays important roles to success for enterprises, because enterprises can be access to valuable information and fund resources, thus contributing to make investment and financing decision with low risks and high rewards. However, individuals'social network is one kind of valuable potential resources, only when converting individuals'social capital into enterprises'social capital with themselves absorbing capacity individuals' relation resources can be translated into enterprises'available resources. As a reliable and low-cost flow channel among enterprises, Interlock directors network is an important social network, which contributes to strengthening information communications and resources acquisition among connected enterprises.
So far, researches on board networks aboard mainly focus on kinds of internal social network (such as current employment, past employment, education, nongovernmental organization) and external network(such as interlock directors, business network) which exert great effects on corporate behaviors(such as M&A, finance policies, innovation). By contrast, researches on board networks at home are at its initial stage reflected in both research contents and methods, a few of scholars have explored how interlock directors in certain types of enterprises influence M&A, compensation incentives and performance. Under the unique background of human relationship in China, we cannot copy foreign researches methods and conclusions blindly or mechanically; contrary to foreign researches, scarce domestic studies about board networks are unable to provide guidance for network construction and optimization, which offers a moment for this paper. Based on social network theory, exploring formation and Function mechanisms of board networks with Chinese features has great theoretical significance and practical significance, in terms of theory, this paper contributes to further integrations of social network theory and network governance theory, thus making for relatively perfect board network theory; this paper does not only adhere rigidly to centrality indicators adopted by existing researches, but adopt structure holes eliminating redundancy relations at first attempt so as to verify board network effects, thus making more scientific and reasonable conclusions; in the context, this paper firstly analyzes the formation motivation of director networks from aspects of supply and demand, and then verifies its impacts on investment and financing decisions, thereby constructing relatively complete formation and function mechanisms for board network.
This paper primarily proceeds to analyze the formation mechanism from perspectives of labor markets and corporates. In terms of labor markets, this paper creatively quantifies the supply of director labor market by way of creating the director market supply index, we find that the market supply has important effects on independence of the board. Compared with state-owned and monopoly companies, the local director markets exert greater influence on non-state-owned and competitive companies; on the contrary, the effects of the center director markets on the state-owned, monopoly and larger companies are greater. After excluding the mandatory demand, the market supply has similar effects on the need for autogenic.
In terms of corporate-level, this paper explores the purpose of network construction from an overall point of view and then analyzes its'spillover effects on performance in order to provide direct evidence for constructions of board network. This paper creatively brings structure holes into analysis of interlock directors'effects on performance and compensation incentives in order to explore the purpose of construction of board network. This paper finds that, directors networks improve performance significantly; the central position and structure holes position exert negative effects on compensation incentives in current period, only when performance has been improved in current period, directors can obtain much more compensation in the next period, followed by performance improvement. Therefore, the purpose of construction of board network is not motivated by individual's needs but motivated by enterprise's needs, when enterprise's needs have been satisfied, directors can obtain great rewards in return.
In terms of function mechanism, this paper explores how both information effects and resource effects influence investment and financing decisions. From perspective of finance policies, this paper firstly separate information effects from resource effects, that is, each of effects plays what roles in coping with financial constraints. This paper finds that, board network have significantly positive impacts on quality of information disclosure, after information effects decomposed, resource effects plays also positive effects on financial constraints, thus verifying both of effects; however, in sub-samples, both of effects do not exert significant effects on financial constraints in state-owned enterprises, while both of effects give full play to financial constraints in non-state-owned enterprises.
With regard to investment decision-making, following transmission routes of board network from finance policies to investment policies, this paper examines how board network play roles in investment decisions and then performance. This paper tentatively analyzes board network effects on investment efficiency including overinvestment and underinvestment, and then explores the difference of impacts between distinguished types of enterprises with diverse forms of ownership. This paper finds that, the listed companies are closer to the kernel of board network, investment efficiency is much lower; by contrast, when the public companies locate in the structure holes positions, their investment efficiency gets improved and will be higher. After distinguishing overinvestment from underinvestment, the central position stimulates the companies'overinvestment and underinvestment behaviors, and the structure holes position curbs the overinvestment and underinvestment behaviors. In subsamples, the central position plays significantly positive roles in both state-owned and non-state-owned companies'inefficient investment, reflected in aggravation of overinvestment and underinvestment; the structure holes position can decrease both state-owned and non-state-owned companies' inefficient investment, that is, inhibiting overinvestment behaviors and reducing underinvestment behaviors with more significant roles in non-state-owned companies.
引文
1 资料来源：“上市公司独立董事已论为特权阶层福利”(人民日报海外版,2012年05月06日)。
[1]边燕杰.社会网络与求职过程[A].林益民,涂肇庆,改革开放与中国社会——西方社会学文献述评[C].香港：牛津大学出版社,1999.
[2]边燕杰,丘海雄,企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2001,(2)：87-99.
[3]边燕杰,洪洵.中国和新加坡的关系网和职业流动[J].国外社会学,1999,(4)：26-44.
[4]边燕杰,张文宏.经济体制,社会网络与职业流动[J].中国社会科学,2001,(2)：77-89.
[5]卜长莉.“差序格局”的理论诠释及现代内涵[J].社会学研究,2003,(1)：21-29.
[6]曹廷求,钱先航.公司治理与风险管理：基于治理风险视角的分析[J].会计研究,2011,(7)：73-77.
[7]曹廷求,王营,张蕾.董事网络位置及其溢出效应：为关系支付薪酬?[J].财经研究,2012,(10)：15-25.
[8]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有控股企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2)：92-101.
[9]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策——基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013,(5)：144-156.
[10]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2013,(12)：117-132.
[11]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置,独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011,(7)：113-127.
[12]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络,独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012,(2)：168-182.
[13]邓峰.董事会制度的起源、演进与中国的学习[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1)：164-176,223.
[14]段海艳.连锁董事,组织冗余与企业创新绩效关系研究[J].科学学研究,2012,(4)：63]-640.
[15]段海艳,仲伟周.CEO人力资本特性,企业特性与企业间网络关系对CEO薪酬影响的实证分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2008,(3)：167-173.
[16]段海艳,仲伟周.企业间连锁董事关系网络对CEO薪酬影响的实证[J].统计与决策,2012,(1)：122-125.
[17]费孝通.乡土中国生育制度[M].北京大学出版社,1998.
[18]耿敬,李琰珺.人际关系资本与关系资本借贷[J].社会,2007,(3)：44-69.
[19]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006(5)：107-113.
[20]李留闯,田高良,马勇,李彬.连锁董事和股价同步性波动：基于网络视角的考察[J].管理科学,2012,(6)：86-100.
[21]李培馨,陈运森,王宝链.社会网络及其在金融研究中的应用：最新研究述评[J].南方经济,2013,(9)：62-74.
[22]李维安等.网络组织：组织发展新趋势[M].经济科学出版社,2003.
[23]李维安,公司治理学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2005.
[24]李维安,周建.网络治理：内涵,结构,机制与价值创造[J].天津社会科学,2005,(5)：59-63.
[25]李维安.公司治理新阶段：合规,创新与发展[J].南开管理评论,2007,(5)：1.
四梁琪,余峰燕,郝项超.独立董事制度引入的市场效应研究[J].中国工业经济,2009,(11)：151-160.
[27]梁漱溟.乡村建设理论[M].上海：世纪出版集团,2006.
[28]梁玉成.求职过程的宏观—微观分析：多层次模型[J].社会,2012,(3)：55-77.
四林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资….经济研究,2001,(1)：10-18.
[30]刘冰,符正平,邱兵.冗余资源,企业网络位置与多元化战略[J].管理学报,2011,(12)：1792-1801.
[31]刘东.企业网络论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003.
132]刘浩,唐松,楼俊.独立董事：监督还是咨询?——银行背景独立董事对企业信贷融资影响研究[J].管理世界,2012,(1)：141-156.
[33]刘军.社会网络分析导论[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004.
[34]刘军.整体网分析讲义[M].上海：格致出版社,2009.
[35]刘涛,朱敏.动态性环境中企业连锁董事与绩效关系的实证研究[J].软科学,2009,(6)：93-97.
[36]卢昌崇,陈仕华.断裂联结重构：连锁董事及其组织功能[J].管理世界,2009,(5)：152-165.
[37]罗家德.社会网分析讲义(第二版)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[38][美]罗纳德·伯特.结构洞——竞争的社会结构[M].任敏,李璐,林虹译.上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[39]马光荣,杨恩艳.社会网络,非正规金融与创业[J].经济研究,2011,(3)：83-93.
[40]宁向东,张颖.独立董事能够勤勉和诚信地进行监督吗——独立董事行为决策模型的构建[J].中国工业经济,2012,(1)：101-109.
[41]彭正银.网络治理理论探析[J].中国软科学,2002,03：51-55.
[42]彭正银,廖天野.连锁董事治理效应的实证分析——基于内在机理视角的探讨[J].南开管理评论,2008,(1)：99-105.
[43]任兵,区玉辉,林自强.企业连锁董事在中国[J].管理世界,2001,(6)：132-159.
[44]任兵,区玉辉,彭维刚.连锁董事与公司绩效：针对中国的研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,(1)：8-15.
[45]任兵,阎大颖,张婧婷.连锁董事与企业战略：前沿理论与实证研究评述[J].南开学报：哲学社会科学版,2008,(3)：119-126.
[46]阮荣平,郑风田.市场化进程中的宗族网络与乡村企业[J].经济学(季刊),2013,(1)：331-356.
[47]沈洪涛,沈艺峰,杨熠.新股增发：自由现金流量假说还是优序融资假说[J].世界经济,2003,(8)：53-61.
[48]沈艺峰,刘微芳,游家兴.嵌入性：企业社会资本和企业融资结构——来自我国房地产上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理2009,(5)：109-1]6.
[49]史晋川,王婷.社会网络与非正式金融制度——基于私人秩序与替代性法律的视角[A].2012年度(第十届)中国法经济学论坛论文集.
[50]孙立平.“关系”,社会关系与社会结构[J].社会学研究,1996,(5)：20-30.
[51]谭劲松,郑国坚,周繁.独立董事辞职的影响因素：理论框架与实证分析[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006,(2)：119-162.
[52]谭兴民,宋增基,蒲勇健.公司治理影响信息披露了吗?——对中英资本市场的实证比较研究[J].金融研究,2009,(8)：171-181.
[53]田高良,李留闯,齐保垒.连锁董事,财务绩效和公司价值[J].管理科学,2011,(3)：13-24.
[54]童馨乐,褚保金,杨向阳.社会资本对农户借贷行为影响的实证研究——基于八省1003个农户的调查数据[J].金融研究,2011,(12)：177-191.
[55]魏刚,肖泽忠,邹宏.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007,(3)：92-105.
[56]巫景飞,何大军,林暐,王云.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略：社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(8)： 107-118.
[57]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.提高信息披露质量真的能降低股权资本成本吗?[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(4)：1201-1216.
[58]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制,经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,(8)：110-122.
[59]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革,企业业绩与国有控股企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009,(11)：68-81.
[60]徐勇,邱兵.网络位置与吸收能力对企业绩效的影响研究[J].中山大学学报(社科版),2011,(3)：199-208.
[61]杨汝岱,陈斌开,朱诗娥.基于社会网络视角的农户民间借贷需求行为研究[J].经济研究,2011,(11)：116-129.
[62]杨蓓,张俊瑞.连锁董事、审计师选择与盈余管理[J1.山西财经大学学报,2011,(12)：117-124.
[63]姚铮,胡梦婕,叶敏.社会网络增进小微企业贷款可得性作用机理研究[J].管理世界,2013,(4)：135-149.
[64]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,张然.独立董事的独立性：基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011,(1)：126-139.
[65]伊志宏,姜付秀,秦义虎.产品市场竞争,公司治理与信息披露质量[J].管理世界,2010,(1)：133-141.
[66]曾颖,陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：69-79,91.
[67]翟学伟,中国人际关系的特质——本土的概念及其模式,见李庆善,中国人社会心理研究论集[M],香港：香港时代文化出版公司,1993.
网张纯,吕伟.机构投资者,终极产权与融资约束[J].管理世界,2007,(11)：119-126.
[69]张杰.民营经济的金融困境与融资次序[J].经济研究,2000,(4)：3-10.
[70]张军.关系：一个初步的经济分析[J].世界经济文汇,1995,(6)：47-55.
[71]张其仔.新经济社会学[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001。
[72]张学勇,廖理.股权分置改革,自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(4)：28-39.
[73]张宗新,杨飞,袁庆海.上市公司信息披露质量提升能否改进公司绩效——基于2002-2005年深市上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(10)：16-23.
[74]郑志刚,孙娟娟,Rui Oliver任人唯亲的董事会文化和经理人超额薪酬问题[J].经济研究,2013(12)：111-124.
[75]钟昀珈.董事资本与公司信息披露质量[J].南方经济,2012,(7)：57-68.
[76]周开国,李涛,张燕.董事会秘书与信息披露质量[J].金融研究,2011,(7)：167-181.
网朱茶芬.发送信号还是讨好政府：关于独立董事聘请动机的经验研究[J].世界经济,2006,(12)：81-89.
[78]Adams R B, Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance:A Conceptual Framework and Survey [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(1):58-107.
[79]Agrawal A, Knoeber C R. Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-98.
[80]Alam, Z., M., Chen, C. Ciccotello, and C. Ryan. Does the Location of Directors Matter? Information Acquisition and Decisions by the Board. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.
[81]Allen M P. The Structure of Interorganizational Elite Cooptation:Interlocking Corporate Directorates [J]. American Sociological Review,1974,39(3):393-406.
[82]Allen F, Qian J, Qian M. Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[83]Almeida H, Campello M, Weisbach M S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[84]Amaro de Matos J, Mergulhao J. Directors' Network and the Method of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[85|Andres C, Bongard I, Lehmann M. Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited[J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2013,40(9-10):1221-1246.
[86]Armstrong C S. Larcker D F. Discussion of "The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders" and "Taxes and the Backdating of Stock Option Exercise Dates"[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2009.47(1):50-58.
[87]Baker W E. Market Networks and Corporate Behavior[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1990,96(3):589-625.
[88]Barnea A, Guedj I. Director Networks [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[89]Barnes J. A.. Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish [J]. Human Relations, 1954,7(1):39-58
[90]Bavelas A. Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups[J]. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America,1950,22(6):725-730.
[91]Beckman C M, Haunschild P R. Network Learning:The Effects of Partners' Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(1):92-124.
[92]Belliveau M A, O'Reilly C A, Wade J B. Social Capital at the Top:Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1996,39(6):1568-1593.
[93]Bertrand M, Kramarz F, Schoar A, et al. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France[R]. Unpublished Working Paper. University of Chicago, 2009.
[94]Bhagat S, Bolton B. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(3):257-273.
[95]Bian Y. Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China [J]. China Quarterly,1994, 140(1):971-999.
[96]Bian Y, Ang S. Guanxi Networks and Job Mobility in China and Singapore [J]. Social Forces,1997,75(3):981-1005.
[97]Bizjak J, Lemmon M, Whitby R. Option Backdating and Board Interlocks [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(11):4821-4847.
[98]Bonacich P. Factoring and Weighting Approaches to Status Scores and Clique Identification [J]. Journal of Mathematical Sociology,1972,2(1):113-120.
[99]Bonacich P, Cody Holdren A, Johnston M. Hyper-edges and Multidimensional Centrality [J]. Social Networks,2004,26(3):189-203.
[100]Bott E.. Family and Social Network:Roles, Norms and External Relationships in Ordinary Urban Families [M]. London, Tavistock,1957.
[101]Bourdieu, Pierre. The Forms of Capital [J]. In:John G. Richardson (ed.):Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York:Greenwood Press 1986, s.241-258.
[102]Bourdieu P, Wacquant L An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology[M]. University of Chicago Press,1992.
[103]Bouwman C H S. Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(7):2358-2394.
[104]Brandeis, L.D. Other People's Money:And How the Bankers Use It [M]. New York: Frederick A.Stokes,1914.
[105]Brickley J A, Linck J S, Coles J L. What Happens to CEOs after They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(3):341-377.
[106]Brown R, Gao N, Lee E, Stathopoulos K. What are Friends for? CEO Networks, Pay and Corporate Governance[R]. Technical Report, Working Paper, Manchester Business School,2008.
[107]Bruner, R.. Applied Mergers and Acquisitions. Hoboken. New Jersey:John Wiley & Sons, Inc,2004.
[108]Burt R S. Autonomy in a Social Topologyl[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1980, 85(4):892-925.
[109]Burt R S. Corporate Profits and Cooptation:Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy[M]. New York:Academic Press,1983.
[110]Burt R S. Structural Holes:The Social Structure of Competition [M]. Harvard University Press,1992.
[111]Burt R S. Structural Holes and Good Ideas [J]. American Journal of Sociology,2004, 110(2):349-399.
[112]Cai Y, Sevilir M. Board Connections and M&A Transactions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(2):327-349.
[113]Cai Y, Pan C, Li H. Executive and Director Networks and IPO Underpricing [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[114]Chahine S, Goergen M. The Effects of Management-Board Ties on IPO Performance [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,21(6):153-179.
[115]Chen R, Dyball M C, Wright S. The Link between Board Composition and Corporate Diversification in Australian Corporations [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2009,17(2):208-223.
[116]Chhaochharia V, Grinstein Y. Corporate Governance and Firm value:The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules[J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(4):1789-1825.
[117]Chidambaran N K, Kedia S, Prabhala N. CEO Director Connections and Corporate Fraud [J]. Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper,2011.
[118]Chikh S, Filbien J Y. Acquisitions and CEO Power:Evidence from French Networks [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(5):1221-1236.
[119]Chiu P C, Teoh S H, Tian F. Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[120]Chuluun T, Prevost A, Puthenpurackal J. Board Ties and the Cost of Corporate Debt[R]. Working Paper, Loyola University-Baltimore,2013.
[121]Claessens S, Tzioumis K. Measuring Firms'Access to Finance[J]. World Bank,2006.
[122]Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C J. The Small World of Investing:Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2008,116(5):951-979.
[123]Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C. Sell-Side School Ties[J]. Journal of Finance,2010, 65(4):1409-1437.
[124]Coleman J, Katz E, Menzel H. The Diffusion of an Innovation among Physicians[J]. Sociometry,1957,20(4):253-270.
[125]Coleman J S. Introduction to Mathematical Sociology [M]. London Free Press Glencoe,1964.
[126]Coleman J S. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1988:S95-S120.
[127]Coles J L, Hoi C K. New evidence on the Market for Directors:Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310[J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):197-230.
[128]Conyon M J, Read L E. A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):645-659.
[129]Core J E, Holthausen R W, Larcker D F. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,51(3):371-406.
[130]Coval J D, Moskowitz T J. The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(4):811-841.
[131]Crespi R, Pascual-Fuster B. Executive Director's Pay and Networks:The Influence of Ownership Structure[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011.
[132]Croci E, Grassi R. The Economic Effect of Interlocking Directorates in Italy:New Evidence Using Centrality Measures [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[133]Davern M. Social Networks and Economic Sociology [J]. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1997,56(3):287-302.
[134]Davis G F. Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Inter Corporate Network [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1991:583-613.
[135]Davis G F. Who Gets ahead in the Market for Corporate Directors:the Political Economy of Multiple Board Memberships[C]. Academy of Management Proceedings. Academy of Management,1993.1993(1):202-206.
[136]Davis G F, Yoo M, Baker W E. The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001[J]. Strategic Organization,2003,1(3):301-326.
[137]de Matos J A, Ferreira M, Matos P, Mergulhao J. The Network Centrality of Influential Bankers:a New Capital Structure Determinant[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[138]Dooley P C. The Interlocking Directorate [J]. American Economic Review,1969, 59(3):314-323.
[139]Drago C, Millo F, Ricciuti R, et al. Corporate Governance reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company value in Italy [R]. CESifo Working Papers,2011.
[140]Duan Y, Hotchkiss E, Jiao Y. Business Ties and Information Advantage:Evidence from Mutual Fund Trading, University of Alberta[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2011.
[141]D'Aveni R A, Kesner I F. Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender Offer Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation during Takeovers[J]. Organization Science,1993,4(2):123-151.
[142]E1-Khatib R, Fogel K, Jandik T. CEO Network Centrality and Merger Performance [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[143]Engelberg J, Gao P, Parsons C A. The Price of a CEO's Rolodex [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(1):79-114.
[144]Etheridge D. Power and Information:The Effect of Board Networks on Mergers and Acquisitions[C].Finance and Corporate Governance Conference,2010.
[145]Fang Y, Francis B, Hasan I. More than Connectedness-Heterogeneity of CEO Social Network and Firm Value [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[146]Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[147]Fich E, White L. CEO Compensation and Turnover:The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards[J]. Wake Forest Law Review,2003,38(3):935-960.
[148]Fich E M, White L J. Why do CEOs Reciprocally Sit on Each Other's Boards [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(1):175-195.
[149]Fich E M, Shivdasani A. Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors [J]. Journal of Finance, 2006,61(2):689-724.
[150]Fracassi C. Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks[C]. AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper,2012.
[151]Fracassi C. Tate G. External Networking and Internal Finn Governance [J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):153-194.
[152]Freeman L C. Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification[J]. Social Networks,1979,1(3):215-239.
[153]Fukuyama F. Trust:The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity [M]. New York: Free Press,1995.
[154]Geletkanycz M A, Boyd B K. CEO Outside Directorships and Firm Performance:A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(2):335-352.
[155]Gompers P, Xuan Y. The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Acquisition of Private Companies[R]. AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.2008.
[156]Goyal S, Vega-Redondo F. Structural Holes in Social Networks[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,2007,137(1):460-492.
[157]Granovetter M S. The Strength of Weak Ties [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1973, 78(6):1360-1380.
[158]Granovetter M. Getting a Job:A Study of Contacts and Careers[M]. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,1974.
[159]Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91 (3):481-510.
[160]Granovetter M. The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19(1):33-50..
[161]Gulati R. Alliances and Networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(4): 293-317.
[162]Hallock K F. Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1997,32(03): 331-344.
[163]Harford J. What Drives Merger Waves?[J]. Journal of financial Economics,2005, 77(3):529-560.
[164]Harris M, Raviv A. A Theory of Board Control and Size[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(4):1797-1832.
[165]Haunschild P R. Interorganizational Imitation:The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[166]Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96-118.
[167]Hermalin B, Weisbach M. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:A Survey of the Economic Literature[J]. Economic Policy Review,2003, 9(1):7-26.
[168]Hochberg Y V, Ljungqvist A, Lu Y. Whom you Know Matters:Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance [J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(1):251-301.
[169]Hoff K, Stiglitz J E. Introduction:Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives[J]. World Bank Economic review,1990,4(3):235-250.
[1701 Hong H, Kubik J D, Stein J C. Thy Neighbor's Portfolio:Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(6): 2801-2824.
[171]Horton J, Serafeim G. Security Analyst Networks, Performance and Career Outcomes [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[172]Horton J, Millo Y, Serafeim G. Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2012,39(4):399-426.
[173]Huang Q, Jiang F, Lie E. The Value of Social Networks during Periods of Distress[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,201 la.
[174]Huang Q, Jiang F, Lie E. The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011b.
[175]Hwang B H, Kim S. It Pays to Have Friends [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009,93(1):138-158.
[176]Hwang B H, Kim S. Social Ties and Earnings Management [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[177]Ishii J, Xuan Y. Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2014, forthcoming.
[178]Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[179]Johansen T R, Pettersson K. The Impact of Board Interlocks on Auditor Choice and Audit Fees [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2013,21(3):287-310.
[180]Jones C, Hesterly W S, Borgatti S P A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1997,22(4):911-945.
[181]Kapferer, B. Norms and the Manipulation of Relationships in a Work Context. In J. C. Mitchell (Ed.), Social Networks in Urban Situations,1969. Manchester:Manchester University Press.
[182]Khanna V, Kim E H, Lu Y. CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[183]Khurana I K, Martin X, Pereira R. Financial Development and the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2006,41(4): 787-808.
[184]Kiang, Nelson,2006, "GUANXI (The Art of Relationships):Microsoft, China, and Bill Gates's Plan to Win the Road Ahead", Simon and Schuster, Inc.
[185]Kim Y. Board Network Characteristics and Firm Performance in Korea [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review.2005,13(6):800-808.
[186]Kirchmaier T, Stathopoulos K. From Fiction to Fact:The Impact of CEO Social Networks[R]. Manchester Business School Working Paper,2008.
[187]Kirchmaier T, Kollo M. The Role of Prestige and Networks in Outside Director Appointments [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2007.
[188]Knyazeva A, Knyazeva D, Masulis R W. The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board independence[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(6):1561-1605.
[189]Koenig T, Gogel R, Sonquist J. Models of the Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates [J]. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1979,38(2):173-186.
[190]Kramarz F, Thesmar D. Social Networks in the Boardroom[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association,2013,11(4):780-807.
[191]Kroszner R S, Strahan P E. Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending[R]. NBER Working Paper Series,2001.
[192]Kuhnen C M. Business Networks, Corporate Governance, and Contracting in the Mutual fund Industry [J]. Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):2185-2220.
[193]Larcker D, Richardson S, Seary A, Tuna Irem. Back Door Links between Directors and Executive Compensation[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2005.
[194]Larcker D F, So E C, Wang C C Y. Boardroom Centrality and Finn Performance [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2013,55(2):225-250.
[195]Laumann E O, Marsden P V, Galaskiewicz J. Community-elite Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1977,83(3): 594-631.
[196]Leonhardt, D. So You Want to Become a Corporate Director [N]. N.Y. Times News Service,2000.
[197]Levine J H. The Sphere of Influence [J]. American Sociological Review,1972,37(1): 14-27.
[198]Levit D, Malenko N. The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance [R]. SSRN Working Papers,2013.
[199]Lin Yutang. My Country and My People[M]. New York:Reynal & Hitchcock.1935.
[200]Lin N, Ensel W M, Vaughn J C. Social Resources and Strength of Ties:Structural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment [J]. American Sociological Review,1981: 393-405.
[201]Lin N, Dumin M. Access to Occupations through Social Ties [J]. Social Networks, 1986,8(4):365-385.
[202]Lin Nan. Social Resources and Instrumental Action[C]. P. Marsden and Nan Lin, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA:Sage,1982.
[203]Lin Nan. Social Capital [M]. Cambridge University Press,2001.
[204]Lin Z J, Peng M W, Yang H, et al. How Do Networks and Learning Drive M&As? An Institutional Comparison between China and the United States[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(10):1113-1132.
[205]Liu Y. The Impact of Networks on CEO Turnover, Appointment, and Compensation [J]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[206]Maman D. Research Note:Interlocking Ties within Business Groups in Israel-A Longitudinal Analysis,1974-1987[J]. Organization studies,1999,20(2):323-339.
[207]Markarian G, Parbonetti A. Financial Interlocks and Earnings Management:Evidence from Italy [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[208]Masulis R W, Wang C, Xie F. Globalizing the Boardroom-The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,53(3):527-554.
[209]Mitchell, J. C. Social Networks in Urban Situations [M]. Manchester:Manchester University Press,1969.
[210]Mizruchi, M.S. The American Corporate Network:1904-1974 [M]. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,1982.
[211]Mizruchi M S. The Structure of Corporate Political Action:Interfirm Relations and Their Consequences [M]. Harvard University Press,1992.
[212]Mizruchi M S. What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates[J]. Annual Review of Sociology,1996,22(1): 271-298.
[213]Moreno, J. L. Who Shall Survive?A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations [M]. Washington, DC:Nervous & Mental Disease,1934.
[214]Myers S C, Majluf N S. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have[J]. Journal of financial Economics,1984, 13(2):187-221.
[215]Nguyen B D. Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite's Small World and the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors[J]. Management Science,2012,58(2):236-252.
[216]Non M, Franses P. Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance:Evidence from a New Panel Database [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2007.
[217]Omer T, Shelley M, Tice F. Do Well-Connected Directors Improve Firm Performance? [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[218]Palmer D, Friedland R, Singh J V. The Ties that Bind:Organizational and Class Bases of Stability in a Corporate Interlock Network[J]. American Sociological Review,1986, 51(6):781-796.
[219]Pan Y. The Determinants and Impact of Executive-Firm Matches[R]. University of Minnesota Working Paper Series,2010.
[220]Pennings J. M. Interlocking Directorates [M]. San Francisco:Jossey Bass,1980.
[221]Perry T, Peyer U. Board Seat Accumulation by Executives:A Shareholder's Perspective [J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(4):2083-2123.
[222]Pfeffer J, Salancik G. The External Control of Organizations:A Resource Dependence Perspective [M]. New York:Harper and Row,1978.
[223]Podolny J M. Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Marketl [J]. American Journal of Sociology,2001,107(1):33-60.
[224]Putnam R D. Bowling alone:America's Declining Social Capital[J]. Journal of democracy,1995,6(1):65-78.
[225]Qi Q. How Does the Director's Social Network Matter? Evidence from Structure Estimation [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011.
[226]Radcliffe-Brown A R. On Social Structure [J]. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland,1940,70(1):1-12.
[227]Rao H, Davis G F, Ward A. Embeddedness, Social Identity and Mobility:Why Firms Leave the NASDAQ and Join the New York Stock Exchange [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2000,45(2):268-292.
[228]Reeb D M, Zhao W. Director Capital and Corporate Disclosure Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(4):191-212.
[229]Renneboog L, Zhao Y. Us Knows us in the UK:On Director Networks and CEO Compensation [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(4):1132-1157.
[230]Richardson G B. The Organisation of Industry [J]. Economic Journal,1972,82(327): 883-96.
[231]Richardson, S.. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,11(2),159-189
[232]Schmidt B. Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[233]Schonlau R, Singh P V. Board Networks and Merger Performance [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[234]Schoorman F D, Bazerman M H, Atkin R S. Interlocking Directorates:A strategy for Reducing Environmental Uncertainty [J]. Academy of Management Review,1981,6(2): 243-251.
[235]Scott J. Networks of Corporate Power:A Comparative Assessment [J]. Annual Review of Sociology,1991,17(1):181-203.
[236]Shipilov A V, Li S X. Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It too? Structural Holes' Influence on Status Accumulation and Market Performance in Collaborative Networks [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2008,53(1):73-108.
[237]Shue K. Executive Networks and Firm Policies:Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(6):1401-1442.
[238]Simpson H, Wright E. Social Networks and Boardroom Appointments:Who You Know Matters[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[239]S(?)rensen M. How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-sided Matching Model of Venture Capital[J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(6):2725-2762.
[240]Stoughton N M, Zechner J. IPO-Mechanisms, Monitoring and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(1):45-77.
[241]Sullivan B N, Tang Y. Small-world Networks, Absorptive Capacity and Firm Performance:Evidence from the US Venture Capital Industry [J]. International Journal of Strategic Change Management.2012,4(2):149-175.
[242]Tirole, J..The Theory of Corporate Finance [M]. Princeton University Press Princeton, 2006.
[243]Wasserman, S., Faust, K. Social Network Analysis:Methods and Applications [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1994.
[244]Wellman B. Network Analysis:Some Basic Principles[J]. Sociological theory,1983, 1(1):155-200.
[245]Wincent J, Anokhin S, Ortqvist D. Does Network Board Capital Matter? A Study of Innovative Performance in Strategic SME Networks[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2010,63(3):265-275.
[246]Withers M C, Hillman A J, Cannella A A. A Multidisciplinary Review of the Director Selection Literature[J]. Journal of Management,2012,38(1):243-277.
[247]Yeo H J, Pochet C, Alcouffe A. CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations [J]. Journal of Management and Governance,2003,7(1):87-108.
[248]Yonker S E. Geography and the Market for CEOs[R]. SSRN Working Paper,2009.
[249]Zaheer A, Bell G G. Benefiting from Network Position:Firm Capabilities, Structural Holes, and Performance [J]. Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(9):809-825.
[250]Zajac E J, Westphal J D. Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(3):507-529.
[251]Zhou X, Li Q, Zhao W, Cai, H.. Embeddedness and Contractual Relationships in China's Transitional Economy[J]. American Sociological Review,2003,68(1):75-102.
[1]边燕杰.社会网络与求职过程[A].林益民,涂肇庆,改革开放与中国社会——西方社会学文献述评[C].香港：牛津大学出版社,1999.
[2]边燕杰,丘海雄,企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2001,(2)：87-99.
[3]边燕杰,洪洵.中国和新加坡的关系网和职业流动[J].国外社会学,1999,(4)：26-44.
[4]边燕杰,张文宏.经济体制,社会网络与职业流动[J].中国社会科学,2001,(2)：77-89.
[5]卜长莉.“差序格局”的理论诠释及现代内涵[J].社会学研究,2003,(1)：21-29.
[6]曹廷求,钱先航.公司治理与风险管理：基于治理风险视角的分析[J].会计研究,2011,(7)：73-77.
[7]曹廷求,王营,张蕾.董事网络位置及其溢出效应：为关系支付薪酬?[J].财经研究,2012,(10)：15-25.
[8]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有控股企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2)：92-101.
[9]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策——基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013,(5)：144-156.
[10]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2013,(12)：117-132.
[11]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置,独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011,(7)：113-127.
[12]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络,独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012,(2)：168-182.
[13]邓峰.董事会制度的起源、演进与中国的学习[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1)：164-176,223.
[14]段海艳.连锁董事,组织冗余与企业创新绩效关系研究[J].科学学研究,2012,(4)：63]-640.
[15]段海艳,仲伟周.CEO人力资本特性,企业特性与企业间网络关系对CEO薪酬影响的实证分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2008,(3)：167-173.
[16]段海艳,仲伟周.企业间连锁董事关系网络对CEO薪酬影响的实证[J].统计与决策,2012,(1)：122-125.
[17]费孝通.乡土中国生育制度[M].北京大学出版社,1998.
[18]耿敬,李琰珺.人际关系资本与关系资本借贷[J].社会,2007,(3)：44-69.
[19]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006(5)：107-113.
[20]李留闯,田高良,马勇,李彬.连锁董事和股价同步性波动：基于网络视角的考察[J].管理科学,2012,(6)：86-100.
[21]李培馨,陈运森,王宝链.社会网络及其在金融研究中的应用：最新研究述评[J].南方经济,2013,(9)：62-74.
[22]李维安等.网络组织：组织发展新趋势[M].经济科学出版社,2003.
[23]李维安,公司治理学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2005.
[24]李维安,周建.网络治理：内涵,结构,机制与价值创造[J].天津社会科学,2005,(5)：59-63.
[25]李维安.公司治理新阶段：合规,创新与发展[J].南开管理评论,2007,(5)：1.
四梁琪,余峰燕,郝项超.独立董事制度引入的市场效应研究[J].中国工业经济,2009,(11)：151-160.
[27]梁漱溟.乡村建设理论[M].上海：世纪出版集团,2006.
[28]梁玉成.求职过程的宏观—微观分析：多层次模型[J].社会,2012,(3)：55-77.
四林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资….经济研究,2001,(1)：10-18.
[30]刘冰,符正平,邱兵.冗余资源,企业网络位置与多元化战略[J].管理学报,2011,(12)：1792-1801.
[31]刘东.企业网络论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003.
132]刘浩,唐松,楼俊.独立董事：监督还是咨询?——银行背景独立董事对企业信贷融资影响研究[J].管理世界,2012,(1)：141-156.
[33]刘军.社会网络分析导论[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004.
[34]刘军.整体网分析讲义[M].上海：格致出版社,2009.
[35]刘涛,朱敏.动态性环境中企业连锁董事与绩效关系的实证研究[J].软科学,2009,(6)：93-97.
[36]卢昌崇,陈仕华.断裂联结重构：连锁董事及其组织功能[J].管理世界,2009,(5)：152-165.
[37]罗家德.社会网分析讲义(第二版)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[38][美]罗纳德·伯特.结构洞——竞争的社会结构[M].任敏,李璐,林虹译.上海：上海人民出版社,2008.
[39]马光荣,杨恩艳.社会网络,非正规金融与创业[J].经济研究,2011,(3)：83-93.
[40]宁向东,张颖.独立董事能够勤勉和诚信地进行监督吗——独立董事行为决策模型的构建[J].中国工业经济,2012,(1)：101-109.
[41]彭正银.网络治理理论探析[J].中国软科学,2002,03：51-55.
[42]彭正银,廖天野.连锁董事治理效应的实证分析——基于内在机理视角的探讨[J].南开管理评论,2008,(1)：99-105.
[43]任兵,区玉辉,林自强.企业连锁董事在中国[J].管理世界,2001,(6)：132-159.
[44]任兵,区玉辉,彭维刚.连锁董事与公司绩效：针对中国的研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,(1)：8-15.
[45]任兵,阎大颖,张婧婷.连锁董事与企业战略：前沿理论与实证研究评述[J].南开学报：哲学社会科学版,2008,(3)：119-126.
[46]阮荣平,郑风田.市场化进程中的宗族网络与乡村企业[J].经济学(季刊),2013,(1)：331-356.
[47]沈洪涛,沈艺峰,杨熠.新股增发：自由现金流量假说还是优序融资假说[J].世界经济,2003,(8)：53-61.
[48]沈艺峰,刘微芳,游家兴.嵌入性：企业社会资本和企业融资结构——来自我国房地产上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理2009,(5)：109-1]6.
[49]史晋川,王婷.社会网络与非正式金融制度——基于私人秩序与替代性法律的视角[A].2012年度(第十届)中国法经济学论坛论文集.
[50]孙立平.“关系”,社会关系与社会结构[J].社会学研究,1996,(5)：20-30.
[51]谭劲松,郑国坚,周繁.独立董事辞职的影响因素：理论框架与实证分析[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006,(2)：119-162.
[52]谭兴民,宋增基,蒲勇健.公司治理影响信息披露了吗?——对中英资本市场的实证比较研究[J].金融研究,2009,(8)：171-181.
[53]田高良,李留闯,齐保垒.连锁董事,财务绩效和公司价值[J].管理科学,2011,(3)：13-24.
[54]童馨乐,褚保金,杨向阳.社会资本对农户借贷行为影响的实证研究——基于八省1003个农户的调查数据[J].金融研究,2011,(12)：177-191.
[55]魏刚,肖泽忠,邹宏.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007,(3)：92-105.
[56]巫景飞,何大军,林暐,王云.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略：社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(8)： 107-118.
[57]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.提高信息披露质量真的能降低股权资本成本吗?[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(4)：1201-1216.
[58]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制,经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,(8)：110-122.
[59]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革,企业业绩与国有控股企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009,(11)：68-81.
[60]徐勇,邱兵.网络位置与吸收能力对企业绩效的影响研究[J].中山大学学报(社科版),2011,(3)：199-208.
[61]杨汝岱,陈斌开,朱诗娥.基于社会网络视角的农户民间借贷需求行为研究[J].经济研究,2011,(11)：116-129.
[62]杨蓓,张俊瑞.连锁董事、审计师选择与盈余管理[J1.山西财经大学学报,2011,(12)：117-124.
[63]姚铮,胡梦婕,叶敏.社会网络增进小微企业贷款可得性作用机理研究[J].管理世界,2013,(4)：135-149.
[64]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,张然.独立董事的独立性：基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011,(1)：126-139.
[65]伊志宏,姜付秀,秦义虎.产品市场竞争,公司治理与信息披露质量[J].管理世界,2010,(1)：133-141.
[66]曾颖,陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：69-79,91.
[67]翟学伟,中国人际关系的特质——本土的概念及其模式,见李庆善,中国人社会心理研究论集[M],香港：香港时代文化出版公司,1993.
网张纯,吕伟.机构投资者,终极产权与融资约束[J].管理世界,2007,(11)：119-126.
[69]张杰.民营经济的金融困境与融资次序[J].经济研究,2000,(4)：3-10.
[70]张军.关系：一个初步的经济分析[J].世界经济文汇,1995,(6)：47-55.
[71]张其仔.新经济社会学[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001。
[72]张学勇,廖理.股权分置改革,自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(4)：28-39.
[73]张宗新,杨飞,袁庆海.上市公司信息披露质量提升能否改进公司绩效——基于2002-2005年深市上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(10)：16-23.
[74]郑志刚,孙娟娟,Rui Oliver任人唯亲的董事会文化和经理人超额薪酬问题[J].经济研究,2013(12)：111-124.
[75]钟昀珈.董事资本与公司信息披露质量[J].南方经济,2012,(7)：57-68.
[76]周开国,李涛,张燕.董事会秘书与信息披露质量[J].金融研究,2011,(7)：167-181.
网朱茶芬.发送信号还是讨好政府：关于独立董事聘请动机的经验研究[J].世界经济,2006,(12)：81-89.
[78]Adams R B, Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance:A Conceptual Framework and Survey [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(1):58-107.
[79]Agrawal A, Knoeber C R. Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-98.
[80]Alam, Z., M., Chen, C. Ciccotello, and C. Ryan. Does the Location of Directors Matter? Information Acquisition and Decisions by the Board. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.
[81]Allen M P. The Structure of Interorganizational Elite Cooptation:Interlocking Corporate Directorates [J]. American Sociological Review,1974,39(3):393-406.
[82]Allen F, Qian J, Qian M. Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[83]Almeida H, Campello M, Weisbach M S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[84]Amaro de Matos J, Mergulhao J. Directors' Network and the Method of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[85|Andres C, Bongard I, Lehmann M. Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited[J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2013,40(9-10):1221-1246.
[86]Armstrong C S. Larcker D F. Discussion of "The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders" and "Taxes and the Backdating of Stock Option Exercise Dates"[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2009.47(1):50-58.
[87]Baker W E. Market Networks and Corporate Behavior[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1990,96(3):589-625.
[88]Barnea A, Guedj I. Director Networks [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[89]Barnes J. A.. Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish [J]. Human Relations, 1954,7(1):39-58
[90]Bavelas A. Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups[J]. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America,1950,22(6):725-730.
[91]Beckman C M, Haunschild P R. Network Learning:The Effects of Partners' Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(1):92-124.
[92]Belliveau M A, O'Reilly C A, Wade J B. Social Capital at the Top:Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1996,39(6):1568-1593.
[93]Bertrand M, Kramarz F, Schoar A, et al. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France[R]. Unpublished Working Paper. University of Chicago, 2009.
[94]Bhagat S, Bolton B. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(3):257-273.
[95]Bian Y. Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China [J]. China Quarterly,1994, 140(1):971-999.
[96]Bian Y, Ang S. Guanxi Networks and Job Mobility in China and Singapore [J]. Social Forces,1997,75(3):981-1005.
[97]Bizjak J, Lemmon M, Whitby R. Option Backdating and Board Interlocks [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(11):4821-4847.
[98]Bonacich P. Factoring and Weighting Approaches to Status Scores and Clique Identification [J]. Journal of Mathematical Sociology,1972,2(1):113-120.
[99]Bonacich P, Cody Holdren A, Johnston M. Hyper-edges and Multidimensional Centrality [J]. Social Networks,2004,26(3):189-203.
[100]Bott E.. Family and Social Network:Roles, Norms and External Relationships in Ordinary Urban Families [M]. London, Tavistock,1957.
[101]Bourdieu, Pierre. The Forms of Capital [J]. In:John G. Richardson (ed.):Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York:Greenwood Press 1986, s.241-258.
[102]Bourdieu P, Wacquant L An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology[M]. University of Chicago Press,1992.
[103]Bouwman C H S. Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(7):2358-2394.
[104]Brandeis, L.D. Other People's Money:And How the Bankers Use It [M]. New York: Frederick A.Stokes,1914.
[105]Brickley J A, Linck J S, Coles J L. What Happens to CEOs after They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(3):341-377.
[106]Brown R, Gao N, Lee E, Stathopoulos K. What are Friends for? CEO Networks, Pay and Corporate Governance[R]. Technical Report, Working Paper, Manchester Business School,2008.
[107]Bruner, R.. Applied Mergers and Acquisitions. Hoboken. New Jersey:John Wiley & Sons, Inc,2004.
[108]Burt R S. Autonomy in a Social Topologyl[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1980, 85(4):892-925.
[109]Burt R S. Corporate Profits and Cooptation:Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy[M]. New York:Academic Press,1983.
[110]Burt R S. Structural Holes:The Social Structure of Competition [M]. Harvard University Press,1992.
[111]Burt R S. Structural Holes and Good Ideas [J]. American Journal of Sociology,2004, 110(2):349-399.
[112]Cai Y, Sevilir M. Board Connections and M&A Transactions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(2):327-349.
[113]Cai Y, Pan C, Li H. Executive and Director Networks and IPO Underpricing [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[114]Chahine S, Goergen M. The Effects of Management-Board Ties on IPO Performance [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,21(6):153-179.
[115]Chen R, Dyball M C, Wright S. The Link between Board Composition and Corporate Diversification in Australian Corporations [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2009,17(2):208-223.
[116]Chhaochharia V, Grinstein Y. Corporate Governance and Firm value:The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules[J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(4):1789-1825.
[117]Chidambaran N K, Kedia S, Prabhala N. CEO Director Connections and Corporate Fraud [J]. Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper,2011.
[118]Chikh S, Filbien J Y. Acquisitions and CEO Power:Evidence from French Networks [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(5):1221-1236.
[119]Chiu P C, Teoh S H, Tian F. Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[120]Chuluun T, Prevost A, Puthenpurackal J. Board Ties and the Cost of Corporate Debt[R]. Working Paper, Loyola University-Baltimore,2013.
[121]Claessens S, Tzioumis K. Measuring Firms'Access to Finance[J]. World Bank,2006.
[122]Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C J. The Small World of Investing:Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2008,116(5):951-979.
[123]Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C. Sell-Side School Ties[J]. Journal of Finance,2010, 65(4):1409-1437.
[124]Coleman J, Katz E, Menzel H. The Diffusion of an Innovation among Physicians[J]. Sociometry,1957,20(4):253-270.
[125]Coleman J S. Introduction to Mathematical Sociology [M]. London Free Press Glencoe,1964.
[126]Coleman J S. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1988:S95-S120.
[127]Coles J L, Hoi C K. New evidence on the Market for Directors:Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310[J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):197-230.
[128]Conyon M J, Read L E. A Model of the Supply of Executives for Outside Directorships [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):645-659.
[129]Core J E, Holthausen R W, Larcker D F. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,51(3):371-406.
[130]Coval J D, Moskowitz T J. The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(4):811-841.
[131]Crespi R, Pascual-Fuster B. Executive Director's Pay and Networks:The Influence of Ownership Structure[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011.
[132]Croci E, Grassi R. The Economic Effect of Interlocking Directorates in Italy:New Evidence Using Centrality Measures [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[133]Davern M. Social Networks and Economic Sociology [J]. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1997,56(3):287-302.
[134]Davis G F. Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Inter Corporate Network [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1991:583-613.
[135]Davis G F. Who Gets ahead in the Market for Corporate Directors:the Political Economy of Multiple Board Memberships[C]. Academy of Management Proceedings. Academy of Management,1993.1993(1):202-206.
[136]Davis G F, Yoo M, Baker W E. The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001[J]. Strategic Organization,2003,1(3):301-326.
[137]de Matos J A, Ferreira M, Matos P, Mergulhao J. The Network Centrality of Influential Bankers:a New Capital Structure Determinant[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[138]Dooley P C. The Interlocking Directorate [J]. American Economic Review,1969, 59(3):314-323.
[139]Drago C, Millo F, Ricciuti R, et al. Corporate Governance reforms, Interlocking Directorship Networks and Company value in Italy [R]. CESifo Working Papers,2011.
[140]Duan Y, Hotchkiss E, Jiao Y. Business Ties and Information Advantage:Evidence from Mutual Fund Trading, University of Alberta[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2011.
[141]D'Aveni R A, Kesner I F. Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender Offer Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation during Takeovers[J]. Organization Science,1993,4(2):123-151.
[142]E1-Khatib R, Fogel K, Jandik T. CEO Network Centrality and Merger Performance [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[143]Engelberg J, Gao P, Parsons C A. The Price of a CEO's Rolodex [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(1):79-114.
[144]Etheridge D. Power and Information:The Effect of Board Networks on Mergers and Acquisitions[C].Finance and Corporate Governance Conference,2010.
[145]Fang Y, Francis B, Hasan I. More than Connectedness-Heterogeneity of CEO Social Network and Firm Value [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[146]Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[147]Fich E, White L. CEO Compensation and Turnover:The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards[J]. Wake Forest Law Review,2003,38(3):935-960.
[148]Fich E M, White L J. Why do CEOs Reciprocally Sit on Each Other's Boards [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(1):175-195.
[149]Fich E M, Shivdasani A. Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors [J]. Journal of Finance, 2006,61(2):689-724.
[150]Fracassi C. Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks[C]. AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper,2012.
[151]Fracassi C. Tate G. External Networking and Internal Finn Governance [J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):153-194.
[152]Freeman L C. Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification[J]. Social Networks,1979,1(3):215-239.
[153]Fukuyama F. Trust:The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity [M]. New York: Free Press,1995.
[154]Geletkanycz M A, Boyd B K. CEO Outside Directorships and Firm Performance:A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(2):335-352.
[155]Gompers P, Xuan Y. The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Acquisition of Private Companies[R]. AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.2008.
[156]Goyal S, Vega-Redondo F. Structural Holes in Social Networks[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,2007,137(1):460-492.
[157]Granovetter M S. The Strength of Weak Ties [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1973, 78(6):1360-1380.
[158]Granovetter M. Getting a Job:A Study of Contacts and Careers[M]. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,1974.
[159]Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91 (3):481-510.
[160]Granovetter M. The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19(1):33-50..
[161]Gulati R. Alliances and Networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(4): 293-317.
[162]Hallock K F. Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1997,32(03): 331-344.
[163]Harford J. What Drives Merger Waves?[J]. Journal of financial Economics,2005, 77(3):529-560.
[164]Harris M, Raviv A. A Theory of Board Control and Size[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(4):1797-1832.
[165]Haunschild P R. Interorganizational Imitation:The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[166]Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96-118.
[167]Hermalin B, Weisbach M. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:A Survey of the Economic Literature[J]. Economic Policy Review,2003, 9(1):7-26.
[168]Hochberg Y V, Ljungqvist A, Lu Y. Whom you Know Matters:Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance [J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(1):251-301.
[169]Hoff K, Stiglitz J E. Introduction:Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives[J]. World Bank Economic review,1990,4(3):235-250.
[1701 Hong H, Kubik J D, Stein J C. Thy Neighbor's Portfolio:Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers[J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(6): 2801-2824.
[171]Horton J, Serafeim G. Security Analyst Networks, Performance and Career Outcomes [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[172]Horton J, Millo Y, Serafeim G. Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2012,39(4):399-426.
[173]Huang Q, Jiang F, Lie E. The Value of Social Networks during Periods of Distress[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,201 la.
[174]Huang Q, Jiang F, Lie E. The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011b.
[175]Hwang B H, Kim S. It Pays to Have Friends [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009,93(1):138-158.
[176]Hwang B H, Kim S. Social Ties and Earnings Management [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[177]Ishii J, Xuan Y. Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2014, forthcoming.
[178]Jensen M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[179]Johansen T R, Pettersson K. The Impact of Board Interlocks on Auditor Choice and Audit Fees [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2013,21(3):287-310.
[180]Jones C, Hesterly W S, Borgatti S P A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1997,22(4):911-945.
[181]Kapferer, B. Norms and the Manipulation of Relationships in a Work Context. In J. C. Mitchell (Ed.), Social Networks in Urban Situations,1969. Manchester:Manchester University Press.
[182]Khanna V, Kim E H, Lu Y. CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[183]Khurana I K, Martin X, Pereira R. Financial Development and the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2006,41(4): 787-808.
[184]Kiang, Nelson,2006, "GUANXI (The Art of Relationships):Microsoft, China, and Bill Gates's Plan to Win the Road Ahead", Simon and Schuster, Inc.
[185]Kim Y. Board Network Characteristics and Firm Performance in Korea [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review.2005,13(6):800-808.
[186]Kirchmaier T, Stathopoulos K. From Fiction to Fact:The Impact of CEO Social Networks[R]. Manchester Business School Working Paper,2008.
[187]Kirchmaier T, Kollo M. The Role of Prestige and Networks in Outside Director Appointments [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2007.
[188]Knyazeva A, Knyazeva D, Masulis R W. The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board independence[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(6):1561-1605.
[189]Koenig T, Gogel R, Sonquist J. Models of the Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates [J]. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1979,38(2):173-186.
[190]Kramarz F, Thesmar D. Social Networks in the Boardroom[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association,2013,11(4):780-807.
[191]Kroszner R S, Strahan P E. Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending[R]. NBER Working Paper Series,2001.
[192]Kuhnen C M. Business Networks, Corporate Governance, and Contracting in the Mutual fund Industry [J]. Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):2185-2220.
[193]Larcker D, Richardson S, Seary A, Tuna Irem. Back Door Links between Directors and Executive Compensation[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2005.
[194]Larcker D F, So E C, Wang C C Y. Boardroom Centrality and Finn Performance [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2013,55(2):225-250.
[195]Laumann E O, Marsden P V, Galaskiewicz J. Community-elite Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1977,83(3): 594-631.
[196]Leonhardt, D. So You Want to Become a Corporate Director [N]. N.Y. Times News Service,2000.
[197]Levine J H. The Sphere of Influence [J]. American Sociological Review,1972,37(1): 14-27.
[198]Levit D, Malenko N. The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance [R]. SSRN Working Papers,2013.
[199]Lin Yutang. My Country and My People[M]. New York:Reynal & Hitchcock.1935.
[200]Lin N, Ensel W M, Vaughn J C. Social Resources and Strength of Ties:Structural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment [J]. American Sociological Review,1981: 393-405.
[201]Lin N, Dumin M. Access to Occupations through Social Ties [J]. Social Networks, 1986,8(4):365-385.
[202]Lin Nan. Social Resources and Instrumental Action[C]. P. Marsden and Nan Lin, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA:Sage,1982.
[203]Lin Nan. Social Capital [M]. Cambridge University Press,2001.
[204]Lin Z J, Peng M W, Yang H, et al. How Do Networks and Learning Drive M&As? An Institutional Comparison between China and the United States[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(10):1113-1132.
[205]Liu Y. The Impact of Networks on CEO Turnover, Appointment, and Compensation [J]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2010.
[206]Maman D. Research Note:Interlocking Ties within Business Groups in Israel-A Longitudinal Analysis,1974-1987[J]. Organization studies,1999,20(2):323-339.
[207]Markarian G, Parbonetti A. Financial Interlocks and Earnings Management:Evidence from Italy [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[208]Masulis R W, Wang C, Xie F. Globalizing the Boardroom-The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,53(3):527-554.
[209]Mitchell, J. C. Social Networks in Urban Situations [M]. Manchester:Manchester University Press,1969.
[210]Mizruchi, M.S. The American Corporate Network:1904-1974 [M]. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,1982.
[211]Mizruchi M S. The Structure of Corporate Political Action:Interfirm Relations and Their Consequences [M]. Harvard University Press,1992.
[212]Mizruchi M S. What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates[J]. Annual Review of Sociology,1996,22(1): 271-298.
[213]Moreno, J. L. Who Shall Survive?A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations [M]. Washington, DC:Nervous & Mental Disease,1934.
[214]Myers S C, Majluf N S. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have[J]. Journal of financial Economics,1984, 13(2):187-221.
[215]Nguyen B D. Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite's Small World and the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors[J]. Management Science,2012,58(2):236-252.
[216]Non M, Franses P. Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance:Evidence from a New Panel Database [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2007.
[217]Omer T, Shelley M, Tice F. Do Well-Connected Directors Improve Firm Performance? [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[218]Palmer D, Friedland R, Singh J V. The Ties that Bind:Organizational and Class Bases of Stability in a Corporate Interlock Network[J]. American Sociological Review,1986, 51(6):781-796.
[219]Pan Y. The Determinants and Impact of Executive-Firm Matches[R]. University of Minnesota Working Paper Series,2010.
[220]Pennings J. M. Interlocking Directorates [M]. San Francisco:Jossey Bass,1980.
[221]Perry T, Peyer U. Board Seat Accumulation by Executives:A Shareholder's Perspective [J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60(4):2083-2123.
[222]Pfeffer J, Salancik G. The External Control of Organizations:A Resource Dependence Perspective [M]. New York:Harper and Row,1978.
[223]Podolny J M. Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Marketl [J]. American Journal of Sociology,2001,107(1):33-60.
[224]Putnam R D. Bowling alone:America's Declining Social Capital[J]. Journal of democracy,1995,6(1):65-78.
[225]Qi Q. How Does the Director's Social Network Matter? Evidence from Structure Estimation [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2011.
[226]Radcliffe-Brown A R. On Social Structure [J]. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland,1940,70(1):1-12.
[227]Rao H, Davis G F, Ward A. Embeddedness, Social Identity and Mobility:Why Firms Leave the NASDAQ and Join the New York Stock Exchange [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2000,45(2):268-292.
[228]Reeb D M, Zhao W. Director Capital and Corporate Disclosure Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(4):191-212.
[229]Renneboog L, Zhao Y. Us Knows us in the UK:On Director Networks and CEO Compensation [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(4):1132-1157.
[230]Richardson G B. The Organisation of Industry [J]. Economic Journal,1972,82(327): 883-96.
[231]Richardson, S.. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,11(2),159-189
[232]Schmidt B. Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[233]Schonlau R, Singh P V. Board Networks and Merger Performance [R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2009.
[234]Schoorman F D, Bazerman M H, Atkin R S. Interlocking Directorates:A strategy for Reducing Environmental Uncertainty [J]. Academy of Management Review,1981,6(2): 243-251.
[235]Scott J. Networks of Corporate Power:A Comparative Assessment [J]. Annual Review of Sociology,1991,17(1):181-203.
[236]Shipilov A V, Li S X. Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It too? Structural Holes' Influence on Status Accumulation and Market Performance in Collaborative Networks [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2008,53(1):73-108.
[237]Shue K. Executive Networks and Firm Policies:Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(6):1401-1442.
[238]Simpson H, Wright E. Social Networks and Boardroom Appointments:Who You Know Matters[R]. SSRN Working Paper Series,2012.
[239]S(?)rensen M. How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-sided Matching Model of Venture Capital[J]. Journal of Finance,2007,62(6):2725-2762.
[240]Stoughton N M, Zechner J. IPO-Mechanisms, Monitoring and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(1):45-77.
[241]Sullivan B N, Tang Y. Small-world Networks, Absorptive Capacity and Firm Performance:Evidence from the US Venture Capital Industry [J]. International Journal of Strategic Change Management.2012,4(2):149-175.
[242]Tirole, J..The Theory of Corporate Finance [M]. Princeton University Press Princeton, 2006.
[243]Wasserman, S., Faust, K. Social Network Analysis:Methods and Applications [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1994.
[244]Wellman B. Network Analysis:Some Basic Principles[J]. Sociological theory,1983, 1(1):155-200.
[245]Wincent J, Anokhin S, Ortqvist D. Does Network Board Capital Matter? A Study of Innovative Performance in Strategic SME Networks[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2010,63(3):265-275.
[246]Withers M C, Hillman A J, Cannella A A. A Multidisciplinary Review of the Director Selection Literature[J]. Journal of Management,2012,38(1):243-277.
[247]Yeo H J, Pochet C, Alcouffe A. CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations [J]. Journal of Management and Governance,2003,7(1):87-108.
[248]Yonker S E. Geography and the Market for CEOs[R]. SSRN Working Paper,2009.
[249]Zaheer A, Bell G G. Benefiting from Network Position:Firm Capabilities, Structural Holes, and Performance [J]. Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(9):809-825.
[250]Zajac E J, Westphal J D. Director Reputation, CEO-Board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(3):507-529.
[251]Zhou X, Li Q, Zhao W, Cai, H.. Embeddedness and Contractual Relationships in China's Transitional Economy[J]. American Sociological Review,2003,68(1):75-102.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |