薪酬管制下国企高管激励研究
|
摘要
中国国有企业改革是伴随着中国经济转型以来的长久话题。随着改革的不断深入和公司治理结构的逐步完善,众多涉及国企经营与管理的问题浮出水面。尤其的,,国企高管薪酬激励成为理论界和实务界讨论热点。
目前,国企高管薪酬激励分为货币性激励和控制权激励：前者包括货币年薪和股权；后者则主要以控制权带来的在职消费为主。货币薪酬存在管制、在职消费过度膨胀是当前国企高管薪酬面临的主要问题。
国企高管货币薪酬存在管制。由于中国国企长期承担着稳定就业、保证分配公平的社会责任,加之高管行政性任命和“准官员”的模糊身份,高管货币薪酬一直受到管制,主要体现为严格规定高管与员工相对薪酬比例。从09年“限薪令”开始,之后相继出台的国企高管《薪酬管理暂行办法》、《业绩考核暂行办法》都明确规定了其绩效薪酬的增长上限；2013年两会的有关国务院批转《关于深化收入分配制度改革的若干意见》再次将国企高管货币薪酬管理做为新时期国企改革的重点。
与此同时,长期存在于国企高管中的过度在职消费却愈演愈烈。据《廉政瞭望》披露,许多国企高管的在职消费“基本处于失控状态,比薪酬乱得多,问题也严重得多,业已成为高管们一笔庞大的隐形收入”。许多学者也发现,薪酬管制与高管腐败存在正相关。因此,作为高管腐败的重要表现,从薪酬管制角度研究国企高管在职消费的成因也具有重要的现实意义。
基于以上背景,本文从国企高管薪酬管制和在职消费两个角度出发,通过递进关系深入研究当前中国国企高管激励问题。
全文分析建立在基于“不平等厌恶偏好”的行为分析范式。与传统经济学纯粹理性人假设不同,行为经济学认为,个体具有他涉偏好。以Fehr等人为代表的实验经济学家,通过一系列代表性实验,如信任实验、礼物交换实验、公共物品实验等。实验结果均发现,被试不仅具有单纯的利己动机,还会考虑其他个体福利,即具有社会偏好。大量实验给出了他涉偏好的实验室证据,行为经济学家又力图通过模型进一步阐释行为变量对个体选择的影响：Rabin通过动态心理博弈模型证实,互惠偏好会显著改变博弈均衡解,从而提出心理博弈均衡；Fehr等人提出的不平等厌恶偏好则是应用性最广的一类基础模型,也是本文建模的参照系。行为分析框架发展的重要领域是应用在激励分析中,即行为劳动经济学的发展。行为劳动经济学领域的激励研究,不仅关注物质激励,更重视行为、心理因素对个体选择的影响,如身份认同、公平和互惠等。该思路奠定了行为“委托—代理”模型的扩展和应用,E&W模型应运而生。同时,Kahneman等人提出了个体选择的“锚定效应”假说,认为初始参照点对最终结果有显著影响。本文理论模型的构建就是在E&W行为“委托—代理”模型基础上,引入“锚定效应”假说,并结合现实分析的需要,通过对假设做出调整而得。
理论模型的构建要依托现实问题的需要,本文围绕“薪酬管制”和“在职消费”对中国国企高管激励进行研究。首先,薪酬管制是中国国企高管的一个典型特征,这也是区别于西方市场经济的主要方面。所以,外国文献对国有企业也薪酬管制的研究不多,可供参考的也只是管制经济学中对管制成因及其影响后果的分析。多数有关管制的研究认为,行政管制会降低效率,不可取。但结合中国国企发展,为何在一致推行市场化改革的同时依然坚持“薪酬管制”不放松呢?这是本文提出的第一个问题。对丁该问题的解答,国内学者给出了更符合逻辑的答案,即行政化选拔的国企高管薪酬必然受到行政化约束。黄再胜等人的研究发现,政治身份是薪酬管制存在的根本原因,虽然提出政治激励是重要方面,但他们的模型依然建立在物质薪酬单一激励框架下的“委托—代理”模型,并没有进一步深化,也没有为管制的经济后果提供经验支持；在进一步研究薪酬管制和在职消费关系中,构建二者的逻辑联系是前提,在这方面,国内研究并不多,多数仅限于对在职消费的经验研究,例如构建计量模型检验某一因素对在职消费影响的显著性等,但缺乏理论支持。
从逻辑上,本文主要从中国国企高管薪酬管制出发,首先讨论中国国企薪酬管制政策实施的原因,再进一步考察薪酬管制是否对高管的在职消费有显著影响。中国国企高管的“薪酬管制”可谓是与“中国特色发展”相结合的典型政策：中国的国有企业从改革最初的“放权让利”到后来的“两权分离”,直至今日的“现代化企业制度”确立,历时30多年,所有权与经营权的关系虽逐步向着市场化体制转变,但高管的“行政式”任命形式依旧延续,这也使得中国的国企高管存在着“亦官亦商”的双重身份,“管制”还是“遵循市场”的激励模式一直饱受争议。本文紧紧围绕国企高管“政治身份”这一关键特征,通过构建委托人不平等厌恶的行为“委托—代理”模型,发现正是由于多重激励的存在,使得具有不平等厌恶的委托人倾向于对代理人薪酬采取管制,从而实现社会“公平”的目标,而且,这种管制会降低企业绩效；在进一步的实证检验发现,薪酬管制的确与绩效显著负相关。
本文的第二个逻辑层次,是讨论当前围绕国企高管在职消费展开的激烈争论。有关高管在职消费的文献研究发现,企业所有制结构、国企分红等诸多因素都会显著提高高管在职消费。仍有薪酬论认为,薪酬管制也是重要影响因素之一本文紧接上文的逻辑思路,考察薪酬管制的主要经济后果之一—在职消费。同样的,依托行为“委托—代理”模型,将不平等厌恶偏好拓展到代理人效用函数中,同时引入“锚定效应”构建代理人效用函数,发现,引入不平等厌恶偏好和“锚定效应”的均衡解显示,薪酬管制使得在职消费成为货币薪酬的替代；之后的实证检验证实了二者的关系。
通过上述两个层次的分析,本文得出结论：国企高管的政治身份和行政选拔使得政府不得不对其薪酬实施管制；薪酬管制除了直接降低企业绩效,更通过“锚定效应”影响高管行为选择,进而使得在职消费成为替代性激励。由此认为,要实现国有企业薪酬改革,首先要摒弃传统的政府干预,实现管理者的市场性选拔机制。
研究方法上,本文采用理论分析和实证检验相结合,对薪酬管制和在职消费展开深入讨论。在理论分析中,首先构建基于不平等厌恶偏好的行为分析范式。在传统“委托—代理”框架基础上,分别在委托人和代理人效用函数中纳入不平等厌恶偏好,考察均衡解的变化,得出相关定理；进一步的,在理论结论基础上通过构建计量模型,以中国上市国企为例,采用非平衡面板数据分析,验证理论假设的准确性。又通过引入上市非国有企业参照组,深入研究薪酬管制对在职消费的影响。
本文创新体现在两个方面：第一,建模的创新。之前文献研究薪酬管制成因时,只考察物质激励的影响,即使有学者提出国企高管的政治身份是造成薪酬管制的根本原因,但只是在约束条件上加以体现,并没有深入剖析政治激励对代理人效用函数的改变。本文在沿用委托人不平等厌恶偏好范式的基础上,进一步拓展了代理人双重激励效用函数,更加直观的展现薪酬管制存在原因。同时,在职消费的分析中也对代理人效用函数进行拓展,加入了除货币收入以外的在职消费收入作为替代变量,从而得出“薪酬管制造成在职消费对货币收入替代”这一理论结果,这也开创性的从理论方面解释薪酬管制和在职消费的关系；第二,实证的创新。实证方面创新主要体现在不平衡面板方法的应用。为了保持充足的数据量,计量模型采用了非平衡面板数据估计,极大地提高了结果的准确性。
The reform of SOEs is a long-lasting story since1990s. More and more new problems have been discussed, especially for the incentives of managers.
Nowadays, the incentives of managers include the pecuniary and non-pecuniary ones. The former is salary and the other is from control compensation, especially for perks.The regulation for salary and overuse of perks are two characters in Chinese SOEs.
The first character is the regulation on salary. More burdens on the SOEs lead to ambiguous identity of managers. The intervention by government is the main reseason for regulation on salary. It is said that the legal regulations since2009are more and more severe.
On the other hand, the perks are important corruption. The papers show that perks have been number one corruption in Chinese SOEs. Many scholars say that regulation partly leads to perks.
So, how to analyse the relationship between regulation of salary and perks is the main topic in this paper.
The base of theoretical analysis is the behavioral labor economics:the unequality-aversion preference. On the contrary to the traditional economics, behavioral economics focuses on the other-regarding perferences. Fehr et.al., show that many experiments such as trust games, gift-exchange games, public games include fairness and reciprocity preferences; furthermore, Rabin built psychological game theory to model this process. But the most important model in this field is made by Fehr in1999, named unequality-aversion preference. This paper take it as a reference point in the theoretical ananlysis. Another important assumption was put forward by Kahneman, the so-called "anchor-effect" in choice.
Literature on regualtion on salary and perks are different. The regualtion on salary is characteristic in Chinese SOEs, which is significantly different from wesetern contries. So the literature in this area is limited, most of which focus on the economic outcome of regualtion. But for China, is it right of wrong to regulate managers'compensation? This is the first question in this paper. Many scholars believe the intervention from government lead to the distortion in incentives, which bring too much perks. Huang found that the political incentive of managers is the fundamantal reseason for regulation. But he did not give us empirical evidence. On the other hand, the papers on perks mostly focus on empirical analysis, which are lack of theoretical base.
Logically, the starting point is the regualtion on salary. Why we need regulations? Does it have influence on effiency? The regualtions on salary in Chinese SOEs is charateristic in Chines economic reform, which have three steps. But the build of modern enterprises does not mean the SOEs have clear property right. The intervention in the managers still exists, which lead to the ambiguous identity in enterprises. The politcial identiy is one important assumption in the theoretical ananlysis. The behaviroal "principle-agent" model shows that political incentive made principle regulate the pecuniary incentive and keep fairness. The following evidence
The second question is on the perks in SOEs. Many literature show that the property rights,dividende and many other factos influence the perks. But more traditional research believe pecunairy compensation is the most important factor. This paper follows the pecunairy one to analyse the basic outcome of regualtion:perks. Similarly, the behavioral "principle-agent" model includes the agent's unequality-aversion perference and "anchor-effect" in this analysis. The theoretical model shows that regualtion on salary leads to more perks, which also has been proved.The analysis above give us two conclusions:(1)The political incentive and intervention by government leads to regulation on salary;(2)The "anchor-effect" and "unequality-aversion preference" make agent more allergic to pecuniary regulation, which lead to more perks. So, in order to promote the reform of SOEs, the government needs to give up the intervention and build up the market of managers.
As for the research method, this paper uses theoretical and empirical combination. For the theoretical analysis, the model is based on the behavioral labor economics, which incorporats behavioral factors into the traditional "principle-agent"' model; the empirical ananlysis uses the unbalanced panel data to prove the conclusions, which incorporates reference point as the comparision.
There two main innovations in this paper:the first one is on model. The traditional research on regualtion just includes pecuniary compensation in the utility function, which cannot characterise the political incentive in Chinese SOEs. This paper make it up and build a model based on double incentives in behavioral "principle-agent" model. Especially, in the model of perks, it puts the assumption of "anchor-effect" in the agent's utility function, which provides a new ananlysis on perks; the second innovation is the use unbalaned panel in empirical ananlysis. This method uses more data in the ananlysis and gives us more robust outcome.
目前,国企高管薪酬激励分为货币性激励和控制权激励：前者包括货币年薪和股权；后者则主要以控制权带来的在职消费为主。货币薪酬存在管制、在职消费过度膨胀是当前国企高管薪酬面临的主要问题。
国企高管货币薪酬存在管制。由于中国国企长期承担着稳定就业、保证分配公平的社会责任,加之高管行政性任命和“准官员”的模糊身份,高管货币薪酬一直受到管制,主要体现为严格规定高管与员工相对薪酬比例。从09年“限薪令”开始,之后相继出台的国企高管《薪酬管理暂行办法》、《业绩考核暂行办法》都明确规定了其绩效薪酬的增长上限；2013年两会的有关国务院批转《关于深化收入分配制度改革的若干意见》再次将国企高管货币薪酬管理做为新时期国企改革的重点。
与此同时,长期存在于国企高管中的过度在职消费却愈演愈烈。据《廉政瞭望》披露,许多国企高管的在职消费“基本处于失控状态,比薪酬乱得多,问题也严重得多,业已成为高管们一笔庞大的隐形收入”。许多学者也发现,薪酬管制与高管腐败存在正相关。因此,作为高管腐败的重要表现,从薪酬管制角度研究国企高管在职消费的成因也具有重要的现实意义。
基于以上背景,本文从国企高管薪酬管制和在职消费两个角度出发,通过递进关系深入研究当前中国国企高管激励问题。
全文分析建立在基于“不平等厌恶偏好”的行为分析范式。与传统经济学纯粹理性人假设不同,行为经济学认为,个体具有他涉偏好。以Fehr等人为代表的实验经济学家,通过一系列代表性实验,如信任实验、礼物交换实验、公共物品实验等。实验结果均发现,被试不仅具有单纯的利己动机,还会考虑其他个体福利,即具有社会偏好。大量实验给出了他涉偏好的实验室证据,行为经济学家又力图通过模型进一步阐释行为变量对个体选择的影响：Rabin通过动态心理博弈模型证实,互惠偏好会显著改变博弈均衡解,从而提出心理博弈均衡；Fehr等人提出的不平等厌恶偏好则是应用性最广的一类基础模型,也是本文建模的参照系。行为分析框架发展的重要领域是应用在激励分析中,即行为劳动经济学的发展。行为劳动经济学领域的激励研究,不仅关注物质激励,更重视行为、心理因素对个体选择的影响,如身份认同、公平和互惠等。该思路奠定了行为“委托—代理”模型的扩展和应用,E&W模型应运而生。同时,Kahneman等人提出了个体选择的“锚定效应”假说,认为初始参照点对最终结果有显著影响。本文理论模型的构建就是在E&W行为“委托—代理”模型基础上,引入“锚定效应”假说,并结合现实分析的需要,通过对假设做出调整而得。
理论模型的构建要依托现实问题的需要,本文围绕“薪酬管制”和“在职消费”对中国国企高管激励进行研究。首先,薪酬管制是中国国企高管的一个典型特征,这也是区别于西方市场经济的主要方面。所以,外国文献对国有企业也薪酬管制的研究不多,可供参考的也只是管制经济学中对管制成因及其影响后果的分析。多数有关管制的研究认为,行政管制会降低效率,不可取。但结合中国国企发展,为何在一致推行市场化改革的同时依然坚持“薪酬管制”不放松呢?这是本文提出的第一个问题。对丁该问题的解答,国内学者给出了更符合逻辑的答案,即行政化选拔的国企高管薪酬必然受到行政化约束。黄再胜等人的研究发现,政治身份是薪酬管制存在的根本原因,虽然提出政治激励是重要方面,但他们的模型依然建立在物质薪酬单一激励框架下的“委托—代理”模型,并没有进一步深化,也没有为管制的经济后果提供经验支持；在进一步研究薪酬管制和在职消费关系中,构建二者的逻辑联系是前提,在这方面,国内研究并不多,多数仅限于对在职消费的经验研究,例如构建计量模型检验某一因素对在职消费影响的显著性等,但缺乏理论支持。
从逻辑上,本文主要从中国国企高管薪酬管制出发,首先讨论中国国企薪酬管制政策实施的原因,再进一步考察薪酬管制是否对高管的在职消费有显著影响。中国国企高管的“薪酬管制”可谓是与“中国特色发展”相结合的典型政策：中国的国有企业从改革最初的“放权让利”到后来的“两权分离”,直至今日的“现代化企业制度”确立,历时30多年,所有权与经营权的关系虽逐步向着市场化体制转变,但高管的“行政式”任命形式依旧延续,这也使得中国的国企高管存在着“亦官亦商”的双重身份,“管制”还是“遵循市场”的激励模式一直饱受争议。本文紧紧围绕国企高管“政治身份”这一关键特征,通过构建委托人不平等厌恶的行为“委托—代理”模型,发现正是由于多重激励的存在,使得具有不平等厌恶的委托人倾向于对代理人薪酬采取管制,从而实现社会“公平”的目标,而且,这种管制会降低企业绩效；在进一步的实证检验发现,薪酬管制的确与绩效显著负相关。
本文的第二个逻辑层次,是讨论当前围绕国企高管在职消费展开的激烈争论。有关高管在职消费的文献研究发现,企业所有制结构、国企分红等诸多因素都会显著提高高管在职消费。仍有薪酬论认为,薪酬管制也是重要影响因素之一本文紧接上文的逻辑思路,考察薪酬管制的主要经济后果之一—在职消费。同样的,依托行为“委托—代理”模型,将不平等厌恶偏好拓展到代理人效用函数中,同时引入“锚定效应”构建代理人效用函数,发现,引入不平等厌恶偏好和“锚定效应”的均衡解显示,薪酬管制使得在职消费成为货币薪酬的替代；之后的实证检验证实了二者的关系。
通过上述两个层次的分析,本文得出结论：国企高管的政治身份和行政选拔使得政府不得不对其薪酬实施管制；薪酬管制除了直接降低企业绩效,更通过“锚定效应”影响高管行为选择,进而使得在职消费成为替代性激励。由此认为,要实现国有企业薪酬改革,首先要摒弃传统的政府干预,实现管理者的市场性选拔机制。
研究方法上,本文采用理论分析和实证检验相结合,对薪酬管制和在职消费展开深入讨论。在理论分析中,首先构建基于不平等厌恶偏好的行为分析范式。在传统“委托—代理”框架基础上,分别在委托人和代理人效用函数中纳入不平等厌恶偏好,考察均衡解的变化,得出相关定理；进一步的,在理论结论基础上通过构建计量模型,以中国上市国企为例,采用非平衡面板数据分析,验证理论假设的准确性。又通过引入上市非国有企业参照组,深入研究薪酬管制对在职消费的影响。
本文创新体现在两个方面：第一,建模的创新。之前文献研究薪酬管制成因时,只考察物质激励的影响,即使有学者提出国企高管的政治身份是造成薪酬管制的根本原因,但只是在约束条件上加以体现,并没有深入剖析政治激励对代理人效用函数的改变。本文在沿用委托人不平等厌恶偏好范式的基础上,进一步拓展了代理人双重激励效用函数,更加直观的展现薪酬管制存在原因。同时,在职消费的分析中也对代理人效用函数进行拓展,加入了除货币收入以外的在职消费收入作为替代变量,从而得出“薪酬管制造成在职消费对货币收入替代”这一理论结果,这也开创性的从理论方面解释薪酬管制和在职消费的关系；第二,实证的创新。实证方面创新主要体现在不平衡面板方法的应用。为了保持充足的数据量,计量模型采用了非平衡面板数据估计,极大地提高了结果的准确性。
The reform of SOEs is a long-lasting story since1990s. More and more new problems have been discussed, especially for the incentives of managers.
Nowadays, the incentives of managers include the pecuniary and non-pecuniary ones. The former is salary and the other is from control compensation, especially for perks.The regulation for salary and overuse of perks are two characters in Chinese SOEs.
The first character is the regulation on salary. More burdens on the SOEs lead to ambiguous identity of managers. The intervention by government is the main reseason for regulation on salary. It is said that the legal regulations since2009are more and more severe.
On the other hand, the perks are important corruption. The papers show that perks have been number one corruption in Chinese SOEs. Many scholars say that regulation partly leads to perks.
So, how to analyse the relationship between regulation of salary and perks is the main topic in this paper.
The base of theoretical analysis is the behavioral labor economics:the unequality-aversion preference. On the contrary to the traditional economics, behavioral economics focuses on the other-regarding perferences. Fehr et.al., show that many experiments such as trust games, gift-exchange games, public games include fairness and reciprocity preferences; furthermore, Rabin built psychological game theory to model this process. But the most important model in this field is made by Fehr in1999, named unequality-aversion preference. This paper take it as a reference point in the theoretical ananlysis. Another important assumption was put forward by Kahneman, the so-called "anchor-effect" in choice.
Literature on regualtion on salary and perks are different. The regualtion on salary is characteristic in Chinese SOEs, which is significantly different from wesetern contries. So the literature in this area is limited, most of which focus on the economic outcome of regualtion. But for China, is it right of wrong to regulate managers'compensation? This is the first question in this paper. Many scholars believe the intervention from government lead to the distortion in incentives, which bring too much perks. Huang found that the political incentive of managers is the fundamantal reseason for regulation. But he did not give us empirical evidence. On the other hand, the papers on perks mostly focus on empirical analysis, which are lack of theoretical base.
Logically, the starting point is the regualtion on salary. Why we need regulations? Does it have influence on effiency? The regualtions on salary in Chinese SOEs is charateristic in Chines economic reform, which have three steps. But the build of modern enterprises does not mean the SOEs have clear property right. The intervention in the managers still exists, which lead to the ambiguous identity in enterprises. The politcial identiy is one important assumption in the theoretical ananlysis. The behaviroal "principle-agent" model shows that political incentive made principle regulate the pecuniary incentive and keep fairness. The following evidence
The second question is on the perks in SOEs. Many literature show that the property rights,dividende and many other factos influence the perks. But more traditional research believe pecunairy compensation is the most important factor. This paper follows the pecunairy one to analyse the basic outcome of regualtion:perks. Similarly, the behavioral "principle-agent" model includes the agent's unequality-aversion perference and "anchor-effect" in this analysis. The theoretical model shows that regualtion on salary leads to more perks, which also has been proved.The analysis above give us two conclusions:(1)The political incentive and intervention by government leads to regulation on salary;(2)The "anchor-effect" and "unequality-aversion preference" make agent more allergic to pecuniary regulation, which lead to more perks. So, in order to promote the reform of SOEs, the government needs to give up the intervention and build up the market of managers.
As for the research method, this paper uses theoretical and empirical combination. For the theoretical analysis, the model is based on the behavioral labor economics, which incorporats behavioral factors into the traditional "principle-agent"' model; the empirical ananlysis uses the unbalanced panel data to prove the conclusions, which incorporates reference point as the comparision.
There two main innovations in this paper:the first one is on model. The traditional research on regualtion just includes pecuniary compensation in the utility function, which cannot characterise the political incentive in Chinese SOEs. This paper make it up and build a model based on double incentives in behavioral "principle-agent" model. Especially, in the model of perks, it puts the assumption of "anchor-effect" in the agent's utility function, which provides a new ananlysis on perks; the second innovation is the use unbalaned panel in empirical ananlysis. This method uses more data in the ananlysis and gives us more robust outcome.
引文
[1]Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher:A theory of reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior[J],2006, Vol.54, pp:293-315
[2]Armin Falk:Notes and comments:gift-exchange in the field.Econometrica, September,2007, Vol.75 (5), pp:1501-151
[3]Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher:Testing theories of fairness—Itentions matter, Games and Economic Behavior [J],2008, Vol.62 pp:287-303
[4]Andreoni, James, and John Miller. Giving According to Garp:An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica,2002,Vol 70(2)pp: 737-53.
[5]Alchian, Armen A, and Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. The American Economic Review,1972,Vol 62(5),pp: 777-95.
[6]Ang, James S, Rebel A Cole, and James Wuh Lin. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.the Journal of Finance,2000,Vol 55(1),pp:81-106.
[7]Akerlof, George A. and Rachel Kranton:Economics and Identity[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,Vol,115(3),pp:715-53.
[8]Akerlof, George A. and Rachel Kranton:Identity and the Economics of Organizations [J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,Vol.19(1),pp:9-32.
[9]Bowles, Hannah Riley, Linda Babcock, and Lei Lai:Social Incentives for Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations:Sometimes it Does Hurt to Ask[J]Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,2006,Vol,103(1),pp: 84-103.
[10]Bebchuk, Lucian and Jesse M. Fried:Executive Compensation as an Agency Prob-lem[J]Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,Vol,17(3),pp:71-92
[11]Bolton, G and Ockenfels, A.:ERC:A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition[J] American Economic Review,2000,Vol,90,pp:166-193
[12]Blanco, Mariana, Dirk Engelmann, and Hans Theo Normann. A within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. [J] Games and Economic Behavior.2011,Vol 72(2),pp:321-38.
[13]Biswas, Abhijit, Chris Pullig, Balaji C Krishnan, and Scot Burton. Consumer Evaluation of Reference Price Advertisements:Effects of Other Brands'Prices and Semantic Cues.[J] Journal of Public Policy & Marketing.1999,Vol35(2),pp:52-65.
[14]Bartling, Bjorn, and Ferdinand A von Siemens. The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets:Moral Hazard with Envious Agents. [J] Labour Economics,2010,Vol.17,(3) pp:598-607.
[15]Bhattacharyya, Sugato, and Francine Lafontaine. Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts.[J] The RAND Journal of Economics,1995,Vol.34,pp: 761-81.
[16]Bordi Brandts,Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games [J], Games and Economic Behavior,2001,Vol.36, pp:138157
[17]Bolton Gary E, Zwick Rami:Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. [J],Games and economic behavior,1995, Vol.10, pp:95-121
[18]Charles Bellemare and Bruce Shearer, Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment[J], Games and EconomicBehavior, 2009,Vol.67(1), pp.233-244
[19]Croson, Rachel, and Simon Gachter. The Science of Experimental Economics. [J] Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2010.Vol.73(1),pp:122-31.
[20]Cabrales, Antonio, and Antoni Calvo-Armengol. Interdependent Preferences and Segregating Equilibria. [J] Journal of Economic Theory,2008,Vol.139(1),pp:99-113.
[21]Charness,G and Rabin, M:Understanding social preferences with simple tests [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,117(3):817-869
[22]Carpenter, J. and Seki, E.:Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from Fisherman in Toyama Bay[j]. Economic Inquiry, 2011,49(2), pp:612-630
[23]Cai, Hongbin, Hanming Fang, and Lixin Colin Xu. Eat, Drink, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms. Journal of Law and Economics,2011,Vol.54(1),pp:55-78.
[24]Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler:Anomalies:Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners[J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring,1995, Vol.9 (2), pp. 209-219
[24]Dur, Robert, and Amihai Glazer. Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss.[J] Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,2008,Vol.24(1),pp:120-37
[25]Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler:Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:Entitlements in the Market. [J]The American Economic Review,Sep.,1986, Vol.76 (4) pp.728-741
[26]Dannenberg, Astrid, Thomas Riechmann, Bodo Sturm, and Carsten Vogt. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games:An Experimental Investigation[J].ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2007,Vol 07,pp,034
[27]Demougin, Dominique, Claude Fluet, and Carsten Helm. Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents.[J] Canadian Journal of Economics Review,2006,Vol.39(2) pp:399-413.
[28]Englmaier, Florian, and Achim Wambach. Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion.[J] Games and Economic Behavior,2010,Vol 69(2),pp:312-28.
[29]Encinosa, William E., Ⅲ, Martin Gaynor, and James B. Rebitzer:The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives:Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems,[J]Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2007,Vol.62(2),pp: 187-214.
[31]Furnham, Adrian, and Hua Chu Boo.,A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect.[J]The Journal of Socio-Economics,2011, Vol.40(l),pp:35-42.
[32]Falk Armin:Notes and comments:gift-exchange in the field [J] Econometrica,2007,Vol.75 (5) pp,1501-151
[33]Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Christian Zehnder,:Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages|The Behavioral Economics of Minimum Wage Laws,[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,Vol.121(4)pp:1347-81
[34]Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter:Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity [J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,Vol.14(3),pp:159-181
[35]Fischbacher, Uris, Christina M. Fong, and Ernst Fehr:Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition,[J] Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009,Vol.72(1),pp:527-545
[36]Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt:Theories of fairness and reciprocity—evidence and economic applications,[M] in Dewatripont, L.Hansen and St. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics-8th World,2002
[37]Fehr and Simon Gachter:Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity [J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer,2000,Vol.14(3):pp. 159-181
[38]Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger and Arno Riedl:Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation[J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics[J], May, 1993, Vol.108 (2), pp:437-459
[39]Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schlnidt.:A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.[J] Quarterly Journal of Econiomics.1999,Vol.114, pp:817-68.
[40]Ernst Fehr:The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs[J], Journal of the European Economic Association, Sep.2004, Vol.2(5), pp:743-771
[41]Galinsky, Adam D, and Thomas Mussweiler. First Offers as Anchors:The Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus. [J] Journal of personality and social psychology,2001,Vol.81(4),pp:657
[42]Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini:A Fine is a Price,[J] Journal of Legal Studies, 2000(a),Vol,29(1),pp:1-17.
[43]Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini:Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(b),115(3)pp:791-810.
[44]Gayle, George-Levi, and Robert A. Miller:Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?[J] American Economic Review, 2009,99(5),PP:1740-1769
[45]Grund, Christian, and Dirk Sliwka. Envy and Compassion in Tournaments.[J] Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,2005,Vol.14(1),pp:187-207
[46]Grogger,Jeffrey,Speech Patterns and Racial Wage Inequality[J], the Journal of Human Resources,2011,Vol.46(1)pp:1-25
[47]Grossman, Sanford J, and Oliver D Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. [J]The Bell Journal of Economics.1980,pp:42-64.
[48]Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels.ERC:A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition[J], The American Economic Review, Mar.,2000, Vol.90 (1):pp. 166-193
[49]Guth,W.,Schmittberger,R.,Schwarze,B:An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. [J]J. Econ.Behav. Organ.,1982, Vol.3, pp:367-388.
[50]Grinstein, Yaniv, David Weinbaum, and Nir Yehuda. Perks and Excess:Evidence from the New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules. [J] Unpublished working paper, Cornell University. Johnson School Research Paper Series,2008,pp:04-09.
[51]Hart, Oliver, and John Moore.,Contracts as Reference Points. [J] The Quarterly Journal Of Economics,2008,123(1),pp:1-48.
[52]Hirsch, Fred. Social Limits to Growth[M]. Routledge,2012.
[53]Henderson, M Todd, and James Spindler. Corporate Heroin:A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption. [J] Georgetown Law Journal, 2005,Vol34,pp:67-78.
[54]Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint[J] American Economic Review,1962, LII, December, pp.1052-1069.
[55]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral Hazard in Teams.[J]The Bell Journal of Economics,1982,Vol.61,pp:324-40.
[56]Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. [J]JL Econ.&Org. 1991,Vol.7,pp:24.
[57]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral Hazard and Observability.[J] The Bell Journal of Economics,1979,Vol.34,pp:74-91
[58]Jacob, Brian A. Accountability, Incentives and Behavior:the Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools,[J], Journal of Public Economics Volume 2005,Vol.89(5-6),pp:761-796.
[59]Jensen, Michael C, and William H Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.[J] Journal of Financia Economics,1976.Vol.3(4),pp:305-60
[60]Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe:Trust, Reciprocity and Social history[J], Games and economic behavior,1995, Vol.10, pp:122-142
[61]Kevin A. McCabe, Mary L. Rigdon and, Vernon L. Smith:Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games[J] Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2003, Vol.52,pp:267-275
[62]Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L Knetsch, and Richard H Thaler. Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics. [J] Journal of business,1986,pp:S285-S300.
[63]Levy, Frank and Peter Temin:Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America NBER Working Paper,2007, No.1310
[64]Lazear,E.P.. Personnel Economics.Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press,1996
[65]Lazear, Edward P, and Sherwin Rosen..Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. [J] Journal of Political Economy,1981, Vol89(5),pp:47-68
[66]Lisa A.Cameron:Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game:experimental evidence from Indonesia[J], Economic inquiry,1999,Vol.37(1), pp:47-59
[67]Milgrom, Paul Robert, and John Roberts. Economics, Organization and Management. [M]Vol.7:Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ,1992.
[68]Mohnen, Alwine, Kathrin Pokorny, and Dirk Sliwka. Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams:Theory and Evidence. [J]Journal of Labor Economics,2008,Vol 26(4),pp:693-720.
[69]Mas-Colell,Whinston and Green:Microeconomic Theory [M],Oxford University Press,1995
[70]Malcomson, James M. Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets."[J]Journal of Political Economy,1984,Vol.92(3),pp:486-507.
[71]Mirrlees, James A. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization. [J] The Bell Journal of Economics,1976,pp:105-31.
[72]Matthew Rabin:"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics", The American Economic Review[J], Dec.,1993, Vol.83 (5):pp.1281-1302
[73]Ross, Stephen A. The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Problem.[J] The American Economic Review,1973,Vol 63(2),pp:134-39.
[74]Rubinstein, Ariel, and Menahem E Yaari. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard.[J] Journal of Economic Theory,1983,Vol.30(1),pp:74-97.
[75]Radner, Roy. Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship. [J]Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1981,pp:1127-48
[76]Richard H. Thaler:Anomalies:The Ultimatum Game[J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Autumn,1988, Vol.2(4), pp:195-206
[77]Rajan, Raghuram G, and Julie Wulf. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,Vol 79(1),pp:1-33.
[78]Rachel Croson and Nancy Buchan:Gender and Culture:International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games[J], The American Economic Review, May, 1999, Vol.89 (2), pp:386-391
[79]Spence, Michael, and Richard Zeckhauser. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action.[J] The American Economic Review,1971,Vol 61 (2),pp:380-87.
[80]Stephen V. Burks, Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Eric Verhoogen:Playing both roles in the trust game[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2003, Vol.51, pp:195-216
[81]Stigler George J., The Theory of Economic Regulation[J],Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2, Spring, pp.3-21.
[82]Terence Burnham, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith,Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2000, Vol.43, pp:57-73
[83]Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. Judgment under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases.[J],Science,1974,185(4157):1124-31.
[84]Werner Giith:On ultimatum bargaining experiments-a personal review [J], Journal of Economic Behavior and Orpranization,1995, Vol.27, pp:329-344
[85]Wilson, Robert. The Theory of Syndicates.[J] Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1968,pp:119-32.
[86]Yermack, David. Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets, Ceo Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns.[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,Vol 80(1),pp:211-42.
[87]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J]经济究,2005,2,：92-101.
[88]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,梁上坤.地区差异,薪酬管制与高管腐败[J]管理世界,2009,11,：130-43.
[89]黄群慧,彭华岗,钟宏武, 张蒽.中国100强企业社会责任发展状况评价.[J,]中国工业经济,2009,10：23-35.
[90]黄再胜.转型期国企经营者的身份博弈与经济后果.[J]当代经济科学,2011,6：016.
[91]黄再胜,曹雷.国企经营者激励的制度性困境与出路.[J]学术月刊,2008.08：72-78
[92]黄再胜,王玉.公平偏好,薪酬管制与国企高管激励——一种基于行为合约理论的分析.[J]财经研究,2009,01：16-27.
[93]刘银国,张劲松,朱龙.国有企业高管薪酬管制有效性研究.[J]经济管理,2009.10：87-93.
[94]李寿喜.产权,代理成本和代理效率.[J]经济研究,2007,1：102-13.
[95]罗进辉,万迪防.大股东持股对管理者过度在职消费行为的治理研究.[J]证券市场导报,2009,06：64-70.
[96]晏艳阳,金鹏.委托人公平偏好下国企高管的最优激励组合.[J]财经研究,2012.12：128-39.
[97]逯东,林高,黄莉,杨丹.”官员型”高管,公司业绩和非生产性支出——基于国有上市公司的经验证据.[J]金融研究,2012,06：139-53.
[98]林毅夫,李周.现代企业制度的内涵与国有企业改革方向.[J]经济研究,1997.03：33.
[99]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力,在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据.[J]南开管理评论,2008,05：85-92.
[100]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释.”[J],管理世界,2009,11：99-109,
[101]梁彤缨,冯莉,陈修德.金字塔结构,在职消费与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.[J]山西财经大学学报,2012,11：75-83.
[102]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力,私有收益与薪酬操纵.[J],经济研究,2010,11：73-87.
[103]汪海波.中国国有企业改革的实.[J]中国经济史研究,2005,03：23.
[104]吴冬梅,庄新田.所有权性质,公司治理与控制权私人收益.[J]管理评,2010.07：53-60.
[105]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革,企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬.[J]经济研究,2009,11：68-81.
[106]周玮.政治密度,在职消费与制度环境.[J]软科学,2010,08：65-69.
[107]周玮,徐玉德,李慧云.政企关系网络,在职消费与市场化制度建设.[J]统计研究2011,28：53-58.
[2]Armin Falk:Notes and comments:gift-exchange in the field.Econometrica, September,2007, Vol.75 (5), pp:1501-151
[3]Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher:Testing theories of fairness—Itentions matter, Games and Economic Behavior [J],2008, Vol.62 pp:287-303
[4]Andreoni, James, and John Miller. Giving According to Garp:An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica,2002,Vol 70(2)pp: 737-53.
[5]Alchian, Armen A, and Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. The American Economic Review,1972,Vol 62(5),pp: 777-95.
[6]Ang, James S, Rebel A Cole, and James Wuh Lin. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.the Journal of Finance,2000,Vol 55(1),pp:81-106.
[7]Akerlof, George A. and Rachel Kranton:Economics and Identity[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,Vol,115(3),pp:715-53.
[8]Akerlof, George A. and Rachel Kranton:Identity and the Economics of Organizations [J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,Vol.19(1),pp:9-32.
[9]Bowles, Hannah Riley, Linda Babcock, and Lei Lai:Social Incentives for Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations:Sometimes it Does Hurt to Ask[J]Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,2006,Vol,103(1),pp: 84-103.
[10]Bebchuk, Lucian and Jesse M. Fried:Executive Compensation as an Agency Prob-lem[J]Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,Vol,17(3),pp:71-92
[11]Bolton, G and Ockenfels, A.:ERC:A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition[J] American Economic Review,2000,Vol,90,pp:166-193
[12]Blanco, Mariana, Dirk Engelmann, and Hans Theo Normann. A within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. [J] Games and Economic Behavior.2011,Vol 72(2),pp:321-38.
[13]Biswas, Abhijit, Chris Pullig, Balaji C Krishnan, and Scot Burton. Consumer Evaluation of Reference Price Advertisements:Effects of Other Brands'Prices and Semantic Cues.[J] Journal of Public Policy & Marketing.1999,Vol35(2),pp:52-65.
[14]Bartling, Bjorn, and Ferdinand A von Siemens. The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets:Moral Hazard with Envious Agents. [J] Labour Economics,2010,Vol.17,(3) pp:598-607.
[15]Bhattacharyya, Sugato, and Francine Lafontaine. Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts.[J] The RAND Journal of Economics,1995,Vol.34,pp: 761-81.
[16]Bordi Brandts,Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games [J], Games and Economic Behavior,2001,Vol.36, pp:138157
[17]Bolton Gary E, Zwick Rami:Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. [J],Games and economic behavior,1995, Vol.10, pp:95-121
[18]Charles Bellemare and Bruce Shearer, Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment[J], Games and EconomicBehavior, 2009,Vol.67(1), pp.233-244
[19]Croson, Rachel, and Simon Gachter. The Science of Experimental Economics. [J] Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2010.Vol.73(1),pp:122-31.
[20]Cabrales, Antonio, and Antoni Calvo-Armengol. Interdependent Preferences and Segregating Equilibria. [J] Journal of Economic Theory,2008,Vol.139(1),pp:99-113.
[21]Charness,G and Rabin, M:Understanding social preferences with simple tests [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,117(3):817-869
[22]Carpenter, J. and Seki, E.:Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from Fisherman in Toyama Bay[j]. Economic Inquiry, 2011,49(2), pp:612-630
[23]Cai, Hongbin, Hanming Fang, and Lixin Colin Xu. Eat, Drink, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms. Journal of Law and Economics,2011,Vol.54(1),pp:55-78.
[24]Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler:Anomalies:Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners[J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring,1995, Vol.9 (2), pp. 209-219
[24]Dur, Robert, and Amihai Glazer. Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss.[J] Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,2008,Vol.24(1),pp:120-37
[25]Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler:Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:Entitlements in the Market. [J]The American Economic Review,Sep.,1986, Vol.76 (4) pp.728-741
[26]Dannenberg, Astrid, Thomas Riechmann, Bodo Sturm, and Carsten Vogt. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games:An Experimental Investigation[J].ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2007,Vol 07,pp,034
[27]Demougin, Dominique, Claude Fluet, and Carsten Helm. Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents.[J] Canadian Journal of Economics Review,2006,Vol.39(2) pp:399-413.
[28]Englmaier, Florian, and Achim Wambach. Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion.[J] Games and Economic Behavior,2010,Vol 69(2),pp:312-28.
[29]Encinosa, William E., Ⅲ, Martin Gaynor, and James B. Rebitzer:The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives:Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems,[J]Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2007,Vol.62(2),pp: 187-214.
[31]Furnham, Adrian, and Hua Chu Boo.,A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect.[J]The Journal of Socio-Economics,2011, Vol.40(l),pp:35-42.
[32]Falk Armin:Notes and comments:gift-exchange in the field [J] Econometrica,2007,Vol.75 (5) pp,1501-151
[33]Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Christian Zehnder,:Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages|The Behavioral Economics of Minimum Wage Laws,[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2006,Vol.121(4)pp:1347-81
[34]Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter:Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity [J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,Vol.14(3),pp:159-181
[35]Fischbacher, Uris, Christina M. Fong, and Ernst Fehr:Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition,[J] Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009,Vol.72(1),pp:527-545
[36]Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt:Theories of fairness and reciprocity—evidence and economic applications,[M] in Dewatripont, L.Hansen and St. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics-8th World,2002
[37]Fehr and Simon Gachter:Fairness and Retaliation:The Economics of Reciprocity [J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer,2000,Vol.14(3):pp. 159-181
[38]Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger and Arno Riedl:Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation[J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics[J], May, 1993, Vol.108 (2), pp:437-459
[39]Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schlnidt.:A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.[J] Quarterly Journal of Econiomics.1999,Vol.114, pp:817-68.
[40]Ernst Fehr:The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs[J], Journal of the European Economic Association, Sep.2004, Vol.2(5), pp:743-771
[41]Galinsky, Adam D, and Thomas Mussweiler. First Offers as Anchors:The Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus. [J] Journal of personality and social psychology,2001,Vol.81(4),pp:657
[42]Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini:A Fine is a Price,[J] Journal of Legal Studies, 2000(a),Vol,29(1),pp:1-17.
[43]Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini:Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(b),115(3)pp:791-810.
[44]Gayle, George-Levi, and Robert A. Miller:Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?[J] American Economic Review, 2009,99(5),PP:1740-1769
[45]Grund, Christian, and Dirk Sliwka. Envy and Compassion in Tournaments.[J] Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,2005,Vol.14(1),pp:187-207
[46]Grogger,Jeffrey,Speech Patterns and Racial Wage Inequality[J], the Journal of Human Resources,2011,Vol.46(1)pp:1-25
[47]Grossman, Sanford J, and Oliver D Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. [J]The Bell Journal of Economics.1980,pp:42-64.
[48]Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels.ERC:A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition[J], The American Economic Review, Mar.,2000, Vol.90 (1):pp. 166-193
[49]Guth,W.,Schmittberger,R.,Schwarze,B:An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. [J]J. Econ.Behav. Organ.,1982, Vol.3, pp:367-388.
[50]Grinstein, Yaniv, David Weinbaum, and Nir Yehuda. Perks and Excess:Evidence from the New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules. [J] Unpublished working paper, Cornell University. Johnson School Research Paper Series,2008,pp:04-09.
[51]Hart, Oliver, and John Moore.,Contracts as Reference Points. [J] The Quarterly Journal Of Economics,2008,123(1),pp:1-48.
[52]Hirsch, Fred. Social Limits to Growth[M]. Routledge,2012.
[53]Henderson, M Todd, and James Spindler. Corporate Heroin:A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption. [J] Georgetown Law Journal, 2005,Vol34,pp:67-78.
[54]Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint[J] American Economic Review,1962, LII, December, pp.1052-1069.
[55]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral Hazard in Teams.[J]The Bell Journal of Economics,1982,Vol.61,pp:324-40.
[56]Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. [J]JL Econ.&Org. 1991,Vol.7,pp:24.
[57]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral Hazard and Observability.[J] The Bell Journal of Economics,1979,Vol.34,pp:74-91
[58]Jacob, Brian A. Accountability, Incentives and Behavior:the Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools,[J], Journal of Public Economics Volume 2005,Vol.89(5-6),pp:761-796.
[59]Jensen, Michael C, and William H Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.[J] Journal of Financia Economics,1976.Vol.3(4),pp:305-60
[60]Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe:Trust, Reciprocity and Social history[J], Games and economic behavior,1995, Vol.10, pp:122-142
[61]Kevin A. McCabe, Mary L. Rigdon and, Vernon L. Smith:Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games[J] Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2003, Vol.52,pp:267-275
[62]Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L Knetsch, and Richard H Thaler. Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics. [J] Journal of business,1986,pp:S285-S300.
[63]Levy, Frank and Peter Temin:Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America NBER Working Paper,2007, No.1310
[64]Lazear,E.P.. Personnel Economics.Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press,1996
[65]Lazear, Edward P, and Sherwin Rosen..Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. [J] Journal of Political Economy,1981, Vol89(5),pp:47-68
[66]Lisa A.Cameron:Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game:experimental evidence from Indonesia[J], Economic inquiry,1999,Vol.37(1), pp:47-59
[67]Milgrom, Paul Robert, and John Roberts. Economics, Organization and Management. [M]Vol.7:Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ,1992.
[68]Mohnen, Alwine, Kathrin Pokorny, and Dirk Sliwka. Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams:Theory and Evidence. [J]Journal of Labor Economics,2008,Vol 26(4),pp:693-720.
[69]Mas-Colell,Whinston and Green:Microeconomic Theory [M],Oxford University Press,1995
[70]Malcomson, James M. Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets."[J]Journal of Political Economy,1984,Vol.92(3),pp:486-507.
[71]Mirrlees, James A. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization. [J] The Bell Journal of Economics,1976,pp:105-31.
[72]Matthew Rabin:"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics", The American Economic Review[J], Dec.,1993, Vol.83 (5):pp.1281-1302
[73]Ross, Stephen A. The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Problem.[J] The American Economic Review,1973,Vol 63(2),pp:134-39.
[74]Rubinstein, Ariel, and Menahem E Yaari. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard.[J] Journal of Economic Theory,1983,Vol.30(1),pp:74-97.
[75]Radner, Roy. Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship. [J]Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1981,pp:1127-48
[76]Richard H. Thaler:Anomalies:The Ultimatum Game[J], The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Autumn,1988, Vol.2(4), pp:195-206
[77]Rajan, Raghuram G, and Julie Wulf. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,Vol 79(1),pp:1-33.
[78]Rachel Croson and Nancy Buchan:Gender and Culture:International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games[J], The American Economic Review, May, 1999, Vol.89 (2), pp:386-391
[79]Spence, Michael, and Richard Zeckhauser. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action.[J] The American Economic Review,1971,Vol 61 (2),pp:380-87.
[80]Stephen V. Burks, Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Eric Verhoogen:Playing both roles in the trust game[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2003, Vol.51, pp:195-216
[81]Stigler George J., The Theory of Economic Regulation[J],Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2, Spring, pp.3-21.
[82]Terence Burnham, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith,Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game[J], Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2000, Vol.43, pp:57-73
[83]Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. Judgment under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases.[J],Science,1974,185(4157):1124-31.
[84]Werner Giith:On ultimatum bargaining experiments-a personal review [J], Journal of Economic Behavior and Orpranization,1995, Vol.27, pp:329-344
[85]Wilson, Robert. The Theory of Syndicates.[J] Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1968,pp:119-32.
[86]Yermack, David. Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets, Ceo Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns.[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,Vol 80(1),pp:211-42.
[87]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J]经济究,2005,2,：92-101.
[88]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,梁上坤.地区差异,薪酬管制与高管腐败[J]管理世界,2009,11,：130-43.
[89]黄群慧,彭华岗,钟宏武, 张蒽.中国100强企业社会责任发展状况评价.[J,]中国工业经济,2009,10：23-35.
[90]黄再胜.转型期国企经营者的身份博弈与经济后果.[J]当代经济科学,2011,6：016.
[91]黄再胜,曹雷.国企经营者激励的制度性困境与出路.[J]学术月刊,2008.08：72-78
[92]黄再胜,王玉.公平偏好,薪酬管制与国企高管激励——一种基于行为合约理论的分析.[J]财经研究,2009,01：16-27.
[93]刘银国,张劲松,朱龙.国有企业高管薪酬管制有效性研究.[J]经济管理,2009.10：87-93.
[94]李寿喜.产权,代理成本和代理效率.[J]经济研究,2007,1：102-13.
[95]罗进辉,万迪防.大股东持股对管理者过度在职消费行为的治理研究.[J]证券市场导报,2009,06：64-70.
[96]晏艳阳,金鹏.委托人公平偏好下国企高管的最优激励组合.[J]财经研究,2012.12：128-39.
[97]逯东,林高,黄莉,杨丹.”官员型”高管,公司业绩和非生产性支出——基于国有上市公司的经验证据.[J]金融研究,2012,06：139-53.
[98]林毅夫,李周.现代企业制度的内涵与国有企业改革方向.[J]经济研究,1997.03：33.
[99]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力,在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据.[J]南开管理评论,2008,05：85-92.
[100]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释.”[J],管理世界,2009,11：99-109,
[101]梁彤缨,冯莉,陈修德.金字塔结构,在职消费与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.[J]山西财经大学学报,2012,11：75-83.
[102]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力,私有收益与薪酬操纵.[J],经济研究,2010,11：73-87.
[103]汪海波.中国国有企业改革的实.[J]中国经济史研究,2005,03：23.
[104]吴冬梅,庄新田.所有权性质,公司治理与控制权私人收益.[J]管理评,2010.07：53-60.
[105]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革,企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬.[J]经济研究,2009,11：68-81.
[106]周玮.政治密度,在职消费与制度环境.[J]软科学,2010,08：65-69.
[107]周玮,徐玉德,李慧云.政企关系网络,在职消费与市场化制度建设.[J]统计研究2011,28：53-58.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |