管理者背景特征与会计稳健性研究
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摘要
会计稳健性是关于会计盈余确认和计量的一项重要原则，有关会计准则制定组织和会计学术界都对此提出了诸多不同的解释。Basu（1997）对会计稳健性提出了一个描述性定义，即在财务报告中确认“好消息”（收益）比“坏消息”（损失）需要更多的保证。该定义反映了会计稳健性对收益和损失的非对称性处理。目前关于会计稳健性的研究一般是基于这个定义的。相关研究表明，公司契约尤其是融资契约、法律诉讼、政府管制、税收政策、公司治理、公司特征、政治关系、经济发展水平等因素都会影响会计稳健性，但鲜有文献问及管理者背景特征对会计稳健性的影响，然而，在现实中这种影响却是不可忽视的。现代企业的一个基本特征就是所有权与控制权相分离，管理者拥有企业控制权，因此管理者对企业行为及业绩便有着决定性的影响，而这种影响会首先表现在会计行为方面。会计信息作为一种通用的商业语言，是企业决策以及企业与各利益相关者之间是否签订契约、是否执行契约、是否修订契约的重要依据，在会计政策选择的过程中，管理者可能从自身利益出发选择有利于自己而不利于各利益相关者或企业的会计政策，从而影响会计稳健性。在现实中管理者也并非总是理性的，其行为选择要受到个人的过度自信、短视行为和实证偏见等心理偏差的影响，而这些心理偏差与个人的背景特征紧密相联，因此，管理者对会计稳健性的影响对于不同性别、年龄、学历、教育背景和任期等背景特征的管理者而言，就可能存在较大的差异。
本文在系统总结国内外相关研究成果的基础上，以高阶理论和行为经济学为出发点，以委托代理理论、契约理论和信号传递理论为理论基础，采用规范分析、实证分析和契约分析等研究方法，理论分析和实证检验管理者背景特征对会计稳健性的影响。首先对国内外相关研究成果和相关理论进行综述和分析；接着对会计稳健性的计量方法选择问题进行了理论和实证分析；然后从总体上检验会计稳健性中的管理者固定效应；在此基础上，实证考察管理者团队背景特征的平均水平、异质性和垂直对特征会计稳健性的影响，接着又考察董事长和财务总监的个人背景特征对会计稳健性的影响；最后总结全文的研究结论、揭示研究结论的政策意义以及指出未来研究的方向。本文的实证结果表明：管理者固定效应在很大程度上影响着会计稳健性；管理者团队的平均水平、异质性和垂直对背景特征，以及董事长和财务总监个人的不同背景特征均对会计稳健性有一定的影响，并且这些影响在国有上市公司和非国有上市公司之间有所差异。
本文在以下三个方面有所创新：①从管理者背景特征的角度建立研究会计稳健性问题的分析框架。以往关于会计稳健性的研究都是隐含管理者是同质的、理性的，但大量研究表明，不同的管理者具有不同的个人偏好和管理风格，他们也并非总是理性的，往往存在心理偏差，从而做出非理性决策。所以，运用高阶理论，研究管理者背景特征对会计稳健性的影响，将有助于拓展研究会计稳健性的视角，揭示会计稳健性的行为动机，从而加深人们对会计稳健性的理解。②从相关性和可靠性的角度研究会计稳健性计量方法的比较和选择问题。虽然目前学术界提出一些计量会计稳健性的方法，但对这些方法的有效性却缺乏比较分析，这势必会影响到实证研究结果的有效性。所以，本文对会计稳健性计量方法进行比较和选择研究，有助于正确地选择计量方法，从而提高实证研究结果的有效性。③从管理者控制权的角度分析会计稳健性中的管理者固定效应问题。以往关于管理者背景特征对公司行为的影响，大都直接选取了管理者的具体特征直接进行分析，而鲜有文献对其根本原因进行分析。相关研究表明，将年度、行业和企业因素控制后，还有很多无法解释的因素影响着公司行为。本文从行为经济学的角度，检验在会计稳健性中存在这种管理者固定效应，为管理者具体背景特征指标的选取提供了基础。
Accounting conservatism is an important principle of recognition and measurement of accountingearnings. There are different interpretations of accounting conservatism by related accountingstandard-setting organizations and accounting academics. Basu(1997) proposes a descriptive definitionfor accounting conservatism, which means that good news (gain) needs much more assurance than badnews (loss) in the financial reports recognition. This definition reflects asymmetric treatment of gainsand losses by accounting conservatism. Nowadays the researches on accounting conservatism aregenerally based on this definition. The existing literature shows that the company contracts, especiallythe factors of financing contracts, litigations, government regulations, tax policies, corporategovernance, firm characteristics, political relations, economic development level, may affect theaccounting conservatism. Meanwhile, rare literatures consider the effects of accounting conservatismon management background characteristics. However, this effect can not be ignored in reality. Anessential feature of the modern enterprise is that its ownership and management are separated, withwhich managers control the enterprises. Therefore, the managers have a decisive influence on corporatebehavior and performance. and this effect is mainly reflected on accounting behaviors. As a universallanguage of business, accounting information is an important reference to the managers and thestakeholders to decide whether to sign the contracts, whether to perform the contracts, and whether toamend the contracts. In the process of accounting policy choice, managers may choose the corporateaccounting policies on behalf of their own interests rather than the interests of all stakeholders, whichsurely affects accounting conservatism. In reality, managers are not always rational, their behaviors aresubjected to their personal overconfidence, short-sighted behaviors and empirical prejudicepsychological deviation, while the above psychological deviations are closely linked to their personalbackground characteristics. Therefore, the impacts of managers on accounting conservatism are quitedifferent among different background characteristics of managers, such as different sexes, ages,educational backgrounds, educational backgrounds and tenures.
On the basis of the results of relevant researches both home and abroad, starting from upperechelons theory and behavioral economics, according to the principal-agent theory, contract theory andsignaling theory, using normative, empirical and contract analysis, this dissertation theoretically andempirically tests the impact of management background characteristics on accounting conservatism.First, it reviews the related researches and analysis relevant theories. Then, it analyzes the measurementmethod choice of accounting conservatism theoretically and empirically. And then, this dissertationtests the impacts of the manager fixed effects on accounting conservatism on a whole. Subsequently,this dissertation empirically investigates the impact of the average level, heterogeneity and verticalcharacteristics of the background characteristics of the management team on accounting conservatism.And then it investigates the impact of the demographic characteristics of the chairman and Chief Financial Officer on accounting conservatism. Finally, come the summary of the conclusions, policyimplications of the study and directions of future research. The empirical results show that the managerfixed effects significantly influence the accounting conservatism. The average level, heterogeneity andvertical characteristics of the background characteristics of the manager team, as well as differentbackground characteristics of the Chairman and Chief Financial Officer have certain influences onaccounting conservatism, and these effects differ between the state-owned listed companies andnon-state-owned listed companies.
There are following three innovations in this dissertation. First, it establishes the analysisframework of accounting conservatism from the perspective of manager background characteristics.The existed researches on accounting conservatism implicitly regard that the managers arehomogeneous and rational, but a large number of studies have shown that different managers havedifferent personal preferences and management style. they are not always rational and are oftensuffered from mental deviation and make irrational decisions. Therefore, study the impact ofmanagement background characteristics on accounting conservatism by upper echelons theories ishelpful to expand the research perspective of accounting conservatism, to reveal the motives ofaccounting conservatism, and deepen public understanding of accounting conservatism. Secondly, itstudies the comparison and selection of accounting conservatism measurement method from the pointsof the relevance and reliability. Although recently, the academia have brought out some measurementmethods of accounting conservatism, but those researches are short of comparative analysis for theeffectiveness of these methods, which certainly affects the validity of the results of empirical research.Therefore, the comparison and selection study of accounting conservatism measurement methods ishelpful to select the measurement methods, thereby to enhance the validity of the empirical researchresults. Thirdly, this dissertation analyzes the managers fixed effect from the perspective of managercontrol. Existed researches on the effect of managers background characteristics on corporate behaviorare most analyzed by directly selecting the specific characteristics of the managers, but rare literaturesinvestigate the root causes of that. Related researches indicate that, except the controlling factors ofindustry and enterprise, there are many other influence factors which can not be explained. From theperspective of behavioral economics, this dissertation inspects the managers fixed effect on accountingconservatism, which provides a basis for the selection of indicators for managers specific backgroundcharacteristics.
本文在系统总结国内外相关研究成果的基础上，以高阶理论和行为经济学为出发点，以委托代理理论、契约理论和信号传递理论为理论基础，采用规范分析、实证分析和契约分析等研究方法，理论分析和实证检验管理者背景特征对会计稳健性的影响。首先对国内外相关研究成果和相关理论进行综述和分析；接着对会计稳健性的计量方法选择问题进行了理论和实证分析；然后从总体上检验会计稳健性中的管理者固定效应；在此基础上，实证考察管理者团队背景特征的平均水平、异质性和垂直对特征会计稳健性的影响，接着又考察董事长和财务总监的个人背景特征对会计稳健性的影响；最后总结全文的研究结论、揭示研究结论的政策意义以及指出未来研究的方向。本文的实证结果表明：管理者固定效应在很大程度上影响着会计稳健性；管理者团队的平均水平、异质性和垂直对背景特征，以及董事长和财务总监个人的不同背景特征均对会计稳健性有一定的影响，并且这些影响在国有上市公司和非国有上市公司之间有所差异。
本文在以下三个方面有所创新：①从管理者背景特征的角度建立研究会计稳健性问题的分析框架。以往关于会计稳健性的研究都是隐含管理者是同质的、理性的，但大量研究表明，不同的管理者具有不同的个人偏好和管理风格，他们也并非总是理性的，往往存在心理偏差，从而做出非理性决策。所以，运用高阶理论，研究管理者背景特征对会计稳健性的影响，将有助于拓展研究会计稳健性的视角，揭示会计稳健性的行为动机，从而加深人们对会计稳健性的理解。②从相关性和可靠性的角度研究会计稳健性计量方法的比较和选择问题。虽然目前学术界提出一些计量会计稳健性的方法，但对这些方法的有效性却缺乏比较分析，这势必会影响到实证研究结果的有效性。所以，本文对会计稳健性计量方法进行比较和选择研究，有助于正确地选择计量方法，从而提高实证研究结果的有效性。③从管理者控制权的角度分析会计稳健性中的管理者固定效应问题。以往关于管理者背景特征对公司行为的影响，大都直接选取了管理者的具体特征直接进行分析，而鲜有文献对其根本原因进行分析。相关研究表明，将年度、行业和企业因素控制后，还有很多无法解释的因素影响着公司行为。本文从行为经济学的角度，检验在会计稳健性中存在这种管理者固定效应，为管理者具体背景特征指标的选取提供了基础。
Accounting conservatism is an important principle of recognition and measurement of accountingearnings. There are different interpretations of accounting conservatism by related accountingstandard-setting organizations and accounting academics. Basu(1997) proposes a descriptive definitionfor accounting conservatism, which means that good news (gain) needs much more assurance than badnews (loss) in the financial reports recognition. This definition reflects asymmetric treatment of gainsand losses by accounting conservatism. Nowadays the researches on accounting conservatism aregenerally based on this definition. The existing literature shows that the company contracts, especiallythe factors of financing contracts, litigations, government regulations, tax policies, corporategovernance, firm characteristics, political relations, economic development level, may affect theaccounting conservatism. Meanwhile, rare literatures consider the effects of accounting conservatismon management background characteristics. However, this effect can not be ignored in reality. Anessential feature of the modern enterprise is that its ownership and management are separated, withwhich managers control the enterprises. Therefore, the managers have a decisive influence on corporatebehavior and performance. and this effect is mainly reflected on accounting behaviors. As a universallanguage of business, accounting information is an important reference to the managers and thestakeholders to decide whether to sign the contracts, whether to perform the contracts, and whether toamend the contracts. In the process of accounting policy choice, managers may choose the corporateaccounting policies on behalf of their own interests rather than the interests of all stakeholders, whichsurely affects accounting conservatism. In reality, managers are not always rational, their behaviors aresubjected to their personal overconfidence, short-sighted behaviors and empirical prejudicepsychological deviation, while the above psychological deviations are closely linked to their personalbackground characteristics. Therefore, the impacts of managers on accounting conservatism are quitedifferent among different background characteristics of managers, such as different sexes, ages,educational backgrounds, educational backgrounds and tenures.
On the basis of the results of relevant researches both home and abroad, starting from upperechelons theory and behavioral economics, according to the principal-agent theory, contract theory andsignaling theory, using normative, empirical and contract analysis, this dissertation theoretically andempirically tests the impact of management background characteristics on accounting conservatism.First, it reviews the related researches and analysis relevant theories. Then, it analyzes the measurementmethod choice of accounting conservatism theoretically and empirically. And then, this dissertationtests the impacts of the manager fixed effects on accounting conservatism on a whole. Subsequently,this dissertation empirically investigates the impact of the average level, heterogeneity and verticalcharacteristics of the background characteristics of the management team on accounting conservatism.And then it investigates the impact of the demographic characteristics of the chairman and Chief Financial Officer on accounting conservatism. Finally, come the summary of the conclusions, policyimplications of the study and directions of future research. The empirical results show that the managerfixed effects significantly influence the accounting conservatism. The average level, heterogeneity andvertical characteristics of the background characteristics of the manager team, as well as differentbackground characteristics of the Chairman and Chief Financial Officer have certain influences onaccounting conservatism, and these effects differ between the state-owned listed companies andnon-state-owned listed companies.
There are following three innovations in this dissertation. First, it establishes the analysisframework of accounting conservatism from the perspective of manager background characteristics.The existed researches on accounting conservatism implicitly regard that the managers arehomogeneous and rational, but a large number of studies have shown that different managers havedifferent personal preferences and management style. they are not always rational and are oftensuffered from mental deviation and make irrational decisions. Therefore, study the impact ofmanagement background characteristics on accounting conservatism by upper echelons theories ishelpful to expand the research perspective of accounting conservatism, to reveal the motives ofaccounting conservatism, and deepen public understanding of accounting conservatism. Secondly, itstudies the comparison and selection of accounting conservatism measurement method from the pointsof the relevance and reliability. Although recently, the academia have brought out some measurementmethods of accounting conservatism, but those researches are short of comparative analysis for theeffectiveness of these methods, which certainly affects the validity of the results of empirical research.Therefore, the comparison and selection study of accounting conservatism measurement methods ishelpful to select the measurement methods, thereby to enhance the validity of the empirical researchresults. Thirdly, this dissertation analyzes the managers fixed effect from the perspective of managercontrol. Existed researches on the effect of managers background characteristics on corporate behaviorare most analyzed by directly selecting the specific characteristics of the managers, but rare literaturesinvestigate the root causes of that. Related researches indicate that, except the controlling factors ofindustry and enterprise, there are many other influence factors which can not be explained. From theperspective of behavioral economics, this dissertation inspects the managers fixed effect on accountingconservatism, which provides a basis for the selection of indicators for managers specific backgroundcharacteristics.
引文
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