自愿性内部控制审计披露与资本成本：理论分析与经验证据
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摘要
安然事件的爆发让全球资本市场清楚地认识到,仅仅依靠企业财务报告披露及其审计无法实现对企业契约执行的有效监督,而对企业财务信息生产流程起监控和优化作用的内部控制引起了资本市场的极大关注。在资本市场上,上市公司披露的内部控制信息是投资者判断公司内部控制有效性、盈余可靠性、违规可能性与自身投资风险性的重要依据,同时也是债权人评价公司信息风险和违约概率的主要参考。我国财政部等五部委联合发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》和《企业内部控制配套指引》,从2011年1月起首先在境内外同时上市的公司实施,自2012年扩大到上海证券交易所、深圳证券交易所主板上市公司。此前,我国上市公司内部控制审计及其披露尚处于自愿阶段。近年来,有为数不少的上市公司自愿披露了审计师出具的内部控制审计报告,由此引发了对其行为动因和经济后果的理论探讨和经验研究。考察信息披露经济后果的重要视角之一就是资本成本。资本成本通常被视为是捕捉信息披露如何实现其向信息使用者提供价值相关信息功能的一项标准。资本市场的有效运行离不开信息披露。内部控制信息披露是企业信息披露不可或缺的重要组成部分。上市公司内部控制的设计和执行都存放在公司的“黑箱”之中,而内部控制审计报告的自愿披露是公司管理层向外部利益相关者释放内部控制质量的信号。在我国现阶段的制度环境下,从资本成本视角考察内部控制审计及其自愿披露的经济后果,对于实证评价我国有关内部控制的制度规范及其执行效果、推动监管机关进一步完善相关政策的制定、规范内部控制信息披露、加强资本市场的监管以及保护外部相关者利益,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。
本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,在提出问题之后,遵循“研究基础——机理分析——实证检验——研究结论”四个层面逐步展开研究。
本文首先梳理了国内外关于信息披露与资本成本以及围绕内部控制展开的相关研究文献,其次运用契约经济学和信息经济学的经典理论,从契约理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和信号显示理论出发深入分析内部控制审计信息的自愿披露影响资本成本的理论基础,借以推演出自愿披露内部控制审计报告影响资本成本的作用机理。而后,考虑到资本市场不同参与者在获取信息和防范风险的能力上存在的差异,其对内部控制治理机制的依赖程度和关注程度也就不同。在后续实证检验部分中,根据上市公司融资渠道的不同,立足于股票市场、公司债券市场和银行信贷市场,分别考察上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告对其不同融资来源资本成本的影响。此外,针对债务资本成本,考虑到我国债务契约往往内生于制度环境,还从上市公司产权差异对自愿披露内部控制审计信息的信号显示功效产生的可能影响进行了探讨。实证研究发现：
在自愿内部控制审计阶段,无论对于公开市场(股票市场和债券市场)还是私有市场(银行信贷市场),上市公司通过聘请独立第三方(注册会计师)对其内部控制有效性及其自我评价进行审计,借助自愿内部控制审计的信号显示功能,向资本市场利益相关者发送自身内部控制有效和财务信息可靠的真实情况,有助于利益相关者更加准确地估计公司价值和企业风险,从而降低自愿披露内部控制审计报告公司的资本成本。因此,内部控制审计作为我国企业有效披露内部控制信息的保障机制,使得资本市场参与者能够有效识别企业的内部控制质量,进而给予差异化对待并进行资本定价。
针对债务市场通过产权性质分组进一步研究发现,相对于非国有上市公司而言,国有上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告的信号显示强度有所减弱。这是因为国有产权提供的隐性担保作用使得资本市场中的广大投资者在进行投资决策时,放松对国有上市公司内部控制和信息质量的相应要求,从而弱化了上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告的信号显示效果。这一发现在公司债券的一、二级市场均获得了经验支持。
本文可能的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面：(1)立足于我国沪深A股主板市场,与现有研究采用已实现报酬率测算权益资本成本的方法不同,本文运用财务分析师盈余预测数据和Easton(2004)的PEG模型测算事前权益资本成本,检验在我国资本市场信息披露环境下,上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计信息如何影响权益资本成本。上述研究视角和方法,不仅为证实我国财务分析师盈利预测有用性提供了经验证据,而且也从研究内容和方法上丰富和拓展了现有的相关研究。(2)基于我国上市公司债务融资的现状,考虑到不同债权人在信息搜集和处理能力等方面存在的差异,本课题将债务资本市场进一步细分为公开债务市场(即交易所间公司债市场)和私有债务市场(即银行信贷市场)两部分,针对我国公开债务市场发行的公司债和私有债务市场的银行借款分别构建计量经济模型,检验内部控制审计信息的自愿披露如何影响债务资本成本。由于契约结构内生于制度约束,在我国转型经济环境下,政府在社会资源配置中仍发挥着重要作用,又通过控股国企转身成为资本市场的参与者。因此,本文将上述关系嵌入我国特有的产权制度环境,进一步考察产权性质对内部控制审计报告信号显示行为效果的影响,具有非常的现实意义。(3)《公司债券发行试点办法》于2007年正式发布,标志着我国公司债券市场的正式启航。公司债券市场的发展,有利于上市公司拓展融资渠道、降低依赖银行贷款带来的财务风险,对发挥市场在社会资源分配中的基础性作用做出了积极的贡献。大力发展公司债券是当前金融改革的热点问题,提高公司债券融资在直接融资中的比重是我国债券市场发展的一项战略目标。目前,国内对公司债的相关研究还处于起步阶段,仍以定性分析为主,缺乏定量研究,吏鲜有运用大样本实证检验研究公司债券一级市场和二级市场的定价问题。本文针对我国公司债券市场展开的理论分析和实证检验,有利于丰富有关公司债券研究的文献,拓展我国公司债券定价的相关理论,积累基于中国制度背景的相关经验证据。
Enron's outbreak makes the global capital markets clearly recognize that relying solely on the disclosure of corporate financial report and its audit can not achieve an effective supervision on the implementation of corporate contract, but internal control playing a role in the monitoring and optimizing the production process of corporate financial information causes great concern in capital markets. Internal control information disclosed by listed companies in the capital markets, which is the important basis for investors to determine the company's internal control effectiveness, surplus reliability, violation possibility and their investment risk, and also the major reference for creditors to evaluate company's information risk and probability of default. Five Chinese ministries including Ministry of Finance jointly issued The Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal Control and Implementing Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control, which are effective for companies listed, both domestically and abroad, from January2011, and expanded to companies listed on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since2012. Previous to this, the internal control audit and its disclosure of listed companies in China is still in the voluntary phase. In recent years, a large number of listed companies to voluntarily disclose the internal control audit report issued by the auditors, giving rise to the theoretical discussion and empirical study about the motivations and economic consequences of their behaviors. The cost of capital is one of important perspectives to examine the economic consequences of information disclosure. The cost of capital is often viewed as a metric that captures how well information disclosure achieves its primary function of providing value-relevant information to users. The effective operation of capital markets can't without information disclosure. Internal control information disclosure is an indispensable part of corporate information disclosure. The design and implementation of internal control of listed companies are being stored in their "black box", so the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit report is the signal from companies' managements to release the internal control quality to the external stakeholders. Under our current institutional environment, to examine the economic consequences of internal control audit and its voluntary disclosure from a capital cost perspective, has a special theoretical value and practical significance, to empirically evaluate the internal control standards and their implementation effect, promote regulatory authorities to further improve the formulation of relevant policies, regulate internal control information disclosure, and strengthen the supervision of the capital market as well as protect the interests of external stakeholders.
This dissertation uses a method of combining normative research and empirical research, and follows the four layers of Research Foundation-Mechanism Analysis-Empirical Test-Conclusions to undertake gradually the study after putting forward questions.
Firstly, it combs relevant research literatures at domestic and abroad about information disclosure and cost of capital, as well as the internal control, followed by the use of the classical theory of contract economics and information economics, to analyze deeply the theoretical basis of the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit affecting the cost of capital, from the contract theory, principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, and signaling theory. And based on the classic theories, it derives the mechanism that voluntary disclosure of internal control audit report affects the cost of capital. Then, taking into account that different participants in the capital markets are different in access to information and ability to prevent risks, and have different extent of depending on and degree of concern about internal control governance mechanism. In the subsequent empirical test sections, according to difference in the financing channels of listed companies, based on the stock market, corporate bond market and bank credit markets, the dissertation examines the effects of listed company to voluntarily disclose internal control audit report on its capital cost of the different sources of financing respectively. In addition, taking account of our debt covenants often endogenous to the institutional environment for cost of debt capital, it also discuss effects of ownership type difference on the signaling of voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information from listed companies. Empirical study finds that:
In the stage of voluntary internal control audit, both for the public markets (stock market and bond market) and private market (bank credit market), listed company by hiring an independent third party (CPA) to audit the effectiveness of internal control and its self-assessment, with the help of signaling function of voluntary internal control audit, can send the real situation of its effective internal control and reliable financial information to stakeholders in capital market, which contributes them to estimate more accurately the value and risk of the company, so as to lower the cost of capital for the listed company who disclosed voluntarily its internal control audit report. As a result, as a safeguard mechanism of effectively disclosing internal control information for Chinese enterprises, the audit of internal control, can make participants in capital market effectively identify the quality of internal control, and then to give differentiated treatment and capital pricing.
Further studies grouped by the nature of ownership for the debt markets showed that, relative to the non-state-owned listed companies, state-owned listed companies'signaling intensity to voluntarily disclose internal control audit reports has been weakened. This is because of the implicit guarantee function provided by state-owned property makes the majority of investors in capital markets relax requirements for the quality of the information and internal control of state-owned listed companies when making investment decisions, which thereby weakens the signaling effect of listed companies to voluntarily disclose internal control audit report. This finding gains empirical supports both in primary market and secondary market of corporate bonds.
The possible innovation of the dissertation is mainly reflected in the following three aspects:(1) Based on the main markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in China, and different from the existing literatures using the realized rate of return method to estimate the cost of equity capital, this dissertation uses financial analyst earnings forecast data and Easton's (2004) PEG model to estimate ex-ante cost of equity capital, to test how the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information affects cost of equity capital of public corporation, under the information disclosure environment in our capital market. The research perspective and methods, not only provide empirical evidence for the usefulness of Chinese financial analysts' earnings forecasts, but also enrich and expand the existing related research from the research content and method.(2) According to the status quo of debt financing in Chinese listed companies, and considering the differences of different creditors in information collection and processing capabilities, the debt capital market is further divided into the public debt market (i.e., corporate bond markets between Exchanges) and private debt market (i.e., bank credit market), the dissertation builds econometric models respectively for the corporate bonds issued in public debt market and bank loans in private debt market, to test how voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information affects the cost of debt capital. Because the contract structure is endogenous in institutional constraints, under the transformation economic environment in China, the government still plays an important role in the allocation of social resources, and through the holding of state-owned enterprises turned to become participants in capital market. Therefore, the dissertation embeds above relationship into Chinese unique property rights system environment, to further investigate the effect of ownership type on signaling behavior result of internal control audit report, which has a special practical significance.(3) Corporate Bond Issuance Pilot Approach was officially released in2007, marking the formal sailing of corporate bond market in china. The development of corporate bond market contributes to the listed companies to enlarge financing channels, reduce financial risk dependent on bank loans, and make a positive contribution to playing a basic role of the market in the allocation of social resources. Vigorously developing corporate bonds is a hot issue in the current financial reform, and it is a strategic target of the development of Chinese bond market to improve the proportion of corporate bond financing in the direct financing. At present, related research on corporate bonds in China is in the initial stage, and still gives priority to qualitative analysis and lacks of quantitative research. There is less research on the pricing problem of the corporate bonds in the primary market and secondary market using a large sample empirical test. The theoretical analysis and empirical test based on Chinese corporate bond markets, is conductive to enriching the research on corporate bond literatures, enlarging theories of corporate bond pricing in China, and the accumulation of relevant empirical evidences based on Chinese institutional context.
本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,在提出问题之后,遵循“研究基础——机理分析——实证检验——研究结论”四个层面逐步展开研究。
本文首先梳理了国内外关于信息披露与资本成本以及围绕内部控制展开的相关研究文献,其次运用契约经济学和信息经济学的经典理论,从契约理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和信号显示理论出发深入分析内部控制审计信息的自愿披露影响资本成本的理论基础,借以推演出自愿披露内部控制审计报告影响资本成本的作用机理。而后,考虑到资本市场不同参与者在获取信息和防范风险的能力上存在的差异,其对内部控制治理机制的依赖程度和关注程度也就不同。在后续实证检验部分中,根据上市公司融资渠道的不同,立足于股票市场、公司债券市场和银行信贷市场,分别考察上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告对其不同融资来源资本成本的影响。此外,针对债务资本成本,考虑到我国债务契约往往内生于制度环境,还从上市公司产权差异对自愿披露内部控制审计信息的信号显示功效产生的可能影响进行了探讨。实证研究发现：
在自愿内部控制审计阶段,无论对于公开市场(股票市场和债券市场)还是私有市场(银行信贷市场),上市公司通过聘请独立第三方(注册会计师)对其内部控制有效性及其自我评价进行审计,借助自愿内部控制审计的信号显示功能,向资本市场利益相关者发送自身内部控制有效和财务信息可靠的真实情况,有助于利益相关者更加准确地估计公司价值和企业风险,从而降低自愿披露内部控制审计报告公司的资本成本。因此,内部控制审计作为我国企业有效披露内部控制信息的保障机制,使得资本市场参与者能够有效识别企业的内部控制质量,进而给予差异化对待并进行资本定价。
针对债务市场通过产权性质分组进一步研究发现,相对于非国有上市公司而言,国有上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告的信号显示强度有所减弱。这是因为国有产权提供的隐性担保作用使得资本市场中的广大投资者在进行投资决策时,放松对国有上市公司内部控制和信息质量的相应要求,从而弱化了上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计报告的信号显示效果。这一发现在公司债券的一、二级市场均获得了经验支持。
本文可能的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面：(1)立足于我国沪深A股主板市场,与现有研究采用已实现报酬率测算权益资本成本的方法不同,本文运用财务分析师盈余预测数据和Easton(2004)的PEG模型测算事前权益资本成本,检验在我国资本市场信息披露环境下,上市公司自愿披露内部控制审计信息如何影响权益资本成本。上述研究视角和方法,不仅为证实我国财务分析师盈利预测有用性提供了经验证据,而且也从研究内容和方法上丰富和拓展了现有的相关研究。(2)基于我国上市公司债务融资的现状,考虑到不同债权人在信息搜集和处理能力等方面存在的差异,本课题将债务资本市场进一步细分为公开债务市场(即交易所间公司债市场)和私有债务市场(即银行信贷市场)两部分,针对我国公开债务市场发行的公司债和私有债务市场的银行借款分别构建计量经济模型,检验内部控制审计信息的自愿披露如何影响债务资本成本。由于契约结构内生于制度约束,在我国转型经济环境下,政府在社会资源配置中仍发挥着重要作用,又通过控股国企转身成为资本市场的参与者。因此,本文将上述关系嵌入我国特有的产权制度环境,进一步考察产权性质对内部控制审计报告信号显示行为效果的影响,具有非常的现实意义。(3)《公司债券发行试点办法》于2007年正式发布,标志着我国公司债券市场的正式启航。公司债券市场的发展,有利于上市公司拓展融资渠道、降低依赖银行贷款带来的财务风险,对发挥市场在社会资源分配中的基础性作用做出了积极的贡献。大力发展公司债券是当前金融改革的热点问题,提高公司债券融资在直接融资中的比重是我国债券市场发展的一项战略目标。目前,国内对公司债的相关研究还处于起步阶段,仍以定性分析为主,缺乏定量研究,吏鲜有运用大样本实证检验研究公司债券一级市场和二级市场的定价问题。本文针对我国公司债券市场展开的理论分析和实证检验,有利于丰富有关公司债券研究的文献,拓展我国公司债券定价的相关理论,积累基于中国制度背景的相关经验证据。
Enron's outbreak makes the global capital markets clearly recognize that relying solely on the disclosure of corporate financial report and its audit can not achieve an effective supervision on the implementation of corporate contract, but internal control playing a role in the monitoring and optimizing the production process of corporate financial information causes great concern in capital markets. Internal control information disclosed by listed companies in the capital markets, which is the important basis for investors to determine the company's internal control effectiveness, surplus reliability, violation possibility and their investment risk, and also the major reference for creditors to evaluate company's information risk and probability of default. Five Chinese ministries including Ministry of Finance jointly issued The Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal Control and Implementing Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control, which are effective for companies listed, both domestically and abroad, from January2011, and expanded to companies listed on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since2012. Previous to this, the internal control audit and its disclosure of listed companies in China is still in the voluntary phase. In recent years, a large number of listed companies to voluntarily disclose the internal control audit report issued by the auditors, giving rise to the theoretical discussion and empirical study about the motivations and economic consequences of their behaviors. The cost of capital is one of important perspectives to examine the economic consequences of information disclosure. The cost of capital is often viewed as a metric that captures how well information disclosure achieves its primary function of providing value-relevant information to users. The effective operation of capital markets can't without information disclosure. Internal control information disclosure is an indispensable part of corporate information disclosure. The design and implementation of internal control of listed companies are being stored in their "black box", so the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit report is the signal from companies' managements to release the internal control quality to the external stakeholders. Under our current institutional environment, to examine the economic consequences of internal control audit and its voluntary disclosure from a capital cost perspective, has a special theoretical value and practical significance, to empirically evaluate the internal control standards and their implementation effect, promote regulatory authorities to further improve the formulation of relevant policies, regulate internal control information disclosure, and strengthen the supervision of the capital market as well as protect the interests of external stakeholders.
This dissertation uses a method of combining normative research and empirical research, and follows the four layers of Research Foundation-Mechanism Analysis-Empirical Test-Conclusions to undertake gradually the study after putting forward questions.
Firstly, it combs relevant research literatures at domestic and abroad about information disclosure and cost of capital, as well as the internal control, followed by the use of the classical theory of contract economics and information economics, to analyze deeply the theoretical basis of the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit affecting the cost of capital, from the contract theory, principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, and signaling theory. And based on the classic theories, it derives the mechanism that voluntary disclosure of internal control audit report affects the cost of capital. Then, taking into account that different participants in the capital markets are different in access to information and ability to prevent risks, and have different extent of depending on and degree of concern about internal control governance mechanism. In the subsequent empirical test sections, according to difference in the financing channels of listed companies, based on the stock market, corporate bond market and bank credit markets, the dissertation examines the effects of listed company to voluntarily disclose internal control audit report on its capital cost of the different sources of financing respectively. In addition, taking account of our debt covenants often endogenous to the institutional environment for cost of debt capital, it also discuss effects of ownership type difference on the signaling of voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information from listed companies. Empirical study finds that:
In the stage of voluntary internal control audit, both for the public markets (stock market and bond market) and private market (bank credit market), listed company by hiring an independent third party (CPA) to audit the effectiveness of internal control and its self-assessment, with the help of signaling function of voluntary internal control audit, can send the real situation of its effective internal control and reliable financial information to stakeholders in capital market, which contributes them to estimate more accurately the value and risk of the company, so as to lower the cost of capital for the listed company who disclosed voluntarily its internal control audit report. As a result, as a safeguard mechanism of effectively disclosing internal control information for Chinese enterprises, the audit of internal control, can make participants in capital market effectively identify the quality of internal control, and then to give differentiated treatment and capital pricing.
Further studies grouped by the nature of ownership for the debt markets showed that, relative to the non-state-owned listed companies, state-owned listed companies'signaling intensity to voluntarily disclose internal control audit reports has been weakened. This is because of the implicit guarantee function provided by state-owned property makes the majority of investors in capital markets relax requirements for the quality of the information and internal control of state-owned listed companies when making investment decisions, which thereby weakens the signaling effect of listed companies to voluntarily disclose internal control audit report. This finding gains empirical supports both in primary market and secondary market of corporate bonds.
The possible innovation of the dissertation is mainly reflected in the following three aspects:(1) Based on the main markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in China, and different from the existing literatures using the realized rate of return method to estimate the cost of equity capital, this dissertation uses financial analyst earnings forecast data and Easton's (2004) PEG model to estimate ex-ante cost of equity capital, to test how the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information affects cost of equity capital of public corporation, under the information disclosure environment in our capital market. The research perspective and methods, not only provide empirical evidence for the usefulness of Chinese financial analysts' earnings forecasts, but also enrich and expand the existing related research from the research content and method.(2) According to the status quo of debt financing in Chinese listed companies, and considering the differences of different creditors in information collection and processing capabilities, the debt capital market is further divided into the public debt market (i.e., corporate bond markets between Exchanges) and private debt market (i.e., bank credit market), the dissertation builds econometric models respectively for the corporate bonds issued in public debt market and bank loans in private debt market, to test how voluntary disclosure of internal control audit information affects the cost of debt capital. Because the contract structure is endogenous in institutional constraints, under the transformation economic environment in China, the government still plays an important role in the allocation of social resources, and through the holding of state-owned enterprises turned to become participants in capital market. Therefore, the dissertation embeds above relationship into Chinese unique property rights system environment, to further investigate the effect of ownership type on signaling behavior result of internal control audit report, which has a special practical significance.(3) Corporate Bond Issuance Pilot Approach was officially released in2007, marking the formal sailing of corporate bond market in china. The development of corporate bond market contributes to the listed companies to enlarge financing channels, reduce financial risk dependent on bank loans, and make a positive contribution to playing a basic role of the market in the allocation of social resources. Vigorously developing corporate bonds is a hot issue in the current financial reform, and it is a strategic target of the development of Chinese bond market to improve the proportion of corporate bond financing in the direct financing. At present, related research on corporate bonds in China is in the initial stage, and still gives priority to qualitative analysis and lacks of quantitative research. There is less research on the pricing problem of the corporate bonds in the primary market and secondary market using a large sample empirical test. The theoretical analysis and empirical test based on Chinese corporate bond markets, is conductive to enriching the research on corporate bond literatures, enlarging theories of corporate bond pricing in China, and the accumulation of relevant empirical evidences based on Chinese institutional context.
引文
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