制度环境、政府行为与募资变更
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摘要
募资变更属于公司重大决策，但现有的实证研究仅分析了公司内部因素对募资变更的影响。对于转型中的中国经济，中国上市公司特有的募资变更行为可能应该从更根本、更实质的角度考虑。本文从制度环境和政府行为出发，将募资变更的研究视角拓展到外部，并讨论了政府干预地方国企募资变更的具体路径和募资变更导致公司价值下降的具体路径。
首先，本文以2001-2005年A股IPO的上市公司为样本，实证检验制度环境、地方政府干预、公司治理三者对募资变更的影响，并从事后5年内（共涉及时间段2001-2009年）公司超额行业价值（并经过规模分组调整）角度将募资变更分为损失性变更和补偿性变更。研究发现，较好的公司治理在非国企中能有效降低募资变更几率，支持公司战略；在地方国企中只对损失性变更起到“防火墙”作用；在央企组中只有地方负担较轻时才对损失性变更起作用。由于“逆向软预算约束”动机的存在，较强的地方政府干预能导致地方国企中的损失性变更，但其在非国企中的影响受制度环境制约。发达的制度环境能抑制非国企的补偿性变更，但无法有效约束损失性变更。
其次，本文进一步选取2001-2009年期间A股发生募资变更的地方国有上市公司为样本，实证检验晋升激励、投资来源对地方国企募资变更的影响。研究发现：官员追求任期内的GDP增长，任期内的移动平均GDP增幅越小，募资变更几率越高；但地方政府对企业募资变更的干预还受到其他投资来源的影响，较少的省区贷款投放也能导致募资变更几率的增加，并且在两种情况并存时，募资变更情况更严重。进一步研究发现，企业长期贷款在晋升激励较小的情况下能部分分担地方政府对募资变更的干预，而省区贷款投放在晋升激励较大的情况下更能缓解地方政府对募资变更的干预；省级国企和市县级国企募资变更都受到晋升激励的影响，但市县级国企募资变更更易受到贷款投放的影响；晋升激励和贷款投放在市场化进程较慢的地区对募资变更的影响更明显。
再次，地方政府干预企业微观行为的研究中大多只见政府不见官员，但政府行为一定程度上取决于官员行为，官员是企业行为背后的重要因素，进而将政府干预募资变更的视角进一步拓展到地方官员。本文以2001-2009年期间A股发生募资变更的地方国有上市公司为样本，检验官员年龄、学历、任期等特征对地方国企募资变更的影响。研究发现：官员年龄越小、学历越低，地方国企募资变更几率越大；随着任期的增加，募资变更几率呈现倒“U”型变化；在任期接近4年，官员年龄越小或学历越低时，募资变更几率越大。并且官员特征对募资变更的影响因官员不同来源、任职地区以及国企产权对应的不同行政级别而异。
最后，现有的文献很少关注募资变更之后的投向，从而使得募资变更如何导致公司价值下降成为“黑箱”。本文选取2001-2009年地方国有上市公司为样本，从政府干预下募资变更后投向的角度解开部分“黑箱”。我们从晋升激励、财政激励和社会稳定等方面构建政府多重目标的干预指数，发现政府干预越强，募资变更几率越大；政府干预下公司募资变更后更易投向固定投资，最终降低公司价值。进一步发现，固定投资的资金是否来自募资变更并不能影响公司价值，降低公司价值的关键原因在于政府干预；政府干预之下公司进行的募资变更和固定投资均降低了公司价值，而募资变更是政府干预下公司进行固定投资的主要途径之一。
本研究从地方政府干预及制度环境角度揭示了IPO募资变更的部分原因；从投资来源角度厘清了地方政府干预地方国企募资变更的具体路径，为我们正确认识募资变更及制定相关监管政策提供了一个新的视角。并且本文进一步将政府“掠夺之手”研究拓展到官员个人层面，有助于我们认识官员个体差异在企业微观行为中的影响，而从募资变更投向角度揭示了政府对企业“掠夺之手”的具体路径，也有助于加深我们对政府干预企业动机及经济后果的认识。
Investment orientation changes is a major decision in listed companies, butexisting empirical study only analyzed corporate internal factors about the changes.For the transformation of China, the peculiar changes of listed companies must toexplain from the more fundamental and more essence views. This paper, from theinstitutional environment and government actions, expanded the views from inside tooutside, and discussed the paths about the government intervention in the changes oflocal state-owned enterprises and how the changes reduce the corporate value.
First of all, by observing the IPO data of the “A” share listed companies from theyear2001to2005, this paper addresses the empirical tests on the impacts ofinstitutional environment, local government intervention and corporate governance onthe change of committed investment orientation. And divide the changes from thecompensatory changes to the prejudicial changes from the company excess industryvalue in the post-5years (the time from2001-2009). The results indicate that in thenon-state owned companies, corporate governance can lower the risk of investmentorientation changes and support the company strategy. However, just working as a“fire wall”, it only can reduce the probability of prejudicial changes in the localstate-owned companies. In the central enterprises, corporate governance would workwhen the local economy and employment is less burdened. Besides, the results alsoillustrate that stronger local government intervention will induce prejudicial changesin the local state-owned companies because of the incentive of “inverted soft budgetconstraint”. But in the non-state owned companies, local government intervention'simpacts are under institutional conditions of constraints. Developed institutionalenvironment could restrain the compensatory changes in the non-state ownedcompanies but the prejudicial changes.
Secondly, this paper further to take the local state-owned A share listedcompanies which have investment orientation changes during the year2000to2009as the sample and conducts empirical tests on the impacts of promotion incentives and investment sources on the orientation changes. The results indicate that: in orderto purchase the promotion which based on the increase of GDP in tenure of office, theprobability of orientation changes is higher when the moving average GDP isgrowing slowly; in addition, the government intervention on orientation changes isalso affected by the other investment sources, like volume of loans dropped, whichmay lead to an increase of orientation changes when it is smaller; moreover, if abovetwo problems occur simultaneously, the orientation changes will be more serious.Furthermore study shows that companies' long-loan can partly share the pressurefrom government on orientation changes when the promotion incentive is smaller;however, the dropped loans can weaken the intervention of government on theorientation changes when the promotion incentive is greater; the orientation changesof provincial and city/county level state-owned companies are affected by thepromotion incentives; and orientation changes in city/county level state-ownedcompanies are more likely be affected by dropped loans; lastly, promotion incentivesand dropped loans have more significant impacts on orientation changes in the regionwhere the marketization is slower.
Thirdly，most research on government's intervention in firms are focused on the"government" rather than "officials", but government action depends on the conductof officials, officials play an important role in corporate behavior. This paper takes thesample of investment orientation changes occurred in A share listed companies whichare local state-owned from the year2001to2009. It empirically examines theofficials' age, education background and tenure's impacts on the orientation changesin local state-owned companies. The results shows that: younger age and lowereducation background of officials make the probability of orientation changes larger;accompanying with the tenure increases, the probability of orientation changes has ainvert "U" shape trend; and when the tenure is close to4years, officials' with youngerage and lower education level are likely to increase the probability of orientationchanges. In addition, the personal features of officials have similar adjusting effectson the relation between holding means and orientation changes. Further research findsthat impacts of official's personal features on orientation changes vary because of thedifferent officials' source, office areas and different political level in state-owned enterprises.
At the last，The past literatures pay little attention to the invest after theinvestment orientation change, making how the changes reduce the company’ valuebecome a "black box". By observing the data of the “A” share local state-ownedlisted companies from the year2000to2008, this paper from the angle of the investafter the change of committed investment orientation to unlock the "black box" partly.We use promotion incentives, financial incentives and social stability, to build amulti-target government intervention index, and found that when governmentintervention is strong, the probability of investment orientation changes will increase;Company will add fixed investment after the investment orientation change under thegovernment intervention. Further, we found that fixed investment after the change ofcommitted investment orientation is not the key factors affecting the value of thecompany, but the government intervention; under the government intervention, thecompany's committed investment orientation change and fixed investment will reducethe value of the company, and the investment orientation change is the main way toadd the kind of fixed investment.
This study partly reveals the reasons of investment orientation changes and todistinguish the local government's intervention path on orientation changes in localstate-owned companies, the conclusion provides a new perspective to comprehendthis phenomenon and make relevant regulatory policies. Further, this paper extendsthe government "grabbing hand" to the individual level of officials, which helps us tocomprehend the effects of officials' individual difference on firms' microscopic action,and this study partly reveals how the government to take the “grabbing hand” to thecompany, which also help us to deepen understanding on the motivation andeconomic consequences of government intervention.
首先，本文以2001-2005年A股IPO的上市公司为样本，实证检验制度环境、地方政府干预、公司治理三者对募资变更的影响，并从事后5年内（共涉及时间段2001-2009年）公司超额行业价值（并经过规模分组调整）角度将募资变更分为损失性变更和补偿性变更。研究发现，较好的公司治理在非国企中能有效降低募资变更几率，支持公司战略；在地方国企中只对损失性变更起到“防火墙”作用；在央企组中只有地方负担较轻时才对损失性变更起作用。由于“逆向软预算约束”动机的存在，较强的地方政府干预能导致地方国企中的损失性变更，但其在非国企中的影响受制度环境制约。发达的制度环境能抑制非国企的补偿性变更，但无法有效约束损失性变更。
其次，本文进一步选取2001-2009年期间A股发生募资变更的地方国有上市公司为样本，实证检验晋升激励、投资来源对地方国企募资变更的影响。研究发现：官员追求任期内的GDP增长，任期内的移动平均GDP增幅越小，募资变更几率越高；但地方政府对企业募资变更的干预还受到其他投资来源的影响，较少的省区贷款投放也能导致募资变更几率的增加，并且在两种情况并存时，募资变更情况更严重。进一步研究发现，企业长期贷款在晋升激励较小的情况下能部分分担地方政府对募资变更的干预，而省区贷款投放在晋升激励较大的情况下更能缓解地方政府对募资变更的干预；省级国企和市县级国企募资变更都受到晋升激励的影响，但市县级国企募资变更更易受到贷款投放的影响；晋升激励和贷款投放在市场化进程较慢的地区对募资变更的影响更明显。
再次，地方政府干预企业微观行为的研究中大多只见政府不见官员，但政府行为一定程度上取决于官员行为，官员是企业行为背后的重要因素，进而将政府干预募资变更的视角进一步拓展到地方官员。本文以2001-2009年期间A股发生募资变更的地方国有上市公司为样本，检验官员年龄、学历、任期等特征对地方国企募资变更的影响。研究发现：官员年龄越小、学历越低，地方国企募资变更几率越大；随着任期的增加，募资变更几率呈现倒“U”型变化；在任期接近4年，官员年龄越小或学历越低时，募资变更几率越大。并且官员特征对募资变更的影响因官员不同来源、任职地区以及国企产权对应的不同行政级别而异。
最后，现有的文献很少关注募资变更之后的投向，从而使得募资变更如何导致公司价值下降成为“黑箱”。本文选取2001-2009年地方国有上市公司为样本，从政府干预下募资变更后投向的角度解开部分“黑箱”。我们从晋升激励、财政激励和社会稳定等方面构建政府多重目标的干预指数，发现政府干预越强，募资变更几率越大；政府干预下公司募资变更后更易投向固定投资，最终降低公司价值。进一步发现，固定投资的资金是否来自募资变更并不能影响公司价值，降低公司价值的关键原因在于政府干预；政府干预之下公司进行的募资变更和固定投资均降低了公司价值，而募资变更是政府干预下公司进行固定投资的主要途径之一。
本研究从地方政府干预及制度环境角度揭示了IPO募资变更的部分原因；从投资来源角度厘清了地方政府干预地方国企募资变更的具体路径，为我们正确认识募资变更及制定相关监管政策提供了一个新的视角。并且本文进一步将政府“掠夺之手”研究拓展到官员个人层面，有助于我们认识官员个体差异在企业微观行为中的影响，而从募资变更投向角度揭示了政府对企业“掠夺之手”的具体路径，也有助于加深我们对政府干预企业动机及经济后果的认识。
Investment orientation changes is a major decision in listed companies, butexisting empirical study only analyzed corporate internal factors about the changes.For the transformation of China, the peculiar changes of listed companies must toexplain from the more fundamental and more essence views. This paper, from theinstitutional environment and government actions, expanded the views from inside tooutside, and discussed the paths about the government intervention in the changes oflocal state-owned enterprises and how the changes reduce the corporate value.
First of all, by observing the IPO data of the “A” share listed companies from theyear2001to2005, this paper addresses the empirical tests on the impacts ofinstitutional environment, local government intervention and corporate governance onthe change of committed investment orientation. And divide the changes from thecompensatory changes to the prejudicial changes from the company excess industryvalue in the post-5years (the time from2001-2009). The results indicate that in thenon-state owned companies, corporate governance can lower the risk of investmentorientation changes and support the company strategy. However, just working as a“fire wall”, it only can reduce the probability of prejudicial changes in the localstate-owned companies. In the central enterprises, corporate governance would workwhen the local economy and employment is less burdened. Besides, the results alsoillustrate that stronger local government intervention will induce prejudicial changesin the local state-owned companies because of the incentive of “inverted soft budgetconstraint”. But in the non-state owned companies, local government intervention'simpacts are under institutional conditions of constraints. Developed institutionalenvironment could restrain the compensatory changes in the non-state ownedcompanies but the prejudicial changes.
Secondly, this paper further to take the local state-owned A share listedcompanies which have investment orientation changes during the year2000to2009as the sample and conducts empirical tests on the impacts of promotion incentives and investment sources on the orientation changes. The results indicate that: in orderto purchase the promotion which based on the increase of GDP in tenure of office, theprobability of orientation changes is higher when the moving average GDP isgrowing slowly; in addition, the government intervention on orientation changes isalso affected by the other investment sources, like volume of loans dropped, whichmay lead to an increase of orientation changes when it is smaller; moreover, if abovetwo problems occur simultaneously, the orientation changes will be more serious.Furthermore study shows that companies' long-loan can partly share the pressurefrom government on orientation changes when the promotion incentive is smaller;however, the dropped loans can weaken the intervention of government on theorientation changes when the promotion incentive is greater; the orientation changesof provincial and city/county level state-owned companies are affected by thepromotion incentives; and orientation changes in city/county level state-ownedcompanies are more likely be affected by dropped loans; lastly, promotion incentivesand dropped loans have more significant impacts on orientation changes in the regionwhere the marketization is slower.
Thirdly，most research on government's intervention in firms are focused on the"government" rather than "officials", but government action depends on the conductof officials, officials play an important role in corporate behavior. This paper takes thesample of investment orientation changes occurred in A share listed companies whichare local state-owned from the year2001to2009. It empirically examines theofficials' age, education background and tenure's impacts on the orientation changesin local state-owned companies. The results shows that: younger age and lowereducation background of officials make the probability of orientation changes larger;accompanying with the tenure increases, the probability of orientation changes has ainvert "U" shape trend; and when the tenure is close to4years, officials' with youngerage and lower education level are likely to increase the probability of orientationchanges. In addition, the personal features of officials have similar adjusting effectson the relation between holding means and orientation changes. Further research findsthat impacts of official's personal features on orientation changes vary because of thedifferent officials' source, office areas and different political level in state-owned enterprises.
At the last，The past literatures pay little attention to the invest after theinvestment orientation change, making how the changes reduce the company’ valuebecome a "black box". By observing the data of the “A” share local state-ownedlisted companies from the year2000to2008, this paper from the angle of the investafter the change of committed investment orientation to unlock the "black box" partly.We use promotion incentives, financial incentives and social stability, to build amulti-target government intervention index, and found that when governmentintervention is strong, the probability of investment orientation changes will increase;Company will add fixed investment after the investment orientation change under thegovernment intervention. Further, we found that fixed investment after the change ofcommitted investment orientation is not the key factors affecting the value of thecompany, but the government intervention; under the government intervention, thecompany's committed investment orientation change and fixed investment will reducethe value of the company, and the investment orientation change is the main way toadd the kind of fixed investment.
This study partly reveals the reasons of investment orientation changes and todistinguish the local government's intervention path on orientation changes in localstate-owned companies, the conclusion provides a new perspective to comprehendthis phenomenon and make relevant regulatory policies. Further, this paper extendsthe government "grabbing hand" to the individual level of officials, which helps us tocomprehend the effects of officials' individual difference on firms' microscopic action,and this study partly reveals how the government to take the “grabbing hand” to thecompany, which also help us to deepen understanding on the motivation andeconomic consequences of government intervention.
引文
1详见谢庆奎等（1998）《中国地方政府体制概论》。
1详见张军（2007）《分权与增长：中国的故事》以及钟晓敏（1998）《政府间财政转移支付论》。
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