产业链变革的动态视角下通信运营商合作伙伴选择与合作机制研究
|
摘要
近年来,随着全业务运营的开展、三网融合的推进、移动互联网的普及、OTT业务的崛起、民营资本即将进入等重大事件的发生,通信行业发生了急剧的变化,通信行业产业链亦出现了革命性的变革,通信运营商的主导地位受到了来自多方主体的挑战。在行业变革导致产业链变化的背景下,市场竞争的多样化和持续加剧对通信运营商整合资源的能力提出了更高的挑战。对产业链资源的整合能力,考验的则是通信运营商与产业链主体之间展开合作共赢的能力。基于电信产业剧烈变革背景下通信行业产业链的变化状况,立足通信运营商,研究了产业链动态变革背景下通信运营商如何选择合作伙伴、如何与合作伙伴展开深入合作等问题。
本文的主要研究内容及研究成果包括：
(1)通信产业变革的深层次解读及合作主体企业分类研究。通信产业深层次变革的主要内容包括：三网融合的试点与推进、全业务运营、移动互联网的普及、智能终端的更新和融合、通信技术的革新、OTT业务及OTT公司的崛起、物联网和云计算广泛应用等。分析了通信行业变革对电信产业链和通信运营商的影响,认为在纵向产业链的基础上,电信行业的变革将深化和扩展横向产业链,电信商业模式创新将形成基于双边市场的侧向产业链,纵向、横向和侧向三个维度的产业链相互交织将形成网状化产业链形态；并依据企业在产业链中与通信运营商的地位关系,将通信运营商的合作伙伴划分为了非对称企业合作主体和对称企业合作主体。其中,非对称企业合作主体包括内容提供商、服务提供商、设备提供商和终端制造商等；对称企业合作主体主要是指广电运营商和其他通信运营商。
(2)产业链变革动态视角下非对称企业合作伙伴的选择研究。对于非对称企业合作伙伴的选择,分别构建了通信运营商选择合作伙伴的共性指标体系和特性指标体系。综合层次分析法和熵值法,采用组合权重计算方法确定了各指标的权重,在此基础上,构建了合作伙伴选择的静态模糊评价体系。考虑到长期合作应重点考虑合作伙伴未来的发展能力变化,建立了基于BP神经网络方法的合作伙伴未来发展趋势预测及其动态模糊评价模型。以湖南移动在推进全业务运营时选择光交换机的设备提供商为例,进行了实证研究。研究结果显示,在静态评价中,湖南移动将选择中兴通讯或华为作为合作伙伴；而在考虑到企业的动态发展时,湖南移动应更多地考虑与华为展开深入合作。
(3)通信运营商与非对称企业合作伙伴的合作机制设计研究。构建了由信任机制、信息共享机制、利益与风险协调机制和合作监督机制所组成的电信运营商与合作伙伴的合作机制,为电信运营商与合作伙伴展开业务往来和合作过程提供重要保障。并提出了利益分成、全资、参股、控股、定制与合作开发以及构建联盟共6种可能的合作模式。其中,利益与风险协调机制采用的是改进Shapley值法,合作监督机制的设计则是依托于演化博弈模型的仿真结果。
(4)通信运营商与对称企业合作伙伴的合作问题研究。首先,就通信运营商与广电运营商在物理建设和业务融合方面的合作模式问题展开了研究,通过构建业务合作模型和结盟模型,提出了成立合资公司、宽带接入合作、在增值业务节目内容等方面深度合作等广电运营商与通信运营商之间可能的合作模式；然后,研究了不同运营商之间如何合作、共享共建基础网络设施问题,具体而言：首先构建了非规制条件下网络共建与接入的博弈模型,然后提出了共享共建模式的解决方案。研究发现政府的管制(尤其是接入费用的管制)是非常必要的,基于研究结果,提出了运营商之间共建共享基础网络和基础设施的实施建议。
最后,就如何应对行业剧变,提出了通信运营商的对策措施；就政府如何推动通信业变革、正视通信运营商地位,提出了对策建议。
本文的创新主要体现在以下几个方面：①深入分析电信产业变革的基础上,综合原有的纵向产业链、深化扩展出的横向产业链、基于双边市场的侧向产业链,提出了电信产业的网状产业链形态。②立足通信运营商,依据其在产业链中的地位关系,将合作主体分类为非对称企业合作主体和对称企业合作主体,并提出了共性指标体系和特性指标体系。③从产业链变革和合作伙伴发展的动态视角,构建了非对称企业合作伙伴的动态选择模型,丰富了合作选择理论和方法。
In recent years, with the development of the whole business operations, three nets fusion propulsion, the rise of the popularity of mobile Internet, OTT business and private capital entering and other major events, dramatic changes have taken place in the communications industry, communication industry chain is also revolutionarily changing, the dominant position of the telecommunication operators is under various main challenge. Changes lead to changes in the industry of background in the industry, the diversification of market competition intensified and sustained for communication operators integrate resources ability put forward higher challenge. For industrial chain resources integration ability, test is the communication operators for win-win cooperation with the industrial chain main body ability. Based on telecom industry under the background of drastic reform of communication industry chain, based on the communication operators, industry chain is studied in this paper dynamic change under the background of telecommunication operators how to choose partners, how to conduct in-depth cooperation with the partners, etc.
In this paper, the main research contents and research achievements are as following:
(1) Research on profound interpretation of communication industry changing and enterprise cooperation subject classification. Communication industry the main content of the deep changes including: three nets fusion of pilot and promote, the whole business operation, the popularity of mobile Internet, smart terminal updates and fusion, communication technology innovation, and OTT company OTT business, with the rise of the Internet of things and cloud computing are widely used, etc. Communications industry change on telecom industry chain are analyzed and the impact of communication operators, think on the basis of vertical industry chain, the change of telecom industry will deepen and extend the industrial chain, telecom business model innovation will form lateral chain based on bilateral market, longitudinal, transverse and lateral three dimensions of the intertwined to form the networked industry chain form. According to enterprise status relationship with telecommunication operators in the industry chain, divide the partners of telecommunication operators in order to cooperation main body and symmetric asymmetric enterprise cooperation main body. Among them, asymmetric enterprise cooperation main body including content providers, service providers, equipment providers and terminal manufacturers, etc.; Symmetric enterprise cooperation main body refers primarily to the radio and television operators and other communications operators.
(2) Research on asymmetric enterprise partners selection with dynamic perspective of industrial chain changing. For asymmetric enterprise partner choice, respectively to build the communication operators choose partners the common index system and index system of personality. Integrated analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and entropy value method, using the combination weighting method to determine the weight of each index, on this basis, build a static fuzzy evaluation of the partner selection system. Considering the long-term cooperation consider your partner's future development should focus on change, was established based on BP neural network of partners for the future development trend prediction and dynamic fuzzy evaluation model. When China Mobile Group Hunan Co., Ltd. advances all business operations and chooses optical switch equipment provider, for example, has carried on the empirical research. Results show that in the static evaluation, China Mobile Hunan will choose ZTE or HuaWei as a partner. While considering the dynamic development of the enterprise, China Mobile Hunan should conduct cooperation with HuaWei instead of ZTE.
(3) Research on the cooperation mechanism design between the communication operators and asymmetric enterprise partners'. Built by the trust mechanism, information sharing mechanism, benefit and risk supervision and coordination mechanism and cooperation mechanism of telecom operators and partners of cooperation mechanism, for telecom operators and partners provide important guarantee for business and cooperation process. Then, we put forward the share interests, wholly owned, equity participation, holding, custom and cooperative development, and building alliances, a total of6kinds of possible cooperation mode. Among them, the benefits and risks coordination mechanism is improved Shapley value method, cooperation supervision mechanism design is based on evolutionary game model in the simulation results.
(4) Research on the cooperation between the communication operators and symmetric partners. First, communication operators and cable operators in the area of physical construction and business integration cooperation pattern question for study, by building a business cooperation model and alliance model, proposed the establishment of the joint venture company, broadband access and cooperation, in such aspects as content value-added service depth cooperation between radio and television operators and communications operators possible cooperation mode; Then studied how to cooperation and sharing between different operators to build network infrastructure issues, specifically:first of all, build the regulation under the condition of network to build with access to the game model, and then put forward the solution for sharing to build model. The study found that the government controls (especially access cost control) is very necessary, based on research results, put forward the co-construction and sharing between operators based network and infrastructure implementation Suggestions.
Finally, on the issue that how to deal with the upheaval, and puts forward the countermeasures for communication operators; Government how to facilitate industry change and the telecommunication operators, puts forward the countermeasures and Suggestions.
This article's innovations are as followings:①on the basis of in-depth analysis of the telecom industry reform, integrated the original vertical industry chain, deepen the extension of industrial chain based on bilateral market, lateral chain, put forward the network of telecom industry chain form.②Based communications operators, according to the relations in the position in the industry chain, categorizing cooperation main body as the main body in the asymmetric enterprise cooperation and symmetric enterprise cooperation main body, and put forward the common index system and the characteristics of index system.③From the dynamic perspective of industry chain and partner development change, build the asymmetric dynamic selection model of enterprise partners, enriched the option theory and method of cooperation.
本文的主要研究内容及研究成果包括：
(1)通信产业变革的深层次解读及合作主体企业分类研究。通信产业深层次变革的主要内容包括：三网融合的试点与推进、全业务运营、移动互联网的普及、智能终端的更新和融合、通信技术的革新、OTT业务及OTT公司的崛起、物联网和云计算广泛应用等。分析了通信行业变革对电信产业链和通信运营商的影响,认为在纵向产业链的基础上,电信行业的变革将深化和扩展横向产业链,电信商业模式创新将形成基于双边市场的侧向产业链,纵向、横向和侧向三个维度的产业链相互交织将形成网状化产业链形态；并依据企业在产业链中与通信运营商的地位关系,将通信运营商的合作伙伴划分为了非对称企业合作主体和对称企业合作主体。其中,非对称企业合作主体包括内容提供商、服务提供商、设备提供商和终端制造商等；对称企业合作主体主要是指广电运营商和其他通信运营商。
(2)产业链变革动态视角下非对称企业合作伙伴的选择研究。对于非对称企业合作伙伴的选择,分别构建了通信运营商选择合作伙伴的共性指标体系和特性指标体系。综合层次分析法和熵值法,采用组合权重计算方法确定了各指标的权重,在此基础上,构建了合作伙伴选择的静态模糊评价体系。考虑到长期合作应重点考虑合作伙伴未来的发展能力变化,建立了基于BP神经网络方法的合作伙伴未来发展趋势预测及其动态模糊评价模型。以湖南移动在推进全业务运营时选择光交换机的设备提供商为例,进行了实证研究。研究结果显示,在静态评价中,湖南移动将选择中兴通讯或华为作为合作伙伴；而在考虑到企业的动态发展时,湖南移动应更多地考虑与华为展开深入合作。
(3)通信运营商与非对称企业合作伙伴的合作机制设计研究。构建了由信任机制、信息共享机制、利益与风险协调机制和合作监督机制所组成的电信运营商与合作伙伴的合作机制,为电信运营商与合作伙伴展开业务往来和合作过程提供重要保障。并提出了利益分成、全资、参股、控股、定制与合作开发以及构建联盟共6种可能的合作模式。其中,利益与风险协调机制采用的是改进Shapley值法,合作监督机制的设计则是依托于演化博弈模型的仿真结果。
(4)通信运营商与对称企业合作伙伴的合作问题研究。首先,就通信运营商与广电运营商在物理建设和业务融合方面的合作模式问题展开了研究,通过构建业务合作模型和结盟模型,提出了成立合资公司、宽带接入合作、在增值业务节目内容等方面深度合作等广电运营商与通信运营商之间可能的合作模式；然后,研究了不同运营商之间如何合作、共享共建基础网络设施问题,具体而言：首先构建了非规制条件下网络共建与接入的博弈模型,然后提出了共享共建模式的解决方案。研究发现政府的管制(尤其是接入费用的管制)是非常必要的,基于研究结果,提出了运营商之间共建共享基础网络和基础设施的实施建议。
最后,就如何应对行业剧变,提出了通信运营商的对策措施；就政府如何推动通信业变革、正视通信运营商地位,提出了对策建议。
本文的创新主要体现在以下几个方面：①深入分析电信产业变革的基础上,综合原有的纵向产业链、深化扩展出的横向产业链、基于双边市场的侧向产业链,提出了电信产业的网状产业链形态。②立足通信运营商,依据其在产业链中的地位关系,将合作主体分类为非对称企业合作主体和对称企业合作主体,并提出了共性指标体系和特性指标体系。③从产业链变革和合作伙伴发展的动态视角,构建了非对称企业合作伙伴的动态选择模型,丰富了合作选择理论和方法。
In recent years, with the development of the whole business operations, three nets fusion propulsion, the rise of the popularity of mobile Internet, OTT business and private capital entering and other major events, dramatic changes have taken place in the communications industry, communication industry chain is also revolutionarily changing, the dominant position of the telecommunication operators is under various main challenge. Changes lead to changes in the industry of background in the industry, the diversification of market competition intensified and sustained for communication operators integrate resources ability put forward higher challenge. For industrial chain resources integration ability, test is the communication operators for win-win cooperation with the industrial chain main body ability. Based on telecom industry under the background of drastic reform of communication industry chain, based on the communication operators, industry chain is studied in this paper dynamic change under the background of telecommunication operators how to choose partners, how to conduct in-depth cooperation with the partners, etc.
In this paper, the main research contents and research achievements are as following:
(1) Research on profound interpretation of communication industry changing and enterprise cooperation subject classification. Communication industry the main content of the deep changes including: three nets fusion of pilot and promote, the whole business operation, the popularity of mobile Internet, smart terminal updates and fusion, communication technology innovation, and OTT company OTT business, with the rise of the Internet of things and cloud computing are widely used, etc. Communications industry change on telecom industry chain are analyzed and the impact of communication operators, think on the basis of vertical industry chain, the change of telecom industry will deepen and extend the industrial chain, telecom business model innovation will form lateral chain based on bilateral market, longitudinal, transverse and lateral three dimensions of the intertwined to form the networked industry chain form. According to enterprise status relationship with telecommunication operators in the industry chain, divide the partners of telecommunication operators in order to cooperation main body and symmetric asymmetric enterprise cooperation main body. Among them, asymmetric enterprise cooperation main body including content providers, service providers, equipment providers and terminal manufacturers, etc.; Symmetric enterprise cooperation main body refers primarily to the radio and television operators and other communications operators.
(2) Research on asymmetric enterprise partners selection with dynamic perspective of industrial chain changing. For asymmetric enterprise partner choice, respectively to build the communication operators choose partners the common index system and index system of personality. Integrated analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and entropy value method, using the combination weighting method to determine the weight of each index, on this basis, build a static fuzzy evaluation of the partner selection system. Considering the long-term cooperation consider your partner's future development should focus on change, was established based on BP neural network of partners for the future development trend prediction and dynamic fuzzy evaluation model. When China Mobile Group Hunan Co., Ltd. advances all business operations and chooses optical switch equipment provider, for example, has carried on the empirical research. Results show that in the static evaluation, China Mobile Hunan will choose ZTE or HuaWei as a partner. While considering the dynamic development of the enterprise, China Mobile Hunan should conduct cooperation with HuaWei instead of ZTE.
(3) Research on the cooperation mechanism design between the communication operators and asymmetric enterprise partners'. Built by the trust mechanism, information sharing mechanism, benefit and risk supervision and coordination mechanism and cooperation mechanism of telecom operators and partners of cooperation mechanism, for telecom operators and partners provide important guarantee for business and cooperation process. Then, we put forward the share interests, wholly owned, equity participation, holding, custom and cooperative development, and building alliances, a total of6kinds of possible cooperation mode. Among them, the benefits and risks coordination mechanism is improved Shapley value method, cooperation supervision mechanism design is based on evolutionary game model in the simulation results.
(4) Research on the cooperation between the communication operators and symmetric partners. First, communication operators and cable operators in the area of physical construction and business integration cooperation pattern question for study, by building a business cooperation model and alliance model, proposed the establishment of the joint venture company, broadband access and cooperation, in such aspects as content value-added service depth cooperation between radio and television operators and communications operators possible cooperation mode; Then studied how to cooperation and sharing between different operators to build network infrastructure issues, specifically:first of all, build the regulation under the condition of network to build with access to the game model, and then put forward the solution for sharing to build model. The study found that the government controls (especially access cost control) is very necessary, based on research results, put forward the co-construction and sharing between operators based network and infrastructure implementation Suggestions.
Finally, on the issue that how to deal with the upheaval, and puts forward the countermeasures for communication operators; Government how to facilitate industry change and the telecommunication operators, puts forward the countermeasures and Suggestions.
This article's innovations are as followings:①on the basis of in-depth analysis of the telecom industry reform, integrated the original vertical industry chain, deepen the extension of industrial chain based on bilateral market, lateral chain, put forward the network of telecom industry chain form.②Based communications operators, according to the relations in the position in the industry chain, categorizing cooperation main body as the main body in the asymmetric enterprise cooperation and symmetric enterprise cooperation main body, and put forward the common index system and the characteristics of index system.③From the dynamic perspective of industry chain and partner development change, build the asymmetric dynamic selection model of enterprise partners, enriched the option theory and method of cooperation.
引文
[1]A.A.Alchian, H.Demsetz. Technological Learning and Innovation in Industrial Clusters in the Sorth [R]. SPRU, Electronic Working Papers Series Paper,1992, 7:12-32
[2]Amit R, Schoemaker P Strategic assets and organizational rent[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1993,14:33-46
[3]Ashmos DP Duchon D, McDaniel R R, Huonker J W. What a mess! Participation as a simple management rule to "complexity" organizations [J]. Journal of Management Studies,2002,39(2):189-206
[4]Benia M. Beamon. Measuring Supply Chain Performance [J]. International Journal of Operations&Production Management.1999,19(3/4):275-292
[5]Berger P D, Gerstenfeld A, Zeng A Z. How many suppliers are best? A decision analysis approach [J]. The International Journal of Management Science, 2004(32):9-15
[6]Bhambri A, Sonnenfeld J. Organization structure and corporate social performance:a field study in two contrasting industries [J]. A Academy of Management Journal,1988,31(3):642-662
[7]Bhutta K S, Huq F Supplier selection problem:A comparison of the total cost of ownership and analytic hierarchy process approaches [J]. Supply Chain Management,2002,7(3/4):126-135
[8]Blomqvist K, Klyaheiko K, Virolainen V M. Filling the gap in traditional transaction cost economics:Towards transaction benefit-based analysis [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2002,79:1-14
[9]Brown G C Graves G W, Honczarenko M D. Design and operation of a multi-commodity production/distribution system using primal goal decomposition [J]. Management Science,1987,33(11):1469-1479
[10]Chang J J, Lai C C, Lin C C. Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model [J]. Journal of comparative Economics,2003, (1):75-93
[11]Chen Y J, Seshadri S. Supply chain structure and demand risk [J]. Aotomatica, 2005,45
[12]Chiclana F, Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E. Integrating three representation models in fuzzy multipurpose decision making based onfuzzy preference relations [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,1998, (97):33-48
[13]Chiclana F, Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E. Integrating multiplicative preference relations in a multipurpose decision-making model based on fuzzy preference relations [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2001, (122):277-291
[14]Christopher C. Corporate valuation, capital structure and risk management:A Stochastic DCF approach [J]. European Journal of Operational Research.2001, (135):311-325
[15]Choi T Y, UD, Yan H. Optimal returns policy for supply chain with e-marketplace [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,88: 205-227
[16]Choi T Y, Krause D R. The supply base and its complexity:Implications for transaction costs, risk, responsiveness and innovation [J]. Journal of Operation Management,2005
[17]Chou S Y, Chang Y H A decision support system for supplier selection based on a strategy-aligned fuzzy SMART approach [J]. Expert Systems with Applications,2008,34(4):2241-2253
[18]Cohen M A, Lee H L. Strategic analysis of integrated production-distribution system:Model and methods [J]. Operations Research,1988,36(2):216-22
[19]Cogger K O, Yu P L. Eigen weight vectors and least distance approximation for revealed preference in pairwise weight ratios [J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Application,1985, (46):483-491
[20]Crawford G B. The geometric mean procedure for estimating the scale of a judgment matrix [J]. Mathematical Modeling,1987,9(3-5):327-334
[21]Dacin M T. The embeddedness of organizations:dialogue and directions [J]. Journal of Management,1999,25(3):317-356
[22]Dalton D R, Todor W D, Spendolini M J, Fielding G J, Porter L W. Organization structure and performance:a critical review [J]. Academy of Management Review,1980,5(1):49-64
[23]Dantzig Cx B. Linear Programming and Extension [M], Princeton University Press. Princeton 1963
[24]Desheng Wu, David L. Oslon. Supply chain risk, simulation, and vender selection [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2008, (114): 646-655
[25]Dohohue K L. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411
[26]Dyer J D, Singh H. The relational view:cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage [J]. Academy of Management Review,1998,23(4):660-679
[27]Dyer J D. How Chrysler created an American Keiretsu [J]. Harvard Business Review,1996(4):42-5
[28]Emmons H, Gibert S M. The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-283
[29]Ethiraj S K, Levinthal D A. Modularity and innovation in complex systems [J]. Management Science,2004,50(2):159-173
[30]Ethiraj S K, Levinthal D A. Bouned rationality and the search for organizational architecture:an evolutionary perspective on the design of organizations and their evolvability [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2004,404-437
[31]Fan Z P, Ma J, Jiang Y P, Sun Y H, Ma L. A goal programming approach to group decision making based on multiplicative preference relations and fuzzy preference relations [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2006(174): 311-321.
[32]Fernandez E, Leyva J C. A method based on multiobjective optimization for deriving a ranking from a fuzzy preference relation [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2004(154):110-124
[33]Forrester J W. Industrial dynamics, systems dynamics series [M]. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1961
[34]Gavirneni S, Kapuscinski R, Tayur S. Value of information in capacitated supply chains [J]. Management Science,1999,45(1):16-24
[35]Gavirneni S. Benefits of co-operation in a production distribution environment [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2001(130):612-622
[36]Gerard P Cachon, Martin A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations [J]. Management Science 2005,18(6):345-357
[37]Giannoccaro I, Erratum P P. Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts [J], International journal of production economics,2004(89):131-139
[38]Glickman T S, White S C. Optimal vendor selection in a multiproduct supply chain with truckload discounts [J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2008,44(5):684-695
[39]Gradori A, Soda G. Inter-firm networks:Antecedents mechanisms and forms [J]. Organisation Studies,1995,16(2):183-214
[40]Granovetter M. Economic action and social structure:the problem of embeddedness [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91 (3):481-510
[41]Gulati R. Alliances and networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998(19): 293-317
[42]Hallikas J, Karvonen I, Pulkkinen U. Risk management processes in supplier networks [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004(90):47-55
[43]Hallikas J, Virolainen V M, Tuominen M. Risk analysis and assessment in network environment [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2002(78):45-55
[44]Handfield R B, Bechtel C. The role of trust and relationship structure in improving supply chain responsiveness [J]. Industrial Marketing Management, 2002,31 (34):367-382
[45]Harland C. Supply chain management:Relationship, chains and networks [J]. British Journal of Management,1996(3):63-80
[46]Harland C, Brencheley H, Walker H. Risk in supply network [J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2003,9(2):51-62
[47]Hines. A conceptual model for researching the creation and operation of supply networks [J]. British Journal of Management,1996(15):1-21
[48]Houlihan J B. Supply chain management [C]. Proceedings of the 19th International Techcical Conference, BPICS,1984:101-110
[49]Ip W, Yung K, Wang D. A branch and bound algorithm for sub-contractor selection in agile manufacturing environment [J]. International Journal of Product Economics,2004,87(2):195-205
[50]Islei G, Lockett A G. Judgemental modelling based on geometric least square [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1988,36(1):27-35
[51]Jia N X, Yokoyama R. Profit allotment of IPPs in retail electric market based on cooperative game theory(C]. Proceedings of International Conference on Power System Technology, Kunming China,2002:853-857
[52]Karjalainen J. Profit and Risk Sharing in Virtual Enterprise [J]. International Journal of International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management, 2004(1):75-92
[53]Kasilingam R G, Lee C P. Selection of Vendors--A Mixed-Integer Programming Aproach[J], Computers industrial Engineering,1996,31(1/2):347-350
[54]Kogut B, Shan W, Walker G The make-or-coorperate decision in the context of an Industry network. In Nohia N&Eccles R (Eds.), Networks and Organizations [M]:348-365, Cambridge, MA:Harvard Business School Press,1992
[55]Kotabe M, Martin M, Domoto H. Gaining from vertical partnerships:knowledge transfer, relationship duration and supplier performance improvement in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries [J]. Strategic Management Journal,2003, 24:293-316
[56]Krause D, Scannell T, Calantone R. A structural analysis of the effectiveness of buying firm s strategies to improve supplier performance [J]. Decsion Science, 2000,31(1):3355
[57]Kenneth.H.Wathne, Jan.B.Heide. Coordination Contracts for decentralized supply chains with retails promotional effort [J]. Management Science,2005, 50(1):48-63
[58]Lau H S, Lau A H L. Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1999, 116(2):291-304
[59]Joe Pepparda. Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains:Incentives and Information [J]. Management Science,1999,45(5):721-732
[60]Lee H L, Whang S. Information Sharing in a Supply Chain [J]. International Journal of Technology Management.2000,20(3/4):373-387
[61]Li C C, Fun Y P, Hung J S. A new measure for supplier performance evaluation [J]. HE Transaction,1997,29:753-758
[62]Martin M K. Design for variety:A methodology for developing product platform architectures [D]. Stanford University,2005
[63]M.Raith. Holonic organizational architectures [J]. Human Systems Management, 2007,15:27-54
[64]New, Snow C C. Causes of failure in network organizations [J]. Califoria Management Review,1996(24):53-72
[65]Oliver R K, Webber M D. Supply chain management—logistics catches up with strategy [A]. Christopher M.Cx Logisticd-Strategic Issues [C], London, Chapman and Hall,1992
[66]Ojala M, Hallikas J. Investment decision-making in supplier networks: Management of risk [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2006(104):201-213
[67]Okino N. Bionic manufacturing systems [A]. In Peklenik J (Ed.), Flexible Manufacturing Systens, Past, Present, Future, CIFP [C], Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Ljubljana,1993
[68]Ossadnik W. AHP-based synergy allocation to partners in a merger [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1996(1):42-49
[69]Padmanabhan V, Png I P L. Returns policies:Make money by making good [J]. Sloan Management Review,1995,37(1):65-72
[70]Padmanabhan V, Png I P L. Manufacturer's returns policies and retail competition [J]. Marketing Science,1997,6(1):81-94
[71]Pasternack B A. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities [J]. Management Science,1985,4(2):166-176
[72]Piller F T. Mass customization:Reflection on the state of the concept [J]. International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems,2004,16(4):313-334
[73]Polanyi K. The great transformation:the political and economic origin of our time, Boston, Mass:Beacon Press,1944
[74]Powell W M. Neither market nor hierarchy:Network forms of organization. In Staw B M, Cummings L L (Eds.). Research in organizational behavior [M], (12): 295-336. Greenwich, CT:JAI,1990
[75]Prahinski C, Benton. Supplier evaluations:communication strategies to improve supplier performance [J]. Journal of Operation Management,2004,22(1):39-62
[76]Qin Y, Ma D. Study on profit distribution Mechanism among enterprises in the supply chain[R]. Proceedings of 2003 international conference on management science & engineering,2003(08):995-999
[77]Roodhooft F, Konings J. Vendor Selection and Evaluation:An Activity Based Costing Approach [J], European Journal of Operational Research,1996,96: 97-102
[78]Sandy D J. Perspectives on joint competitive advantges in Buyer-supplier relationships [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,2001,18:19-35
[79]Sahin F, Robinson E P Flow coordination and information sharing in supply chain:Review, implications and directions for future research [J]. Decision Sciences 2002,33(4):505-536
[80]Sako M. Prices, quality and trust:Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan [M]. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1992
[81]Shapley L S. A value for n-person games:Contributions to the Theory of Games (edited by Kuhn H W, Theker A W) [M], Princeton University Press. Prineeton, New Jersey,1953(2):307-318
[82]Saaty T. Modeling unstructured decision Problems:A theory of analytical hierarchies [C]. Porceedings of the first international conference on mathematical modeling,1977,69-77
[83]Sheffi Y Supply chain management under the threat of international terrorism [J]. International Journal of Logistics Management,2001,12(2):1-11
[84]Shor N Z. Minimization Methods for Non-differentiable Functions [M]. In Springer-Verlag,1985
[85]Stock J, Speh T, Shear H. Many happy (product) returns [J].Harvard Business Review,2002,80(7):16-17
[86]Srinagesh H A. The architechture of complexity [C]. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,2001,106:467-482
[87]Tam M, Tummala V An application of the AHP in vendor selection of a telecommunications system [J]. Omega,2001,29(2):171-180
[88]Taylor T A. Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects [J]. Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007
[89]Trieschmann J S, Gustavson S C} Hoyt R E. Risk Management and Insurance [M]. Thomson Learing,2001
[90]Tsay A A. Risk sensitivity in distribution channel partnerships implications for manufacture return policies [J]. Journal of Retailing,2002(78):147-160
[91]Tseng M M, Jiao J. Design for mass customization [R]. Annuals of the CIRP, 1996(45):153-156
[92]Wadhwa V, Ravindran A R. Vendor selection in outsourcing [J]. Computers & Operations Research,2007,34(12):3725-3737
[93]Wang Q Huang S H, Dismukes J P Product-driven supply chain selection using integrated mufti-critera decision-making methodology [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,91(1):1-15
[94]Wang Y M, Parkan C. Multiple attribute decision making based on fuzzy preference information on alternatives:Ranking and weighting [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2005, (153):331-346
[95]Wang Y M, Fan Z P Fuzzy Preference relations:Aggregation and weight determination [J]. Computer&industrial engineering,2007(53):163-172
[96]Wang Y M, Fan ZP, Hua Z. A chi-square method for obtaining a priority vector from multiplicative and fuzzy preference relations [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007(182):356-366
[97]Webster S, Weng Z K. A risk to free perishable item returns policy [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2000,2(1):100-107
[98]Weber C A, Current J R. A multi-objective Approach to Vendor selection [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1993,68:173-184
[99]Weber C A, Current J R, Benton W C. Vendor Selection Criteria and Methods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1991,50:2-18
[100]Womack J P, Jones D T, Roos D. The machine that changed the world [M]. New York, Harper Perennial,1990
[101]Wu T, Blackhurst J, Chidambaram V A model for inbound supply risk analysis [J]. Computers in Industry,2006(57):350-365
[102]Xia Y S, Yang M H, Golany B, Gilbert S M, Yu G} Real-time disruption management in a two-stage production and inventory system [J]. IIE Transactions,2004,36:111-125
[103]Xu Z S, Da Q L. A least deviation method to obtain a priority vector of a fuzzy preference relation [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2005, (164): 206-216
[104]Yang J L, Chiu H N, Tzeng G H, Yeh R H. Vendor selection by integrated fuzzy MCDM techniques with independent and interdependent relationships [J]. Information Sciences,2008,178(21):4166-4183
[105]X.Zhang. The impact of forecasting methods on the bullwhip effect [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004(88):15-27
[106]常志平,蒋馥.供应链中信息共享的范围[J].工业工程与管理,2002,7(5)：47-49
[107]陈安斌,王信文.供应链之风险值控管一模式建构、策略与案例分析[J].中华管理评论,2001,4(2)
[108]陈菊红,汪应洛,孙林岩.虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2002(1)：11-16
[109]陈辉,刘存草,朱志军.物流配送中的路径优化问题研究[J].西安电子科技大学学报,2006,(5)：16-20
[110]陈志祥.供应链中供需合作关系的分析与优化理论[J].计算机集成制造系统,2005,11(3)：386-393
[111]楚扬杰,王先甲,吴秀君,方德斌.供应链信息共享的道德风险研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2006,28(2)：86-89
[112]董爽.供应链销售渠道中的道德风险问题[J].科技进步与对策,2004,(10)：128-130
[113]单永贵.快速反应——中外知名企业应对全球化的成功战略[J].纺织器材,20035：60-62
[114]戴建华,薛恒新.基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(4)：33-36
[115]丁伟东,刘凯,贺国先.供应链风险研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2003,13(4)：64-66
[116]付晓帆.供应链企业合作利益分配机制研究[D],武汉：武汉理工大学,2004
[117]郭丽华,张明玉.基于利益分配机制的农产品供应链分析[J].物流技术,2006(6)：47-49
[118]郝海,郑王愕.基于Shapley值的供应链合作伙伴利益风险分配机制[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(5)：71-75
[119]黄逸珺.电信运营商的供应链管理[J].中国管理科学,2009,19(5)：781-810
[120]胡智海.三网融合下的广电、电信和互联网企业竞合分析[J].信息网络.2010,12(2)：70-73
[121]胡宣达,沈厚才,风险管理学基础一数理方法[M].南京：东南大学出版社,2001
[122]姜启源.数学模型[M].北京：高等教育出版社,1993
[123]金淳,刘听露.供应链协调的仿真建模方法研究综述[J].计算机应用研究,2006,4：1-3
[124]何霞.新形势下,进一步推进三网融合的发展[J].移动通信,2011,23：9-11
[125]李建忠,邓定宾.基于供应链环境下企业与供应商的合作关系分析[J].交通运输工程与信息学报,2005,3(2)：106-110
[126]林旭东,朱顺泉.供应链企业收益分配的博弈模型研究[J].价值工程,2004(3)：29-31
[127]林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[A].财产权利与制度变迁一一产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集,上海：上海三联书店,1994
[128]刘亮、熊炜烨.供应链中的信息风险管理研究[J].特区经济,2004,10：159-160
[129]罗伯特·希斯.危机管理[M].王成等译.北京：中信出版社,2004：15-17
[130]廖成林,孙洪杰.均势供应链及其利益分配机制探讨[J].管理工程学报, 2003,17(4)：83-85
[131]李华,陈燕,胡松药.供应链网络机制与动态特性的研究[J].系统仿真学报,2006,18(5)：1366-1374
[132]李辉,李向阳,孙洁.供应链伙伴关系管理问题研究现状评述及分析[J].管理工程学报,2008(2)：148-151
[133]李美云.国外产业融合研究新进展[J].外国经济与管理,2005(12)：120-125.
[134]鲁维.三网融合时代的机遇和挑战[J].中国电信业,2011,2：7-11
[135]马惠.运营支撑服务是三网融合重点[J].通信世界,2011,4(2)：15-18
[136]马新安.如何防范供应链风险[J].中国计算机用户,2003(1)：21
[137]马士华,王鹏.基于Shapley值法的供应链合作伙伴间收益分配机制[J].中国管理科学,2006,11(4)：43-45
[138]倪燕翎,李海婴,燕翔.供应链风险管理与企业风险管理之比较[J].物流技术,2004,12-40-42
[139]宁钟.供应链脆弱性的影响因素及其管理原则[J].中国流通经济,2004,4：13-16
[140]彭祖赠,孙楹玉.模糊数学及其应用[M].武汉：武汉大学出版社,2002
[141]乔治·旺·科鲁夫等.知识创新：价值的源泉[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2003
[142]青木昌彦,安藤晴彦.模块时代：新产业结构的本质[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2003
[143]桑圣举,王炬香,杨阳.供应链风险管理的研究和进展[J].工业技术经济,2006,25：116-120
[144]沈剑.我国三网融合上下游产业有效竞争关系研究[D].博士学位论文：北京邮电大学,2011
[145]孙东川,叶飞.动态联盟利益分配的谈判模型研究[J].科研管理,2001,2：91-95
[146]万映红,李江,李怀祖.虚拟合作的伙伴选择智能决策支持系统框架研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2001(12)：60-65
[147]王金样,吴育华.基于遗传算法的前洽生产函数构造及其应用[J].管理科学学报,2004,2：13-17
[148]王来军,史忠科.航班离场排序问题的遗传算法设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,25：119-125
[149]王丽杰,刘奉林.供应链中合作伙伴关系的益处和风险[J].企业研究,2006,2：39-40
[150]王燕,杨文瀚.供应商的违约风险对供应链的影响[J].统计与决策,2005,2： 17-18
[151]魏修建.供应链利益分配研究—资源与贡献率的分配思路与框架[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2)：78-82
[152]文杰,倪勤.改进遗传算法求解TSP问题[J].数学的实践与认识,2005,35：129-133
[153]吴宪华.动态联盟的分配格局研究[J].系统工程,2001,3：34-38
[154]夏晓衍.产品生命周期不合理缩短的原因分析[J].商业研究,2000,3：125-126
[155]解鲤,刘凯,周双贵.供应链战略联盟的风险问题研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2003,13(11)：26-29
[156]杨贵斌.动态联盟合作伙伴选择研究[D].武汉：武汉理工大学,2004
[157]杨红芬,吕安洪,李琪.供应链管理中的信息风险及对策分析[J].商业经济与管理,2002,2：32-35
[158]杨俊.供应链风险管理理论与方法研究[D].武汉：武汉理工大学,2005
[159]杨屹,林宣雄,陈伟.动态联盟合作伙伴间收益分配模型及其求解方法研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003(11)：5-8
[160]叶飞,郭东风,孙东川.虚拟企业成员之间利益分配方法研究[J].统计与决策,2000(7)：11-12
[161]叶飞,孙东川,张红.面向虚拟企业合作伙伴选择的新过程框架结构研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003(11)：88-94
[162]叶飞,李怡娜.基于Stackelberg模型与Nash协商模型的供应链回购契约机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,3：39-43
[163]叶怀珍,胡异杰.供应链合作伙伴收益原则研究[J].西南交通大学学报,20041：35-43
[164]尹钢,邓飞其,李兴厚.基于合作对策的供应链利益分配模型[J].武汉科技大学学报,2003,26(4)：430-432
[165]于辉,陈剑,于刚.协调供应链如何应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,7：9-16
[166]余波.基于三网融合的信息服务展望[J].图书情报工作,2011,55(15)：128-132
[167]袁春晓.供给链变迁与企业组织形式的演化[J].管理世界,2002,1：130-136
[168]曾俊全.三网融合与功能拆分[J].中国电信业,2011,123(3)：52-53
[169]曾剑秋.网和天下——三网融合理论、实验与信息安全[M].北京：北京邮电大学出版社,2010.
[170]张建勇,李军.具有摸糊预约时间的G-RP混合遗传算法[J].管理科学学报,2005,3：64-71
[171]章海峰.供应链企业战略合作风险因素分析[J].武汉冶金管理干部学院学报,2010,14(4)：18-21
[172]张侨,郭宏湘.供应链供需双方利益风险分配方法[J].价值工程,2004,6：46-49
[173]张瑞雯.电信企业开展三网融合业务的路径探讨[J].通信企业管理,2011(4)：24-25
[174]张彤,张世英.企业集团的利益分配研究[J].管理工程学报,2003(1)：123-149
[175]张睿.三网融合普遍接入技术和市场及政策选择[D].博士论文：哈尔滨工业大学,2008
[176]张向阳,杨敏才,刘华明,张晓凤.供应链管理中风险分担与利益分配机制研究[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(5)：94-97
[177]章珉.战略联盟价值创造与分配分析[J].管理工程学报,2003,17(2)：20-22
[178]张缨.信任、契约及其规制——转型期中国企业间信任关系及结构重组研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2004
[179]郑国用.虚拟企业风险分担和利益分配[D].沈阳：沈阳工业大学管理学院,2001
[180]周晴.敏捷虚拟企业利润分配机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(1)：26-28
[181]周艳菊,邱莞华,王宗润.供应链风险管理研究进展的综述与分析[J].系统工程,2006,24(3)：1-7
[182]朱金周.国际上三网融合的监管体制和政策及对我国的启示[J].电信软科学研究,2008(6)：2-5.
[183]邹文英.基于设施的竞争——实现本地电信有效竞争的方式[J].上海经济研究,2005,11：12-14
[2]Amit R, Schoemaker P Strategic assets and organizational rent[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1993,14:33-46
[3]Ashmos DP Duchon D, McDaniel R R, Huonker J W. What a mess! Participation as a simple management rule to "complexity" organizations [J]. Journal of Management Studies,2002,39(2):189-206
[4]Benia M. Beamon. Measuring Supply Chain Performance [J]. International Journal of Operations&Production Management.1999,19(3/4):275-292
[5]Berger P D, Gerstenfeld A, Zeng A Z. How many suppliers are best? A decision analysis approach [J]. The International Journal of Management Science, 2004(32):9-15
[6]Bhambri A, Sonnenfeld J. Organization structure and corporate social performance:a field study in two contrasting industries [J]. A Academy of Management Journal,1988,31(3):642-662
[7]Bhutta K S, Huq F Supplier selection problem:A comparison of the total cost of ownership and analytic hierarchy process approaches [J]. Supply Chain Management,2002,7(3/4):126-135
[8]Blomqvist K, Klyaheiko K, Virolainen V M. Filling the gap in traditional transaction cost economics:Towards transaction benefit-based analysis [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2002,79:1-14
[9]Brown G C Graves G W, Honczarenko M D. Design and operation of a multi-commodity production/distribution system using primal goal decomposition [J]. Management Science,1987,33(11):1469-1479
[10]Chang J J, Lai C C, Lin C C. Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model [J]. Journal of comparative Economics,2003, (1):75-93
[11]Chen Y J, Seshadri S. Supply chain structure and demand risk [J]. Aotomatica, 2005,45
[12]Chiclana F, Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E. Integrating three representation models in fuzzy multipurpose decision making based onfuzzy preference relations [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,1998, (97):33-48
[13]Chiclana F, Herrera F, Herrera-Viedma E. Integrating multiplicative preference relations in a multipurpose decision-making model based on fuzzy preference relations [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2001, (122):277-291
[14]Christopher C. Corporate valuation, capital structure and risk management:A Stochastic DCF approach [J]. European Journal of Operational Research.2001, (135):311-325
[15]Choi T Y, UD, Yan H. Optimal returns policy for supply chain with e-marketplace [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,88: 205-227
[16]Choi T Y, Krause D R. The supply base and its complexity:Implications for transaction costs, risk, responsiveness and innovation [J]. Journal of Operation Management,2005
[17]Chou S Y, Chang Y H A decision support system for supplier selection based on a strategy-aligned fuzzy SMART approach [J]. Expert Systems with Applications,2008,34(4):2241-2253
[18]Cohen M A, Lee H L. Strategic analysis of integrated production-distribution system:Model and methods [J]. Operations Research,1988,36(2):216-22
[19]Cogger K O, Yu P L. Eigen weight vectors and least distance approximation for revealed preference in pairwise weight ratios [J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Application,1985, (46):483-491
[20]Crawford G B. The geometric mean procedure for estimating the scale of a judgment matrix [J]. Mathematical Modeling,1987,9(3-5):327-334
[21]Dacin M T. The embeddedness of organizations:dialogue and directions [J]. Journal of Management,1999,25(3):317-356
[22]Dalton D R, Todor W D, Spendolini M J, Fielding G J, Porter L W. Organization structure and performance:a critical review [J]. Academy of Management Review,1980,5(1):49-64
[23]Dantzig Cx B. Linear Programming and Extension [M], Princeton University Press. Princeton 1963
[24]Desheng Wu, David L. Oslon. Supply chain risk, simulation, and vender selection [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2008, (114): 646-655
[25]Dohohue K L. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411
[26]Dyer J D, Singh H. The relational view:cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage [J]. Academy of Management Review,1998,23(4):660-679
[27]Dyer J D. How Chrysler created an American Keiretsu [J]. Harvard Business Review,1996(4):42-5
[28]Emmons H, Gibert S M. The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-283
[29]Ethiraj S K, Levinthal D A. Modularity and innovation in complex systems [J]. Management Science,2004,50(2):159-173
[30]Ethiraj S K, Levinthal D A. Bouned rationality and the search for organizational architecture:an evolutionary perspective on the design of organizations and their evolvability [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2004,404-437
[31]Fan Z P, Ma J, Jiang Y P, Sun Y H, Ma L. A goal programming approach to group decision making based on multiplicative preference relations and fuzzy preference relations [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2006(174): 311-321.
[32]Fernandez E, Leyva J C. A method based on multiobjective optimization for deriving a ranking from a fuzzy preference relation [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2004(154):110-124
[33]Forrester J W. Industrial dynamics, systems dynamics series [M]. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1961
[34]Gavirneni S, Kapuscinski R, Tayur S. Value of information in capacitated supply chains [J]. Management Science,1999,45(1):16-24
[35]Gavirneni S. Benefits of co-operation in a production distribution environment [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2001(130):612-622
[36]Gerard P Cachon, Martin A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations [J]. Management Science 2005,18(6):345-357
[37]Giannoccaro I, Erratum P P. Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts [J], International journal of production economics,2004(89):131-139
[38]Glickman T S, White S C. Optimal vendor selection in a multiproduct supply chain with truckload discounts [J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2008,44(5):684-695
[39]Gradori A, Soda G. Inter-firm networks:Antecedents mechanisms and forms [J]. Organisation Studies,1995,16(2):183-214
[40]Granovetter M. Economic action and social structure:the problem of embeddedness [J]. American Journal of Sociology,1985,91 (3):481-510
[41]Gulati R. Alliances and networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998(19): 293-317
[42]Hallikas J, Karvonen I, Pulkkinen U. Risk management processes in supplier networks [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004(90):47-55
[43]Hallikas J, Virolainen V M, Tuominen M. Risk analysis and assessment in network environment [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2002(78):45-55
[44]Handfield R B, Bechtel C. The role of trust and relationship structure in improving supply chain responsiveness [J]. Industrial Marketing Management, 2002,31 (34):367-382
[45]Harland C. Supply chain management:Relationship, chains and networks [J]. British Journal of Management,1996(3):63-80
[46]Harland C, Brencheley H, Walker H. Risk in supply network [J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2003,9(2):51-62
[47]Hines. A conceptual model for researching the creation and operation of supply networks [J]. British Journal of Management,1996(15):1-21
[48]Houlihan J B. Supply chain management [C]. Proceedings of the 19th International Techcical Conference, BPICS,1984:101-110
[49]Ip W, Yung K, Wang D. A branch and bound algorithm for sub-contractor selection in agile manufacturing environment [J]. International Journal of Product Economics,2004,87(2):195-205
[50]Islei G, Lockett A G. Judgemental modelling based on geometric least square [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1988,36(1):27-35
[51]Jia N X, Yokoyama R. Profit allotment of IPPs in retail electric market based on cooperative game theory(C]. Proceedings of International Conference on Power System Technology, Kunming China,2002:853-857
[52]Karjalainen J. Profit and Risk Sharing in Virtual Enterprise [J]. International Journal of International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management, 2004(1):75-92
[53]Kasilingam R G, Lee C P. Selection of Vendors--A Mixed-Integer Programming Aproach[J], Computers industrial Engineering,1996,31(1/2):347-350
[54]Kogut B, Shan W, Walker G The make-or-coorperate decision in the context of an Industry network. In Nohia N&Eccles R (Eds.), Networks and Organizations [M]:348-365, Cambridge, MA:Harvard Business School Press,1992
[55]Kotabe M, Martin M, Domoto H. Gaining from vertical partnerships:knowledge transfer, relationship duration and supplier performance improvement in the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries [J]. Strategic Management Journal,2003, 24:293-316
[56]Krause D, Scannell T, Calantone R. A structural analysis of the effectiveness of buying firm s strategies to improve supplier performance [J]. Decsion Science, 2000,31(1):3355
[57]Kenneth.H.Wathne, Jan.B.Heide. Coordination Contracts for decentralized supply chains with retails promotional effort [J]. Management Science,2005, 50(1):48-63
[58]Lau H S, Lau A H L. Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1999, 116(2):291-304
[59]Joe Pepparda. Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains:Incentives and Information [J]. Management Science,1999,45(5):721-732
[60]Lee H L, Whang S. Information Sharing in a Supply Chain [J]. International Journal of Technology Management.2000,20(3/4):373-387
[61]Li C C, Fun Y P, Hung J S. A new measure for supplier performance evaluation [J]. HE Transaction,1997,29:753-758
[62]Martin M K. Design for variety:A methodology for developing product platform architectures [D]. Stanford University,2005
[63]M.Raith. Holonic organizational architectures [J]. Human Systems Management, 2007,15:27-54
[64]New, Snow C C. Causes of failure in network organizations [J]. Califoria Management Review,1996(24):53-72
[65]Oliver R K, Webber M D. Supply chain management—logistics catches up with strategy [A]. Christopher M.Cx Logisticd-Strategic Issues [C], London, Chapman and Hall,1992
[66]Ojala M, Hallikas J. Investment decision-making in supplier networks: Management of risk [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2006(104):201-213
[67]Okino N. Bionic manufacturing systems [A]. In Peklenik J (Ed.), Flexible Manufacturing Systens, Past, Present, Future, CIFP [C], Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Ljubljana,1993
[68]Ossadnik W. AHP-based synergy allocation to partners in a merger [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1996(1):42-49
[69]Padmanabhan V, Png I P L. Returns policies:Make money by making good [J]. Sloan Management Review,1995,37(1):65-72
[70]Padmanabhan V, Png I P L. Manufacturer's returns policies and retail competition [J]. Marketing Science,1997,6(1):81-94
[71]Pasternack B A. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities [J]. Management Science,1985,4(2):166-176
[72]Piller F T. Mass customization:Reflection on the state of the concept [J]. International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems,2004,16(4):313-334
[73]Polanyi K. The great transformation:the political and economic origin of our time, Boston, Mass:Beacon Press,1944
[74]Powell W M. Neither market nor hierarchy:Network forms of organization. In Staw B M, Cummings L L (Eds.). Research in organizational behavior [M], (12): 295-336. Greenwich, CT:JAI,1990
[75]Prahinski C, Benton. Supplier evaluations:communication strategies to improve supplier performance [J]. Journal of Operation Management,2004,22(1):39-62
[76]Qin Y, Ma D. Study on profit distribution Mechanism among enterprises in the supply chain[R]. Proceedings of 2003 international conference on management science & engineering,2003(08):995-999
[77]Roodhooft F, Konings J. Vendor Selection and Evaluation:An Activity Based Costing Approach [J], European Journal of Operational Research,1996,96: 97-102
[78]Sandy D J. Perspectives on joint competitive advantges in Buyer-supplier relationships [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,2001,18:19-35
[79]Sahin F, Robinson E P Flow coordination and information sharing in supply chain:Review, implications and directions for future research [J]. Decision Sciences 2002,33(4):505-536
[80]Sako M. Prices, quality and trust:Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan [M]. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1992
[81]Shapley L S. A value for n-person games:Contributions to the Theory of Games (edited by Kuhn H W, Theker A W) [M], Princeton University Press. Prineeton, New Jersey,1953(2):307-318
[82]Saaty T. Modeling unstructured decision Problems:A theory of analytical hierarchies [C]. Porceedings of the first international conference on mathematical modeling,1977,69-77
[83]Sheffi Y Supply chain management under the threat of international terrorism [J]. International Journal of Logistics Management,2001,12(2):1-11
[84]Shor N Z. Minimization Methods for Non-differentiable Functions [M]. In Springer-Verlag,1985
[85]Stock J, Speh T, Shear H. Many happy (product) returns [J].Harvard Business Review,2002,80(7):16-17
[86]Srinagesh H A. The architechture of complexity [C]. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,2001,106:467-482
[87]Tam M, Tummala V An application of the AHP in vendor selection of a telecommunications system [J]. Omega,2001,29(2):171-180
[88]Taylor T A. Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects [J]. Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007
[89]Trieschmann J S, Gustavson S C} Hoyt R E. Risk Management and Insurance [M]. Thomson Learing,2001
[90]Tsay A A. Risk sensitivity in distribution channel partnerships implications for manufacture return policies [J]. Journal of Retailing,2002(78):147-160
[91]Tseng M M, Jiao J. Design for mass customization [R]. Annuals of the CIRP, 1996(45):153-156
[92]Wadhwa V, Ravindran A R. Vendor selection in outsourcing [J]. Computers & Operations Research,2007,34(12):3725-3737
[93]Wang Q Huang S H, Dismukes J P Product-driven supply chain selection using integrated mufti-critera decision-making methodology [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,91(1):1-15
[94]Wang Y M, Parkan C. Multiple attribute decision making based on fuzzy preference information on alternatives:Ranking and weighting [J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems,2005, (153):331-346
[95]Wang Y M, Fan Z P Fuzzy Preference relations:Aggregation and weight determination [J]. Computer&industrial engineering,2007(53):163-172
[96]Wang Y M, Fan ZP, Hua Z. A chi-square method for obtaining a priority vector from multiplicative and fuzzy preference relations [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007(182):356-366
[97]Webster S, Weng Z K. A risk to free perishable item returns policy [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2000,2(1):100-107
[98]Weber C A, Current J R. A multi-objective Approach to Vendor selection [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1993,68:173-184
[99]Weber C A, Current J R, Benton W C. Vendor Selection Criteria and Methods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,1991,50:2-18
[100]Womack J P, Jones D T, Roos D. The machine that changed the world [M]. New York, Harper Perennial,1990
[101]Wu T, Blackhurst J, Chidambaram V A model for inbound supply risk analysis [J]. Computers in Industry,2006(57):350-365
[102]Xia Y S, Yang M H, Golany B, Gilbert S M, Yu G} Real-time disruption management in a two-stage production and inventory system [J]. IIE Transactions,2004,36:111-125
[103]Xu Z S, Da Q L. A least deviation method to obtain a priority vector of a fuzzy preference relation [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2005, (164): 206-216
[104]Yang J L, Chiu H N, Tzeng G H, Yeh R H. Vendor selection by integrated fuzzy MCDM techniques with independent and interdependent relationships [J]. Information Sciences,2008,178(21):4166-4183
[105]X.Zhang. The impact of forecasting methods on the bullwhip effect [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004(88):15-27
[106]常志平,蒋馥.供应链中信息共享的范围[J].工业工程与管理,2002,7(5)：47-49
[107]陈安斌,王信文.供应链之风险值控管一模式建构、策略与案例分析[J].中华管理评论,2001,4(2)
[108]陈菊红,汪应洛,孙林岩.虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2002(1)：11-16
[109]陈辉,刘存草,朱志军.物流配送中的路径优化问题研究[J].西安电子科技大学学报,2006,(5)：16-20
[110]陈志祥.供应链中供需合作关系的分析与优化理论[J].计算机集成制造系统,2005,11(3)：386-393
[111]楚扬杰,王先甲,吴秀君,方德斌.供应链信息共享的道德风险研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2006,28(2)：86-89
[112]董爽.供应链销售渠道中的道德风险问题[J].科技进步与对策,2004,(10)：128-130
[113]单永贵.快速反应——中外知名企业应对全球化的成功战略[J].纺织器材,20035：60-62
[114]戴建华,薛恒新.基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(4)：33-36
[115]丁伟东,刘凯,贺国先.供应链风险研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2003,13(4)：64-66
[116]付晓帆.供应链企业合作利益分配机制研究[D],武汉：武汉理工大学,2004
[117]郭丽华,张明玉.基于利益分配机制的农产品供应链分析[J].物流技术,2006(6)：47-49
[118]郝海,郑王愕.基于Shapley值的供应链合作伙伴利益风险分配机制[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(5)：71-75
[119]黄逸珺.电信运营商的供应链管理[J].中国管理科学,2009,19(5)：781-810
[120]胡智海.三网融合下的广电、电信和互联网企业竞合分析[J].信息网络.2010,12(2)：70-73
[121]胡宣达,沈厚才,风险管理学基础一数理方法[M].南京：东南大学出版社,2001
[122]姜启源.数学模型[M].北京：高等教育出版社,1993
[123]金淳,刘听露.供应链协调的仿真建模方法研究综述[J].计算机应用研究,2006,4：1-3
[124]何霞.新形势下,进一步推进三网融合的发展[J].移动通信,2011,23：9-11
[125]李建忠,邓定宾.基于供应链环境下企业与供应商的合作关系分析[J].交通运输工程与信息学报,2005,3(2)：106-110
[126]林旭东,朱顺泉.供应链企业收益分配的博弈模型研究[J].价值工程,2004(3)：29-31
[127]林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[A].财产权利与制度变迁一一产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集,上海：上海三联书店,1994
[128]刘亮、熊炜烨.供应链中的信息风险管理研究[J].特区经济,2004,10：159-160
[129]罗伯特·希斯.危机管理[M].王成等译.北京：中信出版社,2004：15-17
[130]廖成林,孙洪杰.均势供应链及其利益分配机制探讨[J].管理工程学报, 2003,17(4)：83-85
[131]李华,陈燕,胡松药.供应链网络机制与动态特性的研究[J].系统仿真学报,2006,18(5)：1366-1374
[132]李辉,李向阳,孙洁.供应链伙伴关系管理问题研究现状评述及分析[J].管理工程学报,2008(2)：148-151
[133]李美云.国外产业融合研究新进展[J].外国经济与管理,2005(12)：120-125.
[134]鲁维.三网融合时代的机遇和挑战[J].中国电信业,2011,2：7-11
[135]马惠.运营支撑服务是三网融合重点[J].通信世界,2011,4(2)：15-18
[136]马新安.如何防范供应链风险[J].中国计算机用户,2003(1)：21
[137]马士华,王鹏.基于Shapley值法的供应链合作伙伴间收益分配机制[J].中国管理科学,2006,11(4)：43-45
[138]倪燕翎,李海婴,燕翔.供应链风险管理与企业风险管理之比较[J].物流技术,2004,12-40-42
[139]宁钟.供应链脆弱性的影响因素及其管理原则[J].中国流通经济,2004,4：13-16
[140]彭祖赠,孙楹玉.模糊数学及其应用[M].武汉：武汉大学出版社,2002
[141]乔治·旺·科鲁夫等.知识创新：价值的源泉[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2003
[142]青木昌彦,安藤晴彦.模块时代：新产业结构的本质[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2003
[143]桑圣举,王炬香,杨阳.供应链风险管理的研究和进展[J].工业技术经济,2006,25：116-120
[144]沈剑.我国三网融合上下游产业有效竞争关系研究[D].博士学位论文：北京邮电大学,2011
[145]孙东川,叶飞.动态联盟利益分配的谈判模型研究[J].科研管理,2001,2：91-95
[146]万映红,李江,李怀祖.虚拟合作的伙伴选择智能决策支持系统框架研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2001(12)：60-65
[147]王金样,吴育华.基于遗传算法的前洽生产函数构造及其应用[J].管理科学学报,2004,2：13-17
[148]王来军,史忠科.航班离场排序问题的遗传算法设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,25：119-125
[149]王丽杰,刘奉林.供应链中合作伙伴关系的益处和风险[J].企业研究,2006,2：39-40
[150]王燕,杨文瀚.供应商的违约风险对供应链的影响[J].统计与决策,2005,2： 17-18
[151]魏修建.供应链利益分配研究—资源与贡献率的分配思路与框架[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2)：78-82
[152]文杰,倪勤.改进遗传算法求解TSP问题[J].数学的实践与认识,2005,35：129-133
[153]吴宪华.动态联盟的分配格局研究[J].系统工程,2001,3：34-38
[154]夏晓衍.产品生命周期不合理缩短的原因分析[J].商业研究,2000,3：125-126
[155]解鲤,刘凯,周双贵.供应链战略联盟的风险问题研究[J].中国安全科学学报,2003,13(11)：26-29
[156]杨贵斌.动态联盟合作伙伴选择研究[D].武汉：武汉理工大学,2004
[157]杨红芬,吕安洪,李琪.供应链管理中的信息风险及对策分析[J].商业经济与管理,2002,2：32-35
[158]杨俊.供应链风险管理理论与方法研究[D].武汉：武汉理工大学,2005
[159]杨屹,林宣雄,陈伟.动态联盟合作伙伴间收益分配模型及其求解方法研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003(11)：5-8
[160]叶飞,郭东风,孙东川.虚拟企业成员之间利益分配方法研究[J].统计与决策,2000(7)：11-12
[161]叶飞,孙东川,张红.面向虚拟企业合作伙伴选择的新过程框架结构研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003(11)：88-94
[162]叶飞,李怡娜.基于Stackelberg模型与Nash协商模型的供应链回购契约机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,3：39-43
[163]叶怀珍,胡异杰.供应链合作伙伴收益原则研究[J].西南交通大学学报,20041：35-43
[164]尹钢,邓飞其,李兴厚.基于合作对策的供应链利益分配模型[J].武汉科技大学学报,2003,26(4)：430-432
[165]于辉,陈剑,于刚.协调供应链如何应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,7：9-16
[166]余波.基于三网融合的信息服务展望[J].图书情报工作,2011,55(15)：128-132
[167]袁春晓.供给链变迁与企业组织形式的演化[J].管理世界,2002,1：130-136
[168]曾俊全.三网融合与功能拆分[J].中国电信业,2011,123(3)：52-53
[169]曾剑秋.网和天下——三网融合理论、实验与信息安全[M].北京：北京邮电大学出版社,2010.
[170]张建勇,李军.具有摸糊预约时间的G-RP混合遗传算法[J].管理科学学报,2005,3：64-71
[171]章海峰.供应链企业战略合作风险因素分析[J].武汉冶金管理干部学院学报,2010,14(4)：18-21
[172]张侨,郭宏湘.供应链供需双方利益风险分配方法[J].价值工程,2004,6：46-49
[173]张瑞雯.电信企业开展三网融合业务的路径探讨[J].通信企业管理,2011(4)：24-25
[174]张彤,张世英.企业集团的利益分配研究[J].管理工程学报,2003(1)：123-149
[175]张睿.三网融合普遍接入技术和市场及政策选择[D].博士论文：哈尔滨工业大学,2008
[176]张向阳,杨敏才,刘华明,张晓凤.供应链管理中风险分担与利益分配机制研究[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(5)：94-97
[177]章珉.战略联盟价值创造与分配分析[J].管理工程学报,2003,17(2)：20-22
[178]张缨.信任、契约及其规制——转型期中国企业间信任关系及结构重组研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2004
[179]郑国用.虚拟企业风险分担和利益分配[D].沈阳：沈阳工业大学管理学院,2001
[180]周晴.敏捷虚拟企业利润分配机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(1)：26-28
[181]周艳菊,邱莞华,王宗润.供应链风险管理研究进展的综述与分析[J].系统工程,2006,24(3)：1-7
[182]朱金周.国际上三网融合的监管体制和政策及对我国的启示[J].电信软科学研究,2008(6)：2-5.
[183]邹文英.基于设施的竞争——实现本地电信有效竞争的方式[J].上海经济研究,2005,11：12-14
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |