融资能力、企业并购与经济后果
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摘要
并购作为资源重新配置的一种方式在转型经济体中发挥着举足轻重中的作用,中国经济发展已经由新建投资驱动模式步入了并购重组阶段。财务领域中关于并购已有研究则多是关注并购动机、支付手段和并购绩效三个方面,而忽视了对并购交易完成具有决定性作用的融资能力研究。融资能力既是完成并购交易所需的必要条件,又可能是驱动并购发生的主要因素之一。为此,本文理论分析了融资能力提升的路径,并进一步分析了融资能力对企业并购的影响。本文利用中国非金融上市公司2002-2009年相关数据和各地区金融发展数据,实证检验了融资能力对企业并购发生可能性、并购规模以及对并购绩效的影响。
理论分析表明,金融资源配置效率受到金融制度和金融机构行为影响。金融制度决定了金融机构行为,推动金融发展,鼓励金融供给主体多元化,有助于金融机构之间相互竞争,降低投资者与企业之间信息不对称,推出满足市场需要的金融创新工具。在企业和投资者之间构建融资桥梁,缓解企业外部融资约束,提升外部融资能力,促使资金向着具有投资机会的企业流动。在外部金融环境一时既定情况下,面临融资约束公司,应该储备更多盈余,构建内源融资能力。对处于转型经济环境中的企业,融资能力直接影响并购活动。
本文实证结果表明,融资能力对企业发生并购概率具有显著正向作用。具体而言,企业外部融资依赖性越高,发生并购的概率则越低。但是,随着金融发展程度提高,可以降低企业外部融资依赖性对并购发生概率的这种负向作用,并且当在金融发展水平值(信贷资源配置市场指数)高于7.431时,金融发展帮助外部融资依赖性高的公司获得资金,提高并购发生的概率。企业持有超额现金越多,发生并购的可能性越高。但是,模型中加入金融发展与超额现金持有量之积的交叉项后,超额现金与发生并购的可能性之间不再是简单的单向关系。当金融发展水平低于6.113时,超额现金持有量的增多,会降低企业发生并购的可能性。而当金融发展水平值超过6.113时,超额现金持有量越多,企业发生并购的概率越大。同时,实证结果还显示,地区的金融发展水平越高,其并购市场规模越大,这意味着地区融资能力对并购市场规模具有正向作用。
融资能力与并购绩效的实证结果表明,对于外部融资依赖性高的企业,金融发展水平越高,并购绩效越好。但是,按所有权性质将样本划分为国有企业样本和非国有企业样本分别进行检验时,我们发现金融发展水平对国有企业样本的并购绩效没有显著影响,对非国有企业样本的并购绩效则具有显著正向作用。这一结果意味着所有权性质对于金融机构在企业信贷资源配置中具有异化效用,“国有”血统的企业对于金融发展不具有敏感性,而非国有企业则能够在金融发展水平高的环境中取得更好发展。对于国有企业样本,内源融资能力与并购绩效之间呈显著负向关系,同代理成本导致自由现金流假说理论预期一致。而非国有企业样本回归结果则没有显示内源融资能力对并购绩效产生负的影响。对于这一发现我们认为是由于国有企业为全民所有,形成所有者缺位,管理层为企业实际控制人,导致股东与管理层存在严重代理问题。但是,对于非国有企业,大股东处于主导地位,管理层机会主义行为空间很小,因此,内源融资能力的提升并没有导致非国有企业并购价值毁损。
M&A is a important way that allocating resources in a transitional economy.The Chinese economy has been undergoing transition from green-field-investment to mergers and acquisitions.However, the existing literature on mergers and acquisitions is extensive on mergers motive、payment and M&A' performance, little literature has been entirely successful at explaining the relation between financing capability and M&A.Financing capability is not only a essential factor but also causes firms to make acquisitions.This paper analyzes path how to improve financing capability, the interaction between financing capability and takeover activity. Based on public corporates'data and various regions'finance development data, we exam the relation between financing capability and takeover activity.
Theory demonstrates that financial resources efficiency is affected by financial system and financial institution.Driving financial development can offer more financial institutions, facilitates financial institutions competition.Financial development can also reduce asymmetric information between investors and firms. So financial development should help firms relieve dependent on external finance and reallocate capital to the highest value use.Thus firms'financing capability can be improved following financial development.In the presence of capital market imperfection, firms with more constrained should keep more retained earnings to build internal financing capability.Firms increase opportunities to make acquisitions in a transitional economy.Whether acquisition deals are finished are related to whether the firm maintains a higher financing capability.
The empirical evidence shows that financing capability-rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions.When the firms are more dependent on external finance, the probability of acquisitions is Iower.However the financial development can reduce the firm's external difficulty of raising money from outsiders.Thus the negative effect of dependent on external finance on acquisitions can be alleviated. And financial development enhances the probability of acquisitions when it is up to7.431.Because firms can more easily raise funds outside within an environment where there are less friction to capital movement.Cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions.But when we add interaction variable which is the financial development and extra-cash reverses into model, the relation between cash and the probability of acquisitions is non-linear.The more extra cash lower the probability of acquisitions when financial development value is below6.113. Extra cash can enhance the probability of acquisitions when financial development value is up to6.113.We also find that the local financial development play an important role on M&A'scale of an area.
We also examine the relation between financing capability and M&A'performance.The evidence suggests that M&A'performance is higher when firms are located in a higher financial development environment. Then we divide sample by ownership.The state-owned sample'results show that financial development has no significant impact on.But non-state-owned sample'evidence suggests that financial development keeps positive impact on M&A'performance.These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer financial discrimination for political reasons.So non-state-owned firms benefit from financial development.We find that among state-owned firms, internal financing capability has a negative impact on M&A'performance. Which is consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow explanation.For the non-state-owned firms,the result shows internal financing capability does not lead to firm'value decreasing.
理论分析表明,金融资源配置效率受到金融制度和金融机构行为影响。金融制度决定了金融机构行为,推动金融发展,鼓励金融供给主体多元化,有助于金融机构之间相互竞争,降低投资者与企业之间信息不对称,推出满足市场需要的金融创新工具。在企业和投资者之间构建融资桥梁,缓解企业外部融资约束,提升外部融资能力,促使资金向着具有投资机会的企业流动。在外部金融环境一时既定情况下,面临融资约束公司,应该储备更多盈余,构建内源融资能力。对处于转型经济环境中的企业,融资能力直接影响并购活动。
本文实证结果表明,融资能力对企业发生并购概率具有显著正向作用。具体而言,企业外部融资依赖性越高,发生并购的概率则越低。但是,随着金融发展程度提高,可以降低企业外部融资依赖性对并购发生概率的这种负向作用,并且当在金融发展水平值(信贷资源配置市场指数)高于7.431时,金融发展帮助外部融资依赖性高的公司获得资金,提高并购发生的概率。企业持有超额现金越多,发生并购的可能性越高。但是,模型中加入金融发展与超额现金持有量之积的交叉项后,超额现金与发生并购的可能性之间不再是简单的单向关系。当金融发展水平低于6.113时,超额现金持有量的增多,会降低企业发生并购的可能性。而当金融发展水平值超过6.113时,超额现金持有量越多,企业发生并购的概率越大。同时,实证结果还显示,地区的金融发展水平越高,其并购市场规模越大,这意味着地区融资能力对并购市场规模具有正向作用。
融资能力与并购绩效的实证结果表明,对于外部融资依赖性高的企业,金融发展水平越高,并购绩效越好。但是,按所有权性质将样本划分为国有企业样本和非国有企业样本分别进行检验时,我们发现金融发展水平对国有企业样本的并购绩效没有显著影响,对非国有企业样本的并购绩效则具有显著正向作用。这一结果意味着所有权性质对于金融机构在企业信贷资源配置中具有异化效用,“国有”血统的企业对于金融发展不具有敏感性,而非国有企业则能够在金融发展水平高的环境中取得更好发展。对于国有企业样本,内源融资能力与并购绩效之间呈显著负向关系,同代理成本导致自由现金流假说理论预期一致。而非国有企业样本回归结果则没有显示内源融资能力对并购绩效产生负的影响。对于这一发现我们认为是由于国有企业为全民所有,形成所有者缺位,管理层为企业实际控制人,导致股东与管理层存在严重代理问题。但是,对于非国有企业,大股东处于主导地位,管理层机会主义行为空间很小,因此,内源融资能力的提升并没有导致非国有企业并购价值毁损。
M&A is a important way that allocating resources in a transitional economy.The Chinese economy has been undergoing transition from green-field-investment to mergers and acquisitions.However, the existing literature on mergers and acquisitions is extensive on mergers motive、payment and M&A' performance, little literature has been entirely successful at explaining the relation between financing capability and M&A.Financing capability is not only a essential factor but also causes firms to make acquisitions.This paper analyzes path how to improve financing capability, the interaction between financing capability and takeover activity. Based on public corporates'data and various regions'finance development data, we exam the relation between financing capability and takeover activity.
Theory demonstrates that financial resources efficiency is affected by financial system and financial institution.Driving financial development can offer more financial institutions, facilitates financial institutions competition.Financial development can also reduce asymmetric information between investors and firms. So financial development should help firms relieve dependent on external finance and reallocate capital to the highest value use.Thus firms'financing capability can be improved following financial development.In the presence of capital market imperfection, firms with more constrained should keep more retained earnings to build internal financing capability.Firms increase opportunities to make acquisitions in a transitional economy.Whether acquisition deals are finished are related to whether the firm maintains a higher financing capability.
The empirical evidence shows that financing capability-rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions.When the firms are more dependent on external finance, the probability of acquisitions is Iower.However the financial development can reduce the firm's external difficulty of raising money from outsiders.Thus the negative effect of dependent on external finance on acquisitions can be alleviated. And financial development enhances the probability of acquisitions when it is up to7.431.Because firms can more easily raise funds outside within an environment where there are less friction to capital movement.Cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions.But when we add interaction variable which is the financial development and extra-cash reverses into model, the relation between cash and the probability of acquisitions is non-linear.The more extra cash lower the probability of acquisitions when financial development value is below6.113. Extra cash can enhance the probability of acquisitions when financial development value is up to6.113.We also find that the local financial development play an important role on M&A'scale of an area.
We also examine the relation between financing capability and M&A'performance.The evidence suggests that M&A'performance is higher when firms are located in a higher financial development environment. Then we divide sample by ownership.The state-owned sample'results show that financial development has no significant impact on.But non-state-owned sample'evidence suggests that financial development keeps positive impact on M&A'performance.These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer financial discrimination for political reasons.So non-state-owned firms benefit from financial development.We find that among state-owned firms, internal financing capability has a negative impact on M&A'performance. Which is consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow explanation.For the non-state-owned firms,the result shows internal financing capability does not lead to firm'value decreasing.
引文
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