主体行为下农业自然灾害风险管理机制研究
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摘要
我国是世界上自然灾害发生最为频繁的国家之一,在全球气候变暖背景下,自然灾害发生周期逐渐缩短,破坏程度不断增大,给弱质性的农业带来了巨大损失。农作物受灾面积增幅明显、农业自然灾害造成的经济损失占农业总产值比重不断上升。自然灾害已成为严重威胁我国农村和农民收入的主要风险源,影响农业可持续发展和我国粮食安全的主要因素。农业自然灾害风险管理成为我国农村经济发展的核心问题。
现阶段我国农业自然灾害风险管理机制尚不完善。灾害救助和农业保险补贴制度受制于政府财政能力；农户自我风险分担机制面对日益严峻的灾害形势抗风险能力不足；新一轮农业保险实践过程中暴露出赔付率高企、道德风险严重等问题抑制了农业保险防范功能；国家层面的农业巨灾风险机制尚未建立；政府缺位导致农业基础设施投入严重不足,农业工程防御能力和灾害救援能力下降；市场经济体制下社会网络内集体组织不断弱化削弱了农户之间共同抗灾防损的行为；资本市场和金融衍生品市场创新不足,不能为农业自然灾害风险转移提供更多渠道。
农业自然灾害的严重性和风险管理机制的局限性成为解决“三农”问题必须面对的主要矛盾。而行为主体的有效互动是提高农业自然灾害风险管理机制效率的前提,为此我们必须深入剖析现行的农业自然灾害风险管理机制,回答农业自然灾害风险管理主体边界、功能和作用,洞悉农业自然灾害风险主体行为决策过程及其影响因素。首先从制度经济学视角分析了我国农业自然灾害风险管理机制的演变。随后以湖北省为研究地域,以期望效用最大化条件下资产配置的均值—方差(M—V)模型为工具,理论和实证分析了农户、市场和政府自然灾害风险管理行为选择,并运用行为金融学研究范式对农户风险态度进行了实践佐证。在此基础上,从风险自担机制、市场机制及政府介入机制三维角度提出了完善农业自然灾害风险管理机制的对策和建议。主要研究内容及结论如下：
研究内容之一：湖北省农业自然灾害及风险管理机制
湖北省作为农业大省也是自然灾害多发省份,农业自然灾害表现出年际变化率大,自然灾害受灾成灾率高,干旱和洪涝是主要致灾因子的特征。湖北省农业自然灾害风险管理机制存在农业保险风险转移作用尚未完全发挥、农户以风险自我分担为主、巨灾风险分散机制不完善、政府灾害救济虽处于基础性地位但财力有限等不足。
研究内容之二：农户自然灾害风险管理行为选择
农户居于农业自然灾害风险管理机制的核心,考察农户风险管理行为及影响因素是完善农业自然灾害风险管理机制的前提。本部分基于不确定状态下行为决策的均值—方差模型和行为金融学理论,采用理论分析和调查相互佐证方法,研究农户风险管理行为选择偏好、风险态度及影响因素,明了农业自然灾害风险需求主体特征。研究表明：农户风险管理首选自我风险分担机制；农户认为政府救济和银行贷款等正规自然灾害风险管理工具不可得或获得的可能性很小。基于行为金融学分析范式和调查问卷,指出农户具有获取自然灾害信息能力弱,从众心理,灾害估计基于上年损失而非预估的特征使农户有限理性偏低,对风险管理反应过度或不足。耕地质量水平、农户对自然灾害损失程度的认知、减产损失占家庭收入比重和保险分散损失的重要性4个变量对农户灾前和灾后是否采取风险管理措施选择有显著影响。基于均值—方差模型的分析表明：农户农业保险需求受风险态度、损失方差、期望损失的影响。农户不愿意购买农业保险的主要原因为周围人都没有买；农产品自产自销,不必购买农业保险等。来自调查问卷的实证表明农户农业保险购买行为受耕地质量水平、灾害发生前后是否采取措施、总耕地面积和受教育年限、对保险公司信任程度的影响。
研究内容之三：农业自然灾害风险管理市场主体行为选择
以农业保险为核心,农业保险再保险和创新金融工具为风险分散支持的农业自然灾害风险管理市场机制是实现农业可持续发展的制度保证。本部分分析了我国农业保险供给现状、再保险市场机制建设以及创新的风险转移工具。研究表明：我国农业保险层次较低如各地区保险条款、费率厘定差异不大。保险公司行为决策的均值—方差模型表明：农业保险供给受经营成本、保费费率、对损失认知程度的制约,农业巨灾风险和经营成本高企使保险供给减少,农业保险供给与参保农户数量不相关,意味着即使参保农户数量足够大,也不可能分散农业保险风险,提高参保率的强制保险制度是不合时宜的,要从根本上分散农业保险巨灾风险必须建立巨灾风险分散制度。均值—方差模型也证明再保险可以提高保险公司农业保险供给能力,应积极发展强制再保险,并给予再保险补贴。天气指数保险可以克服传统农业保险信息不对称、经营成本高的弊端,有利于保险公司承保能力的提升。农业风险承保体本身也会面临自然灾害风险冲击,可通过参与天气衍生品交易等转移和分散风险,实现风险的全社会承担。基于一定假定条件的湖北省农业保险再保险安排在不同保险赔付水平和分保责任下,再保险纯费率不同。并以油菜为例对湖北省天气指数保险契约进行了设计。
研究内容之四：政府介入农业自然灾害风险管理方式
农业的准公共物品性质决定了农业自然灾害是一种“社会成本”,需要政府介入。政府介入农业自然灾害风险管理的方式有制度供给者、公共物品提供者和最后保险人。研究表明：农业自然灾害救助制度存在受政府财力制约,资金效率难以保证,救助资金投入不合理等问题。政府对农业保险提供保费补贴可以增加农业保险需求,促进农业保险市场可持续发展。农田水利基础设施对防范和治理旱涝灾害至关重要,但存在投资和管理主体缺位,投资资金量不足和结构不合理等问题。农户采用新技术是防范风险的方式之一,新技术的使用有赖于农业技术推广体系的完善。政府必须建立巨灾风险准备金制度以防范农业巨灾风险对所有风险管理主体的冲击。通过赔付额方法对湖北省农业巨灾风险准备金测算结果表明：如果以5年为一个周期,则湖北省巨灾风险准备金为1238万元,据此按湖北省农业保险保费收入的3%计提巨灾风险准备金比较合理。
研究内容之五：农业自然灾害风险管理长效机制设计
在对农业风险管理主体行为选择及影响因素进行深入分析基础上,重点围绕农户自我风险分担机制、市场机制和政府介入机制展开。政府作为制度供给者要建立完善的运行保障机制,达到构建多支柱、多层次、立体的农业自然灾害风险管理机制的目的。
China is one of countries in the world that natural disasters occurred most frequently. With global warming speeding up, natural disaster cycle gradually shortened and destructive degree was becoming worse and worse, which brought a great loss to weak agriculture. The crops disaster area increased significantly and the percent of economic losses caused by natural disasters in the total agricultural output value rose. Agricultural natural disasters have already become a main risk resource to threat the rural and farmers and a main factor to affect the sustainable development of agriculture and food security of China.
The agricultural natural disasters risk management has became a core in China rural economic development. But at this stage, disaster relief and agricultural insurance subsidy system is subject to fiscal ability of government. Farmer's risk self-sharing mechanism is lack of ability to resist risks in the face of increasingly severe disasters.The problems such as high loss ratio,moral hazard restrain the protection features of agricultural insurance.The agricultural catastrophe risk mechanism on national level has not yet been established. Absence of government led to a serious shortage of agricultural infrastructure investment and decline of agricultural engineering and disaster relief ability.Under market economic system, the collective organization weakening in social network weakens the behavior of prevention disaster joint with farmers.The lack of innovation in capital and financial derivatives market can't provide more channels for agricultural natural disaster risk sharing.
The severity of the agricultural natural disaster and limitation of the risk management mechanism has become a principal contradiction to China's agricultural sustainable development and farmers' income increasing. Therefore we must analyze the current agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism, answer the agricultural natural disaster risk management subject boundary, function and role, and understand the behavior decision-making and its influencing factors of agricultural natural disaster risk participants.This study researches the improvement of the agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism from the behavioral decision perspective of agricultural natural disaster risk management participants.
First, the evolution of the current agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism is analyzed from the perspective of institutional economics.Then taking Hubei province as the research object, we use mean-variance model under expected utility maximization as the tool to analyze the natural disaster risk management behaviors choice of the farmers, market and government theoretically and mpirically.Meanwhile the risk attitudes of farmers is province practically with the behavioral finance paradigm. Furthermore countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to perfect the mechanism of agricultural natural disaster risk management from risk self-sharing, market and government intervention mechanism.The main research contents and conclusions were as follows:
Research content1:The agricultural natural disaster risk and its risk management mechanisms in Hubei province
As a big agricultural province,Hubei is also a natural disaster-prone province, agricultural natural disasters show that the inter-annual variation is big, affected rate is high and the drought and flood is the main caused factor.The agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism in Hubei exsits the lackage such as agricultu ral insurance risk transfer function are not fully untilized, the risk self-sharing is the priority of farmers,catastrophe risk mechanism is imperfect,government disaster relief is although in a fundamental position but subjet to the fiscal income.
Research content2:The behavior analysis of farmers to manage the risk of natural disaster
Farmers are located in the core of the agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism, so we must investigate the farmers' risk behavior choice and its influencing factors, which is the precondition to improve the effective of risk management mechanism. This section studied the preference of risk management behavior, risk attitude, influence factors of the subject in order to understand the characteristics of demand subject through the theory analysis based on mean-variance model of behavioral decision under uncertain conditions.Research shows that:the risk self-sharing mechanism is the first choice of farmers to manage their risk. The normal natural disaster risk management tools such as government relief and bank loans have a lower possibility in farmers' opinion.Based on behavioral finance analysis paradigm and questionnaire, it is pointed out characteristics that farmers have which weakened natural disasters information ability, herd mentality, disaster loss estimated based on the previous year rather than forecast enable farmers to lower bounded rationality and excessive or insufficient response to risk management. Cultivated land quality level, farmers'perception of natural disaster loss rate, production losses accounted for the proportion of household income and the importance of insurance have a significant influence on farmers risk management behavior choice.Based on the mean-variance model analysis shows that farmers insurance purchase behavior affected by risk attitude, the influence of the variance and expected loss. The main reasons that farmers are not willing to buy are as following:the people around them are not buy, self-consuming etc.. The behavior to buy agricultural insurance of farmers is subjected to the cultivated land quality level, whether to take measures or not, total cultivated land area, education years and the degree to trust the insurance company.
Research content3:The behavior choice of market subject in agricultural natural disaster risk management
Agricultural risk management market mechanism which has the core of agricultural insurance and some supports of reinsurance, innovation of financial instruments is a system guarantee to realize agriculture sustainable development. This section analysis the present situation of the agricultural insurance supply, reinsurance market mechanism and innovation of the risk transfer tools. Research shows that:the level of agricultural insurance in our country is lower because of undifferentiated in insurance terms and rates among regions. The mean-variance model of behavioral decision for insurance companies proves that the agricultural insurance products supply is constrained to the operating costs, premium rate and cognitive degree of loss.Catastrophe risk and high operating cost reduce insurance supply.The supply is not associated with the number of insured farmers,it means that the quantity of insured farmers can't spread agricultural insurance risk. Furthermore compulsory insurance system to improve the rate of agricultural insurance is inappropriate. Catastrophe risk dispersion system must be established to spread the risk of agricultural insurance fundamentally. Mean-variance model also proves that reinsurance can help to improve agricultural insurance supply capacity of insurance company. So the country should actively develop compulsory positive agricultural reinsurance and give subsidies. The weather index insurance can overcome the shortage of traditional insurance such as information asymmetry, high operating costs; benefits to the raise of insurance company accept insurance capacity. Agricultural risk insures itself will face natural disasters risk impact, they can transfer and disperse the risk through weather derivatives transactions to realize the risk dispersive in the whole society. Based on a certain assumed conditions the reinsurance pure rate is varied from insurance pay level and reinsurance liability for Hubei agricultural insurance reinsurance design. Finally taking rapeseed as an example, weather index insurance contract of Hubei is designed.
Research content4:The ways that government intervene the agricultural natural disaster risk management
Agriculture has the nature of quasi-public goods; agricultural natural disaster is a kind of "social cost". So agricultural natural disaster risk management needs the intervention of government.The ways that government intervention in agricultural natural disaster risk management have the system provider, the public goods provider and the insurer.Research shows that:the disaster relief is subject to the limitation of the government financial income, financing efficiency is difficult to guarantee, the input structure of relief money is unreasonable. Agricultural insurance subsidies can increase the agricultural insurance demand and promote the sustainable development of agricultural insurance market.Irrigation and water conservancy infrastructure is essential to prevent and govern the flood and drought,but there are some problems such as the absence of investment and management subject, insufficient investment and unreasonable structure, etc.. Adopting new technology of farmers is one of the main way to prevent risks, the use of new technology depends on the improvement of agricultural technology popularization system.The government must establish catastrophe risk reserve system to guard against agricultural catastrophe risk impact to all risk management subject.Agricultural catastrophe risk reserve calculation results of Hubei show that if in five years for a disaster cycle, the catastrophe risk reserve is12.38million yuan, it is reasonable for Hubei to extract3%of the agricultural insurance premium income as catastrophe risk reserve.
Research content5:The mechanism design of agricultural natural disaster risk management
The mechanism design is focused on farmers' risk self-sharing mechanism, market mechanism and government intervention mechanism based on the depth analysis of the subjects' behavior choice and its influence factors.Government as a system supplier should establish and improve the operation guarantee mechanism to achieve the goal of building the multi-pillar, multi-level, three-dimensional agricultural natural disaster management mechanism.
现阶段我国农业自然灾害风险管理机制尚不完善。灾害救助和农业保险补贴制度受制于政府财政能力；农户自我风险分担机制面对日益严峻的灾害形势抗风险能力不足；新一轮农业保险实践过程中暴露出赔付率高企、道德风险严重等问题抑制了农业保险防范功能；国家层面的农业巨灾风险机制尚未建立；政府缺位导致农业基础设施投入严重不足,农业工程防御能力和灾害救援能力下降；市场经济体制下社会网络内集体组织不断弱化削弱了农户之间共同抗灾防损的行为；资本市场和金融衍生品市场创新不足,不能为农业自然灾害风险转移提供更多渠道。
农业自然灾害的严重性和风险管理机制的局限性成为解决“三农”问题必须面对的主要矛盾。而行为主体的有效互动是提高农业自然灾害风险管理机制效率的前提,为此我们必须深入剖析现行的农业自然灾害风险管理机制,回答农业自然灾害风险管理主体边界、功能和作用,洞悉农业自然灾害风险主体行为决策过程及其影响因素。首先从制度经济学视角分析了我国农业自然灾害风险管理机制的演变。随后以湖北省为研究地域,以期望效用最大化条件下资产配置的均值—方差(M—V)模型为工具,理论和实证分析了农户、市场和政府自然灾害风险管理行为选择,并运用行为金融学研究范式对农户风险态度进行了实践佐证。在此基础上,从风险自担机制、市场机制及政府介入机制三维角度提出了完善农业自然灾害风险管理机制的对策和建议。主要研究内容及结论如下：
研究内容之一：湖北省农业自然灾害及风险管理机制
湖北省作为农业大省也是自然灾害多发省份,农业自然灾害表现出年际变化率大,自然灾害受灾成灾率高,干旱和洪涝是主要致灾因子的特征。湖北省农业自然灾害风险管理机制存在农业保险风险转移作用尚未完全发挥、农户以风险自我分担为主、巨灾风险分散机制不完善、政府灾害救济虽处于基础性地位但财力有限等不足。
研究内容之二：农户自然灾害风险管理行为选择
农户居于农业自然灾害风险管理机制的核心,考察农户风险管理行为及影响因素是完善农业自然灾害风险管理机制的前提。本部分基于不确定状态下行为决策的均值—方差模型和行为金融学理论,采用理论分析和调查相互佐证方法,研究农户风险管理行为选择偏好、风险态度及影响因素,明了农业自然灾害风险需求主体特征。研究表明：农户风险管理首选自我风险分担机制；农户认为政府救济和银行贷款等正规自然灾害风险管理工具不可得或获得的可能性很小。基于行为金融学分析范式和调查问卷,指出农户具有获取自然灾害信息能力弱,从众心理,灾害估计基于上年损失而非预估的特征使农户有限理性偏低,对风险管理反应过度或不足。耕地质量水平、农户对自然灾害损失程度的认知、减产损失占家庭收入比重和保险分散损失的重要性4个变量对农户灾前和灾后是否采取风险管理措施选择有显著影响。基于均值—方差模型的分析表明：农户农业保险需求受风险态度、损失方差、期望损失的影响。农户不愿意购买农业保险的主要原因为周围人都没有买；农产品自产自销,不必购买农业保险等。来自调查问卷的实证表明农户农业保险购买行为受耕地质量水平、灾害发生前后是否采取措施、总耕地面积和受教育年限、对保险公司信任程度的影响。
研究内容之三：农业自然灾害风险管理市场主体行为选择
以农业保险为核心,农业保险再保险和创新金融工具为风险分散支持的农业自然灾害风险管理市场机制是实现农业可持续发展的制度保证。本部分分析了我国农业保险供给现状、再保险市场机制建设以及创新的风险转移工具。研究表明：我国农业保险层次较低如各地区保险条款、费率厘定差异不大。保险公司行为决策的均值—方差模型表明：农业保险供给受经营成本、保费费率、对损失认知程度的制约,农业巨灾风险和经营成本高企使保险供给减少,农业保险供给与参保农户数量不相关,意味着即使参保农户数量足够大,也不可能分散农业保险风险,提高参保率的强制保险制度是不合时宜的,要从根本上分散农业保险巨灾风险必须建立巨灾风险分散制度。均值—方差模型也证明再保险可以提高保险公司农业保险供给能力,应积极发展强制再保险,并给予再保险补贴。天气指数保险可以克服传统农业保险信息不对称、经营成本高的弊端,有利于保险公司承保能力的提升。农业风险承保体本身也会面临自然灾害风险冲击,可通过参与天气衍生品交易等转移和分散风险,实现风险的全社会承担。基于一定假定条件的湖北省农业保险再保险安排在不同保险赔付水平和分保责任下,再保险纯费率不同。并以油菜为例对湖北省天气指数保险契约进行了设计。
研究内容之四：政府介入农业自然灾害风险管理方式
农业的准公共物品性质决定了农业自然灾害是一种“社会成本”,需要政府介入。政府介入农业自然灾害风险管理的方式有制度供给者、公共物品提供者和最后保险人。研究表明：农业自然灾害救助制度存在受政府财力制约,资金效率难以保证,救助资金投入不合理等问题。政府对农业保险提供保费补贴可以增加农业保险需求,促进农业保险市场可持续发展。农田水利基础设施对防范和治理旱涝灾害至关重要,但存在投资和管理主体缺位,投资资金量不足和结构不合理等问题。农户采用新技术是防范风险的方式之一,新技术的使用有赖于农业技术推广体系的完善。政府必须建立巨灾风险准备金制度以防范农业巨灾风险对所有风险管理主体的冲击。通过赔付额方法对湖北省农业巨灾风险准备金测算结果表明：如果以5年为一个周期,则湖北省巨灾风险准备金为1238万元,据此按湖北省农业保险保费收入的3%计提巨灾风险准备金比较合理。
研究内容之五：农业自然灾害风险管理长效机制设计
在对农业风险管理主体行为选择及影响因素进行深入分析基础上,重点围绕农户自我风险分担机制、市场机制和政府介入机制展开。政府作为制度供给者要建立完善的运行保障机制,达到构建多支柱、多层次、立体的农业自然灾害风险管理机制的目的。
China is one of countries in the world that natural disasters occurred most frequently. With global warming speeding up, natural disaster cycle gradually shortened and destructive degree was becoming worse and worse, which brought a great loss to weak agriculture. The crops disaster area increased significantly and the percent of economic losses caused by natural disasters in the total agricultural output value rose. Agricultural natural disasters have already become a main risk resource to threat the rural and farmers and a main factor to affect the sustainable development of agriculture and food security of China.
The agricultural natural disasters risk management has became a core in China rural economic development. But at this stage, disaster relief and agricultural insurance subsidy system is subject to fiscal ability of government. Farmer's risk self-sharing mechanism is lack of ability to resist risks in the face of increasingly severe disasters.The problems such as high loss ratio,moral hazard restrain the protection features of agricultural insurance.The agricultural catastrophe risk mechanism on national level has not yet been established. Absence of government led to a serious shortage of agricultural infrastructure investment and decline of agricultural engineering and disaster relief ability.Under market economic system, the collective organization weakening in social network weakens the behavior of prevention disaster joint with farmers.The lack of innovation in capital and financial derivatives market can't provide more channels for agricultural natural disaster risk sharing.
The severity of the agricultural natural disaster and limitation of the risk management mechanism has become a principal contradiction to China's agricultural sustainable development and farmers' income increasing. Therefore we must analyze the current agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism, answer the agricultural natural disaster risk management subject boundary, function and role, and understand the behavior decision-making and its influencing factors of agricultural natural disaster risk participants.This study researches the improvement of the agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism from the behavioral decision perspective of agricultural natural disaster risk management participants.
First, the evolution of the current agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism is analyzed from the perspective of institutional economics.Then taking Hubei province as the research object, we use mean-variance model under expected utility maximization as the tool to analyze the natural disaster risk management behaviors choice of the farmers, market and government theoretically and mpirically.Meanwhile the risk attitudes of farmers is province practically with the behavioral finance paradigm. Furthermore countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to perfect the mechanism of agricultural natural disaster risk management from risk self-sharing, market and government intervention mechanism.The main research contents and conclusions were as follows:
Research content1:The agricultural natural disaster risk and its risk management mechanisms in Hubei province
As a big agricultural province,Hubei is also a natural disaster-prone province, agricultural natural disasters show that the inter-annual variation is big, affected rate is high and the drought and flood is the main caused factor.The agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism in Hubei exsits the lackage such as agricultu ral insurance risk transfer function are not fully untilized, the risk self-sharing is the priority of farmers,catastrophe risk mechanism is imperfect,government disaster relief is although in a fundamental position but subjet to the fiscal income.
Research content2:The behavior analysis of farmers to manage the risk of natural disaster
Farmers are located in the core of the agricultural natural disaster risk management mechanism, so we must investigate the farmers' risk behavior choice and its influencing factors, which is the precondition to improve the effective of risk management mechanism. This section studied the preference of risk management behavior, risk attitude, influence factors of the subject in order to understand the characteristics of demand subject through the theory analysis based on mean-variance model of behavioral decision under uncertain conditions.Research shows that:the risk self-sharing mechanism is the first choice of farmers to manage their risk. The normal natural disaster risk management tools such as government relief and bank loans have a lower possibility in farmers' opinion.Based on behavioral finance analysis paradigm and questionnaire, it is pointed out characteristics that farmers have which weakened natural disasters information ability, herd mentality, disaster loss estimated based on the previous year rather than forecast enable farmers to lower bounded rationality and excessive or insufficient response to risk management. Cultivated land quality level, farmers'perception of natural disaster loss rate, production losses accounted for the proportion of household income and the importance of insurance have a significant influence on farmers risk management behavior choice.Based on the mean-variance model analysis shows that farmers insurance purchase behavior affected by risk attitude, the influence of the variance and expected loss. The main reasons that farmers are not willing to buy are as following:the people around them are not buy, self-consuming etc.. The behavior to buy agricultural insurance of farmers is subjected to the cultivated land quality level, whether to take measures or not, total cultivated land area, education years and the degree to trust the insurance company.
Research content3:The behavior choice of market subject in agricultural natural disaster risk management
Agricultural risk management market mechanism which has the core of agricultural insurance and some supports of reinsurance, innovation of financial instruments is a system guarantee to realize agriculture sustainable development. This section analysis the present situation of the agricultural insurance supply, reinsurance market mechanism and innovation of the risk transfer tools. Research shows that:the level of agricultural insurance in our country is lower because of undifferentiated in insurance terms and rates among regions. The mean-variance model of behavioral decision for insurance companies proves that the agricultural insurance products supply is constrained to the operating costs, premium rate and cognitive degree of loss.Catastrophe risk and high operating cost reduce insurance supply.The supply is not associated with the number of insured farmers,it means that the quantity of insured farmers can't spread agricultural insurance risk. Furthermore compulsory insurance system to improve the rate of agricultural insurance is inappropriate. Catastrophe risk dispersion system must be established to spread the risk of agricultural insurance fundamentally. Mean-variance model also proves that reinsurance can help to improve agricultural insurance supply capacity of insurance company. So the country should actively develop compulsory positive agricultural reinsurance and give subsidies. The weather index insurance can overcome the shortage of traditional insurance such as information asymmetry, high operating costs; benefits to the raise of insurance company accept insurance capacity. Agricultural risk insures itself will face natural disasters risk impact, they can transfer and disperse the risk through weather derivatives transactions to realize the risk dispersive in the whole society. Based on a certain assumed conditions the reinsurance pure rate is varied from insurance pay level and reinsurance liability for Hubei agricultural insurance reinsurance design. Finally taking rapeseed as an example, weather index insurance contract of Hubei is designed.
Research content4:The ways that government intervene the agricultural natural disaster risk management
Agriculture has the nature of quasi-public goods; agricultural natural disaster is a kind of "social cost". So agricultural natural disaster risk management needs the intervention of government.The ways that government intervention in agricultural natural disaster risk management have the system provider, the public goods provider and the insurer.Research shows that:the disaster relief is subject to the limitation of the government financial income, financing efficiency is difficult to guarantee, the input structure of relief money is unreasonable. Agricultural insurance subsidies can increase the agricultural insurance demand and promote the sustainable development of agricultural insurance market.Irrigation and water conservancy infrastructure is essential to prevent and govern the flood and drought,but there are some problems such as the absence of investment and management subject, insufficient investment and unreasonable structure, etc.. Adopting new technology of farmers is one of the main way to prevent risks, the use of new technology depends on the improvement of agricultural technology popularization system.The government must establish catastrophe risk reserve system to guard against agricultural catastrophe risk impact to all risk management subject.Agricultural catastrophe risk reserve calculation results of Hubei show that if in five years for a disaster cycle, the catastrophe risk reserve is12.38million yuan, it is reasonable for Hubei to extract3%of the agricultural insurance premium income as catastrophe risk reserve.
Research content5:The mechanism design of agricultural natural disaster risk management
The mechanism design is focused on farmers' risk self-sharing mechanism, market mechanism and government intervention mechanism based on the depth analysis of the subjects' behavior choice and its influence factors.Government as a system supplier should establish and improve the operation guarantee mechanism to achieve the goal of building the multi-pillar, multi-level, three-dimensional agricultural natural disaster management mechanism.
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