多种应用环境下安全认证协议的研究
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摘要
摘要：在虚拟网络中,如何实现现实中的应用,如何保障身份和信息内容的真实性,已经成为人们最迫切的应用需求。基于密码学的认证技术是解决这类问题的有效手段,它已经成为构建网络安全环境的重要保障,是信息安全领域的核心技术,其正确性和安全性对整个网络环境的安全起着至关重要的作用。目前,安全认证协议的设计和分析是近年来网络信息安全领域最活跃的研究方向。因此,本文对如何构建安全高效的认证协议进行了较深入的研究,并给出了相应的设计方案。根据不同的应用环境,研究了两方及多方参与的认证协议,其中包括基于智能卡的口令认证协议、射频识别(RFID)系统认证协议和面向群组的多方密钥协商协议。本文的研究工作受到了国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)(No.2011AA010104-2)、国家自然科学基金项目(No.61071076、61201159)、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金研究生创新项目(No.2012YJS023)和高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(No.20100009110002)的支持。主要研究成果如下：
1.研究Chen等人提出的基于智能卡的远程用户认证协议,并对该协议构造了有效的已知密钥攻击和离线猜测攻击。为了弥补以上两种安全漏洞,提出了一种基于智能卡的远程用户登录及验证协议。利用BAN逻辑对新协议进行形式化分析,证明了协议认证过程的正确性。同时,新协议可抵抗已知密钥攻击和离线猜测攻击在内的多种攻击,满足前向安全性,与同类协议相比具有更好的计算效率。
2.对Song提出的增强的智能卡口令认证协议进行安全性分析,指出该协议无法抵抗离线口令猜测攻击,且不具备系统自恢复性。针对以上安全漏洞,提出了一种改进的智能卡口令认证协议。新协议利用单向哈希函数和时间戳机制完善了系统的自恢复性,且计算效率更佳。通过BAN逻辑和安全性分析可知,新协议具有完备的认证功能,可抵抗离线口令猜测攻击在内的多种攻击,同时满足前向安全性。
3.研究分析了几类现有的RFID认证协议。通过研究发现：这几类协议都存在密钥无法更新的设计问题,即固定密钥一旦泄漏,射频组件间的通信和交互访问将不再安全。基于以上发现,利用询问-应答机制和不确定索引值策略提出了一种可更新密钥的RFID认证协议,该协议可提供同一会话时期标签和后台数据库服务器的密钥同步更新,实现了射频组件间的安全认证和访问控制,可保护标签的位置隐私和系统的前向安全性。结合以上密钥更新机制,提出了一种基于混沌映射的RFID认证协议,该协议具有更好的计算效率,更适用于能耗受限的RFID系统。
4.对Guo和Zhang提出的基于混沌映射的组密钥协商协议进行分析,指出该协议无法实现组成员的动态调整和多方密钥协商,且不能抵抗离线口令猜测攻击。针对以上问题,基于混沌映射理论和二叉树结构,提出了一种动态的混沌组密钥协商协议,该协议满足多方密钥协商的贡献性和组密钥独立性,可提供组成员的动态调整操作。经安全性分析可知,新协议可抵抗包含离线口令猜测攻击在内的多种攻击。
5.分析Zhao等人提出的可容错组密钥协商协议,指出该协议存在可容错性缺陷,且无法实现组成员的动态调整。利用RSA算法和受限秘密编号,提出了一种动态的可容错组密钥协商协议。新协议具有良好的可容错性,并实现了单轮的组密钥协商,即诚实组成员只需一轮就可剔除所有恶意成员,并协商出共享的组密钥。同时,新协议利用二叉树结构实现了组成员的动态调整,可提供组密钥的即时更新功能,满足组密钥的独立性。通过安全性和性能分析可知,新协议可抵抗多种攻击,较Zhao等人提出的协议具有更低的计算和通信开销。
ABSTRACT:In the virtual network, how to achieve the real application and protect the authenticity of identity and information content have become the most pressing needs. The cryptography based authentication technology is a valid method to solve the problem well. It has become an important guarantee and core technology of information security, its correctness and security play crucial role in the entire network environment. Currently, the design and analysis of secure authentication protocol is the most active research of network and information security. This dissertation concentrates on how to construct secure and effective authentication protocol and proposes corresponding methods. According to the different application environment, research on the two-party and multi-party authentication protocols, including smart based password authentication protocols, RFID authentication protocols and multi-party key agreement protocols for group communication. The work of this dissertation is supported by the National High Technology and Development Program of China (863Program)(No.2011AA010104-2), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61071076,61201159), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.2012YJS023), and the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (No.20100009110002). The main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. Study Chen et al.'s remote user authentication protocol using smart cards. It is demonstrated that serious vulnerabilities still threaten their protocol by mounting known-key attack and off-line guessing attack. To solve the aforementioned weaknesses, we propose a smart card based protocol for remote login and verification, and utilize BAN logic to verify the correctness of its authentication procedures. Meanwhile, the new protocol can prevent various attacks, including known-key attack and off-line guessing attack, and achieves forward secrecy. To compare with related protocols, the new protocol has better computation efficiency.
2. An advanced password authentication protocol using smart cards is proposed by Song. We point out that his protocol is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, and it is lack of system reparability. To fill the gaps, the improved protocol is proposed. The new protocol utilizes one-way hash function and timestamp mechanism to achieve system reparability, and optimizes the computation efficiency. According to BAN logic proof and security analysis, the new protocol has correct authentication procedures, withstands various attacks and achieves forward secrecy.
3. Study several RFID authentication protocols. It is found that all these protocols have same design problem which the tag key cannot be updated. This means that once the fixed key is leaked, the communication and interaction between RF components would be no longer secure. Based on these findings, we utilize challenge-response mechanism and indefinite index strategy to propose an advanced constantly updated RFID authentication protocol. This protocol allows the tag and the back-end database server to update their respective keys synchronously in same session. It achieves secure authentication and access control between RF components, it can protect the tag's location privacy and forward secrecy of system. Combine with the aforementioned key updated mechanism, an authenticated RFID protocol based on chaotic maps is proposed, which is more suitable for the limited-power RFID system with better computation efficiency.
4. Analyze Guo and Zhang's Chaos based group key agreement protocol. It is shown that their protocol cannot achieve dynamic setting and multi-key agreement, and it cannot withstand off-line password guessing attack. To solve the above problem, based on chaotic maps theory and binary tree structure, we propose a dynamic chaos based group key agreement protocol. It satisfies the contributory property of multi-key agreement and group key independence, it provides dynamic setting for group members. According to security analysis, the new protocol can resist various attacks, including off-line password guessing attack.
5. Analyze Zhao et al.'s fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol. It is presented that their protocol has fault-tolerance weakness without dynamic setting. Based on RSA algorithm and restricted secret number, a dynamic fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol is proposed. The new protocol has good fault-tolerant ability, and it needs only one round to exclude all malicious participants and helps honest members complete group key agreement. Meanwhile, the new protocol utilizes a binary tree structure to achieve dynamic setting, and it satisfies group key independence with instant key refreshment. Due to the security and performance analysis, the new protocol can withstand various attacks, it has lower computation and communication cost than Zhan et al.'s protocol.
1.研究Chen等人提出的基于智能卡的远程用户认证协议,并对该协议构造了有效的已知密钥攻击和离线猜测攻击。为了弥补以上两种安全漏洞,提出了一种基于智能卡的远程用户登录及验证协议。利用BAN逻辑对新协议进行形式化分析,证明了协议认证过程的正确性。同时,新协议可抵抗已知密钥攻击和离线猜测攻击在内的多种攻击,满足前向安全性,与同类协议相比具有更好的计算效率。
2.对Song提出的增强的智能卡口令认证协议进行安全性分析,指出该协议无法抵抗离线口令猜测攻击,且不具备系统自恢复性。针对以上安全漏洞,提出了一种改进的智能卡口令认证协议。新协议利用单向哈希函数和时间戳机制完善了系统的自恢复性,且计算效率更佳。通过BAN逻辑和安全性分析可知,新协议具有完备的认证功能,可抵抗离线口令猜测攻击在内的多种攻击,同时满足前向安全性。
3.研究分析了几类现有的RFID认证协议。通过研究发现：这几类协议都存在密钥无法更新的设计问题,即固定密钥一旦泄漏,射频组件间的通信和交互访问将不再安全。基于以上发现,利用询问-应答机制和不确定索引值策略提出了一种可更新密钥的RFID认证协议,该协议可提供同一会话时期标签和后台数据库服务器的密钥同步更新,实现了射频组件间的安全认证和访问控制,可保护标签的位置隐私和系统的前向安全性。结合以上密钥更新机制,提出了一种基于混沌映射的RFID认证协议,该协议具有更好的计算效率,更适用于能耗受限的RFID系统。
4.对Guo和Zhang提出的基于混沌映射的组密钥协商协议进行分析,指出该协议无法实现组成员的动态调整和多方密钥协商,且不能抵抗离线口令猜测攻击。针对以上问题,基于混沌映射理论和二叉树结构,提出了一种动态的混沌组密钥协商协议,该协议满足多方密钥协商的贡献性和组密钥独立性,可提供组成员的动态调整操作。经安全性分析可知,新协议可抵抗包含离线口令猜测攻击在内的多种攻击。
5.分析Zhao等人提出的可容错组密钥协商协议,指出该协议存在可容错性缺陷,且无法实现组成员的动态调整。利用RSA算法和受限秘密编号,提出了一种动态的可容错组密钥协商协议。新协议具有良好的可容错性,并实现了单轮的组密钥协商,即诚实组成员只需一轮就可剔除所有恶意成员,并协商出共享的组密钥。同时,新协议利用二叉树结构实现了组成员的动态调整,可提供组密钥的即时更新功能,满足组密钥的独立性。通过安全性和性能分析可知,新协议可抵抗多种攻击,较Zhao等人提出的协议具有更低的计算和通信开销。
ABSTRACT:In the virtual network, how to achieve the real application and protect the authenticity of identity and information content have become the most pressing needs. The cryptography based authentication technology is a valid method to solve the problem well. It has become an important guarantee and core technology of information security, its correctness and security play crucial role in the entire network environment. Currently, the design and analysis of secure authentication protocol is the most active research of network and information security. This dissertation concentrates on how to construct secure and effective authentication protocol and proposes corresponding methods. According to the different application environment, research on the two-party and multi-party authentication protocols, including smart based password authentication protocols, RFID authentication protocols and multi-party key agreement protocols for group communication. The work of this dissertation is supported by the National High Technology and Development Program of China (863Program)(No.2011AA010104-2), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61071076,61201159), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.2012YJS023), and the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (No.20100009110002). The main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. Study Chen et al.'s remote user authentication protocol using smart cards. It is demonstrated that serious vulnerabilities still threaten their protocol by mounting known-key attack and off-line guessing attack. To solve the aforementioned weaknesses, we propose a smart card based protocol for remote login and verification, and utilize BAN logic to verify the correctness of its authentication procedures. Meanwhile, the new protocol can prevent various attacks, including known-key attack and off-line guessing attack, and achieves forward secrecy. To compare with related protocols, the new protocol has better computation efficiency.
2. An advanced password authentication protocol using smart cards is proposed by Song. We point out that his protocol is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, and it is lack of system reparability. To fill the gaps, the improved protocol is proposed. The new protocol utilizes one-way hash function and timestamp mechanism to achieve system reparability, and optimizes the computation efficiency. According to BAN logic proof and security analysis, the new protocol has correct authentication procedures, withstands various attacks and achieves forward secrecy.
3. Study several RFID authentication protocols. It is found that all these protocols have same design problem which the tag key cannot be updated. This means that once the fixed key is leaked, the communication and interaction between RF components would be no longer secure. Based on these findings, we utilize challenge-response mechanism and indefinite index strategy to propose an advanced constantly updated RFID authentication protocol. This protocol allows the tag and the back-end database server to update their respective keys synchronously in same session. It achieves secure authentication and access control between RF components, it can protect the tag's location privacy and forward secrecy of system. Combine with the aforementioned key updated mechanism, an authenticated RFID protocol based on chaotic maps is proposed, which is more suitable for the limited-power RFID system with better computation efficiency.
4. Analyze Guo and Zhang's Chaos based group key agreement protocol. It is shown that their protocol cannot achieve dynamic setting and multi-key agreement, and it cannot withstand off-line password guessing attack. To solve the above problem, based on chaotic maps theory and binary tree structure, we propose a dynamic chaos based group key agreement protocol. It satisfies the contributory property of multi-key agreement and group key independence, it provides dynamic setting for group members. According to security analysis, the new protocol can resist various attacks, including off-line password guessing attack.
5. Analyze Zhao et al.'s fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol. It is presented that their protocol has fault-tolerance weakness without dynamic setting. Based on RSA algorithm and restricted secret number, a dynamic fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol is proposed. The new protocol has good fault-tolerant ability, and it needs only one round to exclude all malicious participants and helps honest members complete group key agreement. Meanwhile, the new protocol utilizes a binary tree structure to achieve dynamic setting, and it satisfies group key independence with instant key refreshment. Due to the security and performance analysis, the new protocol can withstand various attacks, it has lower computation and communication cost than Zhan et al.'s protocol.
引文
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