矿产资源开发整合合理性边界研究
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摘要
从1986年《矿产资源法》颁布以来，与矿业经济快速发展、矿产开发逐步走上法制轨道相伴相随的是一轮接一轮、接连不断的秩序治理整顿。为了彻底解决历史形成的矿产开发“多、小、散”的状况，铲除“乱”的根源，2006年以来，在全国范围内，开展了一场轰轰烈烈的资源大整合，从2005年到2010年，全国矿山数量从12.67万座减少到11.25万座，净减少11.2%，原矿产量从52亿吨，增长到90亿吨，增长73%。全国煤炭百万吨死亡率从2.81下降到0.75。矿产资源开发秩序明显好转、规模化集约化水平明显提高、环境保护明显加强、安全生产条件明显改善，取得显著成效。
在欢呼找到了整合这支整治矿业秩序的“利剑”的同时，一个重要的命题摆在我们面前：矿产资源开发整合取得了很大的成绩，但是可不可以无限制的进行下去？也就是矿产资源开发整合的合理性有没有边界？如果有，边界又在哪里？哪些整合是合理的？哪些是不合理的？为了科学回答这一问题，本文在全面梳理矿产资源开发整合工作的历史脉络、推进情况、取得的成效、存在的问题，系统整理总结国内外的相关研究的基础上，从微观的视角，运用规模效应、交易费用、边际成本与边际收益、外部性、资源规制等经济学理论，分析整合行为的内在机理和动力机制，进而提出矿产资源开发整合得以推进的资源、技术、经济、环境、安全“五大约束条件”和整合的合理性边界，构建了矿产资源开发整合合理性边界的逻辑模型，将现有的矿山纳入关闭淘汰区、保留区、强制整合区、科学引导区四个政策区，在科学引导区中，分析比较整合的边际收益与边际成本，确定整合的合理性边界，进一步分出企业主动整合区、政府积极引导区和整合不经济区，针对处于不同区间的矿业权，采取不同的规制政策。
在构建合理性边界逻辑模型之后，本研究进一步深入分析矿产资源开发整合中企业内和企业外获得的收益和付出的成本，以及边际收益和边际成本的变动规律和影响因素。结合索洛的经济增长模型，在传统的柯布-道格拉斯函数中，引入资源和制度要素，建立矿业经济增长模型，进一步解释了整合红利主要来源于释放资源红利和制度红利，从理论上阐释了矿产资源开发整合是一个转变发展方式的过程。运用均衡分析工具，对整合行为内在机理进行了进一步分析，指出了整合合理性边界和长期均衡点的关系。同时选取湖南新田岭整合案例，对本文相关模型和理论假设进行了初步验证。对研究不足和下一步工作进行了评价和展望。
通过研究得出四点结论：一是整合应当权衡收益与成本，合理确定整合的合理性边界，既要积极引导整合，又要警惕过度整合。二是企业是整合的主体，在整合合理性边界范围之内，政府应当充分运用经济手段扩大企业的整合的边际收益，降低边际成本，增强企业参与整合的内生动力。三是整合并非一劳永逸，整合需求将长期存在。今天整合的最优水平，并不代表明天的最优。四是政府角色应当从较为“激进”的强力推动型逐步过渡到较为“保守”的引导促成型，从整合路上的“推车人”转变为“清道夫”。
本研究具有以下四个方面的创新：一是提出了矿产资源开发整合边界问题，并从理论上加以研究，在整合相关研究中尚属首次；二是首次对国外和“矿产资源开发整合”相关的立法实践做了分析，一定程度上突破了以往普遍认为市场经济国家没有促进整合的制度安排的观点；三是构建了矿产资源开发整合合理性边界逻辑模型，对合理性边界给出了理论解释；四是在在传统的柯布-道格拉斯函数中，引入资源和制度要素，解释了整合的本质是释放资源和制度红利，优化矿业经济增长模式。
Since the "Mineral Resources Law" was promulgated in1986, the mining industryhas developed rapidly and mineral exploration and exploitation have gradually beingconducted under a legal system. Accompanying with prosperity of mining, manyprograms aiming to crush down illegal mining were launched one after another. Inorder to root out the excessive, small, scattered, chaotic " problems that stemmedfrom the mineral development history, China had carried out a vigorous integration ofmineral exploration and exploitation over the whole country since2006. From2005to2010, while the number of mines decreased11.2%from126,700to112,500, theproduction of ore increased73%from5.2billion tons to9.0billion tons, and peoplefatality per million tons of coal production decreased from2.81to0.75. In sum，themining integration had reaped remarkable achievement such as improvement ofmining order, upgrading the level of scale, and enhancement of environmentalprotection and safety measures in mining.
While we are cheering for finding a "sword"--the mining integration to fightagainst the disorder of mining, an important question comes up before us: Can miningintegration carry out forever without limitation? Is there a boundary on rationality ofmining integration? If it has, where is the boundary? In order to answer this question,the dissertation summarizes the history, progress, achievements and problems ofmining integration, and analyzes the internal mechanism and dynamic mechanism ofintegration behavior from the microscopic respective by using scale effect, transactioncosts, the marginal cost and revenue, external, resources regulation and othereconomic theories. Then, the article puts forward reasonable boundary and"five-constraint of the mining integration (resources, technology, economy,environment, safety). Next, it builds the logical model of the boundary on rationalityof mining integration and brings the existing mine into four policy areas that close-outarea, reserved area, forced integration area and scientific guide area. We separate the scientific guide areas into the enterprises-initiative integrate area, the government-guiding integrate area and the uneconomic integrate area by analyzing the marginalrevenue and marginal cost of integration. It should take different strategies in differentareas.
After that, the study analyzes further the benefits and the costs of enterprise, as wellas varying regulation and impact factors of marginal revenue and cost in miningintegration. Resources and institutional factors are introduced into traditional Cobb-Douglas function of the Solow model of economic growth to explain the miningeconomic growth. It also explains that the mining integrate itself is a process oftransformation of development mode. After an equilibrium analysis, the study pointsout the relationship between the reasonable border and long-run equilibrium point ofthe integration. At last it selects an integration case from Xintianling in Hunanprovince to study the models and theoretical assumptions. At the same time, itevaluates the shortage of the research and the direction of the further study.
It comes to four conclusions: First, the integration should weigh the benefits andcosts carefully. It is necessary to guide the integration actively and not to do itexcessively. Second, Enterprise is the main force of integration, so the governmentshould make full use of economic means to expand marginal revenue of theintegration, reduce marginal costs, and enhance the enterprises endogenousmotivation to participate. Third, integration is not a once and for all, the demand ofintegration will exist from a long run. The optimal level of integration does not keepsteady forever and will change gradually. Fourth, the role of government shouldgradually transform a "radical" strong push type to a more "conservative" guidancetype.
The paper has four innovations: First, it proposes the rationality boundary problemof mineral exploitation integration, and studies it theoretically for the first time;Second, it analyzes the relevant legislative practice about foreign mining integrationfor the first time, this challenges the generally point that the market economy country has not institutional arrangements to promote integration; Third, it builds logicalmodel of reasonable boundary in mining integration and explains it theoretically.Fourth, it introduces the resources factor and institutional factor into the traditionalCobb-Douglas function, which explains that the essence of integration is the releaseof resources dividends and institutional dividends, and optimizing the model ofmining economic growth.
在欢呼找到了整合这支整治矿业秩序的“利剑”的同时，一个重要的命题摆在我们面前：矿产资源开发整合取得了很大的成绩，但是可不可以无限制的进行下去？也就是矿产资源开发整合的合理性有没有边界？如果有，边界又在哪里？哪些整合是合理的？哪些是不合理的？为了科学回答这一问题，本文在全面梳理矿产资源开发整合工作的历史脉络、推进情况、取得的成效、存在的问题，系统整理总结国内外的相关研究的基础上，从微观的视角，运用规模效应、交易费用、边际成本与边际收益、外部性、资源规制等经济学理论，分析整合行为的内在机理和动力机制，进而提出矿产资源开发整合得以推进的资源、技术、经济、环境、安全“五大约束条件”和整合的合理性边界，构建了矿产资源开发整合合理性边界的逻辑模型，将现有的矿山纳入关闭淘汰区、保留区、强制整合区、科学引导区四个政策区，在科学引导区中，分析比较整合的边际收益与边际成本，确定整合的合理性边界，进一步分出企业主动整合区、政府积极引导区和整合不经济区，针对处于不同区间的矿业权，采取不同的规制政策。
在构建合理性边界逻辑模型之后，本研究进一步深入分析矿产资源开发整合中企业内和企业外获得的收益和付出的成本，以及边际收益和边际成本的变动规律和影响因素。结合索洛的经济增长模型，在传统的柯布-道格拉斯函数中，引入资源和制度要素，建立矿业经济增长模型，进一步解释了整合红利主要来源于释放资源红利和制度红利，从理论上阐释了矿产资源开发整合是一个转变发展方式的过程。运用均衡分析工具，对整合行为内在机理进行了进一步分析，指出了整合合理性边界和长期均衡点的关系。同时选取湖南新田岭整合案例，对本文相关模型和理论假设进行了初步验证。对研究不足和下一步工作进行了评价和展望。
通过研究得出四点结论：一是整合应当权衡收益与成本，合理确定整合的合理性边界，既要积极引导整合，又要警惕过度整合。二是企业是整合的主体，在整合合理性边界范围之内，政府应当充分运用经济手段扩大企业的整合的边际收益，降低边际成本，增强企业参与整合的内生动力。三是整合并非一劳永逸，整合需求将长期存在。今天整合的最优水平，并不代表明天的最优。四是政府角色应当从较为“激进”的强力推动型逐步过渡到较为“保守”的引导促成型，从整合路上的“推车人”转变为“清道夫”。
本研究具有以下四个方面的创新：一是提出了矿产资源开发整合边界问题，并从理论上加以研究，在整合相关研究中尚属首次；二是首次对国外和“矿产资源开发整合”相关的立法实践做了分析，一定程度上突破了以往普遍认为市场经济国家没有促进整合的制度安排的观点；三是构建了矿产资源开发整合合理性边界逻辑模型，对合理性边界给出了理论解释；四是在在传统的柯布-道格拉斯函数中，引入资源和制度要素，解释了整合的本质是释放资源和制度红利，优化矿业经济增长模式。
Since the "Mineral Resources Law" was promulgated in1986, the mining industryhas developed rapidly and mineral exploration and exploitation have gradually beingconducted under a legal system. Accompanying with prosperity of mining, manyprograms aiming to crush down illegal mining were launched one after another. Inorder to root out the excessive, small, scattered, chaotic " problems that stemmedfrom the mineral development history, China had carried out a vigorous integration ofmineral exploration and exploitation over the whole country since2006. From2005to2010, while the number of mines decreased11.2%from126,700to112,500, theproduction of ore increased73%from5.2billion tons to9.0billion tons, and peoplefatality per million tons of coal production decreased from2.81to0.75. In sum，themining integration had reaped remarkable achievement such as improvement ofmining order, upgrading the level of scale, and enhancement of environmentalprotection and safety measures in mining.
While we are cheering for finding a "sword"--the mining integration to fightagainst the disorder of mining, an important question comes up before us: Can miningintegration carry out forever without limitation? Is there a boundary on rationality ofmining integration? If it has, where is the boundary? In order to answer this question,the dissertation summarizes the history, progress, achievements and problems ofmining integration, and analyzes the internal mechanism and dynamic mechanism ofintegration behavior from the microscopic respective by using scale effect, transactioncosts, the marginal cost and revenue, external, resources regulation and othereconomic theories. Then, the article puts forward reasonable boundary and"five-constraint of the mining integration (resources, technology, economy,environment, safety). Next, it builds the logical model of the boundary on rationalityof mining integration and brings the existing mine into four policy areas that close-outarea, reserved area, forced integration area and scientific guide area. We separate the scientific guide areas into the enterprises-initiative integrate area, the government-guiding integrate area and the uneconomic integrate area by analyzing the marginalrevenue and marginal cost of integration. It should take different strategies in differentareas.
After that, the study analyzes further the benefits and the costs of enterprise, as wellas varying regulation and impact factors of marginal revenue and cost in miningintegration. Resources and institutional factors are introduced into traditional Cobb-Douglas function of the Solow model of economic growth to explain the miningeconomic growth. It also explains that the mining integrate itself is a process oftransformation of development mode. After an equilibrium analysis, the study pointsout the relationship between the reasonable border and long-run equilibrium point ofthe integration. At last it selects an integration case from Xintianling in Hunanprovince to study the models and theoretical assumptions. At the same time, itevaluates the shortage of the research and the direction of the further study.
It comes to four conclusions: First, the integration should weigh the benefits andcosts carefully. It is necessary to guide the integration actively and not to do itexcessively. Second, Enterprise is the main force of integration, so the governmentshould make full use of economic means to expand marginal revenue of theintegration, reduce marginal costs, and enhance the enterprises endogenousmotivation to participate. Third, integration is not a once and for all, the demand ofintegration will exist from a long run. The optimal level of integration does not keepsteady forever and will change gradually. Fourth, the role of government shouldgradually transform a "radical" strong push type to a more "conservative" guidancetype.
The paper has four innovations: First, it proposes the rationality boundary problemof mineral exploitation integration, and studies it theoretically for the first time;Second, it analyzes the relevant legislative practice about foreign mining integrationfor the first time, this challenges the generally point that the market economy country has not institutional arrangements to promote integration; Third, it builds logicalmodel of reasonable boundary in mining integration and explains it theoretically.Fourth, it introduces the resources factor and institutional factor into the traditionalCobb-Douglas function, which explains that the essence of integration is the releaseof resources dividends and institutional dividends, and optimizing the model ofmining economic growth.
引文
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