美国联邦官僚制研究
摘要
本篇论文的研究对象是美国的联邦官僚制，笔者将之限定于美国联邦行政系统，美国学者称之为联邦政府的功能系统。本文将美国联邦官僚系统置于美国的整个政治系统中加以探讨，研究和分析美国联邦官僚系统与总统、国会以及社会利益集团之间的关系，探讨美国政治文化对其联邦官僚制所产生的影响，在此基础上尝试建构美国联邦官僚制的理论模型。
在美国分权制衡的政治体制中，联邦官僚系统与总统和国会之间形成一种“一仆二主”的状况，使联邦官僚系统须同时对总统和国会负责。尽管如此，基于联邦官僚系统自身组织结构的多样性、分散性和多层级性、以及在功能上的专业性特征等，使联邦官僚系统在一定程度上保持着某种相对独立性，从而使美国总统和国会都无法完全控制它。美国的多元主义政治文化使其联邦官僚制极具开放性和渗透性。一方面，联邦官僚系统中职业官僚系统的常任制，使之得以与国会委员会和社会利益集团结成“铁三角”，在政策过程中协调一致，去抵制总统的控制；另一方面，美国社会的开放性使其社会利益集团得以游说和渗入政府行政系统，参与政府行政系统的决策和政策执行过程，在一定程度强化了联邦官僚系统与国会和总统相抗衡的实力。
本篇论文运用历史制度主义的理论方法，考察美国联邦官僚制的历史演变和发展脉络，以更加深刻地理解当今美国联邦官僚制的特点。同时运用结构功能主义的理论方法去剖析美国联邦官僚系统的组织结构及其功能，分析美国联邦官僚系统的权力关系，由此揭示美国联邦官僚制的内在特质和类型。
导论部分解析了本选题的来源。美国著名政治学家和比较公共行政学家费勒尔·海迪（Ferrel Heady）在其《比较公共行政》一书中对美国联邦官僚制的定位，引发了笔者对美国联邦官僚制研究的兴趣。笔者在国内外学者对美国联邦官僚制研究的基础上，明确本文的研究视角和切入点，采用政治生态方法对美国联邦官僚制问题加以研究。
在第一章中，笔者对官僚和官僚制的概念加以界定，厘清本文研究的范畴，阐述本项研究中所采用的理论方法。在第二章中，笔者追溯了美国联邦官僚制发展的脉络，将之归纳为“绅士政府”时期、“政党分肥制”时期、“功绩制”时期和“1978年文官制改革后”时期四个阶段，分析了美国的多元主义政治文化背景，解析多元主义政治文化的内涵以及美国的多元主义政治文化，为美国联邦官僚制权力关系的分析加以铺垫。第三章是关于美国联邦官僚制组织结构及其功能的分析。剖析了美国联邦官僚制的构成，包括联邦内阁级各部、独立机构和政府公司；并将美国联邦官僚区分为政治官僚和职业官僚两大类型。在此基础上，分析美国联邦官僚系统的功能，将之归纳为行政管理、政策建议、利益表达与利益综合、交流和政治稳定六大功能。
第四章、第五章和第六章是关于美国联邦官僚制权力关系的论述。第四章分析联邦官僚系统与总统间的权力关系，解析总统对联邦官僚系统的控制、美国“分权制衡”体制对总统联邦官僚控制权的限制、以及联邦官僚系统的自主性及其由此而形成的对美国总统控制权的限制。第五章分析联邦官僚系统与国会的权力关系，解析国会对联邦官僚系统的控制权、控制方式及其实际效果，分析联邦官僚系统所享有的“委任立法权”及其参与立法的诸种因素。第六章分析联邦官僚系统与利益集团之间的关系，解析利益集团影响联邦官僚系统的方式，从联邦官僚系统的角度分析利益集团渗透于政府行政过程的原因及所产生的影响。
基于以上分析，笔者将美国的联邦官僚制归于“分权-多元”类型，突出地体现为分散、开放、多元的特征。如今，美国的联邦官僚制显现出官僚政治化和联邦官僚系统自主性加强的趋势。表现为联邦官僚系统对政治决策参与性的加大和影响力的加强，突出地反映为官僚个人行为政治化倾向有所加强、以及联邦高级文官系统与政治系统的联系日益紧密。随着时间的迁移，如今美国联邦官僚系统的开放性、渗透性和代表性进一步加强，联邦官僚系统在国家政治系统中的地位进一步提升，也因而被称为除立法、行政和司法权之外的“第四权”。
关于美国联邦官僚制的研究在美国如同汗牛充栋，材料很多，但在中国国内，还仅仅是开始，并不充分，希望本文的研究能够对中国的美国官僚制研究有所推动，同时对中国自身的政府官僚体制研究有所裨益。
The research object of this paper is the federal bureaucratic system of the UnitedStates, and defines it as federal administrative system which called as the functionsystem of federal government by American scholars. The Study of FederalBureaucracy which discusses in the entire political system of United States in thispaper focuses on the relationship between the Federal Bureaucracy and President,Congress, as well as social interest groups, and then discusses the impact of U.S.political culture on the Federal Bureaucracy. On the basis of the above-mentionedresearch, the author tries to construct the theoretical model of U.S. FederalBureaucracy at last.
In the separation of power of political system of United States, the FederalBureaucracy, President and Congress form a "One Servant Owning Two Masters"situation, which makes the Federal Bureaucracy respond to both the President andCongress. Nevertheless, Congress and the President cannot fully control the federalbureaucracy system because of itself organization structure of the diversity,dispersivity and multi-level feature, as well as the function of the professionalcharacteristics which makes the federal bureaucracy system to keep a relativeindependence in a certain extent. American pluralistic political culture makes thefederal bureaucracy system highly open and permeability. On the one hand, thepermanent system of career bureaucrats in the Federal Bureaucracy make it form an"iron triangle" with congressional committees and social interest groups, so that theycan coordination in the policy process to resist the president's control; On the otherhand, because of the openness of American society, the social interest groups couldhave the chance to lobby and infiltrate the Federal Bureaucracy, participate in thepolicy decision-making and implementation process, that strengthen the capability ofFederal Bureaucracy to confront the pressure from Congress and President.
In order to profoundly understanding the characteristics of contemporary FederalBureaucracy, the paper uses the historical institutionalism to exam the history and evolution of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy. At the same time, this paper uses thestructural functionalism to explore the structures and functions of U.S. FederalBureaucracy, then analysis the power relationships of the federal bureaucracy system,thus reveal the inherent characteristics and the type of Federal Bureaucracy.
The introduction of this thesis explains the reason why we choose this topic.Ferrel Heady, the well-known political and comparative public administrationscientist of American, who defined the type of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy in PublicAdministration: a Comparative Perspective, sparked the interest of the author to studythis topic. Based on the study of domestic and foreign scholars, the author clears theperspective and the starting point of this paper, and uses political ecology approach tostudy the issue of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.
In the first chapter, the author defines the concept of bureaucrat and bureaucracy,clarifies the scope of this paper, and then elaborates the theory and methods used inthis paper. In the second chapter, the author traces the history and evolution of U.S.Federal Bureaucracy, then divides it as four phases:“Gentleman Government”,“Spoils System”,“Merit System” and “The Reform of the Civil Service System After1978”, analyzes the political cultural background of American pluralism, explains themeaning of pluralism and the pluralism political culture of the United States, and topave the way for the analysis of power relationship of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.The third chapter introduces the structures and functions of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.This section analyzes the composition of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, including thefederal cabinet-level ministries, independent agencies and government corporations;divides the federal bureaucrats into two types: political bureaucrats and careerbureaucrats. On this basis, the paper analyzes the function of U.S. FederalBureaucracy, summarized as administration, policy recommendations, expression andcomprehensive of interests, exchanges and political stability.
Chapter4, Chapters5and Chapters6discusses the power relationships of U.S.Federal Bureaucracy. The fourth chapter discusses the power relationships betweenU.S. Federal Bureaucracy and the President, analyzes the political control overFederal Bureaucracy by Presidents, the restrictions of the presidential power over theFederal Bureaucracy by “Check and Balance” system of American, and the autonomy of Federal Bureaucracy which restricts the power of President to control the FederalBureaucracy. The fifth chapter discusses the power relationship between FederalBureaucracy and Congress, analyzes the power of Congress to control FederalBureaucracy, the type and the effect of congressional political control, then discussesthe “delegated legislation” power of Federal Bureaucracy as well as its participationin the legislation. Chapter6discusses the relationship between Federal Bureaucracyand interest groups, analyzes the types of impact of interest groups over FederalBureaucracy, and explains the causes and impact of interest groups in the process ofadministration from the point of view of Federal Bureaucracy.
Based on above analysis, the author defines U.S. Federal Bureaucracy as a“decentralization-pluralistic” model, which prominently reflects the characteristicsof decentralize, openness, and diversity. Nowadays, U.S. Federal Bureaucracy showsa trend of politicization and the increase of autonomy. This trend expressed asincreased participation and influence of political decision-making of FederalBureaucracy, prominently expressed as politicization of bureaucrats’ private behavior,and the close relationship between senior civil service and political system. Over time,the openness, permeability, and representative of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy isfurther strengthened, and the status of Federal Bureaucracy is also enhanced, so thatthey called the “fourth power” in addition to legislative, executive and judicial power.
Research on U.S. Federal Bureaucracy in the United States is voluminous, butit’s just a not full preliminary study in China. The author hopes that this paper willpromote the study of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, as well as benefit to our governmentbureaucracy research.
在美国分权制衡的政治体制中，联邦官僚系统与总统和国会之间形成一种“一仆二主”的状况，使联邦官僚系统须同时对总统和国会负责。尽管如此，基于联邦官僚系统自身组织结构的多样性、分散性和多层级性、以及在功能上的专业性特征等，使联邦官僚系统在一定程度上保持着某种相对独立性，从而使美国总统和国会都无法完全控制它。美国的多元主义政治文化使其联邦官僚制极具开放性和渗透性。一方面，联邦官僚系统中职业官僚系统的常任制，使之得以与国会委员会和社会利益集团结成“铁三角”，在政策过程中协调一致，去抵制总统的控制；另一方面，美国社会的开放性使其社会利益集团得以游说和渗入政府行政系统，参与政府行政系统的决策和政策执行过程，在一定程度强化了联邦官僚系统与国会和总统相抗衡的实力。
本篇论文运用历史制度主义的理论方法，考察美国联邦官僚制的历史演变和发展脉络，以更加深刻地理解当今美国联邦官僚制的特点。同时运用结构功能主义的理论方法去剖析美国联邦官僚系统的组织结构及其功能，分析美国联邦官僚系统的权力关系，由此揭示美国联邦官僚制的内在特质和类型。
导论部分解析了本选题的来源。美国著名政治学家和比较公共行政学家费勒尔·海迪（Ferrel Heady）在其《比较公共行政》一书中对美国联邦官僚制的定位，引发了笔者对美国联邦官僚制研究的兴趣。笔者在国内外学者对美国联邦官僚制研究的基础上，明确本文的研究视角和切入点，采用政治生态方法对美国联邦官僚制问题加以研究。
在第一章中，笔者对官僚和官僚制的概念加以界定，厘清本文研究的范畴，阐述本项研究中所采用的理论方法。在第二章中，笔者追溯了美国联邦官僚制发展的脉络，将之归纳为“绅士政府”时期、“政党分肥制”时期、“功绩制”时期和“1978年文官制改革后”时期四个阶段，分析了美国的多元主义政治文化背景，解析多元主义政治文化的内涵以及美国的多元主义政治文化，为美国联邦官僚制权力关系的分析加以铺垫。第三章是关于美国联邦官僚制组织结构及其功能的分析。剖析了美国联邦官僚制的构成，包括联邦内阁级各部、独立机构和政府公司；并将美国联邦官僚区分为政治官僚和职业官僚两大类型。在此基础上，分析美国联邦官僚系统的功能，将之归纳为行政管理、政策建议、利益表达与利益综合、交流和政治稳定六大功能。
第四章、第五章和第六章是关于美国联邦官僚制权力关系的论述。第四章分析联邦官僚系统与总统间的权力关系，解析总统对联邦官僚系统的控制、美国“分权制衡”体制对总统联邦官僚控制权的限制、以及联邦官僚系统的自主性及其由此而形成的对美国总统控制权的限制。第五章分析联邦官僚系统与国会的权力关系，解析国会对联邦官僚系统的控制权、控制方式及其实际效果，分析联邦官僚系统所享有的“委任立法权”及其参与立法的诸种因素。第六章分析联邦官僚系统与利益集团之间的关系，解析利益集团影响联邦官僚系统的方式，从联邦官僚系统的角度分析利益集团渗透于政府行政过程的原因及所产生的影响。
基于以上分析，笔者将美国的联邦官僚制归于“分权-多元”类型，突出地体现为分散、开放、多元的特征。如今，美国的联邦官僚制显现出官僚政治化和联邦官僚系统自主性加强的趋势。表现为联邦官僚系统对政治决策参与性的加大和影响力的加强，突出地反映为官僚个人行为政治化倾向有所加强、以及联邦高级文官系统与政治系统的联系日益紧密。随着时间的迁移，如今美国联邦官僚系统的开放性、渗透性和代表性进一步加强，联邦官僚系统在国家政治系统中的地位进一步提升，也因而被称为除立法、行政和司法权之外的“第四权”。
关于美国联邦官僚制的研究在美国如同汗牛充栋，材料很多，但在中国国内，还仅仅是开始，并不充分，希望本文的研究能够对中国的美国官僚制研究有所推动，同时对中国自身的政府官僚体制研究有所裨益。
The research object of this paper is the federal bureaucratic system of the UnitedStates, and defines it as federal administrative system which called as the functionsystem of federal government by American scholars. The Study of FederalBureaucracy which discusses in the entire political system of United States in thispaper focuses on the relationship between the Federal Bureaucracy and President,Congress, as well as social interest groups, and then discusses the impact of U.S.political culture on the Federal Bureaucracy. On the basis of the above-mentionedresearch, the author tries to construct the theoretical model of U.S. FederalBureaucracy at last.
In the separation of power of political system of United States, the FederalBureaucracy, President and Congress form a "One Servant Owning Two Masters"situation, which makes the Federal Bureaucracy respond to both the President andCongress. Nevertheless, Congress and the President cannot fully control the federalbureaucracy system because of itself organization structure of the diversity,dispersivity and multi-level feature, as well as the function of the professionalcharacteristics which makes the federal bureaucracy system to keep a relativeindependence in a certain extent. American pluralistic political culture makes thefederal bureaucracy system highly open and permeability. On the one hand, thepermanent system of career bureaucrats in the Federal Bureaucracy make it form an"iron triangle" with congressional committees and social interest groups, so that theycan coordination in the policy process to resist the president's control; On the otherhand, because of the openness of American society, the social interest groups couldhave the chance to lobby and infiltrate the Federal Bureaucracy, participate in thepolicy decision-making and implementation process, that strengthen the capability ofFederal Bureaucracy to confront the pressure from Congress and President.
In order to profoundly understanding the characteristics of contemporary FederalBureaucracy, the paper uses the historical institutionalism to exam the history and evolution of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy. At the same time, this paper uses thestructural functionalism to explore the structures and functions of U.S. FederalBureaucracy, then analysis the power relationships of the federal bureaucracy system,thus reveal the inherent characteristics and the type of Federal Bureaucracy.
The introduction of this thesis explains the reason why we choose this topic.Ferrel Heady, the well-known political and comparative public administrationscientist of American, who defined the type of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy in PublicAdministration: a Comparative Perspective, sparked the interest of the author to studythis topic. Based on the study of domestic and foreign scholars, the author clears theperspective and the starting point of this paper, and uses political ecology approach tostudy the issue of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.
In the first chapter, the author defines the concept of bureaucrat and bureaucracy,clarifies the scope of this paper, and then elaborates the theory and methods used inthis paper. In the second chapter, the author traces the history and evolution of U.S.Federal Bureaucracy, then divides it as four phases:“Gentleman Government”,“Spoils System”,“Merit System” and “The Reform of the Civil Service System After1978”, analyzes the political cultural background of American pluralism, explains themeaning of pluralism and the pluralism political culture of the United States, and topave the way for the analysis of power relationship of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.The third chapter introduces the structures and functions of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy.This section analyzes the composition of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, including thefederal cabinet-level ministries, independent agencies and government corporations;divides the federal bureaucrats into two types: political bureaucrats and careerbureaucrats. On this basis, the paper analyzes the function of U.S. FederalBureaucracy, summarized as administration, policy recommendations, expression andcomprehensive of interests, exchanges and political stability.
Chapter4, Chapters5and Chapters6discusses the power relationships of U.S.Federal Bureaucracy. The fourth chapter discusses the power relationships betweenU.S. Federal Bureaucracy and the President, analyzes the political control overFederal Bureaucracy by Presidents, the restrictions of the presidential power over theFederal Bureaucracy by “Check and Balance” system of American, and the autonomy of Federal Bureaucracy which restricts the power of President to control the FederalBureaucracy. The fifth chapter discusses the power relationship between FederalBureaucracy and Congress, analyzes the power of Congress to control FederalBureaucracy, the type and the effect of congressional political control, then discussesthe “delegated legislation” power of Federal Bureaucracy as well as its participationin the legislation. Chapter6discusses the relationship between Federal Bureaucracyand interest groups, analyzes the types of impact of interest groups over FederalBureaucracy, and explains the causes and impact of interest groups in the process ofadministration from the point of view of Federal Bureaucracy.
Based on above analysis, the author defines U.S. Federal Bureaucracy as a“decentralization-pluralistic” model, which prominently reflects the characteristicsof decentralize, openness, and diversity. Nowadays, U.S. Federal Bureaucracy showsa trend of politicization and the increase of autonomy. This trend expressed asincreased participation and influence of political decision-making of FederalBureaucracy, prominently expressed as politicization of bureaucrats’ private behavior,and the close relationship between senior civil service and political system. Over time,the openness, permeability, and representative of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy isfurther strengthened, and the status of Federal Bureaucracy is also enhanced, so thatthey called the “fourth power” in addition to legislative, executive and judicial power.
Research on U.S. Federal Bureaucracy in the United States is voluminous, butit’s just a not full preliminary study in China. The author hopes that this paper willpromote the study of U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, as well as benefit to our governmentbureaucracy research.
引文
①费勒尔·海迪：《比较公共行政》，刘俊生译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年，第259-265页。
②Dwight Waldo, The Enterprise of Public Administration: A Summary View, Novato, California: Chandler&Sharp Publisher, Inc.,1981, p.83.
③Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, Lonton: Routledge&Kegan Paul,1983, p.3.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, New York: Brandeis University Press,1977, preface, p.vii.
②Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
③Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy:The Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, p.1.
④霍华德·威亚尔达：《比较政治学导论：概念与过程》，娄亚译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005，第176页。
⑤Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.3.
①马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，阎布克译，北京：知识出版社，1990年，第1-2页。
②马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第1-2页。
③约翰·密尔：《论自由》，程崇华译，北京：商务印书馆，1996年，第115-122页。
④戴维·毕瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林任命出版社，2005年，第3页。
①1940年默顿在《社会力量》杂志上已经发表了《官僚制结构和人格》一文。参见“官僚制结构和人格”，彭和平等编译：《国外公共行政理论》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年。
②米歇尔·克罗齐埃：《科层现象》，刘汉全译，上海：上海人民出版社，2002年。
③伍德罗·威尔逊：“行政学研究”，《国外政治学》，1987年第6期，第30-35页。
①加埃塔诺·莫斯卡：《政治科学要义》，任军锋等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2005年，第137-152页。
②罗伯特·米歇尔斯：《寡头统治铁律———现代民主制度中的政党社会学》，任军锋等译，天津：天津人民出版社，2004年，第315-350页。
③马克斯·韦伯：《经济与社会（下）》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
④汉娜·阿伦特：“耶路撒冷的艾希曼”，载《〈耶路撒冷的艾希曼〉：伦理的现代困境》，孙传钊编，长春：吉林人民出版社，2003年；齐格蒙·鲍曼：《现代性与大屠杀》，杨渝东等译，南京：译林出版社，2002年。
⑤哈贝马斯：《合法化危机》，刘北成等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年。
⑥彭和平等编译：《国外公共行政理论精选》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年，“官僚制”一章。
⑦马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，韩水法译，北京：中国广播电视出版社，1999年，第211-321页。
⑧马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，第322-374页。
①马克斯·韦伯：《经济与社会（下）》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年，第278-323、736-793页。
②主要代表作有：詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊：《美国官僚政治》，张海涛等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1995年；威廉·F·韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社，2001年；Randall B. Ripley andGrace A. Franklin Homewood, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey press，1976；B.Dan. Wood, Bureaucratic Dynamics: the Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy, Boulder: WestviewPress,1994.
③主要代表作有：罗伯特·丹哈特：《公共组织理论》，项龙等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年； W.理查德·斯格特：《组织理论》，黄洋等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年；Thomas P. Murphy, Donald E.Nuechterlein and Ronald J. Stupak：Inside the Bureaucracy: the View from the Assistant Secretary’s Desk,Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,1978. Donald F. Kettl, John J. DiIulio,Jr., editors, Inside the ReinventionMachine: Appraising Government Reform, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1995.Martin laffin,Beyond Bureaucracy?: the Professions in the Contemporary Public Sector, Aldershot, Hants, England;Brookfield, USA: Ashgate,1998. Barry Bozeman, Bureaucracy and Red Tape, Upper Saddle River, N.J.:Prentice Hall,2000.
④黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制：韦伯官僚制理论研究》，哈尔滨：黑龙江人民出版社，2003年，第29页。页。
①马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第79～110页。
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.3.
③戴维·比瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林人民出版社。2005年，第1-50页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第290页。
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy,2nd, New York: Brandeis University Press,1977.
③Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, pp.10-13.
④Patrick Brikinshaw, Grievance, Remedies and the State, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1986.
⑤Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, pp.13-16.
①Richard Stillman Ⅱ,The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, pp.26-29.
②Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making, Boston: Little, Brown,1986,pp. ix-x.
③Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy,3rd,Boston: Little, Brown,1984, pp.9-86.
④Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation inExecutive Agencies,1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2001, p.4.
①Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,pp.739-777.
①Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgencyDiscretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
②B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
③Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,pp.739-777.
④Herbert. Simon,“Why Public Administration?” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8,1998, pp.1–12; Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review,Vol.19,1959, pp.79-88; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertiseand Authority in Bureaucracy,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.29,1985, pp.1-28; Thomas H.Hammond,“Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics,” American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol.30,1986, pp.380-420; C. F. Larry Heimann,“Understanding the Challenger Disaster:Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems,” American Political Science Review, Vol.87,1992, pp.421-435;
⑤Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority inBureaucracy,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.29,1985, pp.1-28.
⑥Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”,” Public Administration Review, Vol.19,1959,pp.79-88.
①Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,p.768.
②Terry M. Moe,“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.79,1985, p.1102.
③Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State, New York: Oxford University Press,1969; RobertD. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2001.
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224;“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,”American Political Science Review, Vol.79,1985, pp.1094-1117;“An Assessment of the Positive Theory ofCongressional Dominance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.12,1987, pp.475-520.
②Terry M. Moe,“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.79,1985, p.1101.
③Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2000; William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct PresidentialAction, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003;David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of AgencyDesign: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy,1946-1997, Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,2003.
④William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action, pp.14-15.
⑤George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999.
⑥Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993.
①威廉·F·韦斯特：《控制官僚——制度制约的理论和实践》，第89页。
②Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” p.201.
③Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997.
④Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1990.
⑤Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978; DavidR.Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press,1974; Morris P. Fiorina,Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press,1989; William Keefeand Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1989.
①William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, p.382.
②Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
③Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, pp.33-66.
④Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
⑤Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
①Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,pp.101-126.
②Matthew D.McCubbins,“The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.29,1985, pp.721-748; Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast,“The Institutional Foundationsof Committee Power,” American Political Science Review, Vol.81,1987, pp.85-104; Barry R. Weingast andMark Moran,“Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the FederalTrade Commission,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.91,1983, pp.756-800; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe,“Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government,” American Political Science Review, Vol.77,1983,pp.297-322; Joel D.Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington,D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1990.
③Barry R. Weingast,“The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective with Applicationsto the SEC,” Public Choice, Vol.44, No.2,1984, pp.147-191; Jack H. Knott and Thomas H. Hammond,“Congressional Committees and Policy Change: Explaining Legislative Outcomes in Banking, Trucking,Airline, and Telecommunications Deregulation,” in Carolyn J. Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn eds., Governanceand Performance: New Perspectives, Washington D.C.:Georgetown University Press,2000.
④Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978; Morris P.Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press,1989.
⑤Allen Cigler,“Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity,” In William Crotty, Mildred Swartz and JohnC. Green ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Lanham, MD: University Press of American,1991,p.100.
⑥Frank Baumgartner and Jones Leech, Basic Interests, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1998, p.81.
①Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy,2nded.,
Washington,D. C.: CQ Press,1999.
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，俞沂暄译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第102页。
③Philip J. Harter,“Negotiation Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113.
④总务管理局的委员会秘书处（the Committee Management Secretariat of the General ServiceAdministration）存有关于咨询委员会的网上数据库，参见http://www.fido.gov/facadatebase,2010-8-24.
⑤Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Wed of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000.
⑥C. Edward Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books,1977, p.5.
①小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第122页。
②宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年，“内容提要”第1页。
③H. G. Frederickson&F. Marini,“Public Administration, New,” in J. M. Shafritz ed., International Encyclopediaof Public Policy and Administration, Vol.3, Bouler Colorado: Westview Press,1998, pp.1801-1805.
①Owen E. Hughes, Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, p.63.
②Jay M. Shafritz, E. W. Russell, Christopher Borick, Introducing Public Administration, p.319.
③戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门》，周敦仁等译，上海：上海译文出版社，2008年，第1-5页。
④安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，张立鹏译，北京：中国人民大学出版社2006年，第311-312页。
①查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，前言，第1-2页。
①Gary L. Wamsley, Robert N. Bacher, Charles T. Goodsell, Philip S. Kronenberg, John A. Rohr, Camilla M.Stivers, Orion F. White, Dr. James F. Wolf, Refunding Public Administration, Newbury Park, California: SagePublications,1990, chap.1.
②珍妮·V·登哈特、罗伯特·B·登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》（丁煌译），中国人民大学出版社2004年，第17页。
①珍妮·V·登哈特、罗伯特·B·登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》（丁煌译），第17-18页
②Kathe.Callahan, Elements of Effective Governance：Measurement, Accountability and Participation, BocaRaton:Taylor&Francis Group,2007, p.194.
③Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First Century, Baltimore,Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press,2002, p.488.
①R. A. W. Rhodes,“Governance and Public Administration,” in Pierre, J.(ed.), Debating Governance: Authority,Steering, and Democracy, Oxford, OK：Oxford University Press,2000, pp.55-61.
②具体的十项治理原则参见：Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration forTwenty-First Century, pp.168-171.
①如金波：“官僚主义若干问题的政治学考察”，《国际关系学院学报》，1998年第3期，第44-49页；龚廷泰：“官僚主义的体制原因及其消解手段——重温列宁反对官僚主义的理论与实践”，《江苏社会科学》，1998年第5期，第72-80页。
②毛寿龙、李梅、陈幽泓：《西方政府的治道变革》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998年，第310-315页。
③周志忍：《当代国外行政改革比较研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年，第1-34页。
①参见竺乾威，吴春成：“公共行政的后官僚模式分析”，《公共行政与人力资源》，2003年第4期；张成福：“公共行政的管理主义：反思与批判”，《中国人民大学学报》，2001年第1期，第15-21页；郁建兴，吴国骅：“新公共管理运动与官僚制”，《教学与研究》，2003年第9期，第15-20页。
②黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制》，第351-356页。
③张康之：《寻找公共行政的伦理视角》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002年，第5、6章。
④李鹏：《新公共管理及应用》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004年；池忠军：《官僚制的伦理困境及其重构》，北京：知识产权出版社，2004年，第400-422页。
①李道揆：《美国政府与美国政治》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990年，第447-483页。
②张定河：《美国政治制度的起源与演变》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1998年，第257-272页。
③谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐—美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年。
④李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第61-71页。
⑤董秀丽编著：《美国政治基础》，北京：北京大学出版社，2010年，第4章第5节。
①石庆环：“论美国文官群体的历史演变”，《史学月刊》，2007年第7期，第70-76页。
②石庆环、高岳：“从艾森豪威尔到卡特：美国文官‘高级行政职位’的建立”，《求是学刊》，2002年第6期，第125-130页。
①朱立言、卢丹、龙宁丽：“美国文官制度的变革与思考”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期，第1-7页。
②朱立言、龙宁丽：“美国高级文官制度与政府回应性”，《中国人民大学学报》，2010年第1期，第101-107页。
③吴志华：《美国公务员制度的改革与转型》，上海：上海交通大学出版社，2006年，第1-3页。
④张千帆：“行政权力的政治监督——以美国行政法为视角”，《当代法学》，2007年第5期，第128-140页。
①石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年。
②刘素梅：“论美国行政内向监督及其对我国的启示”，《扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版)》，2006年第2期，第28-32页。
③张帅：《美国行政权扩张问题研究》山东大学博士论文，2010年，第1-2页。
①王蔚、施雪华：“美国‘行政单头制’政府领导体制的特点及其成因”，《中国行政管理》，2006年第6期，，第85-88页。
②石庆环：“20世纪美国联邦政府行政改革的历史考察”，《史学集刊》，2008年第6期，第5—59页。
①马骏、刘亚平主编：《美国进步时代的政府改革及其对中国的启示》，上海：上海人民出版社，2010年，第1-7页。
②宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，“内容提要”第1-2页。
③鲁彦平：“美国行政改革的价值取向及其启示”，《行政与法》，2004年第4期，第28-29页。
①吴兴智：“美国政府结果导向行政改革评析——一种权力分析学的视角”，《云南行政学院学报》，2007年第6期，第49-53页。
②刘立华、张智胜：“论美国行政改革市场化取向”，《行政论坛》，2002年第6期，第77-78页。
③王世雄：“克林顿治下美国联邦政府改革述评”，《广东行政学院学报》，2003年第5期，第91-96页。
④张志泽、王丽：“美国重塑政府运动对我国行政改革的启示”，《学术界》，2007年第3期，第276-282页。
①Judy Pearsall, The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language EducationPress,2001, p.243.
②乔尔·阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》，陶远华等译，北京：求实出版社，1990年，“译者前言”，第1页。
③戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，邓正来等译，北京：中国政法大学出版社，2002年，第78页。
①戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，第79页。
②詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2007年，第400页。
③Judy Pearsall, The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language EducationPress,2001, p.243.
①梅里亚姆－韦伯斯特公司：《韦氏案头词典》，北京：世界图书出版公司，1996年，第71页。
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, pp.12-17.
③F·J·古德诺：《政治与行政》，王元译，北京：华夏出版社1987年，第11、136-137页。
④理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，第80～92页。
①参见马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第79～110页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学核心概念》，吴勇译，天津：天津人民出版社，2008年，第238页。
②博森，矢泽修次郎：《官僚制统治》，吴春波编译，北京：民族出版社，1988年，第2页。
③西尾胜：《行政学》，毛桂荣等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年，第141页。
④詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》，第400~401页。
①Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy,7th., New York: Mcgraw-Hill Company,2005, p.415.
②Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government, p.3.
③B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism", New York: Pinter,1999,pp.6-11.
①Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism inComparative Analysis, New York: Cambridge University Press,1992.
②Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” p.938.
③Ellen M. Immergut,“The Theoretical Core of the New Insitutionalism,” Politics and Society, Vol.26, No.1,March1998, pp.5-34.
①Peter hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Insitutionalsims”, PoliticalStudies,1996, Vol.44,936-957.
②Koelble Thomas A., Democracy and institutions: the life work of Arend Lijphart, Ann Arbor, Mich.:University of Michigan Press, c2000, p.237.
③Ellen M. Immergut,“The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,”Politics&Society, Vol.26No.1,March (1998), pp.16-22.
④Kathleen Thelen,“Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of PoliticalScience, Vol.2(1999), p.391.
①James Mahoney,“Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society, Vol.29, No.4,2000,pp.508-509.
②Thelen,“Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics,” pp.392-396.
③Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” p.940.
④Paul Pierson,“The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative PoliticalStudies, Vol.29,1996, pp.123-163.
①Krasner Stephen,“Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” ComparativePolitics, Vol.16,1984, pp.223-246.
①Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,”p.937.
①Stephen D.Kranser,“Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” ComparativePolitics, pp.240-242.
②何俊志：《结构、历史与行为——历史制度主义对政治科学的重构》，上海：复旦大学出版社2004年，第285-297页。
①霍华德·威亚尔达：《新兴国家的政治发展：第三世界还存在吗？》，刘青、牛可译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005年，第57页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第284-293页。
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
②安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第310页。
③查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第205-209页。
④查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第208页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第76页。
②戴维·赫尔德：《民主的模式》，燕继荣等译，北京：中央编译出版社，2004年，第256页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《论民主》，李柏光、林猛译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第98页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，曹海军、佟德志译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2006年，第348页。
②罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
③罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第349页。
①乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
②Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.250.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
②约翰·金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第186页。
①谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，天津：天津大学出版社，2006年第2版，第65页。
②Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co.,1958,p.11.，转引自石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年，第
10页。
③David H. Rosebloom, Centenary Issues of The Pendleton Act of1883: The Problematic Legacy of Civil ServiceReform, NY: Marcel Dekker,1982, Preface,p.v.
④David A. Schultz, et al, The Politics of Civil Service Reform, New York: Peter Lang Publishing,1998, p.25.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, New York: W. W. Norton&Company, Inc.,1977, pp.35-36.
②谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，第65页。
①转自谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，第66页。
②Ronald Johnson, et al, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics andPolitics of Institutional Change, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,1994, p.33.
①谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐——美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年，第82页。
①蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，广州：中山大学出版社，2003年，第108页。
①蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，第108页。
②2000State of the Union Address, Thursday, January27,2000.引自蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，第135~137页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，上海：上海译文出版社，1996年。第13～14页；第5页。
②此为瑞典皇家科学院对布坎南公共选择理论的评价。引自丁煌：《西方行政学说史》，武汉：武汉大学出版社，1999年，第377页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“前言”第4～5页。
②戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“序—美国的改革”，第13～17页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“序—美国的改革”，“序—美国的改革”，第23页。
②Donald F. Kettl, Reinventing Government: Appraising the National Performance Review, Washington D. C.:The Brookings Institution,1994, p.49.
③Christopher H. Foreman, Jr.,“Reinventing Capital Hill”, The Brookings Review (Winter),1995, p.35.
①宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，第377～378页。
②《美国1994年国家绩效评论报告》，第72页。引自宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，第379页。
③戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，第1、11页。
①Gabriel A.Almond,“Comparative Political Systems,”The Journal of Politics, Vo.l18, No.3,1956, pp.391-409.
②Lucian W.Pye, International Encyclopedia of Social Science, New York: MaCmillan Co. and the Free Press,1961, Vo.l12, p.218.
③L.W. Pye and S.Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press,1965, p.7.
④加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第14页。
⑤加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第26页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《论民主》，第98页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
②罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
③罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第349页。
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第64页。
②乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
③Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
①Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.250.
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
①约翰·金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，第186页。
②查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①Aaron Wildavsky,“Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institution: A Culture Theory of PreferenceFormation,” American Political Science Review, Vol.81,1987, pp.3-22.
②David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon,“A Cause in Search of An Effect; Or What Does Elite PoliticalCulture Explain?,” Comparative Politics, Vol.11,1979, pp.117-146.
①《美国统计摘要，1985年》，第322、304、311页。转自李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。第448～449页；迈克尔·罗斯金等著：《政治科学》，林震等译，北京：华夏出版社，2001年，第325页。
①参见李道揆《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第454-455页。
②美国国务院国际信息局：《美国政府概况》，沈阳：辽宁教育出版社，2003年，第105页。
②M. Thatcher&A. Stone Sweet,“Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-majoritarian Institutions,” WestEuropean Politics, Vol.25,No.1,2002, pp.1-22.
③D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies (New York: Routledge,2006),p.9.
①李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第456页。
①李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第460页。
②Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, pp.3-4；理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，竺乾威等译，中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第274页。
①李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第74页。
②李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第74页。
③李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，2004年，第476页。
①Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, Washington, D.C.:USGPO,1993, p.73.
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
④National Academy of Public Administration, Guidebook for the Senior Executive Service, Washington, D.C.:NAPA,1989, p.5.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第284-293页。
①U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
②Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
①Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgency Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
②B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
③Nelson Polsby, Political Change and the Character of the Contemporary Congress, in Anthony King, The NewAmerican Political System, Washington, D. C.: The Aei Press,1990, p.80.
①Edward Sidlow, dt al, American at Odds, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning,2002, p.336.
②加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
③查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第310页。
②查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第205-209页。
①Statistical Abstract of the United States:2001, p.278,284,313.
②查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第214页。
③查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第208页。
④理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，第274页。
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224;“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,”American Political Science Review, Vol.79,1985, pp.1094-1117;“An Assessment of the Positive Theory ofCongressional Dominance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.12,1987, pp.475-520.
①Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” Presented at2005meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,2005, pp.11-12.
②Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement, Dissertation, MiamiUniversity,2003, pp.12-20.
③Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” Presented at2005meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,2005, p.27.
①Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” p.28.②Phillip.Cooper,“George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential SigningStatements,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.35,2005, pp.515-532.
①此签署声明的文本可参见George W. Bush,“Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, EmergencySupplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,2006,”December30,2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65259.
②Charlie Savage,“Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban: Waiver Right Reserved,” Boston Globe, January4,2006, A1.
③詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯等著：《民治政府》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社2007年版，第388页。
④Regulatory Information Service,“Unified Agenda,” Federal Register, Vol.67, No.92, May13,2002, p.32819，转引自席涛：“美国政府管制成本与受益分析的制度演变——丛总统行政命令到国会立法”，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》，2003年第1期，第92页。
①Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: the Dynamics of Federal Organization, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1980.
②詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯等著：《民治政府》，第371页。
③威廉F韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社2001年版，第89-90页。
①Curtis. Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in theRulemaking Process,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.37,2007, pp.531-544.
②Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
①Susan. Dudley,“The Bush Administration Regulatory Record,” Regulation, Winter,2004-2005, p.5.
②Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
③Curtis Copeland,“Changes in the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order13422,” CongressionalResearch Service, February5,2007. p.CRS-6.
④Curtis Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in the RulemakingProcess,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.37,2007, pp.531-544.
⑤Curtis Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in the RulemakingProcess,” p.544.
①Stuart Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” p.270.
②Jason Yackee and Susan Yackee,“Is the Bush Administration Any Different? A Macro-Empirical Examinationof Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under ‘43’,” in Provost and Teske, ed., President George W. Bush’sInfluence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, pp.41-60.
①Sean Nicholson Crotty and Jill Nicholson-Crotty,“Efficiency, Enforcement, and Poltical Control: The Case ofthe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W.Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2009.
②Small,2007
③Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
④Paul Light, National Journal, March25,2005.
⑤The National Resources Defense Council, Rewriting the Rules: The Bush Administration’s First-TermEnvironmental Record,2005, p.iv.
⑥Brian. Mannix,“A Midterm Grade for the Bush Administration,” AllBusiness.com, September22,2003.
⑦Susan. Dudley,“The Bush Administration Regulatory Record,” Regulation, Winter,2004-2005, p.5.
①Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan,2009, pp.2-3.
②Seth.Borenstein,“Far Fewer Polluters Punished Under Bush Administration,” Common Dreams.org, December9,2003.
③John Solomon and Juliet Eilperin,“Bush’s EPA is Pursuing Fewer Polluters,” The Washington Post, September30,2007, p. A01
④Jeffrey. Smith,“Under Bush, OSHA Mired in Inaction,” The Washington Post, December29,2008. p. A01.
⑤New York Times reported in its on-line edition (Labaton, April25,2007)
⑥Colin. Provost,“Evaluating Policy in the Bush II Presidency,”p.231.
①Colin Provost, Brian Gerber, and Mark Pickup,“Flying Under the Radar? Political Control in the BushEnvironmental Protection Agency,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s InfluenceOver Bureaucracy and Policy, pp.169-186.
②George Krause and Brent Dupay,“Coordinated Action and the Limits of Presidential Control Over theBureaucracy,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracyand Policy, pp.81-104.
①乔尔阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》（陶远华等译），北京：求实出版社，1990年，第28页。
②Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in Michael Nelson, ThePresidency&The Political System, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1998, p.437.
①Norman C. Thomas, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1997, pp.245-246.
②George C. Edwards, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, NY: St. Martin’s,1999, pp.285-286.
③Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, Lawrence: University Press ofKansas,1991, p.98.
①Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, Washington, D.C.:USGPO,1993, p.73.
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
④National Academy of Public Administration, Guidebook for the Senior Executive Service, Washington, D.C.:NAPA,1989, p.5.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》.曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第290页。
②Francis E. Rourke. Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making,.Boston: Little. Brown,1986. pp.ix-x.
③Francis E. Rourke. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy.3rd.Boston: Little. Brown,1984,pp.9-10.
④Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation inExecutive Agencies,1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2001, p.4.
①《美国统计摘要，1985年》，第322、304、311页。转自李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。第448～449页；迈克尔·罗斯金等著：《政治科学》，林震等译，北京：华夏出版社，2001年，第325页。
②Norman C. Thomas, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1997, p.248.
①Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority inBureaucracy,” pp.1-28
②Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”,” Public Administration Review, Vol.19,1959,pp.79-88.
③Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgency Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
④B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
⑤Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.257.
①John T. Scholz and Feng Heng Wei,“Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.80,1986, pp.1249-1270.
②Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy, p.126.
③Thomas H. Hammond,“Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic System,”in George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier ed., Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the ScientificStudy of Bureaucracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,2003, p.76.
①Sunil Ahuja, Robert Dewhirst,“Congress in the Twentieth,” in Sunil Ahuja, Robert Dewhirst eds., CongressResponds to21stCentury, Columbus, Oh: The Ohio State University Press,2003, p.1.
②Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher eds., Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era,Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,2000.
①Eugene R. Wittkopf, Christopher M. Jones and Charles W. Kegley, American Foreign Policy: Pattern andProcess, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth and Thomson Learning,2007, p.417.
②李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，2004，第372页。
③与非：《美国国会》，北京：中国民主法制出版社，2001年，第89页。
④石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年，第386页。
①李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林人民出版社，2008年，第143页。
②Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, Beyond the Water’s Edge: An Introduction of U. S. Foreign Policy, NewYork: Palgrave-Macmillan,2002, p.171.
③Peter Baker and Glenn Kessler,“U. N. Ambassador Bolton Won’t Stay,” Washington Post, December5,2006,p.A01.
①David A. Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York: St. Martin’s Press,1994, p.109.
①Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, pp.33-66.
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第77页。
③Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997.p.251.
④Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978, p.250.
①Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
②William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall,1989. p.213.
③Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28February,1984, p.165.
④Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, p.33.
①Matthew D.McCubbins,“The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.29,1985, p.721.
②Joel D.Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington, D.C.: TheBrookings Institution,1990, p.231.
③Barry R. Weingast,“The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective with Applicationsto the SEC,” Public Choice, Vol.44, No.2,1984, p.147.
①Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
②Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,pp.101-126.
③D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,p.1.
①D. Epstein,&S. O’Halloram,“A Theory of Efficient Delegation,” In D. Braun&F. Gilardi eds. Delegation inContemporary Democracies (New York: Routledge,2006), p.77,82.
②D. Epstein,&S. O’Halloram,“A Theory of Efficient Delegation,” p.77,82.
③M. Thatcher&A. Stone Sweet,“Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-majoritarian Institutions,” p.4.
①M. J.Horn,The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector, p.46.
②D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,pp.128-129.
③M. J.Horn,The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector, pp.44-45.
①D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,pp.129-130.
②William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,2003, p.109.
③Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.113.
④David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United StatesGovernment Bureaucracy,1946-1997, Stanford: Stanford University Press,2003,p.116.
⑤Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997,p.180Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-244.
①George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999,p.118.
②Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,p.101.
③Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.168.
④Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe,“Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.77,1983, p.297.
⑤Jack H. Knott and Thomas H. Hammond,“Congressional Committees and Policy Change: ExplainingLegislative Outcomes in Banking, Trucking, Airline, and Telecommunications Deregulation,” in Carolyn J.Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn eds., Governance and Performance: New Perspectives, WashingtonD.C.:Georgetown University Press,2000,p.38.
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224.
②Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.187.
③George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999, p.135.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.124.
②Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, p.197.
③Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2000,p.235.
①Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1990, p.115.
①Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997,p.321.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.158.
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.158.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.6.
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.6.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.165.
②Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State, New Haven: Yale University Press,1985, p.245.
①Philip J. Harter,“Negotiation Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113.
①小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第100页。
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第112页。
③Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.124.
④Nelson Polsby,“Political Change and the Character of the Contemporary Congress,” in Anthony King, The NewAmerican Political System, Washington, D. C.: The Aei Press,1990, p.29.
①参见Graham Wilson, Interest Groups, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1991; Clive S. Thomas, First World InterestGroups, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1994; David Lowery and Holly Brasher, Organized Interests andAmerican Government, McGraw Hill,2003.
①Edward C. Page, Bureaucratic Authority and Political Power,2nded., Brighton: Wheatsheaf,1992.
②Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy,2nded.,Washington, D. C.: CQ Press,1999.
③小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第102页。
①Mark P. Petracca,“Federal Advisory Committee, Interest Group, and the Administrative State,” Congress andthe Presidency, Vol.13, Spring1986, pp.84.
①Philip J. Harter,“Negotiated Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113; Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of NegotiatedRulemaking,” Duke Law Journal, Vol.46, April1997, pp.1255-1349.
②Philip J. Harter,“Negotiated Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” p.113.
③Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” p.1255.
④Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,”p.1271.
⑤Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,”p.1309.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.214.
②Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, Washington, D. C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,1994, p.203.
③Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration,“Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-RailGrade Crossings,” Federal Register, March22,2000, p.15298.
④李道揆《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999，第303页。
①Laura Blumenfeld,“Three Peace Suits; For These Passionate American Diplomats, A Middle East Settlement inthe Goal of a Lifetime,” Washington Post, February24,1997.
②谭融：《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年，第144页。
③William T. Gormley, A Test of the Revolving Door Hypthesis at the Federal Communication Commission,American Journal of Political Science,1979, Vol.23, pp.665-683.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.218.
②Michael Grunwald,“Growing Pains in Southwest Florida,” Washington Post, June25,2002, Sec.A.
③Michael Grunwald,“Growing Pains in Southwest Florida,” Sec.A.
④Roger Faith, Donald Leavens, and Robert Tollison,“Antitrust Pork Barrel,” Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.25, October1982, pp.329.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.215.
②Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, Washington, D. C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,1994, p.203.
③Caroline J. Tolbert, Karen Mossberger,“The Effects of e-Government on Trust and Confidence inGovernment,” Public Administration Review, Vol.66, No.3,2006, p.369.
④Eric W.Welch, Charles C. Hnnant, and M. Jae Moon,“Linking Citizen Satisfaction with E-government andTrust in Government,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.15, No.3,2005, p.377.
⑤U. S. General Accounting Office,“Federal Rulemaking.” http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/112501.pdf p.8-9.
⑥Michael Parent, Christine A. Vandebeek, and Andrew C. Gemino,“Building Citizen Trust Through
e-Government,” Paper presented at the37thHawaii International Conference on System Science,2004.
①Jae.Moon,“Can IT Help Government to Restore Public Trust?: Declining Public Trust and Potential Prospectsof IT in the Public Sector,” Paper presented at the36thHawaii International Conference on System Sciences,2002,p.1.
①R.B.Jain,“Politicization of Bureaucracy: A Frame-work for Comparative Measurement,” The Indian Journal ofPublic Administration, Vlo.20,1974, p.797.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
②查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第64页。
③乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
④Norman C. Thomas et al, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D. C.:A Division of CongressionalQuarterly,1997, p.248.
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government, New York: Time Books,1994.
②Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Wed of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000, p.30.
③C. Edward Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books,1977, p.5.
④小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第122页。
①郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，《法治论丛》，2008年第2期，第138页。
②郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，第139页。
③宋世锋：“美国军事情报机构的‘旋转门’现象”，《当代世界》，2009年第4期，第35页。
④汉密尔顿等著：《联邦党人文集》，程逢如等译，北京：商务印书馆，1980年，第47页。
⑤Norton Long, The Polity, Chicago: Rand Mcnally, p.70.
①程亚文：“美式‘旋转门’转出金融危机”，《环球时报》，2008年10月22日。
②马国泉：《美国公务员制和道德规范》，北京：清华大学出版社，1999年，第42页。
③郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，第139页。
①Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Web of Politcs: Three Decades of the U. S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000.
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第64页。
②乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
①Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
①Delmer Dunn,“Mixing Elected and Non-elected Officials in Democratic Policy Making,” in Bernard Manin,Adam Przeworski, and Carol Stokes eds., Democracy, Accountability and Representation, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1999, p.326.
①Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making, pp. ix-x.
[1]池忠军：《官僚制的伦理困境及其重构》，北京：知识产权出版社，2004年。
[2]董秀丽编著：《美国政治基础》，北京：北京大学出版社，2010年。
[3]何俊志：《结构、历史与行为——历史制度主义对政治科学的重构》，上海：复旦大学出版社，2004年。
[4]黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制：韦伯官僚制理论研究》，哈尔滨：黑龙江人民出版社，2003年。
[5]李道揆：《美国政府与美国政治》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990年。
[6]李鹏：《新公共管理及应用》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004年。
[7]李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年。
[8]马骏、刘亚平主编：《美国进步时代的政府改革及其对中国的启示》，上海：上海人民出版社，2010年。
[9]毛寿龙、李梅、陈幽泓：《西方政府的治道变革》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998年。
[10]任爽、石庆环：《科举制度与公务员制度：中西官僚政治比较研究》，北京：海潮出版社，2001年。
[11]石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年。
[12]宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年。
[13]谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，天津：天津大学出版社，2006年。
[14]谭融：《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年。
[15]谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐—美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年。
[16]吴志华：《美国公务员制度的改革与转型》，上海：上海交通大学出版社，2006年。
[17]张定河：《美国政治制度的起源与演变》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1998年。
[18]张康之：《寻找公共行政的伦理视角》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002年。
[19]周志忍：《当代国外行政改革比较研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年。
[1]（英）安德鲁海伍德：《政治学核心概念》，吴勇译，天津：天津人民出版社，2008年。
[2]（英）安德鲁海伍德：《政治学新论》，张立鹏译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年。
[3]（美）查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年。
[4]（英）戴维比瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2005年。
[5]（美）戴维赫尔德：《民主的模式》，燕继荣等译，北京：中央编译出版社，2004年。
[6]（英）戴维·米勒，韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，邓正来等译，北京：中国政法大学出版社，2002年。
[7]（美）戴维·奥斯本，特德·盖布勒：《改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门》，周敦仁等译，上海：上海译文出版社，2008年。
[8]（美）菲德尔海迪：《比较公共行政》，刘俊生译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年。
[9]（美）F J古德诺：《政治与行政》，王元译，北京：华夏出版社，1987年。
[10]（美）霍华德威亚尔达：《新兴国家的政治发展：第三世界还存在吗？》，刘青，牛可译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005年。
[11]（意）加埃塔诺莫斯卡：《政治科学要义》，任军锋译，上海：上海人民出版社，2005年。
[12]（美）加布里埃尔阿尔蒙德、小G宾厄姆鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年。
[13]（美）理查德J斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，竺乾威等译，北京：民大学出版社，2004年。
[14]（美）罗伯特达尔：《论民主》，李柏光、林猛译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。
[15]（美）罗伯特达尔：《民主及其批评者》，曹海军、佟德志译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2006年。
[16]（美）罗伯特丹哈特：《公共组织理论》，项龙等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年。
[17]（美）詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府——美国政府与政治》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2007年。
[18]（美）罗伯特米歇尔斯：《寡头统治铁律——现代民主制度中的政党社会学》，任军锋等译，天津：天津人民出版社，2004年。
[19]（美）詹姆斯Q威尔逊：《美国官僚政治》，张海涛等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1995年。
[20]（英）马丁阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，阎布克译，北京：知识出版社，1990年。
[21]（德）马克斯韦伯：《经济与社会》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
[22]（德）马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，韩水法译，北京：中国广播电视出版社，1999年。
[23]（美）梅里亚姆－韦伯斯特公司：《韦氏案头词典》，北京：世界图书出版公司，1996年。
[24]彭家和等编译：《国外公共行政理论精选》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年。
[25]（美）乔尔阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》，陶远华等译，北京：求实出版社，1990年。
[26]（美）威廉F韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社，2001年。
[27]（美）理查德斯格特：《组织理论》，黄洋等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年。
[28]（美）小威廉姆格姆雷、斯蒂芬巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，俞沂暄译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年。
[29]（美）约翰金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年。
[30]（英）约翰密尔：《论自由》，程崇华译，北京：商务印书馆，1996年。
[31]（英）约翰密尔：《代议制政府》，王瑄译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
[32]（英）珍妮V登哈特、罗伯特B登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年。
[1]陈家浩：“官僚制批判研究的新视角”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期。
[2]龚廷泰：“官僚主义的体制原因及其消解手段”，《江苏社会科学》，1998年第5期。
[3]金波：“官僚主义若干问题的政治学考察”，《国际关系学院学报》，1998年第3期。
[4]金太军：“新公共管理：当代西方公共行政的新趋势”，《国外社会科学》，1997年第5期。
[5]靳永翥：“西方官僚制发展历程与后官僚制改革”，《西南民族大学学报》，2004年第10期。
[6]李承，王运生：“当代公共行政的民主范式”，《政治学研究》，2000年第4期。
[7]刘立华，张智胜：“论美国行政改革市场化取向”，《行政论坛》，2002年第6期。
[8]刘素梅：“论美国行政内向监督及其对我国的启示”，《扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版)》，2006年第2期。
[9]鲁彦平：“美国行政改革的价值取向及其启示”，《行政与法》，2004年第4期。
[10]石庆环：“20世纪美国联邦政府行政改革的历史考察”，《史学集刊》，2008年第6期。
[11]石庆环“20世纪美国文官制度的历史回顾”，《美国研究》，2001年第2期。
[12]石庆环：“论美国联邦文官管理机构的历史演变”，《社会科学阵线》，2009年第12期。
[13]石庆环：“论美国文官群体的历史演变”，《史学月刊》，2007年第7期。
[14]石庆环：“美国利益集团‘游说’高级职业文官现象的历史考察”，《辽宁大学学报》，2009第5期。
[15]石庆环：“文官群体地位的提升与战后美国中产阶级构成的变化”，《史学理论研究》，2009年第3期。
[16]石庆环：“英美文官制度的模式差异及其历史影响”，《世界历史》2001年第6期。
[17]石庆环、高岳：“从艾森豪威尔到卡特：美国文官‘高级行政职位’的建立”，《求是学刊》，2002年第6期。
[18]王敬尧、贾鹏举：“西方官僚体系的权力扩张与民主政治的矛盾”，《社会主义研究》，2000年第4期。
[19]王世雄：“克林顿治下美国联邦政府改革述评”，《广东行政学院学报》，2003年第5期。
[20]王蔚，施雪华：“美国‘行政单头制’政府领导体制的特点及其成因”，《中国行政管理》，2006年第6期。
[21]吴兴智：“美国政府结果导向行政改革评析——一种权力分析学的视角”，《云南行政学院学报》，2007年第6期。
[22]郁建兴，吴国骅：“新公共管理运动与官僚制”，《教学与研究》，2003年第9期。
[23]张国庆：“公共行政的典范革命及其启示”，《北京大学学报》，2000年第5期。
[24]张康之：“论统治视角中的官僚制”，《北京行政学院学报》，2002年第1期。
[25]张康之：“论官僚制组织的等级控制及其终结”，《四川大学学报》，2008年第3期。
[26]张千帆：“行政权力的政治监督——以美国行政法为视角”，《当代法学》，2007年第5期。
[27]张帅：《美国行政权扩张问题研究》，山东大学博士论文，2010年。
[28]张志泽，王丽：“美国重塑政府运动对我国行政改革的启示”，《学术界》，2007年第3期。
[29]朱立言，卢丹，龙宁丽：“美国文官制度的变革与思考”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期。
[30]朱立言，龙宁丽：“美国高级文官制度与政府回应性”，《中国人民大学学报》，2010年第1期。
[31]竺乾威，吴春成：“公共行政的后官僚模式分析”，《公共行政与人力资源》，2003年第4期。
[1] Aberbach, Joel D. Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight.Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1990.
[2] Anderson, James. Public Policymaking: An Introduction.3rded. New York: HoughtonMifflin Co,1990.
[3] Arnold, R. Douglas. Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. New Haven:Yale University Press,1979.
[4] Blumberg, Alan. The School Superintendent: Living with Conflict. New York: TeachersCollege Press, Columbia University,1985.
[5] Helmut K. Anheier, Thousand Oaks ed. When Things Go Wrong: Organizational Failuresand Breakdowns. CA: SAGE Publications,1999.
[6] Brehm, John, Scott Gates. Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to aDemocratic Public. Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press,1997.
[7] Delli Carpini, Michael X, Scott Keeter. What Americans Know aboutPolitics and Why itMatters. New Haven: Yale University Press,1996.
[8] Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little-Brown,1967.
[9] Dunsire, A., Christopher Hood. Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies. Cambridge:University of Cambridge Press,1989.
[10] Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley,1965.
[11] Epstein, David, Sharyn O’Halloran. Delegating Powers: A Transactions Cost PoliticsApproach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press,1999.
[12] Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little Brown,1973.
[13] Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Home Style:House Members and Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown,1978.
[14] Freidrich, Carl, Taylor Cole. Responsible Bureaucracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1932.
[15] Gormley, William. Taming the Bureaucracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1989.
[16] Gruber, Judith E. Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance.Berkeley and Los Angelos: University of California Press,1987.
[17] Huber, John, Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations ofBureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002.
[18] Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. Black Representation and Urban Policy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1980.
[19] Knezevich, S. Administration of Public Education. New York: Harper&Row,1975.
[20] Lewis, David. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2003.
[21] Lipsky, Michael. Street Level Bureaucracy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,1980.
[22] Lynn, Laurence E., Carolyn J. Heinrich, and Carolyn J. Hill. Improving Governance: A NewLogic for Empirical Research. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,2001.
[23] Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press,1974.
[24] Meier, Kenneth J. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch ofGovernmen.4th. Ft. Worth: Harcourt Brace,2000.
[25] Meier, Kenneth, Joseph Stewart, Jr. The Politics of Hispanic Education. Albany: SUNYPress,1991.
[26] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A GovernancePerspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,2006.
[27] Chubb, John E, Paul E. Peterson. Can the Government Govern? Washington, D. C.:Brookings,1989.
[28] Pratt, John W, Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds. Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business.Boston: Harvard Business School Press,1985.
[29] Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A. Franklin. Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Pubic Policy.Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press,1991.
[30] Rourke, Francis E. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston: Little Brown,1984.
[31] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin Classics,1968.
[32] Selden, Sally C. The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy. New York: M.E. SharpePublishers,1997.
[33] Swain, Carol M. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans inCongress. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1993.
[34] Tate, Katherine. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives inthe U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003.
[35] Waldo, Dwight ed. Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence. Scranton, PA: Chandler,1971.
[36] Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in aDemocracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1994.
[37]Wright, David E, III, Michael W. Hirlinger, and Robert E. England. The Politics of SecondGeneration Discrimination in American Indian Education: Incidence, Explanation, andMitigating Strategies. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey,1998.
[1] Arnold, R. Douglas. Political Control of Administrative Officials. Journal of Law, Economics,and Organization, Vol.3, No.2,1987.
[2] Balla, Steven J. Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.American Political Science Review, Vol.92, September,1998.
[3] Balla, Steven and John R. Wright. Interest Groups, Advisory Committees and CongressionalControl of the Bureaucracy, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45, October,2001.
[4] Bawn, Kathleen. Bureaucratic Accountability for Regulatory Decisions: Comment on Lupiaand McCubbins. Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.57,1994.
[5] Bawn, Kathleen. Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices aboutAdministrative Procedures. American Political Science Review, Vol.89, March,1995.
[6] Bawn, Kathleen. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints,Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13,No.1,1997.
[7] Bendor, Jonathan Serge Taylor, Roland Van Gaalen. Politicians, Bureaucrats, andAsymmetric Information. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.3,1987.
[8] Bernstein, Mary. Identity Politics. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.31, No.1,2005.
[9] Bibby, John F. Committee Characteristics and Legislative Oversight of Administration.Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.10, February,1966.
[10] Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, Matt Golder. Understanding Interaction Models:Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis, Vol.14,2006.
[11]Bratton, Kathleen, Kerry L. Haynie. Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in StateLegislatures: The Effects of Race and Gender. Journal of Politics, Vol.61,1999.
[12] Caiden, Gerald E. What Really Is Public Maladministration? Public Administration Review,Vol.51, No.6,1991.
[13] Calvert, Randall, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast. A Theory of PoliticalControl and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989.
[14] Cook, Brian, and B. Dan Wood. Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of theBureaucracy. American Political Science Review, Vol.83,1989.
[15] Downs, Anthony. A Theory of Bureaucracy. The American Economic Review, Vol.55,1965.
[16] Edwards, George, William Mitchell and Reed Welch. Explaining Presidential Approval: TheSignificance of Issue Salience. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.1,1995.
[17] Fenno, Richard. U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies. American Political ScienceReview, Vol.71, Sept,1977.
[18] Finer, Herman. Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government. PublicAdministration Review, Vol.1,1941.
[19] Fiorina, Morris P. Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation ofLegislative Power. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.2, No.1,1986.
[20] Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Kenneth J. Meier, and Robert E. England. Hispanic Americans andEducational Policy: Limits to Equal Access. Journal of Politics, Vol.48,1986.
[21] Furlong, Scott R. Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks. Journalof Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8, No.1,1998.
[22] Gay, Claudine. The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation.American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.3,2001.
[23] Goerdel, H. T. Taking Initiative: Proactive Management and Organizational Performance inNetworked Environments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.16,No.3,2006.
[24] Hammond, Thomas H., Jack H. Knott. Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power,Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model ofMulti-institutional Policy-making. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.12,No.1,1996.
[25] Hanushek, Erik A. Conclusions and Controversies About the Effectiveness of SchoolResources. Economic Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1,1998.
[26] Holye, John, Linda Skrla. The Politics of Superintendent Evaluation. Journal of PersonnelEvaluation in Education, Vol.13, No.4,1999.
[27] Keiser, Lael R., Catherine Holland. Lipstick or Logarithms: Gender, Identity, Institutions andRepresentative Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, Vol.96, No.3,2002
[28] Kerr, Brinck, Kenneth R. Mladenka. Does Policy Matter? A Time-Series Analysis ofMinority Employment Patterns. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.38,1994.
[29] McCubbins, Matthew, Thomas Schwartz. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: PolicePatrols versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28, February,1984.
[30] McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll, Barry Weingast. Administrative Procedures asInstruments of Popular Control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987.
[31] McCubbins, Matthew, Roger G. Noll, and Berry R. Weingast. Structure and Process, Politicsand Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. Virginia LawReview, Vol.75, No.2,1989.
[32] Meier, Kenneth J. Representative Bureaucracy: A Theoretical and Empirical Exposition.Research in Public Administration, Vol.2,1993.
[33] Meier, Kenneth, L. Polinard and Robert Wrinkle. Politics, Bureaucracy, and Farm Credit.Public Administration Review, Vol.59, July/August,1999.
[34] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Managerial Strategies and Behavior in Networks: AModel with Evidence from U.S. Public Education. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.11, July,2001.
[35] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Public Management and Educational Performance:The Impact of Managerial Networking. Public Administration Review, Vol.63,November/December,2003.
[36] Meier, Kenneth, Lawrence J. O’Toole Jr. Unsung Impossible Jobs: The Politics of PublicManagement. Presented at the2004Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation Meeting, Chicago, IL2004.
[37] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Managerial Networking: Issues of Measurementand Research Design. Administration and Society, Vol.37, No.5,2005.
[38] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Daniel P. Hawes. Testing the TheoreticalDeterminants of Political Control over the Bureaucracy: Taking Wood and WatermanSeriously. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,August31,2007, Chicago, IL.
[39] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. Multilevel Governanceand Organizational Performance: Investigating the Political-Bureaucratic Labyrinth. Journalof Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.23, Winter,2004.
[40] Miller, Gary J. The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual Review ofPolitical Science, Vol.8,2005.
[41] Moe, Terry M. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science,Vol.28, November,1984.
[42] Moe, Terry M. Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.American Political Science Review, Vol.79, December,1985.
[43] Nicholson-Crotty, Sean and Lawrence J. O’Toole, Jr. Public Management and OrganizationalPerformance: The Case of Law Enforcement Agencies. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.14, No.1,2004.
[44] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Modeling the Impact of Public Management: TheImplications of Structural Context. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,Vol.9, October,1999.
[45] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Plus a Change: Public Management, PersonnelStability, and Organizational Performance. Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory, Vol.13, No.1,2003.
[46] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Desperately Seeking Selznick: Cooptation and theDark Side of Public Management in Networks. Public Administration Review, Vol.64, No.6,2004.
[47] O’Toole, Laurence J., Jr. and Kenneth J. Meier. Public Management in IntergovernmentalNetworks: Matching Structural Networks and Managerial Networking. Journal of PublicAdministration, Research and Theory, Vol14, No.4,2004.
[48] Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro. Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol.77, No.1,1983.
[49] Pearson, James. Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function. Kansas LawReview, Vol.23,1975.
[50] Polinard, J., Robert D. Wrinkle, Tomas Longoria. Education and Governance:Representational Links to Second Generation Discrimination,” The Western PoliticalQuarterly, Vol.43, Sept.,1990.
[51] Ray, Lee Ann, Robert L. Marshall. The Aftershock of Superintendent Buyouts: An Analysisof the Effects on School Finance, School Climate, Student Achievement and CommunityRelations. National Forum of Educational, Administration and Supervision Journal, Vol.23,No.4E,2006.
[52] Ringquist, Evan, Jeff Worsham,Marc Allen Eisner. Salience, Complexity, and the LegislativeDirection of Regulatory Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,Vol.13,2003.
[53] Robinson, Scott E. Rules, Roles, and Minority Representation: The Dynamics of Budgetingfor Bilingual Education Programs in Texas. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol.2,2002.
[54] Rocha, Rene R. Black/Brown Cooperation and Conflict in the Education PolicymakingProcess. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Texas A&MUniversity.2006.
[55] Scholz, John, B. Dan Wood.Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and PublicAdministration. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.42, January,1998.
[56] Simon, Herbert. Why Public Administration? Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory, Vol.8, January,1998.
[57] Spence, David. Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the PositiveTheory of Political Control. Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol.14, No.2,1997.
[58] Spence, Michael, Richard Zeckhauser. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action.American Economic Review, Vol.61,1971.
[59] Tucker, Harvey, Harmon Zeigler. Responsiveness in Public School Districts: A ComparativeAnalysis of Boards of Education. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.3, No.2,1978.
[60] Waterman, Richard, B. Dan Wood. Policy Monitoring and Policy Analysis. Journal of PolicyAnalysis and Management, Vol.12, No.4,1993.
[61] Waterman, Richard, Kenneth J. Meier. Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? Journal ofPublic Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8,1998.
[62] Weingast, Barry. The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspectivewith Applications to the SEC. Public Choice Vol.44, No.2,1984.
[63] Weingast, Barry, Mark Moran. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy,Vol.91, October,1983.
[64] Weissberg, Robert. Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress. American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.72, June,1978.
[65] Whitford, Andrew B. Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and DemocraticResponsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.12,2002
[66] Whitford, Andrew B. Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. Journal ofTheoretical Politics, Vol.14, No.2,2002
[67] Wood, B. Dan. Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements.American Political Science Review, Vol.82, March,1988.
[68] Wood, B. Dan. Modeling Federal Implementation as a System. American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.36, February,1992.
[69] Wood, B. Dan. Presidential Rhetoric and Economic Leadership. Presidential StudiesQuarterly, Vol.34, Sept.,2004.
[70] Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.American Political Science Review, Vol.85, Sept.,1991.
[71]Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation.American Journal of Political Science, Vol.37, May,1993.
②Dwight Waldo, The Enterprise of Public Administration: A Summary View, Novato, California: Chandler&Sharp Publisher, Inc.,1981, p.83.
③Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, Lonton: Routledge&Kegan Paul,1983, p.3.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, New York: Brandeis University Press,1977, preface, p.vii.
②Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
③Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy:The Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, p.1.
④霍华德·威亚尔达：《比较政治学导论：概念与过程》，娄亚译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005，第176页。
⑤Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.3.
①马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，阎布克译，北京：知识出版社，1990年，第1-2页。
②马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第1-2页。
③约翰·密尔：《论自由》，程崇华译，北京：商务印书馆，1996年，第115-122页。
④戴维·毕瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林任命出版社，2005年，第3页。
①1940年默顿在《社会力量》杂志上已经发表了《官僚制结构和人格》一文。参见“官僚制结构和人格”，彭和平等编译：《国外公共行政理论》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年。
②米歇尔·克罗齐埃：《科层现象》，刘汉全译，上海：上海人民出版社，2002年。
③伍德罗·威尔逊：“行政学研究”，《国外政治学》，1987年第6期，第30-35页。
①加埃塔诺·莫斯卡：《政治科学要义》，任军锋等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2005年，第137-152页。
②罗伯特·米歇尔斯：《寡头统治铁律———现代民主制度中的政党社会学》，任军锋等译，天津：天津人民出版社，2004年，第315-350页。
③马克斯·韦伯：《经济与社会（下）》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
④汉娜·阿伦特：“耶路撒冷的艾希曼”，载《〈耶路撒冷的艾希曼〉：伦理的现代困境》，孙传钊编，长春：吉林人民出版社，2003年；齐格蒙·鲍曼：《现代性与大屠杀》，杨渝东等译，南京：译林出版社，2002年。
⑤哈贝马斯：《合法化危机》，刘北成等译，上海：上海人民出版社，2000年。
⑥彭和平等编译：《国外公共行政理论精选》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年，“官僚制”一章。
⑦马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，韩水法译，北京：中国广播电视出版社，1999年，第211-321页。
⑧马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，第322-374页。
①马克斯·韦伯：《经济与社会（下）》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年，第278-323、736-793页。
②主要代表作有：詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊：《美国官僚政治》，张海涛等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1995年；威廉·F·韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社，2001年；Randall B. Ripley andGrace A. Franklin Homewood, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey press，1976；B.Dan. Wood, Bureaucratic Dynamics: the Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy, Boulder: WestviewPress,1994.
③主要代表作有：罗伯特·丹哈特：《公共组织理论》，项龙等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年； W.理查德·斯格特：《组织理论》，黄洋等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年；Thomas P. Murphy, Donald E.Nuechterlein and Ronald J. Stupak：Inside the Bureaucracy: the View from the Assistant Secretary’s Desk,Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,1978. Donald F. Kettl, John J. DiIulio,Jr., editors, Inside the ReinventionMachine: Appraising Government Reform, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1995.Martin laffin,Beyond Bureaucracy?: the Professions in the Contemporary Public Sector, Aldershot, Hants, England;Brookfield, USA: Ashgate,1998. Barry Bozeman, Bureaucracy and Red Tape, Upper Saddle River, N.J.:Prentice Hall,2000.
④黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制：韦伯官僚制理论研究》，哈尔滨：黑龙江人民出版社，2003年，第29页。页。
①马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第79～110页。
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.3.
③戴维·比瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林人民出版社。2005年，第1-50页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第290页。
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy,2nd, New York: Brandeis University Press,1977.
③Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, pp.10-13.
④Patrick Brikinshaw, Grievance, Remedies and the State, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1986.
⑤Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, pp.13-16.
①Richard Stillman Ⅱ,The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, pp.26-29.
②Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making, Boston: Little, Brown,1986,pp. ix-x.
③Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy,3rd,Boston: Little, Brown,1984, pp.9-86.
④Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation inExecutive Agencies,1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2001, p.4.
①Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,pp.739-777.
①Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgencyDiscretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
②B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
③Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,pp.739-777.
④Herbert. Simon,“Why Public Administration?” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8,1998, pp.1–12; Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review,Vol.19,1959, pp.79-88; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertiseand Authority in Bureaucracy,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.29,1985, pp.1-28; Thomas H.Hammond,“Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics,” American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol.30,1986, pp.380-420; C. F. Larry Heimann,“Understanding the Challenger Disaster:Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems,” American Political Science Review, Vol.87,1992, pp.421-435;
⑤Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority inBureaucracy,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.29,1985, pp.1-28.
⑥Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”,” Public Administration Review, Vol.19,1959,pp.79-88.
①Terry M. Moe,“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28,1984,p.768.
②Terry M. Moe,“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.79,1985, p.1102.
③Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State, New York: Oxford University Press,1969; RobertD. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2001.
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224;“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,”American Political Science Review, Vol.79,1985, pp.1094-1117;“An Assessment of the Positive Theory ofCongressional Dominance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.12,1987, pp.475-520.
②Terry M. Moe,“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.79,1985, p.1101.
③Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2000; William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct PresidentialAction, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003;David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of AgencyDesign: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy,1946-1997, Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,2003.
④William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action, pp.14-15.
⑤George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999.
⑥Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993.
①威廉·F·韦斯特：《控制官僚——制度制约的理论和实践》，第89页。
②Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” p.201.
③Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997.
④Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1990.
⑤Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978; DavidR.Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press,1974; Morris P. Fiorina,Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press,1989; William Keefeand Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1989.
①William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, p.382.
②Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
③Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, pp.33-66.
④Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
⑤Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
①Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,pp.101-126.
②Matthew D.McCubbins,“The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.29,1985, pp.721-748; Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast,“The Institutional Foundationsof Committee Power,” American Political Science Review, Vol.81,1987, pp.85-104; Barry R. Weingast andMark Moran,“Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the FederalTrade Commission,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.91,1983, pp.756-800; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe,“Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government,” American Political Science Review, Vol.77,1983,pp.297-322; Joel D.Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington,D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1990.
③Barry R. Weingast,“The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective with Applicationsto the SEC,” Public Choice, Vol.44, No.2,1984, pp.147-191; Jack H. Knott and Thomas H. Hammond,“Congressional Committees and Policy Change: Explaining Legislative Outcomes in Banking, Trucking,Airline, and Telecommunications Deregulation,” in Carolyn J. Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn eds., Governanceand Performance: New Perspectives, Washington D.C.:Georgetown University Press,2000.
④Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978; Morris P.Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press,1989.
⑤Allen Cigler,“Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity,” In William Crotty, Mildred Swartz and JohnC. Green ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Lanham, MD: University Press of American,1991,p.100.
⑥Frank Baumgartner and Jones Leech, Basic Interests, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1998, p.81.
①Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy,2nded.,
Washington,D. C.: CQ Press,1999.
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，俞沂暄译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第102页。
③Philip J. Harter,“Negotiation Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113.
④总务管理局的委员会秘书处（the Committee Management Secretariat of the General ServiceAdministration）存有关于咨询委员会的网上数据库，参见http://www.fido.gov/facadatebase,2010-8-24.
⑤Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Wed of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000.
⑥C. Edward Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books,1977, p.5.
①小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第122页。
②宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年，“内容提要”第1页。
③H. G. Frederickson&F. Marini,“Public Administration, New,” in J. M. Shafritz ed., International Encyclopediaof Public Policy and Administration, Vol.3, Bouler Colorado: Westview Press,1998, pp.1801-1805.
①Owen E. Hughes, Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, p.63.
②Jay M. Shafritz, E. W. Russell, Christopher Borick, Introducing Public Administration, p.319.
③戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门》，周敦仁等译，上海：上海译文出版社，2008年，第1-5页。
④安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，张立鹏译，北京：中国人民大学出版社2006年，第311-312页。
①查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，前言，第1-2页。
①Gary L. Wamsley, Robert N. Bacher, Charles T. Goodsell, Philip S. Kronenberg, John A. Rohr, Camilla M.Stivers, Orion F. White, Dr. James F. Wolf, Refunding Public Administration, Newbury Park, California: SagePublications,1990, chap.1.
②珍妮·V·登哈特、罗伯特·B·登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》（丁煌译），中国人民大学出版社2004年，第17页。
①珍妮·V·登哈特、罗伯特·B·登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》（丁煌译），第17-18页
②Kathe.Callahan, Elements of Effective Governance：Measurement, Accountability and Participation, BocaRaton:Taylor&Francis Group,2007, p.194.
③Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First Century, Baltimore,Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press,2002, p.488.
①R. A. W. Rhodes,“Governance and Public Administration,” in Pierre, J.(ed.), Debating Governance: Authority,Steering, and Democracy, Oxford, OK：Oxford University Press,2000, pp.55-61.
②具体的十项治理原则参见：Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration forTwenty-First Century, pp.168-171.
①如金波：“官僚主义若干问题的政治学考察”，《国际关系学院学报》，1998年第3期，第44-49页；龚廷泰：“官僚主义的体制原因及其消解手段——重温列宁反对官僚主义的理论与实践”，《江苏社会科学》，1998年第5期，第72-80页。
②毛寿龙、李梅、陈幽泓：《西方政府的治道变革》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998年，第310-315页。
③周志忍：《当代国外行政改革比较研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年，第1-34页。
①参见竺乾威，吴春成：“公共行政的后官僚模式分析”，《公共行政与人力资源》，2003年第4期；张成福：“公共行政的管理主义：反思与批判”，《中国人民大学学报》，2001年第1期，第15-21页；郁建兴，吴国骅：“新公共管理运动与官僚制”，《教学与研究》，2003年第9期，第15-20页。
②黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制》，第351-356页。
③张康之：《寻找公共行政的伦理视角》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002年，第5、6章。
④李鹏：《新公共管理及应用》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004年；池忠军：《官僚制的伦理困境及其重构》，北京：知识产权出版社，2004年，第400-422页。
①李道揆：《美国政府与美国政治》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990年，第447-483页。
②张定河：《美国政治制度的起源与演变》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1998年，第257-272页。
③谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐—美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年。
④李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第61-71页。
⑤董秀丽编著：《美国政治基础》，北京：北京大学出版社，2010年，第4章第5节。
①石庆环：“论美国文官群体的历史演变”，《史学月刊》，2007年第7期，第70-76页。
②石庆环、高岳：“从艾森豪威尔到卡特：美国文官‘高级行政职位’的建立”，《求是学刊》，2002年第6期，第125-130页。
①朱立言、卢丹、龙宁丽：“美国文官制度的变革与思考”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期，第1-7页。
②朱立言、龙宁丽：“美国高级文官制度与政府回应性”，《中国人民大学学报》，2010年第1期，第101-107页。
③吴志华：《美国公务员制度的改革与转型》，上海：上海交通大学出版社，2006年，第1-3页。
④张千帆：“行政权力的政治监督——以美国行政法为视角”，《当代法学》，2007年第5期，第128-140页。
①石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年。
②刘素梅：“论美国行政内向监督及其对我国的启示”，《扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版)》，2006年第2期，第28-32页。
③张帅：《美国行政权扩张问题研究》山东大学博士论文，2010年，第1-2页。
①王蔚、施雪华：“美国‘行政单头制’政府领导体制的特点及其成因”，《中国行政管理》，2006年第6期，，第85-88页。
②石庆环：“20世纪美国联邦政府行政改革的历史考察”，《史学集刊》，2008年第6期，第5—59页。
①马骏、刘亚平主编：《美国进步时代的政府改革及其对中国的启示》，上海：上海人民出版社，2010年，第1-7页。
②宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，“内容提要”第1-2页。
③鲁彦平：“美国行政改革的价值取向及其启示”，《行政与法》，2004年第4期，第28-29页。
①吴兴智：“美国政府结果导向行政改革评析——一种权力分析学的视角”，《云南行政学院学报》，2007年第6期，第49-53页。
②刘立华、张智胜：“论美国行政改革市场化取向”，《行政论坛》，2002年第6期，第77-78页。
③王世雄：“克林顿治下美国联邦政府改革述评”，《广东行政学院学报》，2003年第5期，第91-96页。
④张志泽、王丽：“美国重塑政府运动对我国行政改革的启示”，《学术界》，2007年第3期，第276-282页。
①Judy Pearsall, The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language EducationPress,2001, p.243.
②乔尔·阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》，陶远华等译，北京：求实出版社，1990年，“译者前言”，第1页。
③戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，邓正来等译，北京：中国政法大学出版社，2002年，第78页。
①戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，第79页。
②詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2007年，第400页。
③Judy Pearsall, The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language EducationPress,2001, p.243.
①梅里亚姆－韦伯斯特公司：《韦氏案头词典》，北京：世界图书出版公司，1996年，第71页。
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, pp.12-17.
③F·J·古德诺：《政治与行政》，王元译，北京：华夏出版社1987年，第11、136-137页。
④理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，第80～92页。
①参见马丁·阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，第79～110页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学核心概念》，吴勇译，天津：天津人民出版社，2008年，第238页。
②博森，矢泽修次郎：《官僚制统治》，吴春波编译，北京：民族出版社，1988年，第2页。
③西尾胜：《行政学》，毛桂荣等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年，第141页。
④詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》，第400~401页。
①Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy,7th., New York: Mcgraw-Hill Company,2005, p.415.
②Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government, p.3.
③B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism", New York: Pinter,1999,pp.6-11.
①Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism inComparative Analysis, New York: Cambridge University Press,1992.
②Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” p.938.
③Ellen M. Immergut,“The Theoretical Core of the New Insitutionalism,” Politics and Society, Vol.26, No.1,March1998, pp.5-34.
①Peter hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Insitutionalsims”, PoliticalStudies,1996, Vol.44,936-957.
②Koelble Thomas A., Democracy and institutions: the life work of Arend Lijphart, Ann Arbor, Mich.:University of Michigan Press, c2000, p.237.
③Ellen M. Immergut,“The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,”Politics&Society, Vol.26No.1,March (1998), pp.16-22.
④Kathleen Thelen,“Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of PoliticalScience, Vol.2(1999), p.391.
①James Mahoney,“Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society, Vol.29, No.4,2000,pp.508-509.
②Thelen,“Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics,” pp.392-396.
③Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” p.940.
④Paul Pierson,“The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative PoliticalStudies, Vol.29,1996, pp.123-163.
①Krasner Stephen,“Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” ComparativePolitics, Vol.16,1984, pp.223-246.
①Hall and Taylor,“Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,”p.937.
①Stephen D.Kranser,“Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” ComparativePolitics, pp.240-242.
②何俊志：《结构、历史与行为——历史制度主义对政治科学的重构》，上海：复旦大学出版社2004年，第285-297页。
①霍华德·威亚尔达：《新兴国家的政治发展：第三世界还存在吗？》，刘青、牛可译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005年，第57页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第284-293页。
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
②安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第310页。
③查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第205-209页。
④查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第208页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第76页。
②戴维·赫尔德：《民主的模式》，燕继荣等译，北京：中央编译出版社，2004年，第256页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《论民主》，李柏光、林猛译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第98页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，曹海军、佟德志译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2006年，第348页。
②罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
③罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第349页。
①乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
②Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.250.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
②约翰·金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第186页。
①谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，天津：天津大学出版社，2006年第2版，第65页。
②Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co.,1958,p.11.，转引自石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年，第
10页。
③David H. Rosebloom, Centenary Issues of The Pendleton Act of1883: The Problematic Legacy of Civil ServiceReform, NY: Marcel Dekker,1982, Preface,p.v.
④David A. Schultz, et al, The Politics of Civil Service Reform, New York: Peter Lang Publishing,1998, p.25.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, New York: W. W. Norton&Company, Inc.,1977, pp.35-36.
②谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，第65页。
①转自谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，第66页。
②Ronald Johnson, et al, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics andPolitics of Institutional Change, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,1994, p.33.
①谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐——美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年，第82页。
①蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，广州：中山大学出版社，2003年，第108页。
①蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，第108页。
②2000State of the Union Address, Thursday, January27,2000.引自蓝志勇：《行政官僚与现代社会》，第135~137页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，上海：上海译文出版社，1996年。第13～14页；第5页。
②此为瑞典皇家科学院对布坎南公共选择理论的评价。引自丁煌：《西方行政学说史》，武汉：武汉大学出版社，1999年，第377页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“前言”第4～5页。
②戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“序—美国的改革”，第13～17页。
①戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，“序—美国的改革”，“序—美国的改革”，第23页。
②Donald F. Kettl, Reinventing Government: Appraising the National Performance Review, Washington D. C.:The Brookings Institution,1994, p.49.
③Christopher H. Foreman, Jr.,“Reinventing Capital Hill”, The Brookings Review (Winter),1995, p.35.
①宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，第377～378页。
②《美国1994年国家绩效评论报告》，第72页。引自宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，第379页。
③戴维·奥斯本、特德·盖布勒：《改革政府：企业精神如何改革着公营部门》，第1、11页。
①Gabriel A.Almond,“Comparative Political Systems,”The Journal of Politics, Vo.l18, No.3,1956, pp.391-409.
②Lucian W.Pye, International Encyclopedia of Social Science, New York: MaCmillan Co. and the Free Press,1961, Vo.l12, p.218.
③L.W. Pye and S.Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press,1965, p.7.
④加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第14页。
⑤加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第26页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《论民主》，第98页。
①罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
②罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第348页。
③罗伯特·达尔：《民主及其批评者》，第349页。
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第64页。
②乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
③Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
①Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.250.
②Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
①约翰·金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，第186页。
②查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①Aaron Wildavsky,“Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institution: A Culture Theory of PreferenceFormation,” American Political Science Review, Vol.81,1987, pp.3-22.
②David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon,“A Cause in Search of An Effect; Or What Does Elite PoliticalCulture Explain?,” Comparative Politics, Vol.11,1979, pp.117-146.
①《美国统计摘要，1985年》，第322、304、311页。转自李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。第448～449页；迈克尔·罗斯金等著：《政治科学》，林震等译，北京：华夏出版社，2001年，第325页。
①参见李道揆《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第454-455页。
②美国国务院国际信息局：《美国政府概况》，沈阳：辽宁教育出版社，2003年，第105页。
②M. Thatcher&A. Stone Sweet,“Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-majoritarian Institutions,” WestEuropean Politics, Vol.25,No.1,2002, pp.1-22.
③D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies (New York: Routledge,2006),p.9.
①李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第456页。
①李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年，第460页。
②Richard Stillman Ⅱ, The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government,3rd, Belmont:Wadsworth,2004, pp.3-4；理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，竺乾威等译，中国人民大学出版社，2004年，第274页。
①李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第74页。
②李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年，第74页。
③李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，2004年，第476页。
①Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, Washington, D.C.:USGPO,1993, p.73.
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
④National Academy of Public Administration, Guidebook for the Senior Executive Service, Washington, D.C.:NAPA,1989, p.5.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第284-293页。
①U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
②Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
①Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgency Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
②B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
③Nelson Polsby, Political Change and the Character of the Contemporary Congress, in Anthony King, The NewAmerican Political System, Washington, D. C.: The Aei Press,1990, p.80.
①Edward Sidlow, dt al, American at Odds, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning,2002, p.336.
②加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
③查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，第291页。
①安德鲁·海伍德：《政治学新论》，第310页。
②查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第205-209页。
①Statistical Abstract of the United States:2001, p.278,284,313.
②查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第214页。
③查尔斯·葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第208页。
④理查德·J·斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，第274页。
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224;“Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB,”American Political Science Review, Vol.79,1985, pp.1094-1117;“An Assessment of the Positive Theory ofCongressional Dominance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.12,1987, pp.475-520.
①Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” Presented at2005meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,2005, pp.11-12.
②Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement, Dissertation, MiamiUniversity,2003, pp.12-20.
③Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” Presented at2005meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,2005, p.27.
①Chrisopher.Kelley,“Rethinking Presidential Power–The Unitary Executive and the George W. BushPresidency,” p.28.②Phillip.Cooper,“George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential SigningStatements,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.35,2005, pp.515-532.
①此签署声明的文本可参见George W. Bush,“Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, EmergencySupplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,2006,”December30,2005, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65259.
②Charlie Savage,“Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban: Waiver Right Reserved,” Boston Globe, January4,2006, A1.
③詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯等著：《民治政府》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社2007年版，第388页。
④Regulatory Information Service,“Unified Agenda,” Federal Register, Vol.67, No.92, May13,2002, p.32819，转引自席涛：“美国政府管制成本与受益分析的制度演变——丛总统行政命令到国会立法”，《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》，2003年第1期，第92页。
①Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: the Dynamics of Federal Organization, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1980.
②詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯等著：《民治政府》，第371页。
③威廉F韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社2001年版，第89-90页。
①Curtis. Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in theRulemaking Process,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.37,2007, pp.531-544.
②Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
①Susan. Dudley,“The Bush Administration Regulatory Record,” Regulation, Winter,2004-2005, p.5.
②Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
③Curtis Copeland,“Changes in the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order13422,” CongressionalResearch Service, February5,2007. p.CRS-6.
④Curtis Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in the RulemakingProcess,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.37,2007, pp.531-544.
⑤Curtis Copeland,“The Law: Executive Order13422: An Expansion of Presidential Influence in the RulemakingProcess,” p.544.
①Stuart Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” p.270.
②Jason Yackee and Susan Yackee,“Is the Bush Administration Any Different? A Macro-Empirical Examinationof Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under ‘43’,” in Provost and Teske, ed., President George W. Bush’sInfluence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, pp.41-60.
①Sean Nicholson Crotty and Jill Nicholson-Crotty,“Efficiency, Enforcement, and Poltical Control: The Case ofthe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W.Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2009.
②Small,2007
③Stuart. Shapiro,“An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process,” pp.270-290.
④Paul Light, National Journal, March25,2005.
⑤The National Resources Defense Council, Rewriting the Rules: The Bush Administration’s First-TermEnvironmental Record,2005, p.iv.
⑥Brian. Mannix,“A Midterm Grade for the Bush Administration,” AllBusiness.com, September22,2003.
⑦Susan. Dudley,“The Bush Administration Regulatory Record,” Regulation, Winter,2004-2005, p.5.
①Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracy and Policy, NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan,2009, pp.2-3.
②Seth.Borenstein,“Far Fewer Polluters Punished Under Bush Administration,” Common Dreams.org, December9,2003.
③John Solomon and Juliet Eilperin,“Bush’s EPA is Pursuing Fewer Polluters,” The Washington Post, September30,2007, p. A01
④Jeffrey. Smith,“Under Bush, OSHA Mired in Inaction,” The Washington Post, December29,2008. p. A01.
⑤New York Times reported in its on-line edition (Labaton, April25,2007)
⑥Colin. Provost,“Evaluating Policy in the Bush II Presidency,”p.231.
①Colin Provost, Brian Gerber, and Mark Pickup,“Flying Under the Radar? Political Control in the BushEnvironmental Protection Agency,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s InfluenceOver Bureaucracy and Policy, pp.169-186.
②George Krause and Brent Dupay,“Coordinated Action and the Limits of Presidential Control Over theBureaucracy,” in Colin. Provost and Paul Teske ed., President George W. Bush’s Influence Over Bureaucracyand Policy, pp.81-104.
①乔尔阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》（陶远华等译），北京：求实出版社，1990年，第28页。
②Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in Michael Nelson, ThePresidency&The Political System, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1998, p.437.
①Norman C. Thomas, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1997, pp.245-246.
②George C. Edwards, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, NY: St. Martin’s,1999, pp.285-286.
③Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, Lawrence: University Press ofKansas,1991, p.98.
①Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, Washington, D.C.:USGPO,1993, p.73.
②U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Personnel Research Highlights: Special Report on the Survey of federalEmployees, Washington, D.C.: USOPM,1993, p.3.
③Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better&Costs Less, p.74.
④National Academy of Public Administration, Guidebook for the Senior Executive Service, Washington, D.C.:NAPA,1989, p.5.
①加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德，小G·宾厄姆·鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》.曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年，第290页。
②Francis E. Rourke. Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making,.Boston: Little. Brown,1986. pp.ix-x.
③Francis E. Rourke. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy.3rd.Boston: Little. Brown,1984,pp.9-10.
④Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation inExecutive Agencies,1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University Press,2001, p.4.
①《美国统计摘要，1985年》，第322、304、311页。转自李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。第448～449页；迈克尔·罗斯金等著：《政治科学》，林震等译，北京：华夏出版社，2001年，第325页。
②Norman C. Thomas, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly,1997, p.248.
①Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller,“A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority inBureaucracy,” pp.1-28
②Charles E. Lindblom,“The Science of “Muddling Through”,” Public Administration Review, Vol.19,1959,pp.79-88.
③Randall L.Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast,“A Theory of Political Control andAgency Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989, p.595.
④B. Dan. Wood,“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.82,1988, pp.213-34.
⑤Norton Long,“Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol.2,1949, p.257.
①John T. Scholz and Feng Heng Wei,“Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.80,1986, pp.1249-1270.
②Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy, p.126.
③Thomas H. Hammond,“Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic System,”in George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier ed., Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the ScientificStudy of Bureaucracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,2003, p.76.
①Sunil Ahuja, Robert Dewhirst,“Congress in the Twentieth,” in Sunil Ahuja, Robert Dewhirst eds., CongressResponds to21stCentury, Columbus, Oh: The Ohio State University Press,2003, p.1.
②Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher eds., Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era,Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,2000.
①Eugene R. Wittkopf, Christopher M. Jones and Charles W. Kegley, American Foreign Policy: Pattern andProcess, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth and Thomson Learning,2007, p.417.
②李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，2004，第372页。
③与非：《美国国会》，北京：中国民主法制出版社，2001年，第89页。
④石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年，第386页。
①李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林人民出版社，2008年，第143页。
②Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, Beyond the Water’s Edge: An Introduction of U. S. Foreign Policy, NewYork: Palgrave-Macmillan,2002, p.171.
③Peter Baker and Glenn Kessler,“U. N. Ambassador Bolton Won’t Stay,” Washington Post, December5,2006,p.A01.
①David A. Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New York: St. Martin’s Press,1994, p.109.
①Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, pp.33-66.
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第77页。
③Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997.p.251.
④Richard F., Jr.Fenno, Home Style:House Members and Their Districts, Boston: Little, Brown.1978, p.250.
①Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
②William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall,1989. p.213.
③Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28February,1984, p.165.
④Morris P. Fiorina,“Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?” PublicChoice, Vol.39,1982, p.33.
①Matthew D.McCubbins,“The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.29,1985, p.721.
②Joel D.Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington, D.C.: TheBrookings Institution,1990, p.231.
③Barry R. Weingast,“The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective with Applicationsto the SEC,” Public Choice, Vol.44, No.2,1984, p.147.
①Matthew D.McCubbins, and Thomas Schwartz,“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versusFire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28(February,1984.), pp.165-179; MatthewD.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of PopularControl,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-277.
②Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,pp.101-126.
③D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,p.1.
①D. Epstein,&S. O’Halloram,“A Theory of Efficient Delegation,” In D. Braun&F. Gilardi eds. Delegation inContemporary Democracies (New York: Routledge,2006), p.77,82.
②D. Epstein,&S. O’Halloram,“A Theory of Efficient Delegation,” p.77,82.
③M. Thatcher&A. Stone Sweet,“Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-majoritarian Institutions,” p.4.
①M. J.Horn,The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector, p.46.
②D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,pp.128-129.
③M. J.Horn,The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector, pp.44-45.
①D. Braun&F. Gilardi, Delegation in Contemporary Democracies,pp.129-130.
②William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,2003, p.109.
③Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.113.
④David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United StatesGovernment Bureaucracy,1946-1997, Stanford: Stanford University Press,2003,p.116.
⑤Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997,p.180Matthew D.McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments ofPopular Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987. pp.243-244.
①George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999,p.118.
②Kathleen Bawn,“Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and theCommittee System,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13, No.1,1997,p.101.
③Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.168.
④Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe,“Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government,” American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.77,1983, p.297.
⑤Jack H. Knott and Thomas H. Hammond,“Congressional Committees and Policy Change: ExplainingLegislative Outcomes in Banking, Trucking, Airline, and Telecommunications Deregulation,” in Carolyn J.Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn eds., Governance and Performance: New Perspectives, WashingtonD.C.:Georgetown University Press,2000,p.38.
①Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, pp.197-224.
②Robert J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American Government,New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.1993, p.187.
③George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, New York:Worth Publishers, Inc.1999, p.135.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.124.
②Terry M. Moe,“Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration,” American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.26,1982, p.197.
③Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,2000,p.235.
①Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1990, p.115.
①Samuel. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, Washington D. C.: CQ Press,1997,p.321.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.158.
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.158.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.6.
②Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.6.
①Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.165.
②Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State, New Haven: Yale University Press,1985, p.245.
①Philip J. Harter,“Negotiation Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113.
①小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第100页。
②小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第112页。
③Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, p.124.
④Nelson Polsby,“Political Change and the Character of the Contemporary Congress,” in Anthony King, The NewAmerican Political System, Washington, D. C.: The Aei Press,1990, p.29.
①参见Graham Wilson, Interest Groups, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1991; Clive S. Thomas, First World InterestGroups, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1994; David Lowery and Holly Brasher, Organized Interests andAmerican Government, McGraw Hill,2003.
①Edward C. Page, Bureaucratic Authority and Political Power,2nded., Brighton: Wheatsheaf,1992.
②Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy,2nded.,Washington, D. C.: CQ Press,1999.
③小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第102页。
①Mark P. Petracca,“Federal Advisory Committee, Interest Group, and the Administrative State,” Congress andthe Presidency, Vol.13, Spring1986, pp.84.
①Philip J. Harter,“Negotiated Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.71, December1982, pp.1-113; Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of NegotiatedRulemaking,” Duke Law Journal, Vol.46, April1997, pp.1255-1349.
②Philip J. Harter,“Negotiated Rulemaking: A Cure for Malaise,” p.113.
③Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” p.1255.
④Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,”p.1271.
⑤Cary Coglianese,“Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,”p.1309.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.214.
②Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, Washington, D. C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,1994, p.203.
③Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration,“Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-RailGrade Crossings,” Federal Register, March22,2000, p.15298.
④李道揆《美国政府和美国政治》，北京：商务印书馆，1999，第303页。
①Laura Blumenfeld,“Three Peace Suits; For These Passionate American Diplomats, A Middle East Settlement inthe Goal of a Lifetime,” Washington Post, February24,1997.
②谭融：《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年，第144页。
③William T. Gormley, A Test of the Revolving Door Hypthesis at the Federal Communication Commission,American Journal of Political Science,1979, Vol.23, pp.665-683.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.218.
②Michael Grunwald,“Growing Pains in Southwest Florida,” Washington Post, June25,2002, Sec.A.
③Michael Grunwald,“Growing Pains in Southwest Florida,” Sec.A.
④Roger Faith, Donald Leavens, and Robert Tollison,“Antitrust Pork Barrel,” Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.25, October1982, pp.329.
①William T. Gormley, Interest Group Intervention in the Administrative Process: Conspirators andCo-Conspirators, in Paul S. Hermson, The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, andPolicymaking in Washington, Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers Inc.,1998, p.215.
②Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, Washington, D. C.:Congressional Quarterly Press,1994, p.203.
③Caroline J. Tolbert, Karen Mossberger,“The Effects of e-Government on Trust and Confidence inGovernment,” Public Administration Review, Vol.66, No.3,2006, p.369.
④Eric W.Welch, Charles C. Hnnant, and M. Jae Moon,“Linking Citizen Satisfaction with E-government andTrust in Government,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.15, No.3,2005, p.377.
⑤U. S. General Accounting Office,“Federal Rulemaking.” http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/112501.pdf p.8-9.
⑥Michael Parent, Christine A. Vandebeek, and Andrew C. Gemino,“Building Citizen Trust Through
e-Government,” Paper presented at the37thHawaii International Conference on System Science,2004.
①Jae.Moon,“Can IT Help Government to Restore Public Trust?: Declining Public Trust and Potential Prospectsof IT in the Public Sector,” Paper presented at the36thHawaii International Conference on System Sciences,2002,p.1.
①R.B.Jain,“Politicization of Bureaucracy: A Frame-work for Comparative Measurement,” The Indian Journal ofPublic Administration, Vlo.20,1974, p.797.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
②查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年，第64页。
③乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
④Norman C. Thomas et al, The Politics and the Presidency, Washington, D. C.:A Division of CongressionalQuarterly,1997, p.248.
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第148页。
①Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government, New York: Time Books,1994.
②Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Wed of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000, p.30.
③C. Edward Lindblom, Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books,1977, p.5.
④小威廉姆·格姆雷、斯蒂芬·巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，第122页。
①郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，《法治论丛》，2008年第2期，第138页。
②郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，第139页。
③宋世锋：“美国军事情报机构的‘旋转门’现象”，《当代世界》，2009年第4期，第35页。
④汉密尔顿等著：《联邦党人文集》，程逢如等译，北京：商务印书馆，1980年，第47页。
⑤Norton Long, The Polity, Chicago: Rand Mcnally, p.70.
①程亚文：“美式‘旋转门’转出金融危机”，《环球时报》，2008年10月22日。
②马国泉：《美国公务员制和道德规范》，北京：清华大学出版社，1999年，第42页。
③郭道晖：“论多元化的社会利益集团对国家权力的影响”，第139页。
①Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Web of Politcs: Three Decades of the U. S. Federal Executive,Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press,2000.
①查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，第64页。
②乔尔阿伯巴奇：《两种人：官僚与政客》，第259页。
①Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government,4th,NewYork: Wadsworth Publishing,2000, p.i.
①Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, p.44.
①Delmer Dunn,“Mixing Elected and Non-elected Officials in Democratic Policy Making,” in Bernard Manin,Adam Przeworski, and Carol Stokes eds., Democracy, Accountability and Representation, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press,1999, p.326.
①Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in National Policy Making, pp. ix-x.
[1]池忠军：《官僚制的伦理困境及其重构》，北京：知识产权出版社，2004年。
[2]董秀丽编著：《美国政治基础》，北京：北京大学出版社，2010年。
[3]何俊志：《结构、历史与行为——历史制度主义对政治科学的重构》，上海：复旦大学出版社，2004年。
[4]黄小勇：《现代化进程中的官僚制：韦伯官僚制理论研究》，哈尔滨：黑龙江人民出版社，2003年。
[5]李道揆：《美国政府与美国政治》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990年。
[6]李鹏：《新公共管理及应用》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004年。
[7]李文良：《美国政府运行机制》，长春：吉林大学出版社，2008年。
[8]马骏、刘亚平主编：《美国进步时代的政府改革及其对中国的启示》，上海：上海人民出版社，2010年。
[9]毛寿龙、李梅、陈幽泓：《西方政府的治道变革》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998年。
[10]任爽、石庆环：《科举制度与公务员制度：中西官僚政治比较研究》，北京：海潮出版社，2001年。
[11]石庆环：《20世纪美国文官制度与官僚政治》，长春：东北师范大学出版社，2003年。
[12]宋世明：《美国行政改革研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年。
[13]谭融：《公共部门人力资源管理》，天津：天津大学出版社，2006年。
[14]谭融：《美国利益集团政治研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2002年。
[15]谭融：《权力的分配与权力的角逐—美国分权体制研究》，天津：天津大学出版社，1994年。
[16]吴志华：《美国公务员制度的改革与转型》，上海：上海交通大学出版社，2006年。
[17]张定河：《美国政治制度的起源与演变》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1998年。
[18]张康之：《寻找公共行政的伦理视角》，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002年。
[19]周志忍：《当代国外行政改革比较研究》，北京：国家行政学院出版社，1999年。
[1]（英）安德鲁海伍德：《政治学核心概念》，吴勇译，天津：天津人民出版社，2008年。
[2]（英）安德鲁海伍德：《政治学新论》，张立鹏译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年。
[3]（美）查尔斯葛德塞尔：《为官僚制正名——一场公共行政的辩论》，张怡译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年。
[4]（英）戴维比瑟姆：《官僚制》，韩志明、张毅译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2005年。
[5]（美）戴维赫尔德：《民主的模式》，燕继荣等译，北京：中央编译出版社，2004年。
[6]（英）戴维·米勒，韦农·波格丹诺编：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》，邓正来等译，北京：中国政法大学出版社，2002年。
[7]（美）戴维·奥斯本，特德·盖布勒：《改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门》，周敦仁等译，上海：上海译文出版社，2008年。
[8]（美）菲德尔海迪：《比较公共行政》，刘俊生译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2006年。
[9]（美）F J古德诺：《政治与行政》，王元译，北京：华夏出版社，1987年。
[10]（美）霍华德威亚尔达：《新兴国家的政治发展：第三世界还存在吗？》，刘青，牛可译，北京：北京大学出版社，2005年。
[11]（意）加埃塔诺莫斯卡：《政治科学要义》，任军锋译，上海：上海人民出版社，2005年。
[12]（美）加布里埃尔阿尔蒙德、小G宾厄姆鲍威尔：《比较政治学：体系、过程和政策》，曹沛霖等译，北京：东方出版社，2007年。
[13]（美）理查德J斯蒂尔曼二世编著：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，竺乾威等译，北京：民大学出版社，2004年。
[14]（美）罗伯特达尔：《论民主》，李柏光、林猛译，北京：商务印书馆，1999年。
[15]（美）罗伯特达尔：《民主及其批评者》，曹海军、佟德志译，长春：吉林人民出版社，2006年。
[16]（美）罗伯特丹哈特：《公共组织理论》，项龙等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年。
[17]（美）詹姆斯麦格雷戈伯恩斯等著：《民治政府——美国政府与政治》，吴爱明等译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2007年。
[18]（美）罗伯特米歇尔斯：《寡头统治铁律——现代民主制度中的政党社会学》，任军锋等译，天津：天津人民出版社，2004年。
[19]（美）詹姆斯Q威尔逊：《美国官僚政治》，张海涛等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1995年。
[20]（英）马丁阿尔布罗：《官僚制》，阎布克译，北京：知识出版社，1990年。
[21]（德）马克斯韦伯：《经济与社会》，林荣远译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
[22]（德）马克斯韦伯：《韦伯文集》，韩水法译，北京：中国广播电视出版社，1999年。
[23]（美）梅里亚姆－韦伯斯特公司：《韦氏案头词典》，北京：世界图书出版公司，1996年。
[24]彭家和等编译：《国外公共行政理论精选》，北京：中共中央党校出版社，1997年。
[25]（美）乔尔阿伯巴奇等：《两种人：官僚与政客》，陶远华等译，北京：求实出版社，1990年。
[26]（美）威廉F韦斯特：《控制官僚》，张定淮、白锐译，重庆：重庆出版社，2001年。
[27]（美）理查德斯格特：《组织理论》，黄洋等译，北京：华夏出版社，2002年。
[28]（美）小威廉姆格姆雷、斯蒂芬巴拉：《官僚机构与民主——责任与绩效》，俞沂暄译，上海：复旦大学出版社，2007年。
[29]（美）约翰金登：《议程、备选方案与公共政策》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年。
[30]（英）约翰密尔：《论自由》，程崇华译，北京：商务印书馆，1996年。
[31]（英）约翰密尔：《代议制政府》，王瑄译，北京：商务印书馆，1997年。
[32]（英）珍妮V登哈特、罗伯特B登哈特：《新公共服务：服务，而不是掌舵》，丁煌译，北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004年。
[1]陈家浩：“官僚制批判研究的新视角”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期。
[2]龚廷泰：“官僚主义的体制原因及其消解手段”，《江苏社会科学》，1998年第5期。
[3]金波：“官僚主义若干问题的政治学考察”，《国际关系学院学报》，1998年第3期。
[4]金太军：“新公共管理：当代西方公共行政的新趋势”，《国外社会科学》，1997年第5期。
[5]靳永翥：“西方官僚制发展历程与后官僚制改革”，《西南民族大学学报》，2004年第10期。
[6]李承，王运生：“当代公共行政的民主范式”，《政治学研究》，2000年第4期。
[7]刘立华，张智胜：“论美国行政改革市场化取向”，《行政论坛》，2002年第6期。
[8]刘素梅：“论美国行政内向监督及其对我国的启示”，《扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版)》，2006年第2期。
[9]鲁彦平：“美国行政改革的价值取向及其启示”，《行政与法》，2004年第4期。
[10]石庆环：“20世纪美国联邦政府行政改革的历史考察”，《史学集刊》，2008年第6期。
[11]石庆环“20世纪美国文官制度的历史回顾”，《美国研究》，2001年第2期。
[12]石庆环：“论美国联邦文官管理机构的历史演变”，《社会科学阵线》，2009年第12期。
[13]石庆环：“论美国文官群体的历史演变”，《史学月刊》，2007年第7期。
[14]石庆环：“美国利益集团‘游说’高级职业文官现象的历史考察”，《辽宁大学学报》，2009第5期。
[15]石庆环：“文官群体地位的提升与战后美国中产阶级构成的变化”，《史学理论研究》，2009年第3期。
[16]石庆环：“英美文官制度的模式差异及其历史影响”，《世界历史》2001年第6期。
[17]石庆环、高岳：“从艾森豪威尔到卡特：美国文官‘高级行政职位’的建立”，《求是学刊》，2002年第6期。
[18]王敬尧、贾鹏举：“西方官僚体系的权力扩张与民主政治的矛盾”，《社会主义研究》，2000年第4期。
[19]王世雄：“克林顿治下美国联邦政府改革述评”，《广东行政学院学报》，2003年第5期。
[20]王蔚，施雪华：“美国‘行政单头制’政府领导体制的特点及其成因”，《中国行政管理》，2006年第6期。
[21]吴兴智：“美国政府结果导向行政改革评析——一种权力分析学的视角”，《云南行政学院学报》，2007年第6期。
[22]郁建兴，吴国骅：“新公共管理运动与官僚制”，《教学与研究》，2003年第9期。
[23]张国庆：“公共行政的典范革命及其启示”，《北京大学学报》，2000年第5期。
[24]张康之：“论统治视角中的官僚制”，《北京行政学院学报》，2002年第1期。
[25]张康之：“论官僚制组织的等级控制及其终结”，《四川大学学报》，2008年第3期。
[26]张千帆：“行政权力的政治监督——以美国行政法为视角”，《当代法学》，2007年第5期。
[27]张帅：《美国行政权扩张问题研究》，山东大学博士论文，2010年。
[28]张志泽，王丽：“美国重塑政府运动对我国行政改革的启示”，《学术界》，2007年第3期。
[29]朱立言，卢丹，龙宁丽：“美国文官制度的变革与思考”，《公共管理学报》，2010年第1期。
[30]朱立言，龙宁丽：“美国高级文官制度与政府回应性”，《中国人民大学学报》，2010年第1期。
[31]竺乾威，吴春成：“公共行政的后官僚模式分析”，《公共行政与人力资源》，2003年第4期。
[1] Aberbach, Joel D. Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight.Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1990.
[2] Anderson, James. Public Policymaking: An Introduction.3rded. New York: HoughtonMifflin Co,1990.
[3] Arnold, R. Douglas. Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. New Haven:Yale University Press,1979.
[4] Blumberg, Alan. The School Superintendent: Living with Conflict. New York: TeachersCollege Press, Columbia University,1985.
[5] Helmut K. Anheier, Thousand Oaks ed. When Things Go Wrong: Organizational Failuresand Breakdowns. CA: SAGE Publications,1999.
[6] Brehm, John, Scott Gates. Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to aDemocratic Public. Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press,1997.
[7] Delli Carpini, Michael X, Scott Keeter. What Americans Know aboutPolitics and Why itMatters. New Haven: Yale University Press,1996.
[8] Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little-Brown,1967.
[9] Dunsire, A., Christopher Hood. Cutback Management in Public Bureaucracies. Cambridge:University of Cambridge Press,1989.
[10] Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley,1965.
[11] Epstein, David, Sharyn O’Halloran. Delegating Powers: A Transactions Cost PoliticsApproach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press,1999.
[12] Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little Brown,1973.
[13] Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Home Style:House Members and Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown,1978.
[14] Freidrich, Carl, Taylor Cole. Responsible Bureaucracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1932.
[15] Gormley, William. Taming the Bureaucracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1989.
[16] Gruber, Judith E. Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance.Berkeley and Los Angelos: University of California Press,1987.
[17] Huber, John, Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations ofBureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002.
[18] Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. Black Representation and Urban Policy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1980.
[19] Knezevich, S. Administration of Public Education. New York: Harper&Row,1975.
[20] Lewis, David. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2003.
[21] Lipsky, Michael. Street Level Bureaucracy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,1980.
[22] Lynn, Laurence E., Carolyn J. Heinrich, and Carolyn J. Hill. Improving Governance: A NewLogic for Empirical Research. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,2001.
[23] Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press,1974.
[24] Meier, Kenneth J. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch ofGovernmen.4th. Ft. Worth: Harcourt Brace,2000.
[25] Meier, Kenneth, Joseph Stewart, Jr. The Politics of Hispanic Education. Albany: SUNYPress,1991.
[26] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A GovernancePerspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,2006.
[27] Chubb, John E, Paul E. Peterson. Can the Government Govern? Washington, D. C.:Brookings,1989.
[28] Pratt, John W, Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds. Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business.Boston: Harvard Business School Press,1985.
[29] Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A. Franklin. Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Pubic Policy.Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press,1991.
[30] Rourke, Francis E. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston: Little Brown,1984.
[31] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin Classics,1968.
[32] Selden, Sally C. The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy. New York: M.E. SharpePublishers,1997.
[33] Swain, Carol M. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans inCongress. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1993.
[34] Tate, Katherine. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives inthe U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003.
[35] Waldo, Dwight ed. Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence. Scranton, PA: Chandler,1971.
[36] Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in aDemocracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1994.
[37]Wright, David E, III, Michael W. Hirlinger, and Robert E. England. The Politics of SecondGeneration Discrimination in American Indian Education: Incidence, Explanation, andMitigating Strategies. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey,1998.
[1] Arnold, R. Douglas. Political Control of Administrative Officials. Journal of Law, Economics,and Organization, Vol.3, No.2,1987.
[2] Balla, Steven J. Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.American Political Science Review, Vol.92, September,1998.
[3] Balla, Steven and John R. Wright. Interest Groups, Advisory Committees and CongressionalControl of the Bureaucracy, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45, October,2001.
[4] Bawn, Kathleen. Bureaucratic Accountability for Regulatory Decisions: Comment on Lupiaand McCubbins. Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.57,1994.
[5] Bawn, Kathleen. Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices aboutAdministrative Procedures. American Political Science Review, Vol.89, March,1995.
[6] Bawn, Kathleen. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints,Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.13,No.1,1997.
[7] Bendor, Jonathan Serge Taylor, Roland Van Gaalen. Politicians, Bureaucrats, andAsymmetric Information. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.3,1987.
[8] Bernstein, Mary. Identity Politics. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.31, No.1,2005.
[9] Bibby, John F. Committee Characteristics and Legislative Oversight of Administration.Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol.10, February,1966.
[10] Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, Matt Golder. Understanding Interaction Models:Improving Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis, Vol.14,2006.
[11]Bratton, Kathleen, Kerry L. Haynie. Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in StateLegislatures: The Effects of Race and Gender. Journal of Politics, Vol.61,1999.
[12] Caiden, Gerald E. What Really Is Public Maladministration? Public Administration Review,Vol.51, No.6,1991.
[13] Calvert, Randall, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast. A Theory of PoliticalControl and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.33,1989.
[14] Cook, Brian, and B. Dan Wood. Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of theBureaucracy. American Political Science Review, Vol.83,1989.
[15] Downs, Anthony. A Theory of Bureaucracy. The American Economic Review, Vol.55,1965.
[16] Edwards, George, William Mitchell and Reed Welch. Explaining Presidential Approval: TheSignificance of Issue Salience. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.1,1995.
[17] Fenno, Richard. U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies. American Political ScienceReview, Vol.71, Sept,1977.
[18] Finer, Herman. Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government. PublicAdministration Review, Vol.1,1941.
[19] Fiorina, Morris P. Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation ofLegislative Power. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.2, No.1,1986.
[20] Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Kenneth J. Meier, and Robert E. England. Hispanic Americans andEducational Policy: Limits to Equal Access. Journal of Politics, Vol.48,1986.
[21] Furlong, Scott R. Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The Bureaucracy Speaks. Journalof Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8, No.1,1998.
[22] Gay, Claudine. The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation.American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.3,2001.
[23] Goerdel, H. T. Taking Initiative: Proactive Management and Organizational Performance inNetworked Environments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.16,No.3,2006.
[24] Hammond, Thomas H., Jack H. Knott. Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power,Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model ofMulti-institutional Policy-making. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.12,No.1,1996.
[25] Hanushek, Erik A. Conclusions and Controversies About the Effectiveness of SchoolResources. Economic Policy Review, Vol.4, No.1,1998.
[26] Holye, John, Linda Skrla. The Politics of Superintendent Evaluation. Journal of PersonnelEvaluation in Education, Vol.13, No.4,1999.
[27] Keiser, Lael R., Catherine Holland. Lipstick or Logarithms: Gender, Identity, Institutions andRepresentative Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, Vol.96, No.3,2002
[28] Kerr, Brinck, Kenneth R. Mladenka. Does Policy Matter? A Time-Series Analysis ofMinority Employment Patterns. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.38,1994.
[29] McCubbins, Matthew, Thomas Schwartz. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: PolicePatrols versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.28, February,1984.
[30] McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll, Barry Weingast. Administrative Procedures asInstruments of Popular Control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.3,1987.
[31] McCubbins, Matthew, Roger G. Noll, and Berry R. Weingast. Structure and Process, Politicsand Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. Virginia LawReview, Vol.75, No.2,1989.
[32] Meier, Kenneth J. Representative Bureaucracy: A Theoretical and Empirical Exposition.Research in Public Administration, Vol.2,1993.
[33] Meier, Kenneth, L. Polinard and Robert Wrinkle. Politics, Bureaucracy, and Farm Credit.Public Administration Review, Vol.59, July/August,1999.
[34] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Managerial Strategies and Behavior in Networks: AModel with Evidence from U.S. Public Education. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.11, July,2001.
[35] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Public Management and Educational Performance:The Impact of Managerial Networking. Public Administration Review, Vol.63,November/December,2003.
[36] Meier, Kenneth, Lawrence J. O’Toole Jr. Unsung Impossible Jobs: The Politics of PublicManagement. Presented at the2004Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation Meeting, Chicago, IL2004.
[37] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. Managerial Networking: Issues of Measurementand Research Design. Administration and Society, Vol.37, No.5,2005.
[38] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Daniel P. Hawes. Testing the TheoreticalDeterminants of Political Control over the Bureaucracy: Taking Wood and WatermanSeriously. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,August31,2007, Chicago, IL.
[39] Meier, Kenneth, Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. Multilevel Governanceand Organizational Performance: Investigating the Political-Bureaucratic Labyrinth. Journalof Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.23, Winter,2004.
[40] Miller, Gary J. The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual Review ofPolitical Science, Vol.8,2005.
[41] Moe, Terry M. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science,Vol.28, November,1984.
[42] Moe, Terry M. Control and Feedback in Economics Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.American Political Science Review, Vol.79, December,1985.
[43] Nicholson-Crotty, Sean and Lawrence J. O’Toole, Jr. Public Management and OrganizationalPerformance: The Case of Law Enforcement Agencies. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.14, No.1,2004.
[44] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Modeling the Impact of Public Management: TheImplications of Structural Context. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,Vol.9, October,1999.
[45] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Plus a Change: Public Management, PersonnelStability, and Organizational Performance. Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory, Vol.13, No.1,2003.
[46] O’Toole, Laurence, Kenneth J. Meier. Desperately Seeking Selznick: Cooptation and theDark Side of Public Management in Networks. Public Administration Review, Vol.64, No.6,2004.
[47] O’Toole, Laurence J., Jr. and Kenneth J. Meier. Public Management in IntergovernmentalNetworks: Matching Structural Networks and Managerial Networking. Journal of PublicAdministration, Research and Theory, Vol14, No.4,2004.
[48] Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro. Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol.77, No.1,1983.
[49] Pearson, James. Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function. Kansas LawReview, Vol.23,1975.
[50] Polinard, J., Robert D. Wrinkle, Tomas Longoria. Education and Governance:Representational Links to Second Generation Discrimination,” The Western PoliticalQuarterly, Vol.43, Sept.,1990.
[51] Ray, Lee Ann, Robert L. Marshall. The Aftershock of Superintendent Buyouts: An Analysisof the Effects on School Finance, School Climate, Student Achievement and CommunityRelations. National Forum of Educational, Administration and Supervision Journal, Vol.23,No.4E,2006.
[52] Ringquist, Evan, Jeff Worsham,Marc Allen Eisner. Salience, Complexity, and the LegislativeDirection of Regulatory Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,Vol.13,2003.
[53] Robinson, Scott E. Rules, Roles, and Minority Representation: The Dynamics of Budgetingfor Bilingual Education Programs in Texas. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol.2,2002.
[54] Rocha, Rene R. Black/Brown Cooperation and Conflict in the Education PolicymakingProcess. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Texas A&MUniversity.2006.
[55] Scholz, John, B. Dan Wood.Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and PublicAdministration. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.42, January,1998.
[56] Simon, Herbert. Why Public Administration? Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory, Vol.8, January,1998.
[57] Spence, David. Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the PositiveTheory of Political Control. Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol.14, No.2,1997.
[58] Spence, Michael, Richard Zeckhauser. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action.American Economic Review, Vol.61,1971.
[59] Tucker, Harvey, Harmon Zeigler. Responsiveness in Public School Districts: A ComparativeAnalysis of Boards of Education. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.3, No.2,1978.
[60] Waterman, Richard, B. Dan Wood. Policy Monitoring and Policy Analysis. Journal of PolicyAnalysis and Management, Vol.12, No.4,1993.
[61] Waterman, Richard, Kenneth J. Meier. Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? Journal ofPublic Administration Research and Theory, Vol.8,1998.
[62] Weingast, Barry. The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspectivewith Applications to the SEC. Public Choice Vol.44, No.2,1984.
[63] Weingast, Barry, Mark Moran. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy,Vol.91, October,1983.
[64] Weissberg, Robert. Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress. American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.72, June,1978.
[65] Whitford, Andrew B. Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and DemocraticResponsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys. Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory, Vol.12,2002
[66] Whitford, Andrew B. Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. Journal ofTheoretical Politics, Vol.14, No.2,2002
[67] Wood, B. Dan. Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements.American Political Science Review, Vol.82, March,1988.
[68] Wood, B. Dan. Modeling Federal Implementation as a System. American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol.36, February,1992.
[69] Wood, B. Dan. Presidential Rhetoric and Economic Leadership. Presidential StudiesQuarterly, Vol.34, Sept.,2004.
[70] Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.American Political Science Review, Vol.85, Sept.,1991.
[71]Wood, B. Dan, Richard W. Waterman. The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation.American Journal of Political Science, Vol.37, May,1993.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |