我国国有企业风险控制问题研究
|
摘要
如何实现公有制和市场经济的结合,是社会主义市场经济体制改革的核心命题。作为公有制经济的主体,国有企业改革始终是中国经济体制改革的中心环节。30多年来国有企业的改革历程,就适应社会化大生产和市场经济的要求,寻找一条公有制与市场经济相结合的有效途径的渐进过程。
当前,在历年利润增加和规模扩张效应的累积影响下,国有企业作为一个整体,无论是在行业控制力和市场影响力方面,都在中国经济、乃至世界经济中扮演着越来越重要的角色。但同时,随着不断重组和经营规模持续扩大,由内部结构调整、外部市场风险等多种风险因素的共同作用下,我国大型国有企业经营环境不确定性加强,经营风险凸显。构建一个规范、稳定的风险控制机制已经成为当前国有企业改革的一个重要问题。
另一方面,现阶段的国有企业改革,解决以下两个相互联系的问题至关重要。第一,如何在企业层面进一步推进股份制改革,完善法人治理结构；第二,如何在国有资产监管层面进一步完善监管体制,实现以企业形式存在的国有资产的保值增值。当前无论是涉及企业个体的微观层面制度改革,还是涉及企业群体的宏观层面体制调整,如何应对与控制风险都是共同的话题。基于以上的认识,在推进股权分置改革的同时,在治理结构的设计和调整中充分考虑风险评价和控制,既是推进国有企业治理结构改革和完善的应时之举,又是巩固国有企业发展的制度基础、提高国有资产经营效率的解局之措。
在国有企业改革进程中,风险控制是一个全新的话题。有关企业风险控制的理论与实践都尚在积极的探索过程中。目前,在理论中,当前的国有企业的风险评价与控制问题被视为一个管理技术问题,在国有资产管理实践层面上则被视为一个有关规范和标准的制度问题,在企业实际操作层面上被视为一个借鉴、试错和调整的演进过程。国有企业的风险控制实践,明显地具有行业特殊性、个体差异性和措施相机性等特点。在金融领域内得到强调和推广的风险管理在非金融企业中的应用客观上存在着理论、实践等诸多方面的障碍。
正是出于对风险问题在当前国有企业改革中重要性以及当前理论研究存在问题的认识,本文从交易的风险溢价理论研究出发,分别从微观的企业制度层面和宏观的国有资产监管体制层面两个方面,对国有企业风险评价与控制问题进行初步研究。主要研究以下三个问题：①如何认识国有企业风险控制的特殊性?②如何构造国有企业风险控制机制的一般框架来保障国有资产经营的安全性?③如何通过建立风险控制机制来提高国有企业治理结构的效率?
本文对国有企业风险问题的研究是政治经济学式的研究,所涉及的内容并非面面俱到,也并没有非常具体地深入到国有企业风险管理机制设计和运行的具体问题分析中,而是集中在国有企业风险治理层次,从个体的国有企业风险治理与整体的国有企业群体风险控制与传导阻断两个层次展开。本文研究的目的,①以新的视角看待国有企业改革,围绕风险控制探讨国有企业改革的未来方向。②为国有企业风险控制实践的展开提供新思路,如果从更为广泛的角度看,本文的研究可以为风险控制理论在企业的应用提供参考和案例。
论文分为六个部分：①导言,主要内容为论述展开之前的必要说明和词汇准备。②第二个部分为“研究基础与文献综述”,从三个方面,即国有企业改革、治理结构理论与实践、企业风险控制的理论与实践等三个方面对本文所涉及的理论文献进行了梳理和评述。③第三个部分是“问题的提出：国有企业风险识别”与“企业风险控制：一个基于交易的观点”。提出国有企业风险控制研究的主要问题,论述目的在于阐明本文的研讨问题；对交易的风险溢价模型进行分析与阐述,为论述的展开进行理论准备。④第四个部分是“国有企业风险控制：一个政治经济学分析”。对国有制下企业的交易属性进行政治经济学探讨。⑤第五个部分是“单个国有企业风险控制：风险治理”和“国有企业群体风险控制：风险类别与传导机制”。从理论与案例两个角度,对单个国有企业风险治理的主要内容进行研究；对国有企业群体风险传导与阻断机制的分析与研究。⑥第六个部分为“结语”。对论文的基本结论和政策含义进行进行总结。
导言。主要介绍论文的研究背景、选题意义、论文结构、研究工具、主要观点、核心词汇等内容。主要观点包括：①指出围绕风险控制展开的国有企业研究,是在新的问题环境下对国有企业改革问题的再次探讨；②所要探讨的主要问题包括：如何认识国有企业风险控制的特殊性?如何构造国有企业风险控制机制的一般框架来保障国有资产经营的安全性?如何通过建立风险控制机制来提高国有企业治理结构的效率?③对论文的核心词汇“国有企业”和“风险”进行了概述和界定。
(1)研究基础与文献综述。本部分以文献述评的方式,从风险理论出发,分别对本论文研究所涉及的理论基础,即国有企业改革、风险理论及其发展、治理结构以及风险控制等四个方面的相关理论进行阐述。①在“国有企业改革与风险控制”方面,对国有企业定位与国有企业改革的理论争论进行了探讨。对“基于一般企业组织模型的国有企业市场化改革”和“基于国有企业发展路径的管理变革”等两种观点分别进行了评述,在此基础上,指出我国国有企业所面临的风险问题,不仅有个体的风险管理问题,更为重要地,还要处理整体风险识别和评价的问题。在国有企业内部通过管理和技术的方式来解决风险控制问题,显然是对风险控制的一种误读。因此,必须跳出企业这个小的框架和限制,在更为广大的、包容性更强的政治经济学框架中讨论国有企业的风险控制问题。②在“不确定性和风险理论及其发展”方面,对奈特的风险和企业组织理论及其发展进行了评述,全面回顾了不确定性与风险理论的发展,探讨了基于奈特的风险理论,发展一个不确定条件下的企业组织理论应该要探讨的问题。③在“企业治理结构与风险”方面,对在现有的公司治理理论下探讨风险治理问题的局限性进行了探讨,并提出了发展基于风险治理的公司治理理论的可能性。④在“风险控制”方面,对全面风险管理框架的形成及其构成、风险管理工具及其发展等两个方面的内容进行了综述,并对当前研究存在的问题进行了评述。
(2)问题的提出：国有企业风险识别。本部分从企业风险识别的一般原则出发,结合国有企业的特殊性质指出,①风险管理在一般企业中集中体现在管理层面,而国有企业中则集中体现在治理层面。②探讨国有企业风险识别的特殊点,即国有企业风险识别主体的外在决定性、风险控制目标识别的矛盾性、风险传导机制的无边界性和风险集成性。③描述国有企业风险控制研究所需要解决的主要问题,指出国有企业的风险控制可以分为单个企业的风险控制和国有企业群体的风险控制两个层次,研究的重点在于风险传导机制、单个国有企业的风险治理与国有企业群体的风险控制。
(3)企业风险控制：一个基于交易的观点。本部分通过以交易博弈模型为基础的交易风险溢价研究,阐述基于风险分散的企业组织与风险传导机制分析框架。交易博弈模型所阐述的主要观点包括：①任何一个交易都必然地包括以下两个层次,一是对具体交易标的物的交换,例如商品和劳务。二是对风险和不确定性的交易,即“交易的风险配置功能”。②交易的风险溢价(Risk Premium),即交易2方对通过交易方式希望分散出去的风险或不确定性的定价。基于风险分散的企业组织和风险传导机制分析框架的主要观点包括：①企业是一系列相关交易的叠加,而这一系列交易之所以被叠加的目的在于控制和减小企业所面对的风险和不确定性,获得交易的风险溢价收益。②企业治理结构之所以重要,在于治理结构是管理叠加起来的交易组合的基础性机制。③企业组织的存在,使得风险控制存在两种基本的手段,一是在企业组织内部通过交易的方式来配置风险,二是在市场交易的过程中进行风险的配置。④风险传导的过程究竟是一个风险化解的过程,还是一个风险逐渐累积的过程,取决于交易风险溢价收益的大小以及收益在交易双方之间的配置结构。⑤影响风险传导机制的因素主要包括以下三个。一是市场因素。二是制度因素。三是知识因素。
(4)国有企业风险控制：一个政治经济学分析。本部分是对国有企业制度及其对企业风险控制的含义的分析。主要观点包括：①资产的庞大规模决定了国有企业内部进行交易以配置风险的空间巨大。②国有企业外在的制度支撑体系决定了国有企业通过外在的交易手段将风险转移出去的空间同样巨大。③国有企业风险控制潜力能否发挥,取决于国有企业基本制度构成的两个层次,一是作为企业内部交易风险配置功能发挥的基本制度平台,二是由于监管体系的作用。④国有企业的风险控制并非一个完全的管理过程,而是一个如何在企业层面实现风险共同治理的问题⑤必须严格控制国有企业自身的风险等同于国家风险。
(5)单个国有企业风险控制：风险治理。本部分对国有企业公司治理与风险控制的现状进行描述,对当前国有企业风险治理的主要关注点进行分析,并以案例的形式对当前国有企业风险治理的成效进行评价。主要观点包括：①尽管股份制改革为国有企业的公司治理结构完善设定了基本路线,但传统管理体制和行政体制对国有企业治理结构的影响难以忽视,企业的利益相关者存在着明显的、且相互联系的强势利益群体,其自身的诉求足以影响企业的生产和经营。②国有企业的风险控制缺乏一个恰当的向外分散风险和内部配置风险的治理结构平台。③企业的风险分散配置要求企业的利益相关者具有与分担企业风险相匹配的能力。而从现实的情况看,无论是国有企业的职工、管理层、还是外在的投资者(内资或者外资),均无法担当起国有企业风险分担者的角色。④当前的国有企业风险治理,承担风险的主体过少,承担风险能力与参与风险治理能力不匹配是国有企业风险治理的最大问题。⑤国有企业风险治理的分析中,主要风险类别包括：主体缺失风险、内部交易定价机制行政化风险、内部风险错配风险、风险控制封闭化风险。
(6)国有企业群体风险控制：风险类别与传导机制。本部分对国有企业群体所面对的宏观风险及其类别、国有企业微观风险向宏观风险传导的机制进行研究。主要观点包括：①政治风险、金融风险、产业风险是当前国有企业群体风险控制所需要关注的三个重要方面。②国有企业风险传导机制三个可能的阻断机制包括：微观企业制度、监管体制、政策约束与社会关注。③当前国有企业风险防范的三个重要方面是：防范国有企业个体的局部政治风险演变为整体性政治风险、防范个体的财务风险演变为整体性的金融风险、防范个体的行业风险演变为整体性经济结构失调。
本文可能的创新,主要包括以下四个方面：
①选题与体系创新。选题创新方面,将国有企业风险管理的实践放到国有企业改革的理论研究和实践探索领域内进行探讨,并从风险控制的角度对当前国有企业改革实践中存在的问题进行较为系统的理论分析。体系创新。尽管论文的研究尚且粗浅,但基于交易博弈模型为基础的交易风险溢价研究,以及基于风险分散的企业组织与风险传导机制分析框架,在分析所采用的基本概念(例如交易的风险配置功能、交易的风险溢价)、方法(期权理论在交易风险定价方面的运用)以及切入点(基于未来的不确定性)等方面,是奈特风险和组织理论的重新表述和发展,在上述方面,与基于交易费用的企业理论等现有理论存在较为明显的差异。
②视角创新。包括以下三个方面,第一,本文对于国有企业风险控制的分析与探讨,是从一个全新的角度对国有企业改革的再认识；第二,本文对国有企业风险控制的研究,更多地是从经济理论对企业风险控制的政治经济学分析,而不仅仅是停留在管理研究层面,对风险管理技术的工具性探讨。第三,本文对风险的分析,并没有完全停留在现有的风险理论的基础之上,而是在运用新的风险分析工具方面进行了积极的探索。
③观点创新(理论部分)：任何一个交易都必然地包括以下两个层次,一是对具体交易标的物的交换,例如商品和劳务,二是对风险和不确定性的交易,即“交易的风险配置功能”；交易的风险溢价,即交易各方对通过交易方式希望分散出去的风险或不确定性的定价；企业是一系列相关交易的叠加,而这一系列交易之所以被叠加的目的在于控制和减小企业所面对的风险和不确定性,获得交易的风险溢价收益。
④观点创新(应用部分)：国有企业风险识别的特殊点包括：国有企业风险识别主体的外在决定性、风险控制目标识别的矛盾性、风险传导机制的无边界性和风险集成性。国有企业的风险控制可以分为单个企业的风险控制和国有企业群体的风险控制两个层次,研究的重点在于风险传导机制、单个国有企业的风险治理与国有企业群体的风险控制。当前的国有企业风险治理,承担风险的主体过少,承担风险能力与参与风险治理能力不匹配是国有企业风险治理的最大问题。国有企业风险控制潜力能否发挥,取决于国有企业基本制度构成的两个层次,一是作为企业内部交易风险配置功能发挥的基本制度平台,二是基于监管体系的作用。
How to integrate the public ownership and market economy is the key issue of reform of socialist market economy. As the main section of economy based on public ownership, the reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been the central issue of the economical mechanism reform in China. Under the request of modern production mode and market economy, the reform of SOEs in past30years is the gradual process during which the path how to integrate the public ownership and market economy efficiently was discussed and explored.
Nowadays, under the accumulated impact of profit increasing and scale expanding, as a whole, no matter on the aspect of control capacity in industries or the aspect of the market power, SOEs is playing the important role in Chinese economy and global economy. On the other hand, with the effect of continual merging and expanding, under the combined impact of bundle of risk factors, which includes the internal structural re-configuration and external market risk, the uncertainty of business environment confronted by the large scale SOEs is increasing. Risk of business appears. How to construct the stable risk control mechanism has been one of the important issue of SOEs' reform.
On the other hand, it is important to resolve two interacted problems in the process of the current reform of SOEs in China:Firstly, how to advance the reform of shareholding system and perfect the governance structure consequently in individual SOE. Secondly-how to perfect the State-owned assets supervision system so that the purpose of maintenance and appreciation of assets value could be reached. And how to evaluate and control the risk is the common issue in the process of institutional reform occurred on the mirco-level of individual SOE, and on the marco-level of SOEs' group. Based on the knowledge, at the same time of equity division reform, integrating the risk evaluation and control into the reform of corporate governance structure, should be either proper strategy of perfecting the corporate governance structure in SOEs, or the correct solution of improving efficiency of state-owned assets.
In the process of SOEs' reform, risk control is a new issue. Relevant theory on risk control of enterprise is probed actively. The occurring problem of the probing is:In theoretical research field, the research of the risk evaluation and control in SOEs is only treated as managerial topic; In the practical field, implementation of the risk evaluation and control is only treated as standard topic. Processing practice occurred in SOEs has the industrial, individual, discretionary features. The risk management adopted in financial field confronts the theoretical and practical handicaps in the process of applying in enterprises.
Based on the theory of risk premium in transaction, this paper probes into the issue of evaluation and control of risk in SOEs from two aspects, which includes mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs'group.Three issues are discussed:①How to understand the particularities of risk control in SOEs?②How to construct the common framework of risk control in SOEs so that the safety of state-owned assets can be guaranteed?③How to set up the mechanism of risk control in SOEs so that the efficiency of corporate governance structure can be improved?
Applying the methodology of political economy, the analysis of risk control in SOEs in this paper focuses on the governance of risk in SOEs. Two aspects, which includes the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs'group is discussed. The purposes of this paper as follow:①Reviewing the reform of SOEs on the new perspective, discuss the possible direction of future reform on the foundation of risk control research.②providing new solution for the implementation of risk control in SOEs, more broadly, for the application of risk control in other enterprises.
This paper includes6parts:①Preface. Necessary explanation and theoretical preparation was displayed.②"Reviewing and Foundation of Research". Four theoretical reviews, which include reform of SOEs, theory of risk, governance structure and risk control, are displayed and evaluated.③"Bring up the topic:Risk Identification in SOEs" and "Risk Control in Enterprises:a Viewpoint Based on Transaction". Bring up the main topic in the research of risk control in SOEs; analysis the model of risk premium in transaction which is the preparation for next section.④"Risk Control in SOEs:a Political economy analysis". The characteristic of transaction in SOEs is discussed.⑤"Risk Control of Individual SOE:Governance of Risk" and "Risk Control of SOEs Group:Category of Risk and Mechanism of Risk Conduction". By the theoretical analysis and case study, the risk control of individual SOE, category of risk and mechanism of risk conduction are discussed.⑥Epilogue. The conclusion and possible policy implications are displayed.
Preface. The background, structure, methodology, main viewpoints, keyword are stated. The main viewpoints of this section include:①Reviewing the reform of SOEs on the new perspective, discuss the possible direction of future reform an the foundation of risk control research.②Three issues:Firstly, How to understand the particularities of risk control in SOEs? Secondly, How to construct the common framework of risk control in SOEs so that the safety of state-owned assets can be guaranteed? Thirdly, how to set up the mechanism of risk control in SOEs so that the efficiency of corporate governance structure can be improved?③Definition of the key word, which includes SOEs, Risk is given and discussed.
(1) Reviewing and Foundation of Research. In this section, four theoretical reviews, which includes reform of SOEs, theory of risk, governance structure and risk control, is displayed and evaluated. Main viewpoints includes:①Reform of SOEs. The risk confronted by the SOEs, includes not only the risk management of individual SOE, but also the risk identification and control of SOEs' group. The internal solution, which considers the risk issue as managerial issue within the boundary of firm, is based on the misunderstanding of risk control. It should be proper to go beyond the boundary of firm, to analysis the risk control of SOEs in boarder political economy framework of research.②Theory of risk. Why and how Knight's theory of risk and organization should be advanced is discussed.③Governance structure and risk control. The possibilities of advancing the theory of governance structure with risk control are discussed.④Risk Control. The framework of risk management, the tool and methodology applied in risk management practice are displayed and discussed.
(2) Bring up the topic:Risk Identification in SOEs. This section analysis the common principle of risk identification and the special features of risk control in SOEs. The main viewpoints include:①Risk control in SOEs should focus on the governance of risk. On the contrary, the risk control of other business should focus on the management of risk, as usually does.②The particularities of risk identification, which includes:Firstly, the external determination of the subject of risk identification; Secondly, the contradiction of the target of risk identification; Thirdly, the limitless of the risk conduction; And fourthly, the integration of risk.③Two aspects of risk control in SOEs, which includes the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs' group is discussed.
(3) Risk Control in Enterprises:a Viewpoint Based on Transaction. This section probes into the risk premium in transaction on the modeling of gaming that simulates the transaction. The main viewpoints includes:①Any transaction includes two parts, one is the transaction of certain object of transaction, e.g. commodity or services; the other is the transaction and allocation consequently of risk, which is defined as "The risk allocation function of transaction".②The risk premium of transaction means the pricing of the risk by the insiders of transaction who like to diverse or grasp the risk premium.③Firm is the nexus of transactions. The transactions are integrated to decrease, to control the risks and uncertainties, and to win the risk premium of transactions.(4)the reasons why governance structure matters is that governance structure is the basic mechanism to deal with the integrated transaction.⑤the basic solution of risk control includes:Firstly, allocating risk internally and secondly, diversifying risk externally, both in way of transaction.⑥the process of risk conduction could be either diversifying or accumulating, according to the difference and structure of allocation of risk premium.⑦Three factors could work on the mechanism of risk conduction: market, institution and knowledge.
(4) Risk Control in SOEs:a Political economy analysis. This section analysis the institutional system of SOEs and its implication on risk control. Main viewpoints includes:①The huge scale of assets of SOEs means its capacity to allocate risk internally is considerable.②The external institutional support system means the capacity of SOEs to diversify risk externally is also considerable.③he function of risk control works or not, is decided by two factors:efficiency of internal institutional platform and external supervision system.④The risk control of SOEs is not just the pure managerial issue, but the issue of governance of risk.⑤it is necessary to control the transition during which the risk in individual SOE change into national risk.
(5) Risk Control of Individual SOE:Governance of Risk. This section describes the latest situation of governance and risk control in SOEs. Main viewpoints includes:①although the reform of shareholding system has settle down the path of the governance reform in SOEs, the traditional management system in SOEs still matters.②The risk control in SOEs nowadays has no proper platform of governance structure, on which the diversification and allocation of risk can be carried on.③whether the employee, managers, external investors(domestic or foreign), cannot afford the role of diversifying risk.①The main handicap that impact the governance of risk in SOEs is that the capacity of affording risk and power of involving risk decision cannot match.⑤The main category of risk in individual SOE includes:Subject-missing risk; Administratization risk of pricing mechanism in internal transaction; Internal risk mismatch; risk of insulation.
(6) Risk Control of SOEs Group:Category of Risk and Mechanism of Risk Conduction. This section analysises the category of marco-risk confronted by SOEs' group and the mechanism of risk conduction. Main viewpoints includes:①the category of macro-risk should be focused include:political risk, financial risk, industrial risk.②The possible cut-off insititutions includes:institution of firm, supervision system, government industrial policy and publicity.③Three important tendency:it is necessary to supervise the individual SOE's political risk, financial risk and industrial risk transform into the national risk and economic imbalance.
This paper may be an important innovation in accordance with the degree of severity of light arranged mainly in the following four aspects:
(1) Topic and System innovation. Topic:Introducing the practice of risk management in SOEs into research and practice of the reform of SOEs, and systematically analyzing the current issue of the reform on the perspective of risk controlling. System:Although the research in this paper hasn't been developed too far, but the research on the risk premium with the modeling of transaction, and the research of risk diversification and conduction is the development of Knight's theory of risk, the basic definition(risk allocation of transaction, risk premium), methodology (applying theory of option into the field of pricing of transaction)and perspective(uncertainty) is quiet different with the theory of firm which is based on the definition of transaction cost.
(2) Perspective Innovation. Three possible perspective innovation includes:①re-considering the reform of SOEs from the perspective of risk control.②Rather managerial approach, than economic theoretical approach, is adopted in this paper to analysis the risk control in SOEs.③Rather relying on the current theory of risk, than exploring new framework, the risk control of SOEs is analysised.System innovation.
(3) New viewpoints (Theoretical Section):Any transaction includes two parts, one is the transaction of certain object of transaction, e.g. commodity or services; the other is the transaction and allocation consequently of risk, which is defined as "the risk allocation function of transaction"; The risk premium of transaction, which means the pricing of the risk by the insiders of transaction who likes to diverse or grasp the risk premium; Firm is the nexus of transactions. The transactions are integrated to decrease, to control the risks and uncertainties, and to win the risk premium of transactions.
(4) New viewpoints (Application Section):The particularities of risk identification, which includes:Firstly, the external determination of the subject of risk identification; Secondly, the contradiction of the target of risk identification; Thirdly, the limitless of the risk conduction; And fourthly, the integration of risk. Two aspects of risk control in SOEs include the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs' group. Whether the employee, managers, external investors(domestic or foreign) in SOEs, cannot afford the role of diversifying risk. The main handicap that impacts the governance of risk in SOEs is that the capacity of affording risk and power of involving risk decision cannot match.
当前,在历年利润增加和规模扩张效应的累积影响下,国有企业作为一个整体,无论是在行业控制力和市场影响力方面,都在中国经济、乃至世界经济中扮演着越来越重要的角色。但同时,随着不断重组和经营规模持续扩大,由内部结构调整、外部市场风险等多种风险因素的共同作用下,我国大型国有企业经营环境不确定性加强,经营风险凸显。构建一个规范、稳定的风险控制机制已经成为当前国有企业改革的一个重要问题。
另一方面,现阶段的国有企业改革,解决以下两个相互联系的问题至关重要。第一,如何在企业层面进一步推进股份制改革,完善法人治理结构；第二,如何在国有资产监管层面进一步完善监管体制,实现以企业形式存在的国有资产的保值增值。当前无论是涉及企业个体的微观层面制度改革,还是涉及企业群体的宏观层面体制调整,如何应对与控制风险都是共同的话题。基于以上的认识,在推进股权分置改革的同时,在治理结构的设计和调整中充分考虑风险评价和控制,既是推进国有企业治理结构改革和完善的应时之举,又是巩固国有企业发展的制度基础、提高国有资产经营效率的解局之措。
在国有企业改革进程中,风险控制是一个全新的话题。有关企业风险控制的理论与实践都尚在积极的探索过程中。目前,在理论中,当前的国有企业的风险评价与控制问题被视为一个管理技术问题,在国有资产管理实践层面上则被视为一个有关规范和标准的制度问题,在企业实际操作层面上被视为一个借鉴、试错和调整的演进过程。国有企业的风险控制实践,明显地具有行业特殊性、个体差异性和措施相机性等特点。在金融领域内得到强调和推广的风险管理在非金融企业中的应用客观上存在着理论、实践等诸多方面的障碍。
正是出于对风险问题在当前国有企业改革中重要性以及当前理论研究存在问题的认识,本文从交易的风险溢价理论研究出发,分别从微观的企业制度层面和宏观的国有资产监管体制层面两个方面,对国有企业风险评价与控制问题进行初步研究。主要研究以下三个问题：①如何认识国有企业风险控制的特殊性?②如何构造国有企业风险控制机制的一般框架来保障国有资产经营的安全性?③如何通过建立风险控制机制来提高国有企业治理结构的效率?
本文对国有企业风险问题的研究是政治经济学式的研究,所涉及的内容并非面面俱到,也并没有非常具体地深入到国有企业风险管理机制设计和运行的具体问题分析中,而是集中在国有企业风险治理层次,从个体的国有企业风险治理与整体的国有企业群体风险控制与传导阻断两个层次展开。本文研究的目的,①以新的视角看待国有企业改革,围绕风险控制探讨国有企业改革的未来方向。②为国有企业风险控制实践的展开提供新思路,如果从更为广泛的角度看,本文的研究可以为风险控制理论在企业的应用提供参考和案例。
论文分为六个部分：①导言,主要内容为论述展开之前的必要说明和词汇准备。②第二个部分为“研究基础与文献综述”,从三个方面,即国有企业改革、治理结构理论与实践、企业风险控制的理论与实践等三个方面对本文所涉及的理论文献进行了梳理和评述。③第三个部分是“问题的提出：国有企业风险识别”与“企业风险控制：一个基于交易的观点”。提出国有企业风险控制研究的主要问题,论述目的在于阐明本文的研讨问题；对交易的风险溢价模型进行分析与阐述,为论述的展开进行理论准备。④第四个部分是“国有企业风险控制：一个政治经济学分析”。对国有制下企业的交易属性进行政治经济学探讨。⑤第五个部分是“单个国有企业风险控制：风险治理”和“国有企业群体风险控制：风险类别与传导机制”。从理论与案例两个角度,对单个国有企业风险治理的主要内容进行研究；对国有企业群体风险传导与阻断机制的分析与研究。⑥第六个部分为“结语”。对论文的基本结论和政策含义进行进行总结。
导言。主要介绍论文的研究背景、选题意义、论文结构、研究工具、主要观点、核心词汇等内容。主要观点包括：①指出围绕风险控制展开的国有企业研究,是在新的问题环境下对国有企业改革问题的再次探讨；②所要探讨的主要问题包括：如何认识国有企业风险控制的特殊性?如何构造国有企业风险控制机制的一般框架来保障国有资产经营的安全性?如何通过建立风险控制机制来提高国有企业治理结构的效率?③对论文的核心词汇“国有企业”和“风险”进行了概述和界定。
(1)研究基础与文献综述。本部分以文献述评的方式,从风险理论出发,分别对本论文研究所涉及的理论基础,即国有企业改革、风险理论及其发展、治理结构以及风险控制等四个方面的相关理论进行阐述。①在“国有企业改革与风险控制”方面,对国有企业定位与国有企业改革的理论争论进行了探讨。对“基于一般企业组织模型的国有企业市场化改革”和“基于国有企业发展路径的管理变革”等两种观点分别进行了评述,在此基础上,指出我国国有企业所面临的风险问题,不仅有个体的风险管理问题,更为重要地,还要处理整体风险识别和评价的问题。在国有企业内部通过管理和技术的方式来解决风险控制问题,显然是对风险控制的一种误读。因此,必须跳出企业这个小的框架和限制,在更为广大的、包容性更强的政治经济学框架中讨论国有企业的风险控制问题。②在“不确定性和风险理论及其发展”方面,对奈特的风险和企业组织理论及其发展进行了评述,全面回顾了不确定性与风险理论的发展,探讨了基于奈特的风险理论,发展一个不确定条件下的企业组织理论应该要探讨的问题。③在“企业治理结构与风险”方面,对在现有的公司治理理论下探讨风险治理问题的局限性进行了探讨,并提出了发展基于风险治理的公司治理理论的可能性。④在“风险控制”方面,对全面风险管理框架的形成及其构成、风险管理工具及其发展等两个方面的内容进行了综述,并对当前研究存在的问题进行了评述。
(2)问题的提出：国有企业风险识别。本部分从企业风险识别的一般原则出发,结合国有企业的特殊性质指出,①风险管理在一般企业中集中体现在管理层面,而国有企业中则集中体现在治理层面。②探讨国有企业风险识别的特殊点,即国有企业风险识别主体的外在决定性、风险控制目标识别的矛盾性、风险传导机制的无边界性和风险集成性。③描述国有企业风险控制研究所需要解决的主要问题,指出国有企业的风险控制可以分为单个企业的风险控制和国有企业群体的风险控制两个层次,研究的重点在于风险传导机制、单个国有企业的风险治理与国有企业群体的风险控制。
(3)企业风险控制：一个基于交易的观点。本部分通过以交易博弈模型为基础的交易风险溢价研究,阐述基于风险分散的企业组织与风险传导机制分析框架。交易博弈模型所阐述的主要观点包括：①任何一个交易都必然地包括以下两个层次,一是对具体交易标的物的交换,例如商品和劳务。二是对风险和不确定性的交易,即“交易的风险配置功能”。②交易的风险溢价(Risk Premium),即交易2方对通过交易方式希望分散出去的风险或不确定性的定价。基于风险分散的企业组织和风险传导机制分析框架的主要观点包括：①企业是一系列相关交易的叠加,而这一系列交易之所以被叠加的目的在于控制和减小企业所面对的风险和不确定性,获得交易的风险溢价收益。②企业治理结构之所以重要,在于治理结构是管理叠加起来的交易组合的基础性机制。③企业组织的存在,使得风险控制存在两种基本的手段,一是在企业组织内部通过交易的方式来配置风险,二是在市场交易的过程中进行风险的配置。④风险传导的过程究竟是一个风险化解的过程,还是一个风险逐渐累积的过程,取决于交易风险溢价收益的大小以及收益在交易双方之间的配置结构。⑤影响风险传导机制的因素主要包括以下三个。一是市场因素。二是制度因素。三是知识因素。
(4)国有企业风险控制：一个政治经济学分析。本部分是对国有企业制度及其对企业风险控制的含义的分析。主要观点包括：①资产的庞大规模决定了国有企业内部进行交易以配置风险的空间巨大。②国有企业外在的制度支撑体系决定了国有企业通过外在的交易手段将风险转移出去的空间同样巨大。③国有企业风险控制潜力能否发挥,取决于国有企业基本制度构成的两个层次,一是作为企业内部交易风险配置功能发挥的基本制度平台,二是由于监管体系的作用。④国有企业的风险控制并非一个完全的管理过程,而是一个如何在企业层面实现风险共同治理的问题⑤必须严格控制国有企业自身的风险等同于国家风险。
(5)单个国有企业风险控制：风险治理。本部分对国有企业公司治理与风险控制的现状进行描述,对当前国有企业风险治理的主要关注点进行分析,并以案例的形式对当前国有企业风险治理的成效进行评价。主要观点包括：①尽管股份制改革为国有企业的公司治理结构完善设定了基本路线,但传统管理体制和行政体制对国有企业治理结构的影响难以忽视,企业的利益相关者存在着明显的、且相互联系的强势利益群体,其自身的诉求足以影响企业的生产和经营。②国有企业的风险控制缺乏一个恰当的向外分散风险和内部配置风险的治理结构平台。③企业的风险分散配置要求企业的利益相关者具有与分担企业风险相匹配的能力。而从现实的情况看,无论是国有企业的职工、管理层、还是外在的投资者(内资或者外资),均无法担当起国有企业风险分担者的角色。④当前的国有企业风险治理,承担风险的主体过少,承担风险能力与参与风险治理能力不匹配是国有企业风险治理的最大问题。⑤国有企业风险治理的分析中,主要风险类别包括：主体缺失风险、内部交易定价机制行政化风险、内部风险错配风险、风险控制封闭化风险。
(6)国有企业群体风险控制：风险类别与传导机制。本部分对国有企业群体所面对的宏观风险及其类别、国有企业微观风险向宏观风险传导的机制进行研究。主要观点包括：①政治风险、金融风险、产业风险是当前国有企业群体风险控制所需要关注的三个重要方面。②国有企业风险传导机制三个可能的阻断机制包括：微观企业制度、监管体制、政策约束与社会关注。③当前国有企业风险防范的三个重要方面是：防范国有企业个体的局部政治风险演变为整体性政治风险、防范个体的财务风险演变为整体性的金融风险、防范个体的行业风险演变为整体性经济结构失调。
本文可能的创新,主要包括以下四个方面：
①选题与体系创新。选题创新方面,将国有企业风险管理的实践放到国有企业改革的理论研究和实践探索领域内进行探讨,并从风险控制的角度对当前国有企业改革实践中存在的问题进行较为系统的理论分析。体系创新。尽管论文的研究尚且粗浅,但基于交易博弈模型为基础的交易风险溢价研究,以及基于风险分散的企业组织与风险传导机制分析框架,在分析所采用的基本概念(例如交易的风险配置功能、交易的风险溢价)、方法(期权理论在交易风险定价方面的运用)以及切入点(基于未来的不确定性)等方面,是奈特风险和组织理论的重新表述和发展,在上述方面,与基于交易费用的企业理论等现有理论存在较为明显的差异。
②视角创新。包括以下三个方面,第一,本文对于国有企业风险控制的分析与探讨,是从一个全新的角度对国有企业改革的再认识；第二,本文对国有企业风险控制的研究,更多地是从经济理论对企业风险控制的政治经济学分析,而不仅仅是停留在管理研究层面,对风险管理技术的工具性探讨。第三,本文对风险的分析,并没有完全停留在现有的风险理论的基础之上,而是在运用新的风险分析工具方面进行了积极的探索。
③观点创新(理论部分)：任何一个交易都必然地包括以下两个层次,一是对具体交易标的物的交换,例如商品和劳务,二是对风险和不确定性的交易,即“交易的风险配置功能”；交易的风险溢价,即交易各方对通过交易方式希望分散出去的风险或不确定性的定价；企业是一系列相关交易的叠加,而这一系列交易之所以被叠加的目的在于控制和减小企业所面对的风险和不确定性,获得交易的风险溢价收益。
④观点创新(应用部分)：国有企业风险识别的特殊点包括：国有企业风险识别主体的外在决定性、风险控制目标识别的矛盾性、风险传导机制的无边界性和风险集成性。国有企业的风险控制可以分为单个企业的风险控制和国有企业群体的风险控制两个层次,研究的重点在于风险传导机制、单个国有企业的风险治理与国有企业群体的风险控制。当前的国有企业风险治理,承担风险的主体过少,承担风险能力与参与风险治理能力不匹配是国有企业风险治理的最大问题。国有企业风险控制潜力能否发挥,取决于国有企业基本制度构成的两个层次,一是作为企业内部交易风险配置功能发挥的基本制度平台,二是基于监管体系的作用。
How to integrate the public ownership and market economy is the key issue of reform of socialist market economy. As the main section of economy based on public ownership, the reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been the central issue of the economical mechanism reform in China. Under the request of modern production mode and market economy, the reform of SOEs in past30years is the gradual process during which the path how to integrate the public ownership and market economy efficiently was discussed and explored.
Nowadays, under the accumulated impact of profit increasing and scale expanding, as a whole, no matter on the aspect of control capacity in industries or the aspect of the market power, SOEs is playing the important role in Chinese economy and global economy. On the other hand, with the effect of continual merging and expanding, under the combined impact of bundle of risk factors, which includes the internal structural re-configuration and external market risk, the uncertainty of business environment confronted by the large scale SOEs is increasing. Risk of business appears. How to construct the stable risk control mechanism has been one of the important issue of SOEs' reform.
On the other hand, it is important to resolve two interacted problems in the process of the current reform of SOEs in China:Firstly, how to advance the reform of shareholding system and perfect the governance structure consequently in individual SOE. Secondly-how to perfect the State-owned assets supervision system so that the purpose of maintenance and appreciation of assets value could be reached. And how to evaluate and control the risk is the common issue in the process of institutional reform occurred on the mirco-level of individual SOE, and on the marco-level of SOEs' group. Based on the knowledge, at the same time of equity division reform, integrating the risk evaluation and control into the reform of corporate governance structure, should be either proper strategy of perfecting the corporate governance structure in SOEs, or the correct solution of improving efficiency of state-owned assets.
In the process of SOEs' reform, risk control is a new issue. Relevant theory on risk control of enterprise is probed actively. The occurring problem of the probing is:In theoretical research field, the research of the risk evaluation and control in SOEs is only treated as managerial topic; In the practical field, implementation of the risk evaluation and control is only treated as standard topic. Processing practice occurred in SOEs has the industrial, individual, discretionary features. The risk management adopted in financial field confronts the theoretical and practical handicaps in the process of applying in enterprises.
Based on the theory of risk premium in transaction, this paper probes into the issue of evaluation and control of risk in SOEs from two aspects, which includes mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs'group.Three issues are discussed:①How to understand the particularities of risk control in SOEs?②How to construct the common framework of risk control in SOEs so that the safety of state-owned assets can be guaranteed?③How to set up the mechanism of risk control in SOEs so that the efficiency of corporate governance structure can be improved?
Applying the methodology of political economy, the analysis of risk control in SOEs in this paper focuses on the governance of risk in SOEs. Two aspects, which includes the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs'group is discussed. The purposes of this paper as follow:①Reviewing the reform of SOEs on the new perspective, discuss the possible direction of future reform on the foundation of risk control research.②providing new solution for the implementation of risk control in SOEs, more broadly, for the application of risk control in other enterprises.
This paper includes6parts:①Preface. Necessary explanation and theoretical preparation was displayed.②"Reviewing and Foundation of Research". Four theoretical reviews, which include reform of SOEs, theory of risk, governance structure and risk control, are displayed and evaluated.③"Bring up the topic:Risk Identification in SOEs" and "Risk Control in Enterprises:a Viewpoint Based on Transaction". Bring up the main topic in the research of risk control in SOEs; analysis the model of risk premium in transaction which is the preparation for next section.④"Risk Control in SOEs:a Political economy analysis". The characteristic of transaction in SOEs is discussed.⑤"Risk Control of Individual SOE:Governance of Risk" and "Risk Control of SOEs Group:Category of Risk and Mechanism of Risk Conduction". By the theoretical analysis and case study, the risk control of individual SOE, category of risk and mechanism of risk conduction are discussed.⑥Epilogue. The conclusion and possible policy implications are displayed.
Preface. The background, structure, methodology, main viewpoints, keyword are stated. The main viewpoints of this section include:①Reviewing the reform of SOEs on the new perspective, discuss the possible direction of future reform an the foundation of risk control research.②Three issues:Firstly, How to understand the particularities of risk control in SOEs? Secondly, How to construct the common framework of risk control in SOEs so that the safety of state-owned assets can be guaranteed? Thirdly, how to set up the mechanism of risk control in SOEs so that the efficiency of corporate governance structure can be improved?③Definition of the key word, which includes SOEs, Risk is given and discussed.
(1) Reviewing and Foundation of Research. In this section, four theoretical reviews, which includes reform of SOEs, theory of risk, governance structure and risk control, is displayed and evaluated. Main viewpoints includes:①Reform of SOEs. The risk confronted by the SOEs, includes not only the risk management of individual SOE, but also the risk identification and control of SOEs' group. The internal solution, which considers the risk issue as managerial issue within the boundary of firm, is based on the misunderstanding of risk control. It should be proper to go beyond the boundary of firm, to analysis the risk control of SOEs in boarder political economy framework of research.②Theory of risk. Why and how Knight's theory of risk and organization should be advanced is discussed.③Governance structure and risk control. The possibilities of advancing the theory of governance structure with risk control are discussed.④Risk Control. The framework of risk management, the tool and methodology applied in risk management practice are displayed and discussed.
(2) Bring up the topic:Risk Identification in SOEs. This section analysis the common principle of risk identification and the special features of risk control in SOEs. The main viewpoints include:①Risk control in SOEs should focus on the governance of risk. On the contrary, the risk control of other business should focus on the management of risk, as usually does.②The particularities of risk identification, which includes:Firstly, the external determination of the subject of risk identification; Secondly, the contradiction of the target of risk identification; Thirdly, the limitless of the risk conduction; And fourthly, the integration of risk.③Two aspects of risk control in SOEs, which includes the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs' group is discussed.
(3) Risk Control in Enterprises:a Viewpoint Based on Transaction. This section probes into the risk premium in transaction on the modeling of gaming that simulates the transaction. The main viewpoints includes:①Any transaction includes two parts, one is the transaction of certain object of transaction, e.g. commodity or services; the other is the transaction and allocation consequently of risk, which is defined as "The risk allocation function of transaction".②The risk premium of transaction means the pricing of the risk by the insiders of transaction who like to diverse or grasp the risk premium.③Firm is the nexus of transactions. The transactions are integrated to decrease, to control the risks and uncertainties, and to win the risk premium of transactions.(4)the reasons why governance structure matters is that governance structure is the basic mechanism to deal with the integrated transaction.⑤the basic solution of risk control includes:Firstly, allocating risk internally and secondly, diversifying risk externally, both in way of transaction.⑥the process of risk conduction could be either diversifying or accumulating, according to the difference and structure of allocation of risk premium.⑦Three factors could work on the mechanism of risk conduction: market, institution and knowledge.
(4) Risk Control in SOEs:a Political economy analysis. This section analysis the institutional system of SOEs and its implication on risk control. Main viewpoints includes:①The huge scale of assets of SOEs means its capacity to allocate risk internally is considerable.②The external institutional support system means the capacity of SOEs to diversify risk externally is also considerable.③he function of risk control works or not, is decided by two factors:efficiency of internal institutional platform and external supervision system.④The risk control of SOEs is not just the pure managerial issue, but the issue of governance of risk.⑤it is necessary to control the transition during which the risk in individual SOE change into national risk.
(5) Risk Control of Individual SOE:Governance of Risk. This section describes the latest situation of governance and risk control in SOEs. Main viewpoints includes:①although the reform of shareholding system has settle down the path of the governance reform in SOEs, the traditional management system in SOEs still matters.②The risk control in SOEs nowadays has no proper platform of governance structure, on which the diversification and allocation of risk can be carried on.③whether the employee, managers, external investors(domestic or foreign), cannot afford the role of diversifying risk.①The main handicap that impact the governance of risk in SOEs is that the capacity of affording risk and power of involving risk decision cannot match.⑤The main category of risk in individual SOE includes:Subject-missing risk; Administratization risk of pricing mechanism in internal transaction; Internal risk mismatch; risk of insulation.
(6) Risk Control of SOEs Group:Category of Risk and Mechanism of Risk Conduction. This section analysises the category of marco-risk confronted by SOEs' group and the mechanism of risk conduction. Main viewpoints includes:①the category of macro-risk should be focused include:political risk, financial risk, industrial risk.②The possible cut-off insititutions includes:institution of firm, supervision system, government industrial policy and publicity.③Three important tendency:it is necessary to supervise the individual SOE's political risk, financial risk and industrial risk transform into the national risk and economic imbalance.
This paper may be an important innovation in accordance with the degree of severity of light arranged mainly in the following four aspects:
(1) Topic and System innovation. Topic:Introducing the practice of risk management in SOEs into research and practice of the reform of SOEs, and systematically analyzing the current issue of the reform on the perspective of risk controlling. System:Although the research in this paper hasn't been developed too far, but the research on the risk premium with the modeling of transaction, and the research of risk diversification and conduction is the development of Knight's theory of risk, the basic definition(risk allocation of transaction, risk premium), methodology (applying theory of option into the field of pricing of transaction)and perspective(uncertainty) is quiet different with the theory of firm which is based on the definition of transaction cost.
(2) Perspective Innovation. Three possible perspective innovation includes:①re-considering the reform of SOEs from the perspective of risk control.②Rather managerial approach, than economic theoretical approach, is adopted in this paper to analysis the risk control in SOEs.③Rather relying on the current theory of risk, than exploring new framework, the risk control of SOEs is analysised.System innovation.
(3) New viewpoints (Theoretical Section):Any transaction includes two parts, one is the transaction of certain object of transaction, e.g. commodity or services; the other is the transaction and allocation consequently of risk, which is defined as "the risk allocation function of transaction"; The risk premium of transaction, which means the pricing of the risk by the insiders of transaction who likes to diverse or grasp the risk premium; Firm is the nexus of transactions. The transactions are integrated to decrease, to control the risks and uncertainties, and to win the risk premium of transactions.
(4) New viewpoints (Application Section):The particularities of risk identification, which includes:Firstly, the external determination of the subject of risk identification; Secondly, the contradiction of the target of risk identification; Thirdly, the limitless of the risk conduction; And fourthly, the integration of risk. Two aspects of risk control in SOEs include the mirco-level of individual SOE and marco-level of SOEs' group. Whether the employee, managers, external investors(domestic or foreign) in SOEs, cannot afford the role of diversifying risk. The main handicap that impacts the governance of risk in SOEs is that the capacity of affording risk and power of involving risk decision cannot match.
引文
①概念来自：中国统计年鉴(2007)[M].中国统计出版社.2007.
①按照财政部的统计分类,国有企业包括：国有及国有控股企业,包括中央企业和36个省(自治区、直辖市、计划单列市)国有及国有控股企业。其中,中央企业包括两个部分,即：82个中央部门所属的国有及国有控股企业及133户中央管理企业,以上均不含国有金融类企业。
②中华人民共和国企业国有资产法[J].2008年10月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第五次会议通过.第5条.
③纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.33-34.
④辞海中风险词条解释如下：“风险：人们在生产建设和日常生活中遭遇能导致人身伤亡、财产受损及其他经济损失的自然灾害、意外事故和其他不测事件的可能性。保险人承担经济责任的风险叫保险风险。成为保险风险必须具备几个条件：大量同质的风险存在、损失必须是意外的,而且必须是能导致一定的经济损失的,同时它又不是投机性的。”辞海(1999年版缩印本)[M].上海辞书出版社.2000.P4351.
①约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷： Q-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.P216、728.
②“风险”概念在经济、管理理论中大致存在以下几种表述：(1)损失的机会和损失的可能性；(2)损失的不确定性,包括客观的和主观的不确定性；(3)实际与预期结果的离差；(4)实际结果偏离预期结果的概率。见许谨良.风险管理(第三版)[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2009.1-2.
③在《中央企业全面风险管理指引》(2006.6.6)“总则”第三条中给出一个概要的“企业风险”概念,即“未来的不确定性对企业实现其经营目标的影响”,但并未对其赋予更为明确的规定性。目前见于各国国家标准中的、更为具体的风险概念可参考如下：the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives. NOTE 1:A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and the consequences that may flow from it. NOTE 2:Risk is measured in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (1.3.4) and their likelihood (1.3.7).NOTE 3:Risk may have a positive or negative impact. NOTE 4: See ISO/IEC Guide 51, for issues related to safety. Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004(Third Edition)[M]. Standard Australia/Standards News Zealand.2004.4.
① C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Richard M. Heins. Risk management and insurance[M]. New York:McGraw-Hill. c1985. pp.1.
①[美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G.赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.P10-11.
②例如风险被定义为如下的不确定性："The type of uncertainty in which the possible outcomes are either 'loss'or 'no loss', rather that with uncertainty that also present the opportunity for profit."从理论研究上看,风险至少包括了一下三种分类方式,即纯风险(Pure Risk)和机会风险(Speculative Risk)、静态风险(Static Risk)和动态风险(Dynamic Risk)、主观风险(Subjective Risk)和客观风险(Objective Risk)。 James S. Trieschmann, Robert E. Hoyt, David W. Sommer. Risk Management and Insurance(12th edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.P4-5.
①李荣融.宏大的工程宝贵的经验——记国有企业改革发展30年[J].求是.2008.16.P27-30.
②OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004.
③金碚.国有企业的地位和作用[J].红旗文稿.1999(19).15-17.
①陈清泰.国有大型企业改革与发展问题研究[J].煤炭企业管理.2002(7).17-19.
② OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004
①周其仁.公有制企业的性质[J].经济研究.2000(11).3-12.
②吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社.1994.
③易宪容.政府：国有企业改革难以逾越的障碍[Jl.江苏社会科学.8-15.
④张维迎.完善公司治理结构已成国企改革最大挑战[J].领导决策信息.2002(34).24-25.
⑤张维迎.国企改革的真问题[J].商界.2007(2).
⑥“配备给定的己知技术,在定义周密的市场约束之下经营的一家厂商,是获取最大利润的一个行为者(不管是由于有意识的、理性决策或其他什么方式获得的),他就会认为不必需要有任何特定的厂商理论：厂商理论只不过是最优化方法(可能还有市场结构)的档案……经济学家的工作只是力求发展和应用最优化技术”。约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷：E-J)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.P381.
①陈清泰.公司治理：解开中国国企改革的关键一环[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊).2002(4).5-9.
②陈清泰.国企改革——五大重点亟待深化[J].中国电力企业管理.2005(3).26-27.
①所谓政策性负担是指由于国有企业承担过多的社会性职能而形成的负担,战略性负担是指在传统发展战略的指导下,国有企业由于投资于中国不具比较优势的资本相对密集的产业和产业区段所形成的负担。林毅夫,李志.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊).2005(4).913-936.
①[美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.7.
①[美]H·范里安,费方域等译.微观经济学：现代观点[M].生活·读书·新知三联书店.上海人民出版社.1994.271.
② [US]J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. US:Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.43.4.587-609.
③在管理中,不确定性可以定性地分为四个层次：①前景清晰明确的,②有几种可能的前景,③有一定变化范围的前景,④前景不明。见休.考特尼.不确定性管理[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.7-11.
④公司风险管理一般包括4个步骤：①判明企业所面临的风险,②将风险暴露量化,③确定所求结果的形式,④设计或构造一个策略,把风险暴露转变为所希望的形式。见[美]约翰·马歇尔,维普尔·班赛尔,宋逢明等译.金融工程[M].清华大学出版社.1998.151.
⑤[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.215、35、216.
⑥[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.279.
① LeRoy, Stephen F., Larry D. Singell, Jr. Knight on Risk and Uncertainty [J]. Journal of Political Economy. April 1987.394-406.
②[美]埃德加·E·彼得斯.宋学锋,曹庆仁,乇新宇译.复杂性、风险与金融市场[M].中国人民大学出版社.2004.5-9.
③[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.242-245.
② (1) R. R. Nelson. Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1991. 12.61-74. (2) B. Wernerfelt. A resource-based view of the Firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1984.5. 171-180. D.J.
①[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克,曾刚等译.风险管理[M].中国财政经济出版社.2005.32.
①[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.210.
②奈特认为,专业化过程在企业内部之所以能够发生,尤其是专门行使管理职能的企业家的出现,并非由于行使管理职能的企业家的风险态度与行使生产职能的工人的风险态度不同,而是由于人的个体在判断和行为方式上的差异所致。“人们寻求他们所需要的那种管理才能极强的个人,并让这些人来负责群体的工作,使其他成员的活动服从于这些人的指挥和管制。……产业组织的存在依据于这样一个重要的事实,即在通常情况下,一个人的智力可以用于指挥其他人的日常操作和精神活动。”见[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.242.
③“高级组织形式在两个方面优于低级组织形式,一是包括大量个人决策、风险或‘各种实例’的经营活动的扩大；二是可以更有效地实现利益的统一,这就可以减少一个人根据另一个人的决策来行为所引出的败德风险问题”。见[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.210、228-229.
④[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.230.
①Herbert A.Simon,Models of Man[M].New York:John Wiley & Sons.1957.pp.199.
①在简单的合同模型中,当存在专用性资产时,由于必须对专业性资产设置保护,由此得到的合同价格(收益)会低于没有保护情况下的价格。由此交易成本可以通过两个不同的价格差异大小得到衡量。见Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring, 1985). pp.177-208.
② [US]Zingales, Luigi, Corporate Governance [J]. NBER Working Paper No. W6309. (December 1997). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=226064.
① Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer,2003, Family firms[J], Journal of Finance 58,2167-2201.
② Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century[J], Journal of Financial Economics.69.5-50.
① Morck, Randall K., Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu.2000, The Information Contents of Stock Markets; Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 58.215-260.
② Durnev, Artyom, Kan Li, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung.2004. Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications For Economies In Transition[J]. Economics of Transition.12.593-634.
③ Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon.2002. Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.66.3-27.
④ Kose John, Lubomir Litov, and Bernard Yeung.2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.4.1679-1728.
⑤ Morck Randall and Masao Nakamura.1999. Banks and Corporate Control In Japan[J]. Journal of Finance. 54.319-339.
① Fogel, Kathy, Randall Morck, and BernardYeung.2008. Corporate Stability and Economic Growth:Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America? Journal of Financial Economics, (available at jfe.rochester.edu).
②当前研究中,所谓公司治理风险(Corporate Governance Risk)仅存在于审计研究领域,意指治理结构的质量。见[US]Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Plannning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review. Vol.79. No.2.2004.277-304.
③ (1) Alba, P., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, S.,1998. Thailand's Corporate Financing and Governance Structures:Impact on Firms' Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank. (2) Khan, Haider, 2003. Corporate Governance of Family-based Businesses in Asia:Which Road to Take?[J]. Unpublished manuscript. University of Denver. (3) Enriques, Luca, Volpin, Paolo,2007. Corporate Governance Reforms In Continental Europe[J]. J. Econ. Perspect.21,117-140.
①世界银行.东亚复兴之路[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.1999.63-66.
② Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring,1985). pp.177-208.
① [TH]Sudarat Ananchotikul, [US]Barry Eichengreen. Corporate GovernanceReform in Emerging Markets: How Much, Why, and With What Effects? [J]. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies.23(2009). 149-176.
① Risk and Insurance Management Society(RIMS) and Marsh. The 360° View of Risk:Excellence in Risk Management(Ⅳ)[R]. New York.2007.
② The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Enterprise Risk Mnagement-Integrated Framework, Executive Summary[R]. September.2004. pp.2.
① Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission(COSO). Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework:Executive Summary[R]. September.2004.
② Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp. 115-132.
③ John R. S. Fraser, etc. Who Reads What Most Often? A Survey of Enterprise Risk Management Literature Read by Risk Executives[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer 2008. pp.73-91.
④风险管理部分内容来自：[美]兹维·博迪,罗伯特·C·莫顿.伊志宏等译校.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2000.252-261.
①[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克.曾刚等译.风险管理[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.517.
② Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp. 115-132.
①黄达.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2003.247.
①[美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.204.
②马克维茨资产组合理论的基本假设包括：(1)投资者仅仅考虑收益概率分布的前两阶矩；(2)在给定资产组合均值收益的情况下,投资者选择一个最低收益方差的资产组合；(3)投资期限是一个时期；(4)投资者的个体决策不影响市场价格：(5)投资可以被无限细分；(6)投资者能卖空资产。见。[美]R.A.贾罗,V马斯科西莫维,W.T津巴.吴文峰等译.金融经济学手册[M].世纪出版社·上海人民出版社.2007.15.
①[美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.231-241.
② [US] Edward J. Lusk, Michael Halperin. Towards Reformulation of The Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM) Focusing on Idiosyncratic Rsik And Roll's Meta-Analysis:Methodological Approach[J]. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis.21(1):2008. pp.1-23.
①[英]Martin Baxter, Andrew Rennie.叶中行等译.金融数学：衍生产品定价引论[M].人民邮电出版社.2006.4.
② J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.434. ABI/INFORM Global, pp.587-609.
③ (1) Dongsae Cho. The Impact of Risk Management Decisions on Firm Value:Gordon's Growth Model Approach[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.55, No.1 (Mar.,1988), pp.118-131; (2) Steven M. Cassidy, Richard L. Constand, Richard B. Corbett. The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Management Function[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.57, No.4 (Dec.,1990), pp.664-670.
①Black-Scholes模型的基本假设为：(1)标的资产服从对数正态随机游走(风险中性),(2)无风险利率是关于时间的一个己知函数；(3)标的资产无分红；(4)套期保值连续进行；(5)无交易费用；(6)无套利。见[英]保罗·威尔莫特.刘立新译.金融工程与风险管理技术[M].机械工业出版社.2009.107-111.
②[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克.曾刚等译.风险管理[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.150.
① (1) D. Hendricks. Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data[J]. Economic Policy Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).2 (1996). pp.39-69. (2) Peter J.G Vlaar. Value at Risk Models for Dutch Bond Portfolios[J], Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol.24. No.7 (2000). pp.1131-1154.
② Chu-Hsiung Lin et al.. A General Revised Historical Simulation Method for Portfolio Value-at-Risk[J]. The Journal of Alternative Investment.2005 Fall. pp.87-103.
③ Lambadiaris, G, L. Papadopoulou, G Skiadopoulos, and I. Zoulis. VAR:History or Simulation?[J]. Risk. 16 (2003). pp.122-127.
④ J. de la Torre, D. Neckar. Forecasting Political Risks For International Operations[J]. International Journal of Forecasting.4(2), (1988).221-241.
① S. Kobrin. Political risk:a review and reconsideration[J]. Journal of International Business Studies.10(1), (1979). pp.67-80.
② James Agarwal, Dorothee Feils. Political Risk and the Internationalization of Firms:An Empirical Study of Canadian-based Export and FDI Firms[J]. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences.24(3):(2007). pp. 165-181.
③ R. C. Merton. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates[J]. Journal of Finance.29.2(May 1974). pp.449-470.
① R. A. Jarrow, D. Lando, S. M. Turnbull. A Markov Model for The Term Stucture of Credit Risk SpreadsfJ]. Review of Financial Studies.10.2. (Summer 1997). pp.481-523.
② Ephraim Clark, Radu Tunaru. Quantification of Political Risk with Multiple Dependent Sources[J]. Journal of Economics and Finance. Vol.27. No.1. Summer 2003. pp.125-135.
③ Elena Iankova, Jan Katz. Strategies For Political Risk Mediation by International Firms in Transition Economies:The Case of Bulgaria[J]. Journal of World Business.38 (2003). pp.182-203.
④ Tracy Chan Su Yin, Douglas Sikorski, Louis Ta Huu Phuong. How Singapore Companies in Asean Manafe Political Risk[J]. Seoul Journal of Economics. Spring 2003; 16,1. pp.23-58.
⑤[美]J. S. Trieschmann, R. E. Hoyt, D. W. Sommer.齐瑞宗改编.风险管理与保险(Risk Management and Insurance)(12th Edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.75-86.
① Bhagwah Chowdhry, Jonathan T. B. Howe. Corporate Risk Management for Multinational Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies[J]. European Finance Review.2(1999). pp.229-246.
② Assaf Eisdoefer. Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms[J1. The Journal of Finance. Vol. LⅩⅢ. No.2. April 2008. pp.609-637.
① P. Branas-Garza et al. Math skills and risk attitudes[J]. Economics Letters.2008 (99). pp.332-336.
①肖振宇.金融混业经营及其风险管理研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
②杨文瀚.商业银行信用风险度量模型与管理研究[D].南京航空航天大学.2006.
③孔繁利.金融市场风险的度量——基于极值理论和Copula的应用研究[Dl.吉林大学.2006.
④邓兰松.基于EVT的证券公司市场风险管理的VAR与CVAR研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
⑤刘荣茂.我国商业银行风险管理的研究[D].南京农业大学.1998.
①宝钢集团有限公司.宝钢推进全面风险管理的探索与实践[J].国际商务财会.2007.12.5-7.
②赵息,张雷,王鹏.国有投资控股公司全面风险管理[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版).2008(2).150-152.
③李劲松.经营风险决策和框架效应机制研究[D].浙江大学管理学院.2000.26-29.
④郭焱.战略联盟形式选择与风险控制[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.12.
⑤唐守安.国际石油公司的全面风险管理[J].国际石油经济.2007.8.37-45.
⑥崔毅等.企业风险与微观经济杠杆[M].华南理工大学出版社.2006.
⑦刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经.2007(6).115-120.
⑧谢志华.内部控制、公司治理、风险管理：关系与整合[J].会计研究.2007.10.37-45.
① S. B. Sitkin, A. L. Pablo. Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior[J]. Academy of Management Review.17(1).1992. pp.9-38.
② L.E. Palich, D.R. Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk Taking:Challenging Conventional Wisdom[J]. Journal of Business Venturing.1995(10). pp.425-438.
③ W. I. Norton Jr., W. T. Moore. The Influence of Entrepreneurial Risk Assessment on Venture Launch or Growth Decisions[J]. Small Business Economics.2006(26). pp.215-226.
①邓明然,夏喆.基于耦合的企业风险传导模型探讨[J].经济与管理研究.2006(3).66-88.
① Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century[J], Journal of Financial Economics.69. pp.5-50.
②2007年,经修订后的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》开始执行；2008年,《中华人民共
②[美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上、下)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.
①上述问题等价于一个最优化问题,在线性情况下,可以利用线性规划进行求解。详见[美]罗杰B.迈尔森.费剑平译.博弈论：矛盾冲突分析[M].北京：中国经济出版社.2001.96.
②[美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.235-257.
① (1) R. Frisch. Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics[J]. Economic Essays in Honour of G. Cassel. Allen and Unqin[M].1933. London. (2) E. Slutsky. The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes[J]. Econometrica.1937(5). pp.105-146. (3) M. Friedman. The Role of Monetary Policy [J]. American Economic Review.1968(58). pp.1-17. (4) R. E. Lucas. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money[J]. Journal of Economic Theory.1972(4). pp.103-124.
② P. Ferri, H. P. Minsky. Market Processes and Thwarting Systems[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics.1992. Vol.3, No.1. pp.79-91.
① C.-E Bai, Li, D.D., Z. Tao. Wang, Y., A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics.2000.28 (4), pp.716-738.
②纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.43.
①黄淑和：今年央企利润有望实现同比正增长[J].中国证券报.2009.12.4.A02.
①数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
②图中数据为1998年至2008年国有及国有控股工业企业部分指标占同期规模以上工业企业相应指标的比例。数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
③根据年鉴数据计算得出.数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
①参见：李荣融.国有资产管理体制改革的目标和途径[J].上海国资.2003(9).4-17.
②参见：纪尽善.当前国有企业改革发展现状问题与对策研究[Jl.经济师.2001(6).23-27.
③见《关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号).2006.12.5.
①纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.79-81.
②主要包括以下文件：①国资委令第1号,《国有企业清产核资办法》,2003.9.9。②国资委令第2号、第17号,《中央企业度责任经营业绩考核暂行办法》,2003.11.25,2006.12.30。③国资委、财政部令第3号,《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》,2003.12.31。④《中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法》(国资发分配[2004]227号)。⑤国办发[2003]96号,《关于规范国有企业改制工作的意见》,2003.11.30。⑥《国有控股上市公司(境外)实施股权激励试行办法》(国资发分配[2006]8号)、《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(国资发分配[2006]175号)。⑦《国有独资公司董事会试点企业职工董事管理办法(试行)》(国资发群工[2006]21号)。⑧《关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号)。⑨《关于加强和改进国有企业监事会工作的若干意见》(国资发监督[2006]174号)⑩国资委令第19号,《国有股东转让所持上市公司股份管理暂行办法》,2007.6.30。①《董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法》(国资发群工[2009]53号)。12《关于规范国有股东与上市公司进行资产重组有关事项的通知》(国资发产权[2009]124号)。13经贸委等八部门,《关于国有大中型企业主辅分离辅业改制分流安置富余人员的实施办法》,2002.11.18。14国资委令第13号,《中央企业总会计师工作职责管理暂行办法》,2006.4.14。
③中央企业改制经历了从特大型中央企业的“存续分立”,到大中型企业“主辅分离”,到大型中央企业“整体上市”,然后到“整体改制,整体上市”的发展历程。见：徐鸣.中央企业改制模式的分析[J].国际经贸探索.2007(10).33-42.
④李荣融.我们找到了一条发展国有企业的新路——五年来国有企业改革发展的成就与经验[J].当代经济.2008(4).8-9.
①世界银行东亚及太平洋地区扶贫与经济管理局.中国第十一个五年规划——中期进展情况评估[R].2008.34.
②对四川工业产业政策的研究可以作为一个佐证。见杨志远.论四川产业集群政策体系及其优化[J].理论与改革.2010(1).136-139.
①纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.14.
①部分特征在前文已有论述,此处只陈述观点,不再展开论述。
②基础数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
③基础数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
①2008年1-11月,中央企业资产总额14.6万亿元,资产总额超过1000亿元的企业有40家,净资产6.5万亿元,平均资产负债率55.6%。许多中央企业在快速发展的同时,整体素质和实力进一步提高,竞争力明显增强,不但居于国内同行业的领先地位,在国际上也有较大影响。建筑行业,中交集团、中冶集团、中国建筑、中国中铁、中国铁建都是国内龙头企业,中交集团在2007年全球最大225家承包商中拍米干第14位,居中资企业第一。煤炭行业中,神华集团2007年煤炭产量将超过2亿吨,销量超过2.6亿吨,稳居世界第一；航运业,中远集团船队规模世界第二；造船业,中船集团、中船重工2007年新接订单稳居世界前列；设备制造业,东方电气集团发电设别产量连续三年排名世界第一；商贸业,中化集团、中粮集团、中国五矿均进入世界500强。见李荣融.努力开创中央企业又好又快发展新局面[J].宏观经济研究.2008(2).3-11.
②约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷：O-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.579-580.
①王键.日本企业集团的形成与发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2001.序41-43.
②[美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京：商务印书馆.2002.413-418.
③在产业经济理论中,企业的纵向一体化和多元化扩展都是企业集团(Conglomerates)形成的原因。一个最广义的企业集团定义是从生产经营的角度进行描述的,即当一家厂商的全部产出可由其在一种以上产品市场上的活动构成,这一厂商就可被称为企业集团(见约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷：A-D)[M1.北京：经济科学出版社.1996.621.)。这是一个极为宽泛的定义,难以描述现实中企业集团的现实状况。对现实中的企业集团相接近的概念是：“所谓企业集团,是通过股份相互持有、融资关系、交易关系以及董事兼任制而形成的企业结合体,这些企业形成一个群体”(见[英]约翰逊·斯考特.现代企业的所有与支配[M].税务经理协会.1989.206.)。在组织特征上,随着区域、产业和发展阶段的不同,企业集团具有各自不同的特征。
①2007年以来,中央企业抓住资本市场快速发展的有利时机,加快整体上市和回归A股市场步伐。9家企业实现了境内外首次公开发行股票并上市,中国中铁实现了主业资产整体上市,中国远洋、中国神华、中国石油、中国铝业、中海油服、中海集装箱等6家企业H股回归A股。鞍钢股份、中国船舶等12家企业境内增发、配股。
②见李荣融.中央企业要在深层次问题上加大改革创新力度[Jl.当代经济.2006(10).4-5.
③国有控股上市公司的股权分置改革工作要着眼于上市公司长远发展,切实保护投资者特别是公众投资者的合法权益。上市公司质量是保证资本市场稳定发展的基石。国有控股上市公司及其国有股股东要不断提高公司的竞争力,做强做大,实现可持续发展,努力增加对投资者的回报,构建国有股股东和其他投资者的共同利益基础。见国务院国资委关于国有控股上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见(国资发产权[2005]111号).截止2007年底,国有控股上市公司股权分置改革基本完成。
①见《国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于国有独资公司董事会建设的指导意见(试行)》；董事会试点中央企业专职外部董事管理办法(试行)(国资发干二[2009]301号).
②见董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
③截止2007年底,中央企业党员总数409万人(其中离退休党员127.4万人),党组570个,党委15482个,党总支14074个,党支部19.1万个。见国资委五年回顾[M].61.
①我国第一家整体上市公司是中交集团。2005年12月,原中港集团和路桥集团以强强联合、新设合并方式重组成立中国交通建设集团有限公司。2006年10月,通过改制和资产重组,将535家法人单位和54家分支机构全部纳入上市范围,在全面、严格审计和资产评估的基础上,中交集团以全部主营业务及相关资产作为投入,独家发起设立了中国交通建设股份有限公司。2006年12月15日,中交股份在香港成功上市,成为中央企业第一家整体上市、不留存续的企业。中交股份股价持续走高,2007年第4季度成为全球市值最大的建筑公司。见国资委五年回顾[M].52.
② Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong. Putting people first? Chinese state-owned enterprises' adjustment to globalization [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2008(26). pp.573-585.
①国资发评价[2009]19号.关于进一步加强中央企业金融衍生业务监管的通知[R].2009.2.3.
[1]中国统计年鉴(2007)[M].中国统计出版社.2007.
[2]中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
[3]中国财政统计年鉴(2007)
[4]辞海(1999年版缩印本)[M].上海辞书出版社.2000.
[5]约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷：A-D,第二卷：E-J,第四卷：Q-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.
[6]马克思.资本论(第1卷)[M].北京：人民出版社.1975.
[7]纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.
[8]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社.1994.
[9]许谨良.风险管理(第三版)[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2009.
[10]崔毅等.企业风险与微观经济杠杆[M].华南理工大学出版社.2006.
[11][美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].商务印书馆.2006.
[12][美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G.赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.7.
[13][美]H·范里安,费方域等译.微观经济学：现代观点[M].生活·读书·新知三联书店.上海人民出版社.1994.
[14][美]休.考特尼.不确定性管理[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[15][美]约翰·马歇尔,维普尔·班赛尔,宋逢明等译.金融工程[M].清华大学出版社.1998.
[16][美]埃德加·E.彼得斯.宋学锋,曹庆仁,王新宇译.复杂性、风险与 金融市场[M].中国人民大学出版社.2004.
[17][美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹.加莱,罗伯特·马克,曾刚等译.风险管理[M].中国财政经济出版社.2005.
[18][美]帕特里克·博尔顿,[比]马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞,费方域等译.合同理论[M].上海：格致出版社·上海三联出版社·上海人民出版社.2008.
[19]施锡铨.博弈论[M].上海财经大学出版社.2000.
[20]孙永祥.公司治理结构：理论与实证研究[M].上海：上海三联书店·上海人民出版社.2002.
[21]世界银行.东亚复兴之路[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.1999.
[22][美]兹维·博迪,罗伯特·C·莫顿.伊志宏等译校.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[23]黄达.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2003.
[24][美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.
[25][美]R.A.贾罗, V马斯科西莫维,W.T.津巴.吴文峰等译.金融经济学手册[M].世纪出版社·上海人民出版社.2007.
[26][英]Martin Baxter,Andrew Rennie.叶中行等译.金融数学：衍生产品定价引论[M].人民邮电出版社.2006.4.
[27][英]保罗·威尔莫特.刘立新译.金融工程与风险管理技术[M].机械工业出版社.2009.
[28]国资委五年回顾[M].
[29][美]罗杰B.迈尔森.费剑平译.博弈论：矛盾冲突分析[M].北京：中国经济出版社.2001.
[30][美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上、下)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.
[31]王键.日本企业集团的形成与发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2001.
[32][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京：商务印书馆.2002.
[33][英]约翰逊·斯考特.现代企业的所有与支配[M].税务经理协会. 1989.
[34]纪尽善.当前国有企业改革发展现状问题与对策研究[J].经济师.2001(6).23-27.
[35]李荣融.宏大的工程宝贵的经验——记国有企业改革发展30年[J].求是.2008.16.
[36]李荣融.国有资产管理体制改革的目标和途径[J].上海国资.2003(9).4-17.
[37]李荣融.我们找到了一条发展国有企业的新路——五年来国有企业改革发展的成就与经验[J].当代经济.2008(4).8-9.
[38]李荣融.中央企业要在深层次问题上加大改革创新力度[J].当代经济.2006(10).4-5.
[39]李荣融.努力开创中央企业又好又快发展新局面[J].宏观经济研究.2008(2).3-11.
[40]金碚.国有企业的地位和作用[J].红旗文稿.1999(19)
[41]陈清泰.国有大型企业改革与发展问题研究[J].煤炭企业管理.2002(7).
[42]陈清泰.公司治理：解开中国国企改革的关键一环[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊).2002().5-9.
[43]陈清泰.国企改革——五大重点亟待深化[J].中国电力企业管理.2005(3).26-27.
[44]周其仁.公有制企业的性质[J].经济研究.2000(11).3-12.
[45]易宪容.政府：国有企业改革难以逾越的障碍[J].江苏社会科学.8-15.
[46]张维迎.完善公司治理结构己成国企改革最大挑战[J].领导决策信息.2002(34).24-25.
[47]张维迎.国企改革的真问题[J].商界.2007(2)
[48]国企改革出路何在?——专家观点摘编[J].中国改革.26-29.
[49]林毅夫,李志.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊)2005(4).913-936.
[50]宝钢集团有限公司.宝钢推进全面风险管理的探索与实践[J].国际商务财会.2007.12.5-7.
[51]赵息,张雷,王鹏.国有投资控股公司全面风险管理[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版).2008(2).150-152.
[52]李劲松.经营风险决策和框架效应机制研究[D].浙江大学管理学院.2000.26-29.
[53]郭焱.战略联盟形式选择与风险控制[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.12.
[54]邓兰松.基于EVT的证券公司市场风险管理的VAR与CVAR研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
[55]肖振宇.金融混业经营及其风险管理研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
[56]孔繁利.金融市场风险的度量——基于极值理论和Copula的应用研究[D].吉林大学.2006.
[57]杨文瀚.商业银行信用风险度量模型与管理研究[D].南京航空航天大学.2006.
[58]刘荣茂.我国商业银行风险管理的研究[D].南京农业大学.1998.
[59]沈俊.企业风险传导条件、类型及路径研究[J].当代经济管理.2006(3).23-26.
[60]杨乃定,Rolf Mirus.企业集成风险管理——企业风险管理发展新方向[J].工业工程与管理.2002(5).1-5.
[60]叶建木,邓明然,王洪运.企业风险传导的机理研究[J].理论月刊.2005(3).156-158.
[61]崔毅,杨卫,邵希娟.从亚洲金融风暴反观企业风险的传导机理[J].南方金融.2001(10).27-29.
[61]唐守安.国际石油公司的全面风险管理[J].国际石油经济.2007.8.37-45.
[62]刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经.2007(6).115-120.
[63]谢志华.内部控制、公司治理、风险管理：关系与整合[J].会计研究.2007.10.37-45.
[64]邓明然,夏喆.基于耦合的企业风险传导模型探讨[J].经济与管理研 究.2006(3).66-88.
[65]黄淑和：今年央企利润有望实现同比正增长[J].中国证券报.2009.12.4.A02.
[66]世界银行东亚及太平洋地区扶贫与经济管理局.中国第十一个五年规划——中期进展情况评估[R].2008.
[67]徐鸣.中央企业改制模式的分析[J].国际经贸探索.2007(10).33-42.
[68]郝洪.500强不能总是“大老粗”[J].人民日报.2009.9.7.(9,经济版).
[69]国资委副主任李伟披露68家央企涉足金融衍生产品业务浮亏114亿元[J].学习时报2009.11.30.(1版).
[70]四大资产管理公司完成政策性不良资产处置任务[J].上海证券报.2007.1.16.
[71]后危机时代央企面临六大法律风险[J].法制日报.2009.12.1.
[72][美]J. S. Trieschmann, R. E. Hoyt, D. W. Sommer.齐瑞宗改编.风险管理与保险(Risk Management and Insurance)(12th Edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.
[73]James S. Trieschmann, Robert E. Hoyt, David W. Sommer. Risk Management and Insurance(12th edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.
[74]OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004.
[75]Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004(Third Edition)[M]. Standard Australia/Standards News Zealand.2004.
[76]Alba, P., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, S.,1998. Thailand's Corporate Financing and Governance Structures:Impact on Firms'Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank.
[77]Alexander, CO., CT. Leigh. On the Covariance Matrices Used in Value at Risk Models[J]. The Journal of Derivatives, Spring 1997, pp.50-62.
[78]Assaf Eisdoefer. Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms[J]. The Journal of Finance. Vol. LⅩⅢ. No.2. April 2008. pp. 609-637.
[79]B. Wernerfelt. A resource-based view of the Firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1984.5.171-180. D.J.
[80]Bhagwah Chowdhry, Jonathan T. B. Howe. Corporate Risk Management for Multinational Corporations:Financial and Operational Hedging Policies[J]. European Finance Review.2(1999). pp.229-246.
[81]Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp.115-132.
[82]Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer,2003, Family firms[J], Journal of Finance 58,2167-2201.
[83]C.-E Bai, Li, D.D., Z. Tao. Wang, Y., A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics.2000.28 (4), pp. 716-738.
[84]Chu-Hsiung Lin et al.. A General Revised Historical Simulation Method for Portfolio Value-at-Risk[J]. The Journal of Alternative Investment.2005 Fall. pp. 87-103.
[85]D. Hendricks. Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data[J]. Economic Policy Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).2 (1996). pp.39-69.
[86]Derivatives:Over the Counter, Out of Sight[J]. Economist.2009.11.14.
[87]Dongsae Cho. The Impact of Risk Management Decisions on Firm Value: Gordon's Growth Model Approach[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.55, No.1 (Mar.,1988), pp.118-131.
[88]Durnev, A., Kim, E.H.. To steal or not to steal:Firm attributes, legal environment and valuation[J]. J. Finance.2005.60,1461-1493.
[89]Durnev, Artyom, Kan Li, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung.2004. Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications For Economies In Transition [J]. Economics of Transition.12.593-634.
[90]Edward J. Lusk, Michael Halperin. Towards Reformulation of The Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM) Focusing on Idiosyncratic Rsik And Roll's Meta-Analysis:Methodological Approach[J]. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis.21(1):2008. pp.1-23.
[91]Enriques, Luca, Volpin, Paolo,2007. Corporate Governance Reforms In Continental Europe[J]. J. Econ. Perspect.21,117-140.
[92]Elena Iankova, Jan Katz. Strategies For Political Risk Mediation by International Firms in Transition Economies:The Case of Bulgaria[J]. Journal of World Business.38 (2003). pp.182-203.
[93]Ephraim Clark, Radu Tunaru. Quantification of Political Risk with Multiple Dependent Sources[J]. Journal of Economics and Finance. Vol.27. No.1. Summer 2003. pp.125-135.
[94]E. Slutsky. The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes[J]. Econometrica.1937(5). pp.105-146.
[95]Fogel, Kathy, Randall Morck, and BernardYeung.2008. Corporate Stability and Economic Growth:Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America? Journal of Financial Economics, (available atjfe.rochester.edu).
[96]Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A.. Corporate governance and equity prices[J]. Quart. J. Econ.2003.118,107-155.
[97]Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man[M]. New York:John Wiley & Sons. 1957.
[98]James Agarwal, Dorothee Feils. Political Risk and the Internationalization of Firms:An Empirical Study of Canadian-based Export and FDI Firms[J]. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences.24(3):(2007). pp. 165-181.
[99]Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Plannning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review. Vol.79. No.2.2004.277-304.
[100]John R. S. Fraser, etc. Who Reads What Most Often? A Survey of Enterprise Risk Management Literature Read by Risk Executives[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer 2008. pp.73-91.
[101]J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.43 4. ABI/INFORM Global. pp. 587-609.
[102]J. de la Torre, D. Neckar. Forecasting Political Risks For International Operations[J]. International Journal of Forecasting.4(2), (1988).221-241.
[103]Khan, Haider,2003. Corporate Governance of Family-based Businesses in Asia:Which Road to Take?[J]. Unpublished manuscript. University of Denver.
[104]Kose John, Lubomir Litov, and Bernard Yeung.2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.4.1679-1728.
[105]Lambadiaris, G, L. Papadopoulou, GSkiadopoulos, and I. Zoulis. VAR: History or Simulation? [J]. Risk.16 (2003). pp.122-127.
[106]LeRoy, Stephen F., Larry D. Singell, Jr. Knight on Risk and Uncertainty [J]. Journal of Political Economy. April 1987.394-406.
[107]L.E. Palich, D.R. Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk Taking:Challenging Conventional Wisdom[J], Journal of Business Venturing.1995(10). pp.425-438.
[108]Markets:How Much, Why, and With What Effects?[J]. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies.23(2009).149-176.
[109]Morck, Randall K., Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu.2000, The Information Contents of Stock
Morck Randall and Masao Nakamura.1999. Banks and Corporate Control In Japan[J]. Journal of Finance.54.319-339.
[110]Markets; Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.58.215-260.
[111]M. Friedman. The Role of Monetary Policy[J]. American Economic Review.1968(58). pp.1-17.
[112]Oliver E. Williamson. Corporate Governance[J]. Yale Law Jouenal. Vol. 93.1984. pp.1197-1230.
[113]Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring,1985). pp.177-208.
[114]R. R. Nelson. Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1991.12.61-74.
[115]Peter J.G. Vlaar. Value at Risk Models for Dutch Bond Portfolios[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol.24. No.7 (2000). pp.1131-1154.
[116]P. Branas-Garza et al. Math skills and risk attitudes[J]. Economics Letters 99(2008). pp.332-336.
[117]P. Ferri, H. P. Minsky. Market Processes and Thwarting Systems[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics.1992. Vol.3, No.1. pp.79-91.
[118]Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century [J], Journal of Financial Economics.69.5-50.
[119]Risk Mnagement-Integrated Framework, Executive Summary[R]. September.2004.
[120]Risk and Insurance Management Society(RIMS) and Marsh. The 360°View of Risk:Excellence in Risk Management(Ⅳ)[R]. New York.2007.
[121]R. C. Merton. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates[J]. Journal of Finance.29.2(May 1974). pp.449-470.
[122]R. A. Jarrow, D. Lando, S. M. Turnbull. A Markov Model for The Term Stucture of Credit Risk Spreads[J]. Review of Financial Studies.10.2. (Summer 1997). pp.481-523.
[123]R. Frisch. Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics[J]. Economic Essays in Honour of G. Cassel. Allen and Unqin[M]. 1933. London.
[124]R. E. Lucas. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money[J]. Journal of Economic Theory.1972(4). pp.103-124.
[125]S. B. Sitkin, A. L. Pablo. Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior[J]. Academy of Management Review.17(1).1992. pp.9-38.
[126]Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon.2002. Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.66.3-27.
[127]Structures:Impact on Firms' Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank.
[128]S. Kobrin. Political risk:a review and reconsideration [J]. Journal of International Business Studies.10(1), (1979). pp.67-80.
[129][TH]Sudarat Ananchotikul, [US]Barry Eichengreen. Corporate GovernanceReform in Emerging
[130]Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong. Putting people first?Chinese state-owned enterprises' adjustment to globalization[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2008(26). pp.573-585.
[131]The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Enterprise Steven M. Cassidy, Richard L. Constand, Richard B. Corbett. The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Management Function[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.57, No.4 (Dec.,1990), pp. 664-670.
[132]Tracy Chan Su Yin, Douglas Sikorski, Louis Ta Huu Phuong. How Singapore Companies in Asean Manafe Political Risk[J]. Seoul Journal of Economics. Spring 2003; 16,1.PP.23-58.
[133]V. Chhaochharia, L. Laeven. Corporate Governance Norms and Practices [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation.2009.18.405-431.
[134]W. I. Norton Jr., W. T. Moore. The Influence of Entrepreneurial Risk Assessment on Venture Launch or Growth Decisions[J]. Small Business Economics.2006(26). pp.215-226.
[135]Zingales, Luigi, Corporate Governance [J]. NBER Working Paper No. W6309. (December 1997). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=226064.
[136]中华人民共和国企业国有资产法[J].2008年10月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第五次会议通过.
[137]国资发改革[2006]108号.中央企业全面风险管理指引.2006.6.6.
[138]内部审计具体准则第16号--风险管理审计.中国内审协会2005.5.1.
[139]中华人民共和国财政部企业司网站.全国国有及国有控股企业主要财务指标(2008年5月)[J].http://www.mof.gov.cn/qiyesi/zhengwuxinxi/qiyesi/200806/t20080626_53832.html.
[140]中华人民共和国财政部.2008年1-12月国有及国有控股企业经济运行情况[J].http://qys.mof.gov.cn/qiyesi/zhengwuxinxi/qiyeyunxingdongtai/200901/t20090121 110055.html.
[141]中央企业2008年度分户国有资产运营情况表
[142]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见(国办发[2006]97号).2006.12.5.
[143]国资委令第1号,国有企业清产核资办法,2003.9.9.
[144]国资委令第2号、第17号,中央企业度责任经营业绩考核暂行办法,2003.11.25,2006.12.30。
[145]国资委、财政部令第3号,企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法,2003.12.31。
[146]中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法(国资发分配[2004]227号)。
[147]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会网站.全国国有企业改革发展取得重大进展[J].http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n4175042/n5405123/n5576790/5576917.html.
[148]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会网站.中央企业经营业绩[J].http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n4175042/n5405123/n5576790/5576866.html.
[149]国办发[2003]96号,关于规范国有企业改制工作的意见,2003.11.30.
[150]国有控股上市公司(境外)实施股权激励试行办法(国资发分配[2006]8号)
[151]国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法(国资发分配[2006]175号)
[152]国有独资公司董事会试点企业职工董事管理办法(试行)(国资发群工[2006]21号)
[153]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号)
[154]关于加强和改进国有企业监事会工作的若干意见》(国资发监督[2006]174号)
[155]国资委令第19号.国有股东转让所持上市公司股份管理暂行办法.2007.6.30.
[156]董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
[157]关于规范国有股东与上市公司进行资产重组有关事项的通知(国资发产权[2009]124号)
[158]经贸委等八部门.关于国有大中型企业主辅分离辅业改制分流安置富余人员的实施办法.2002.11.18.
[159]国资委令第13号.中央企业总会计师工作职责管理暂行办法.2006.4.14.
[160]企业国有资本保值增值结果确认暂行办法(国资委令第9号,2004年8月25日)
[161]四川省培育壮大重点优势企业规划(川府发[2001]30号)
[162]四川省培育大企业大集团工作实施意见(川府发[2007]27号)
[163]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见(国办发[2006]97号)
[164]国务院国资委关于国有控股上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见(国资发产权[2005]111号)
[165]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于国有独资公司董事会建设的指导意见(试行)》
[166]董事会试点中央企业专职外部董事管理办法(试行)(国资发干二[2009]301号)
[167]董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
[168]国资发评价[2009]19号.关于进一步加强中央企业金融衍生业务监管的通知[R].2009.2.3.
[169]国资发规划[2004]324号.关于公布中央企业主业(第一批)的通知.
[170]国资发规划[2005]80号.关于公布中央企业主业(第二批)的通知.
[171]国资发规划[2005]251号.关于公布中央企业主业(第三批)的通知.
[172]国资发规划[2006]49号.关于公布中国有色矿冶集团有限公司等16家中央企业主业的通知.
[173]国资发规划[2006]126号.关于公布煤炭科学研究总院等25家中央企业主业的通知.
[174]国资发规划[2007]40号.关于公布中国国际工程咨询公司等4家中央企业主业的通知.
[175]国资发规划[2007]90号.关于公布中国航空器材进出口集团公司等12家中央企业主业的通知.
[176]2008年度国务院国资委监管企业国有资产信息公告(二)
[177]].2009年1-4月全国国有及国有控股企业经济运行情况[J].国务院国有资产监督管理委员会.
①按照财政部的统计分类,国有企业包括：国有及国有控股企业,包括中央企业和36个省(自治区、直辖市、计划单列市)国有及国有控股企业。其中,中央企业包括两个部分,即：82个中央部门所属的国有及国有控股企业及133户中央管理企业,以上均不含国有金融类企业。
②中华人民共和国企业国有资产法[J].2008年10月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第五次会议通过.第5条.
③纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.33-34.
④辞海中风险词条解释如下：“风险：人们在生产建设和日常生活中遭遇能导致人身伤亡、财产受损及其他经济损失的自然灾害、意外事故和其他不测事件的可能性。保险人承担经济责任的风险叫保险风险。成为保险风险必须具备几个条件：大量同质的风险存在、损失必须是意外的,而且必须是能导致一定的经济损失的,同时它又不是投机性的。”辞海(1999年版缩印本)[M].上海辞书出版社.2000.P4351.
①约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷： Q-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.P216、728.
②“风险”概念在经济、管理理论中大致存在以下几种表述：(1)损失的机会和损失的可能性；(2)损失的不确定性,包括客观的和主观的不确定性；(3)实际与预期结果的离差；(4)实际结果偏离预期结果的概率。见许谨良.风险管理(第三版)[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2009.1-2.
③在《中央企业全面风险管理指引》(2006.6.6)“总则”第三条中给出一个概要的“企业风险”概念,即“未来的不确定性对企业实现其经营目标的影响”,但并未对其赋予更为明确的规定性。目前见于各国国家标准中的、更为具体的风险概念可参考如下：the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives. NOTE 1:A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and the consequences that may flow from it. NOTE 2:Risk is measured in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (1.3.4) and their likelihood (1.3.7).NOTE 3:Risk may have a positive or negative impact. NOTE 4: See ISO/IEC Guide 51, for issues related to safety. Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004(Third Edition)[M]. Standard Australia/Standards News Zealand.2004.4.
① C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Richard M. Heins. Risk management and insurance[M]. New York:McGraw-Hill. c1985. pp.1.
①[美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G.赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.P10-11.
②例如风险被定义为如下的不确定性："The type of uncertainty in which the possible outcomes are either 'loss'or 'no loss', rather that with uncertainty that also present the opportunity for profit."从理论研究上看,风险至少包括了一下三种分类方式,即纯风险(Pure Risk)和机会风险(Speculative Risk)、静态风险(Static Risk)和动态风险(Dynamic Risk)、主观风险(Subjective Risk)和客观风险(Objective Risk)。 James S. Trieschmann, Robert E. Hoyt, David W. Sommer. Risk Management and Insurance(12th edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.P4-5.
①李荣融.宏大的工程宝贵的经验——记国有企业改革发展30年[J].求是.2008.16.P27-30.
②OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004.
③金碚.国有企业的地位和作用[J].红旗文稿.1999(19).15-17.
①陈清泰.国有大型企业改革与发展问题研究[J].煤炭企业管理.2002(7).17-19.
② OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004
①周其仁.公有制企业的性质[J].经济研究.2000(11).3-12.
②吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社.1994.
③易宪容.政府：国有企业改革难以逾越的障碍[Jl.江苏社会科学.8-15.
④张维迎.完善公司治理结构已成国企改革最大挑战[J].领导决策信息.2002(34).24-25.
⑤张维迎.国企改革的真问题[J].商界.2007(2).
⑥“配备给定的己知技术,在定义周密的市场约束之下经营的一家厂商,是获取最大利润的一个行为者(不管是由于有意识的、理性决策或其他什么方式获得的),他就会认为不必需要有任何特定的厂商理论：厂商理论只不过是最优化方法(可能还有市场结构)的档案……经济学家的工作只是力求发展和应用最优化技术”。约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷：E-J)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.P381.
①陈清泰.公司治理：解开中国国企改革的关键一环[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊).2002(4).5-9.
②陈清泰.国企改革——五大重点亟待深化[J].中国电力企业管理.2005(3).26-27.
①所谓政策性负担是指由于国有企业承担过多的社会性职能而形成的负担,战略性负担是指在传统发展战略的指导下,国有企业由于投资于中国不具比较优势的资本相对密集的产业和产业区段所形成的负担。林毅夫,李志.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊).2005(4).913-936.
①[美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.7.
①[美]H·范里安,费方域等译.微观经济学：现代观点[M].生活·读书·新知三联书店.上海人民出版社.1994.271.
② [US]J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. US:Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.43.4.587-609.
③在管理中,不确定性可以定性地分为四个层次：①前景清晰明确的,②有几种可能的前景,③有一定变化范围的前景,④前景不明。见休.考特尼.不确定性管理[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.7-11.
④公司风险管理一般包括4个步骤：①判明企业所面临的风险,②将风险暴露量化,③确定所求结果的形式,④设计或构造一个策略,把风险暴露转变为所希望的形式。见[美]约翰·马歇尔,维普尔·班赛尔,宋逢明等译.金融工程[M].清华大学出版社.1998.151.
⑤[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.215、35、216.
⑥[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.279.
① LeRoy, Stephen F., Larry D. Singell, Jr. Knight on Risk and Uncertainty [J]. Journal of Political Economy. April 1987.394-406.
②[美]埃德加·E·彼得斯.宋学锋,曹庆仁,乇新宇译.复杂性、风险与金融市场[M].中国人民大学出版社.2004.5-9.
③[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.242-245.
② (1) R. R. Nelson. Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1991. 12.61-74. (2) B. Wernerfelt. A resource-based view of the Firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1984.5. 171-180. D.J.
①[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克,曾刚等译.风险管理[M].中国财政经济出版社.2005.32.
①[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.210.
②奈特认为,专业化过程在企业内部之所以能够发生,尤其是专门行使管理职能的企业家的出现,并非由于行使管理职能的企业家的风险态度与行使生产职能的工人的风险态度不同,而是由于人的个体在判断和行为方式上的差异所致。“人们寻求他们所需要的那种管理才能极强的个人,并让这些人来负责群体的工作,使其他成员的活动服从于这些人的指挥和管制。……产业组织的存在依据于这样一个重要的事实,即在通常情况下,一个人的智力可以用于指挥其他人的日常操作和精神活动。”见[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.242.
③“高级组织形式在两个方面优于低级组织形式,一是包括大量个人决策、风险或‘各种实例’的经营活动的扩大；二是可以更有效地实现利益的统一,这就可以减少一个人根据另一个人的决策来行为所引出的败德风险问题”。见[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.210、228-229.
④[美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].北京：商务印书馆.2006.230.
①Herbert A.Simon,Models of Man[M].New York:John Wiley & Sons.1957.pp.199.
①在简单的合同模型中,当存在专用性资产时,由于必须对专业性资产设置保护,由此得到的合同价格(收益)会低于没有保护情况下的价格。由此交易成本可以通过两个不同的价格差异大小得到衡量。见Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring, 1985). pp.177-208.
② [US]Zingales, Luigi, Corporate Governance [J]. NBER Working Paper No. W6309. (December 1997). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=226064.
① Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer,2003, Family firms[J], Journal of Finance 58,2167-2201.
② Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century[J], Journal of Financial Economics.69.5-50.
① Morck, Randall K., Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu.2000, The Information Contents of Stock Markets; Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 58.215-260.
② Durnev, Artyom, Kan Li, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung.2004. Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications For Economies In Transition[J]. Economics of Transition.12.593-634.
③ Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon.2002. Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.66.3-27.
④ Kose John, Lubomir Litov, and Bernard Yeung.2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.4.1679-1728.
⑤ Morck Randall and Masao Nakamura.1999. Banks and Corporate Control In Japan[J]. Journal of Finance. 54.319-339.
① Fogel, Kathy, Randall Morck, and BernardYeung.2008. Corporate Stability and Economic Growth:Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America? Journal of Financial Economics, (available at jfe.rochester.edu).
②当前研究中,所谓公司治理风险(Corporate Governance Risk)仅存在于审计研究领域,意指治理结构的质量。见[US]Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Plannning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review. Vol.79. No.2.2004.277-304.
③ (1) Alba, P., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, S.,1998. Thailand's Corporate Financing and Governance Structures:Impact on Firms' Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank. (2) Khan, Haider, 2003. Corporate Governance of Family-based Businesses in Asia:Which Road to Take?[J]. Unpublished manuscript. University of Denver. (3) Enriques, Luca, Volpin, Paolo,2007. Corporate Governance Reforms In Continental Europe[J]. J. Econ. Perspect.21,117-140.
①世界银行.东亚复兴之路[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.1999.63-66.
② Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring,1985). pp.177-208.
① [TH]Sudarat Ananchotikul, [US]Barry Eichengreen. Corporate GovernanceReform in Emerging Markets: How Much, Why, and With What Effects? [J]. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies.23(2009). 149-176.
① Risk and Insurance Management Society(RIMS) and Marsh. The 360° View of Risk:Excellence in Risk Management(Ⅳ)[R]. New York.2007.
② The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Enterprise Risk Mnagement-Integrated Framework, Executive Summary[R]. September.2004. pp.2.
① Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission(COSO). Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework:Executive Summary[R]. September.2004.
② Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp. 115-132.
③ John R. S. Fraser, etc. Who Reads What Most Often? A Survey of Enterprise Risk Management Literature Read by Risk Executives[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer 2008. pp.73-91.
④风险管理部分内容来自：[美]兹维·博迪,罗伯特·C·莫顿.伊志宏等译校.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2000.252-261.
①[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克.曾刚等译.风险管理[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.517.
② Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp. 115-132.
①黄达.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2003.247.
①[美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.204.
②马克维茨资产组合理论的基本假设包括：(1)投资者仅仅考虑收益概率分布的前两阶矩；(2)在给定资产组合均值收益的情况下,投资者选择一个最低收益方差的资产组合；(3)投资期限是一个时期；(4)投资者的个体决策不影响市场价格：(5)投资可以被无限细分；(6)投资者能卖空资产。见。[美]R.A.贾罗,V马斯科西莫维,W.T津巴.吴文峰等译.金融经济学手册[M].世纪出版社·上海人民出版社.2007.15.
①[美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.231-241.
② [US] Edward J. Lusk, Michael Halperin. Towards Reformulation of The Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM) Focusing on Idiosyncratic Rsik And Roll's Meta-Analysis:Methodological Approach[J]. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis.21(1):2008. pp.1-23.
①[英]Martin Baxter, Andrew Rennie.叶中行等译.金融数学：衍生产品定价引论[M].人民邮电出版社.2006.4.
② J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.434. ABI/INFORM Global, pp.587-609.
③ (1) Dongsae Cho. The Impact of Risk Management Decisions on Firm Value:Gordon's Growth Model Approach[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.55, No.1 (Mar.,1988), pp.118-131; (2) Steven M. Cassidy, Richard L. Constand, Richard B. Corbett. The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Management Function[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.57, No.4 (Dec.,1990), pp.664-670.
①Black-Scholes模型的基本假设为：(1)标的资产服从对数正态随机游走(风险中性),(2)无风险利率是关于时间的一个己知函数；(3)标的资产无分红；(4)套期保值连续进行；(5)无交易费用；(6)无套利。见[英]保罗·威尔莫特.刘立新译.金融工程与风险管理技术[M].机械工业出版社.2009.107-111.
②[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克.曾刚等译.风险管理[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.150.
① (1) D. Hendricks. Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data[J]. Economic Policy Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).2 (1996). pp.39-69. (2) Peter J.G Vlaar. Value at Risk Models for Dutch Bond Portfolios[J], Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol.24. No.7 (2000). pp.1131-1154.
② Chu-Hsiung Lin et al.. A General Revised Historical Simulation Method for Portfolio Value-at-Risk[J]. The Journal of Alternative Investment.2005 Fall. pp.87-103.
③ Lambadiaris, G, L. Papadopoulou, G Skiadopoulos, and I. Zoulis. VAR:History or Simulation?[J]. Risk. 16 (2003). pp.122-127.
④ J. de la Torre, D. Neckar. Forecasting Political Risks For International Operations[J]. International Journal of Forecasting.4(2), (1988).221-241.
① S. Kobrin. Political risk:a review and reconsideration[J]. Journal of International Business Studies.10(1), (1979). pp.67-80.
② James Agarwal, Dorothee Feils. Political Risk and the Internationalization of Firms:An Empirical Study of Canadian-based Export and FDI Firms[J]. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences.24(3):(2007). pp. 165-181.
③ R. C. Merton. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates[J]. Journal of Finance.29.2(May 1974). pp.449-470.
① R. A. Jarrow, D. Lando, S. M. Turnbull. A Markov Model for The Term Stucture of Credit Risk SpreadsfJ]. Review of Financial Studies.10.2. (Summer 1997). pp.481-523.
② Ephraim Clark, Radu Tunaru. Quantification of Political Risk with Multiple Dependent Sources[J]. Journal of Economics and Finance. Vol.27. No.1. Summer 2003. pp.125-135.
③ Elena Iankova, Jan Katz. Strategies For Political Risk Mediation by International Firms in Transition Economies:The Case of Bulgaria[J]. Journal of World Business.38 (2003). pp.182-203.
④ Tracy Chan Su Yin, Douglas Sikorski, Louis Ta Huu Phuong. How Singapore Companies in Asean Manafe Political Risk[J]. Seoul Journal of Economics. Spring 2003; 16,1. pp.23-58.
⑤[美]J. S. Trieschmann, R. E. Hoyt, D. W. Sommer.齐瑞宗改编.风险管理与保险(Risk Management and Insurance)(12th Edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.75-86.
① Bhagwah Chowdhry, Jonathan T. B. Howe. Corporate Risk Management for Multinational Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies[J]. European Finance Review.2(1999). pp.229-246.
② Assaf Eisdoefer. Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms[J1. The Journal of Finance. Vol. LⅩⅢ. No.2. April 2008. pp.609-637.
① P. Branas-Garza et al. Math skills and risk attitudes[J]. Economics Letters.2008 (99). pp.332-336.
①肖振宇.金融混业经营及其风险管理研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
②杨文瀚.商业银行信用风险度量模型与管理研究[D].南京航空航天大学.2006.
③孔繁利.金融市场风险的度量——基于极值理论和Copula的应用研究[Dl.吉林大学.2006.
④邓兰松.基于EVT的证券公司市场风险管理的VAR与CVAR研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
⑤刘荣茂.我国商业银行风险管理的研究[D].南京农业大学.1998.
①宝钢集团有限公司.宝钢推进全面风险管理的探索与实践[J].国际商务财会.2007.12.5-7.
②赵息,张雷,王鹏.国有投资控股公司全面风险管理[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版).2008(2).150-152.
③李劲松.经营风险决策和框架效应机制研究[D].浙江大学管理学院.2000.26-29.
④郭焱.战略联盟形式选择与风险控制[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.12.
⑤唐守安.国际石油公司的全面风险管理[J].国际石油经济.2007.8.37-45.
⑥崔毅等.企业风险与微观经济杠杆[M].华南理工大学出版社.2006.
⑦刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经.2007(6).115-120.
⑧谢志华.内部控制、公司治理、风险管理：关系与整合[J].会计研究.2007.10.37-45.
① S. B. Sitkin, A. L. Pablo. Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior[J]. Academy of Management Review.17(1).1992. pp.9-38.
② L.E. Palich, D.R. Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk Taking:Challenging Conventional Wisdom[J]. Journal of Business Venturing.1995(10). pp.425-438.
③ W. I. Norton Jr., W. T. Moore. The Influence of Entrepreneurial Risk Assessment on Venture Launch or Growth Decisions[J]. Small Business Economics.2006(26). pp.215-226.
①邓明然,夏喆.基于耦合的企业风险传导模型探讨[J].经济与管理研究.2006(3).66-88.
① Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century[J], Journal of Financial Economics.69. pp.5-50.
②2007年,经修订后的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》开始执行；2008年,《中华人民共
②[美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上、下)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.
①上述问题等价于一个最优化问题,在线性情况下,可以利用线性规划进行求解。详见[美]罗杰B.迈尔森.费剑平译.博弈论：矛盾冲突分析[M].北京：中国经济出版社.2001.96.
②[美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.235-257.
① (1) R. Frisch. Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics[J]. Economic Essays in Honour of G. Cassel. Allen and Unqin[M].1933. London. (2) E. Slutsky. The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes[J]. Econometrica.1937(5). pp.105-146. (3) M. Friedman. The Role of Monetary Policy [J]. American Economic Review.1968(58). pp.1-17. (4) R. E. Lucas. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money[J]. Journal of Economic Theory.1972(4). pp.103-124.
② P. Ferri, H. P. Minsky. Market Processes and Thwarting Systems[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics.1992. Vol.3, No.1. pp.79-91.
① C.-E Bai, Li, D.D., Z. Tao. Wang, Y., A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics.2000.28 (4), pp.716-738.
②纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.43.
①黄淑和：今年央企利润有望实现同比正增长[J].中国证券报.2009.12.4.A02.
①数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
②图中数据为1998年至2008年国有及国有控股工业企业部分指标占同期规模以上工业企业相应指标的比例。数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
③根据年鉴数据计算得出.数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
①参见：李荣融.国有资产管理体制改革的目标和途径[J].上海国资.2003(9).4-17.
②参见：纪尽善.当前国有企业改革发展现状问题与对策研究[Jl.经济师.2001(6).23-27.
③见《关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号).2006.12.5.
①纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.79-81.
②主要包括以下文件：①国资委令第1号,《国有企业清产核资办法》,2003.9.9。②国资委令第2号、第17号,《中央企业度责任经营业绩考核暂行办法》,2003.11.25,2006.12.30。③国资委、财政部令第3号,《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》,2003.12.31。④《中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法》(国资发分配[2004]227号)。⑤国办发[2003]96号,《关于规范国有企业改制工作的意见》,2003.11.30。⑥《国有控股上市公司(境外)实施股权激励试行办法》(国资发分配[2006]8号)、《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》(国资发分配[2006]175号)。⑦《国有独资公司董事会试点企业职工董事管理办法(试行)》(国资发群工[2006]21号)。⑧《关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号)。⑨《关于加强和改进国有企业监事会工作的若干意见》(国资发监督[2006]174号)⑩国资委令第19号,《国有股东转让所持上市公司股份管理暂行办法》,2007.6.30。①《董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法》(国资发群工[2009]53号)。12《关于规范国有股东与上市公司进行资产重组有关事项的通知》(国资发产权[2009]124号)。13经贸委等八部门,《关于国有大中型企业主辅分离辅业改制分流安置富余人员的实施办法》,2002.11.18。14国资委令第13号,《中央企业总会计师工作职责管理暂行办法》,2006.4.14。
③中央企业改制经历了从特大型中央企业的“存续分立”,到大中型企业“主辅分离”,到大型中央企业“整体上市”,然后到“整体改制,整体上市”的发展历程。见：徐鸣.中央企业改制模式的分析[J].国际经贸探索.2007(10).33-42.
④李荣融.我们找到了一条发展国有企业的新路——五年来国有企业改革发展的成就与经验[J].当代经济.2008(4).8-9.
①世界银行东亚及太平洋地区扶贫与经济管理局.中国第十一个五年规划——中期进展情况评估[R].2008.34.
②对四川工业产业政策的研究可以作为一个佐证。见杨志远.论四川产业集群政策体系及其优化[J].理论与改革.2010(1).136-139.
①纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.14.
①部分特征在前文已有论述,此处只陈述观点,不再展开论述。
②基础数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
③基础数据来源.中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
①2008年1-11月,中央企业资产总额14.6万亿元,资产总额超过1000亿元的企业有40家,净资产6.5万亿元,平均资产负债率55.6%。许多中央企业在快速发展的同时,整体素质和实力进一步提高,竞争力明显增强,不但居于国内同行业的领先地位,在国际上也有较大影响。建筑行业,中交集团、中冶集团、中国建筑、中国中铁、中国铁建都是国内龙头企业,中交集团在2007年全球最大225家承包商中拍米干第14位,居中资企业第一。煤炭行业中,神华集团2007年煤炭产量将超过2亿吨,销量超过2.6亿吨,稳居世界第一；航运业,中远集团船队规模世界第二；造船业,中船集团、中船重工2007年新接订单稳居世界前列；设备制造业,东方电气集团发电设别产量连续三年排名世界第一；商贸业,中化集团、中粮集团、中国五矿均进入世界500强。见李荣融.努力开创中央企业又好又快发展新局面[J].宏观经济研究.2008(2).3-11.
②约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第四卷：O-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.579-580.
①王键.日本企业集团的形成与发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2001.序41-43.
②[美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京：商务印书馆.2002.413-418.
③在产业经济理论中,企业的纵向一体化和多元化扩展都是企业集团(Conglomerates)形成的原因。一个最广义的企业集团定义是从生产经营的角度进行描述的,即当一家厂商的全部产出可由其在一种以上产品市场上的活动构成,这一厂商就可被称为企业集团(见约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷：A-D)[M1.北京：经济科学出版社.1996.621.)。这是一个极为宽泛的定义,难以描述现实中企业集团的现实状况。对现实中的企业集团相接近的概念是：“所谓企业集团,是通过股份相互持有、融资关系、交易关系以及董事兼任制而形成的企业结合体,这些企业形成一个群体”(见[英]约翰逊·斯考特.现代企业的所有与支配[M].税务经理协会.1989.206.)。在组织特征上,随着区域、产业和发展阶段的不同,企业集团具有各自不同的特征。
①2007年以来,中央企业抓住资本市场快速发展的有利时机,加快整体上市和回归A股市场步伐。9家企业实现了境内外首次公开发行股票并上市,中国中铁实现了主业资产整体上市,中国远洋、中国神华、中国石油、中国铝业、中海油服、中海集装箱等6家企业H股回归A股。鞍钢股份、中国船舶等12家企业境内增发、配股。
②见李荣融.中央企业要在深层次问题上加大改革创新力度[Jl.当代经济.2006(10).4-5.
③国有控股上市公司的股权分置改革工作要着眼于上市公司长远发展,切实保护投资者特别是公众投资者的合法权益。上市公司质量是保证资本市场稳定发展的基石。国有控股上市公司及其国有股股东要不断提高公司的竞争力,做强做大,实现可持续发展,努力增加对投资者的回报,构建国有股股东和其他投资者的共同利益基础。见国务院国资委关于国有控股上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见(国资发产权[2005]111号).截止2007年底,国有控股上市公司股权分置改革基本完成。
①见《国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于国有独资公司董事会建设的指导意见(试行)》；董事会试点中央企业专职外部董事管理办法(试行)(国资发干二[2009]301号).
②见董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
③截止2007年底,中央企业党员总数409万人(其中离退休党员127.4万人),党组570个,党委15482个,党总支14074个,党支部19.1万个。见国资委五年回顾[M].61.
①我国第一家整体上市公司是中交集团。2005年12月,原中港集团和路桥集团以强强联合、新设合并方式重组成立中国交通建设集团有限公司。2006年10月,通过改制和资产重组,将535家法人单位和54家分支机构全部纳入上市范围,在全面、严格审计和资产评估的基础上,中交集团以全部主营业务及相关资产作为投入,独家发起设立了中国交通建设股份有限公司。2006年12月15日,中交股份在香港成功上市,成为中央企业第一家整体上市、不留存续的企业。中交股份股价持续走高,2007年第4季度成为全球市值最大的建筑公司。见国资委五年回顾[M].52.
② Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong. Putting people first? Chinese state-owned enterprises' adjustment to globalization [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2008(26). pp.573-585.
①国资发评价[2009]19号.关于进一步加强中央企业金融衍生业务监管的通知[R].2009.2.3.
[1]中国统计年鉴(2007)[M].中国统计出版社.2007.
[2]中国统计年鉴(2009)[M].中国统计出版社.2009.
[3]中国财政统计年鉴(2007)
[4]辞海(1999年版缩印本)[M].上海辞书出版社.2000.
[5]约翰·伊特韦尔,默里·米尔盖特,彼得·纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷：A-D,第二卷：E-J,第四卷：Q-Z)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1996.
[6]马克思.资本论(第1卷)[M].北京：人民出版社.1975.
[7]纪尽善.大型国有经济主体股份制与增强控制力研究[M].人民出版社.2009.
[8]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津：天津人民出版社.1994.
[9]许谨良.风险管理(第三版)[M].北京：中国金融出版社.2009.
[10]崔毅等.企业风险与微观经济杠杆[M].华南理工大学出版社.2006.
[11][美]弗兰克·H.奈特,安佳译,风险、不确定性与利润[M].商务印书馆.2006.
[12][美]杰克·赫什莱佛,约翰G.赖利.刘广灵,李绍荣译.不确定性与信息分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2000.7.
[13][美]H·范里安,费方域等译.微观经济学：现代观点[M].生活·读书·新知三联书店.上海人民出版社.1994.
[14][美]休.考特尼.不确定性管理[M].中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[15][美]约翰·马歇尔,维普尔·班赛尔,宋逢明等译.金融工程[M].清华大学出版社.1998.
[16][美]埃德加·E.彼得斯.宋学锋,曹庆仁,王新宇译.复杂性、风险与 金融市场[M].中国人民大学出版社.2004.
[17][美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹.加莱,罗伯特·马克,曾刚等译.风险管理[M].中国财政经济出版社.2005.
[18][美]帕特里克·博尔顿,[比]马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞,费方域等译.合同理论[M].上海：格致出版社·上海三联出版社·上海人民出版社.2008.
[19]施锡铨.博弈论[M].上海财经大学出版社.2000.
[20]孙永祥.公司治理结构：理论与实证研究[M].上海：上海三联书店·上海人民出版社.2002.
[21]世界银行.东亚复兴之路[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.1999.
[22][美]兹维·博迪,罗伯特·C·莫顿.伊志宏等译校.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2000.
[23]黄达.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2003.
[24][美]卢恩伯格.沈丽萍等译.投资科学[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005.
[25][美]R.A.贾罗, V马斯科西莫维,W.T.津巴.吴文峰等译.金融经济学手册[M].世纪出版社·上海人民出版社.2007.
[26][英]Martin Baxter,Andrew Rennie.叶中行等译.金融数学：衍生产品定价引论[M].人民邮电出版社.2006.4.
[27][英]保罗·威尔莫特.刘立新译.金融工程与风险管理技术[M].机械工业出版社.2009.
[28]国资委五年回顾[M].
[29][美]罗杰B.迈尔森.费剑平译.博弈论：矛盾冲突分析[M].北京：中国经济出版社.2001.
[30][美]冯·诺依曼,摩根斯顿.王文玉,王宇译.博弈论与经济行为(上、下)[M].上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店.2004.
[31]王键.日本企业集团的形成与发展[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社.2001.
[32][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.段毅才,王伟译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].北京：商务印书馆.2002.
[33][英]约翰逊·斯考特.现代企业的所有与支配[M].税务经理协会. 1989.
[34]纪尽善.当前国有企业改革发展现状问题与对策研究[J].经济师.2001(6).23-27.
[35]李荣融.宏大的工程宝贵的经验——记国有企业改革发展30年[J].求是.2008.16.
[36]李荣融.国有资产管理体制改革的目标和途径[J].上海国资.2003(9).4-17.
[37]李荣融.我们找到了一条发展国有企业的新路——五年来国有企业改革发展的成就与经验[J].当代经济.2008(4).8-9.
[38]李荣融.中央企业要在深层次问题上加大改革创新力度[J].当代经济.2006(10).4-5.
[39]李荣融.努力开创中央企业又好又快发展新局面[J].宏观经济研究.2008(2).3-11.
[40]金碚.国有企业的地位和作用[J].红旗文稿.1999(19)
[41]陈清泰.国有大型企业改革与发展问题研究[J].煤炭企业管理.2002(7).
[42]陈清泰.公司治理：解开中国国企改革的关键一环[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊).2002().5-9.
[43]陈清泰.国企改革——五大重点亟待深化[J].中国电力企业管理.2005(3).26-27.
[44]周其仁.公有制企业的性质[J].经济研究.2000(11).3-12.
[45]易宪容.政府：国有企业改革难以逾越的障碍[J].江苏社会科学.8-15.
[46]张维迎.完善公司治理结构己成国企改革最大挑战[J].领导决策信息.2002(34).24-25.
[47]张维迎.国企改革的真问题[J].商界.2007(2)
[48]国企改革出路何在?——专家观点摘编[J].中国改革.26-29.
[49]林毅夫,李志.中国的国有企业与金融体制改革[J].经济学(季刊)2005(4).913-936.
[50]宝钢集团有限公司.宝钢推进全面风险管理的探索与实践[J].国际商务财会.2007.12.5-7.
[51]赵息,张雷,王鹏.国有投资控股公司全面风险管理[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版).2008(2).150-152.
[52]李劲松.经营风险决策和框架效应机制研究[D].浙江大学管理学院.2000.26-29.
[53]郭焱.战略联盟形式选择与风险控制[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.12.
[54]邓兰松.基于EVT的证券公司市场风险管理的VAR与CVAR研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
[55]肖振宇.金融混业经营及其风险管理研究[D].天津大学管理学院.2004.
[56]孔繁利.金融市场风险的度量——基于极值理论和Copula的应用研究[D].吉林大学.2006.
[57]杨文瀚.商业银行信用风险度量模型与管理研究[D].南京航空航天大学.2006.
[58]刘荣茂.我国商业银行风险管理的研究[D].南京农业大学.1998.
[59]沈俊.企业风险传导条件、类型及路径研究[J].当代经济管理.2006(3).23-26.
[60]杨乃定,Rolf Mirus.企业集成风险管理——企业风险管理发展新方向[J].工业工程与管理.2002(5).1-5.
[60]叶建木,邓明然,王洪运.企业风险传导的机理研究[J].理论月刊.2005(3).156-158.
[61]崔毅,杨卫,邵希娟.从亚洲金融风暴反观企业风险的传导机理[J].南方金融.2001(10).27-29.
[61]唐守安.国际石油公司的全面风险管理[J].国际石油经济.2007.8.37-45.
[62]刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经.2007(6).115-120.
[63]谢志华.内部控制、公司治理、风险管理：关系与整合[J].会计研究.2007.10.37-45.
[64]邓明然,夏喆.基于耦合的企业风险传导模型探讨[J].经济与管理研 究.2006(3).66-88.
[65]黄淑和：今年央企利润有望实现同比正增长[J].中国证券报.2009.12.4.A02.
[66]世界银行东亚及太平洋地区扶贫与经济管理局.中国第十一个五年规划——中期进展情况评估[R].2008.
[67]徐鸣.中央企业改制模式的分析[J].国际经贸探索.2007(10).33-42.
[68]郝洪.500强不能总是“大老粗”[J].人民日报.2009.9.7.(9,经济版).
[69]国资委副主任李伟披露68家央企涉足金融衍生产品业务浮亏114亿元[J].学习时报2009.11.30.(1版).
[70]四大资产管理公司完成政策性不良资产处置任务[J].上海证券报.2007.1.16.
[71]后危机时代央企面临六大法律风险[J].法制日报.2009.12.1.
[72][美]J. S. Trieschmann, R. E. Hoyt, D. W. Sommer.齐瑞宗改编.风险管理与保险(Risk Management and Insurance)(12th Edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.
[73]James S. Trieschmann, Robert E. Hoyt, David W. Sommer. Risk Management and Insurance(12th edition)[M].高等教育出版社.2005.
[74]OECD:OECD GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES[Z]. OECD.2004.
[75]Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004(Third Edition)[M]. Standard Australia/Standards News Zealand.2004.
[76]Alba, P., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, S.,1998. Thailand's Corporate Financing and Governance Structures:Impact on Firms'Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank.
[77]Alexander, CO., CT. Leigh. On the Covariance Matrices Used in Value at Risk Models[J]. The Journal of Derivatives, Spring 1997, pp.50-62.
[78]Assaf Eisdoefer. Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms[J]. The Journal of Finance. Vol. LⅩⅢ. No.2. April 2008. pp. 609-637.
[79]B. Wernerfelt. A resource-based view of the Firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1984.5.171-180. D.J.
[80]Bhagwah Chowdhry, Jonathan T. B. Howe. Corporate Risk Management for Multinational Corporations:Financial and Operational Hedging Policies[J]. European Finance Review.2(1999). pp.229-246.
[81]Bruce Branson, etc. Financial Management Association International. October,2007. Enterprise Risk Management:Current Initiatives and Issues[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer.2008. pp.115-132.
[82]Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer,2003, Family firms[J], Journal of Finance 58,2167-2201.
[83]C.-E Bai, Li, D.D., Z. Tao. Wang, Y., A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics.2000.28 (4), pp. 716-738.
[84]Chu-Hsiung Lin et al.. A General Revised Historical Simulation Method for Portfolio Value-at-Risk[J]. The Journal of Alternative Investment.2005 Fall. pp. 87-103.
[85]D. Hendricks. Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data[J]. Economic Policy Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).2 (1996). pp.39-69.
[86]Derivatives:Over the Counter, Out of Sight[J]. Economist.2009.11.14.
[87]Dongsae Cho. The Impact of Risk Management Decisions on Firm Value: Gordon's Growth Model Approach[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.55, No.1 (Mar.,1988), pp.118-131.
[88]Durnev, A., Kim, E.H.. To steal or not to steal:Firm attributes, legal environment and valuation[J]. J. Finance.2005.60,1461-1493.
[89]Durnev, Artyom, Kan Li, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung.2004. Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications For Economies In Transition [J]. Economics of Transition.12.593-634.
[90]Edward J. Lusk, Michael Halperin. Towards Reformulation of The Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM) Focusing on Idiosyncratic Rsik And Roll's Meta-Analysis:Methodological Approach[J]. Journal of Financial Management and Analysis.21(1):2008. pp.1-23.
[91]Enriques, Luca, Volpin, Paolo,2007. Corporate Governance Reforms In Continental Europe[J]. J. Econ. Perspect.21,117-140.
[92]Elena Iankova, Jan Katz. Strategies For Political Risk Mediation by International Firms in Transition Economies:The Case of Bulgaria[J]. Journal of World Business.38 (2003). pp.182-203.
[93]Ephraim Clark, Radu Tunaru. Quantification of Political Risk with Multiple Dependent Sources[J]. Journal of Economics and Finance. Vol.27. No.1. Summer 2003. pp.125-135.
[94]E. Slutsky. The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclic Processes[J]. Econometrica.1937(5). pp.105-146.
[95]Fogel, Kathy, Randall Morck, and BernardYeung.2008. Corporate Stability and Economic Growth:Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America? Journal of Financial Economics, (available atjfe.rochester.edu).
[96]Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A.. Corporate governance and equity prices[J]. Quart. J. Econ.2003.118,107-155.
[97]Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man[M]. New York:John Wiley & Sons. 1957.
[98]James Agarwal, Dorothee Feils. Political Risk and the Internationalization of Firms:An Empirical Study of Canadian-based Export and FDI Firms[J]. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences.24(3):(2007). pp. 165-181.
[99]Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Plannning and Pricing Decisions. The Accounting Review. Vol.79. No.2.2004.277-304.
[100]John R. S. Fraser, etc. Who Reads What Most Often? A Survey of Enterprise Risk Management Literature Read by Risk Executives[J]. Journal of Applied Finance. Spring/Summer 2008. pp.73-91.
[101]J. David Cummins. Risk Management and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance. Dec 1976.43 4. ABI/INFORM Global. pp. 587-609.
[102]J. de la Torre, D. Neckar. Forecasting Political Risks For International Operations[J]. International Journal of Forecasting.4(2), (1988).221-241.
[103]Khan, Haider,2003. Corporate Governance of Family-based Businesses in Asia:Which Road to Take?[J]. Unpublished manuscript. University of Denver.
[104]Kose John, Lubomir Litov, and Bernard Yeung.2008. Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.4.1679-1728.
[105]Lambadiaris, G, L. Papadopoulou, GSkiadopoulos, and I. Zoulis. VAR: History or Simulation? [J]. Risk.16 (2003). pp.122-127.
[106]LeRoy, Stephen F., Larry D. Singell, Jr. Knight on Risk and Uncertainty [J]. Journal of Political Economy. April 1987.394-406.
[107]L.E. Palich, D.R. Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk Taking:Challenging Conventional Wisdom[J], Journal of Business Venturing.1995(10). pp.425-438.
[108]Markets:How Much, Why, and With What Effects?[J]. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies.23(2009).149-176.
[109]Morck, Randall K., Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu.2000, The Information Contents of Stock
Morck Randall and Masao Nakamura.1999. Banks and Corporate Control In Japan[J]. Journal of Finance.54.319-339.
[110]Markets; Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.58.215-260.
[111]M. Friedman. The Role of Monetary Policy[J]. American Economic Review.1968(58). pp.1-17.
[112]Oliver E. Williamson. Corporate Governance[J]. Yale Law Jouenal. Vol. 93.1984. pp.1197-1230.
[113]Oliver E. Williamson. Assessing Contract[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. Vol. No.1(Spring,1985). pp.177-208.
[114]R. R. Nelson. Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?[J]. Strategic Management Journal.1991.12.61-74.
[115]Peter J.G. Vlaar. Value at Risk Models for Dutch Bond Portfolios[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol.24. No.7 (2000). pp.1131-1154.
[116]P. Branas-Garza et al. Math skills and risk attitudes[J]. Economics Letters 99(2008). pp.332-336.
[117]P. Ferri, H. P. Minsky. Market Processes and Thwarting Systems[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics.1992. Vol.3, No.1. pp.79-91.
[118]Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales.2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development In the 20th Century [J], Journal of Financial Economics.69.5-50.
[119]Risk Mnagement-Integrated Framework, Executive Summary[R]. September.2004.
[120]Risk and Insurance Management Society(RIMS) and Marsh. The 360°View of Risk:Excellence in Risk Management(Ⅳ)[R]. New York.2007.
[121]R. C. Merton. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates[J]. Journal of Finance.29.2(May 1974). pp.449-470.
[122]R. A. Jarrow, D. Lando, S. M. Turnbull. A Markov Model for The Term Stucture of Credit Risk Spreads[J]. Review of Financial Studies.10.2. (Summer 1997). pp.481-523.
[123]R. Frisch. Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics[J]. Economic Essays in Honour of G. Cassel. Allen and Unqin[M]. 1933. London.
[124]R. E. Lucas. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money[J]. Journal of Economic Theory.1972(4). pp.103-124.
[125]S. B. Sitkin, A. L. Pablo. Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior[J]. Academy of Management Review.17(1).1992. pp.9-38.
[126]Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon.2002. Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.66.3-27.
[127]Structures:Impact on Firms' Competitiveness[J]. Unpublished manuscript. World Bank.
[128]S. Kobrin. Political risk:a review and reconsideration [J]. Journal of International Business Studies.10(1), (1979). pp.67-80.
[129][TH]Sudarat Ananchotikul, [US]Barry Eichengreen. Corporate GovernanceReform in Emerging
[130]Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong. Putting people first?Chinese state-owned enterprises' adjustment to globalization[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization.2008(26). pp.573-585.
[131]The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Enterprise Steven M. Cassidy, Richard L. Constand, Richard B. Corbett. The Market Value of the Corporate Risk Management Function[J]. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol.57, No.4 (Dec.,1990), pp. 664-670.
[132]Tracy Chan Su Yin, Douglas Sikorski, Louis Ta Huu Phuong. How Singapore Companies in Asean Manafe Political Risk[J]. Seoul Journal of Economics. Spring 2003; 16,1.PP.23-58.
[133]V. Chhaochharia, L. Laeven. Corporate Governance Norms and Practices [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation.2009.18.405-431.
[134]W. I. Norton Jr., W. T. Moore. The Influence of Entrepreneurial Risk Assessment on Venture Launch or Growth Decisions[J]. Small Business Economics.2006(26). pp.215-226.
[135]Zingales, Luigi, Corporate Governance [J]. NBER Working Paper No. W6309. (December 1997). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=226064.
[136]中华人民共和国企业国有资产法[J].2008年10月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第五次会议通过.
[137]国资发改革[2006]108号.中央企业全面风险管理指引.2006.6.6.
[138]内部审计具体准则第16号--风险管理审计.中国内审协会2005.5.1.
[139]中华人民共和国财政部企业司网站.全国国有及国有控股企业主要财务指标(2008年5月)[J].http://www.mof.gov.cn/qiyesi/zhengwuxinxi/qiyesi/200806/t20080626_53832.html.
[140]中华人民共和国财政部.2008年1-12月国有及国有控股企业经济运行情况[J].http://qys.mof.gov.cn/qiyesi/zhengwuxinxi/qiyeyunxingdongtai/200901/t20090121 110055.html.
[141]中央企业2008年度分户国有资产运营情况表
[142]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见(国办发[2006]97号).2006.12.5.
[143]国资委令第1号,国有企业清产核资办法,2003.9.9.
[144]国资委令第2号、第17号,中央企业度责任经营业绩考核暂行办法,2003.11.25,2006.12.30。
[145]国资委、财政部令第3号,企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法,2003.12.31。
[146]中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法(国资发分配[2004]227号)。
[147]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会网站.全国国有企业改革发展取得重大进展[J].http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n4175042/n5405123/n5576790/5576917.html.
[148]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会网站.中央企业经营业绩[J].http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n4175042/n5405123/n5576790/5576866.html.
[149]国办发[2003]96号,关于规范国有企业改制工作的意见,2003.11.30.
[150]国有控股上市公司(境外)实施股权激励试行办法(国资发分配[2006]8号)
[151]国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法(国资发分配[2006]175号)
[152]国有独资公司董事会试点企业职工董事管理办法(试行)(国资发群工[2006]21号)
[153]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见》(国办发[2006]97号)
[154]关于加强和改进国有企业监事会工作的若干意见》(国资发监督[2006]174号)
[155]国资委令第19号.国有股东转让所持上市公司股份管理暂行办法.2007.6.30.
[156]董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
[157]关于规范国有股东与上市公司进行资产重组有关事项的通知(国资发产权[2009]124号)
[158]经贸委等八部门.关于国有大中型企业主辅分离辅业改制分流安置富余人员的实施办法.2002.11.18.
[159]国资委令第13号.中央企业总会计师工作职责管理暂行办法.2006.4.14.
[160]企业国有资本保值增值结果确认暂行办法(国资委令第9号,2004年8月25日)
[161]四川省培育壮大重点优势企业规划(川府发[2001]30号)
[162]四川省培育大企业大集团工作实施意见(川府发[2007]27号)
[163]关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见(国办发[2006]97号)
[164]国务院国资委关于国有控股上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见(国资发产权[2005]111号)
[165]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于国有独资公司董事会建设的指导意见(试行)》
[166]董事会试点中央企业专职外部董事管理办法(试行)(国资发干二[2009]301号)
[167]董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法(国资发群工[2009]53号)
[168]国资发评价[2009]19号.关于进一步加强中央企业金融衍生业务监管的通知[R].2009.2.3.
[169]国资发规划[2004]324号.关于公布中央企业主业(第一批)的通知.
[170]国资发规划[2005]80号.关于公布中央企业主业(第二批)的通知.
[171]国资发规划[2005]251号.关于公布中央企业主业(第三批)的通知.
[172]国资发规划[2006]49号.关于公布中国有色矿冶集团有限公司等16家中央企业主业的通知.
[173]国资发规划[2006]126号.关于公布煤炭科学研究总院等25家中央企业主业的通知.
[174]国资发规划[2007]40号.关于公布中国国际工程咨询公司等4家中央企业主业的通知.
[175]国资发规划[2007]90号.关于公布中国航空器材进出口集团公司等12家中央企业主业的通知.
[176]2008年度国务院国资委监管企业国有资产信息公告(二)
[177]].2009年1-4月全国国有及国有控股企业经济运行情况[J].国务院国有资产监督管理委员会.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |