金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为的影响研究
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摘要
中国上市公司普遍存在终极控制股东,金字塔控制结构是终极控制股东控制公司与获取收益的重要方式。终极控制权、现金流权、终极控制权与现金流权分离等金字塔控制结构特征,决定了终极控制股东在投票权、收益权与私人利益方面的差异,能影响其行为取向,具有显著的治理效应。金字塔控制结构中控制链的复杂与隐蔽性,使终极控制股东的行为具有不可见性,在高度集中的股权结构下,加剧了其掏空公司的行为；控制链的多重及冗长性,与所有者缺位的制度背景相结合,造成终极控制股东对公司管理层的监督缺失,弱化了管理层股权激励的有效性；产权结构变迁中发生的终极控制股东与员工间的利益冲突,突显了对员工利益分配机制的重要性。基于上述问题,研究金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为的影响具有理论与实践上的紧迫性,对完善上市公司的监管机制、提升公司治理的效率与深化国有企业的改革具有重要指导意义。
本文在对股东行为分析的相关理论进行述评的基础上,梳理与述评了不同股权与控制权结构特征下股东行为的相关文献,从公司、管理层与员工的维度出发,围绕终极控制股东掏空与支撑公司、监督管理层及对员工的利益分配三个问题,在金字塔控制结构特征、终极控制股东行为及行为的结果间建立起逻辑联系,研究了金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为的影响。根据理论分析提出研究假设,分别在公司、管理层与员工三个维度上构建了理论模型,据此建立对应的面板数据模型,并使用STATA10.1对2003～2007年中国制造业上市公司的数据进行实证分析,得出了相关结论。在此基础上,构建了金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为影响的综合理论模型。
通过上述研究过程,本文得到了以下研究结论：
首先,在公司维度上,终极控制权、终极控制股东类型、终极控制权与现金流权分离可以改变终极控制股东的掏空与支撑行为。本文将掏空行为的研究视角从终极控制权与现金流权分离进一步扩展,并将支撑行为的内涵拓宽为长期积极治理行为,通过分析终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离、终极控制股东类型与公司全要素生产率的关系,反映了金字塔控制结构特征对掏空与支撑行为的影响。实证结果表明,终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度的高低能影响终极控制股东的利益取向,从而引起终极控制股东在掏空与支撑行为上的差异；终极控制股东类型能调节促使支撑向掏空行为转化的终极控制权的临界值。
其次,在管理层维度上,现金流权、终极控制权与现金流权分离对终极控制股东的监督行为具有显著影响。本文开辟了监督行为研究的新视角,在阐述终极控制股东与上市公司管理层之间代理问题的基础上,从管理层股权激励的有效性出发,在不同现金流权水平、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度下,通过比较管理层持股与公司全要素生产率的正向关系区间大小,分析了金字塔控制结构特征对监督行为的影响。实证结果显示,较高的现金流权、较低的终极控制权与现金流权分离程度可以促进终极控制股东对管理层的监督,降低代理成本并扩大管理层持股与公司全要素生产率的正向关系区间,从而提高管理层股权激励的有效性。
最后,在员工维度上,终极控制权与终极控制股东类型能影响终极控制股东对员工的利益分配行为。本文通过对生产函数的分析,研究了终极控制股东与员工共享公司产出或发生利益冲突的情况,使用资本与劳动力投入之比衡量终极控制股东对员工的利益分配水平,通过验证终极控制权、终极控制股东类型与这一比率的关系,探索了不同金字塔控制结构特征下的利益分配行为。实证结果证明,终极控制权水平较低时,对终极控制股东的利益分配行为有正向影响；终极控制权水平较高时,对利益分配行为有负向影响；政府终极控制股东的利益分配水平要显著高于家族或自然人终极控制股东。
Chinese listed companies generally have ultimate controlling shareholders and the pyramid control structure is an important way to control the company and obtain benefits for the ultimate controlling shareholder. The characteristics of pyramid control structure, ultimate control right, cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, determine the differences of voting right, income right and private benefits of ultimate controlling shareholder. Thus, the characteristics can influence the behavioral orientation and have significant governance effects. Because of the complexity and imperceptibility of the control chains in the pyramid control structure, the behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder are invisible, which further aggravates the tunneling of ultimate controlling shareholder under high concentration of ownership structure. Futhermore, the multiplicity and redundancy of the control chains, which combines with the institutional background of the absence of the owners in state-owned enterprises, give rise to lack of monitoring managers by ultimate controlling shareholder and weaken the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive. Moreover, the interest conflict between ultimate controlling shareholder and employees in the process of property right change highlights the importance of benefit allocation to employees. Based on the problems above, it is urgent to study the impacts of characteristics of pyramid control structure on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder in theory and practice, and it has a significant meaning of guidance to consummate the supervision mechanism for listed companies, improve the efficiency of corporate governance and deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.
On the foundation of surveying the relevant theories of shareholder behavior analysis, the dissertation summarizes and reviews relevant literatures of the shareholder behaviors under different ownership and control structures. On the dimensions of company, manager and employee, the dissertation selects three research issues that are tunneling or propping companies, monitoring managers and benefit allocation to employees. According to the problems above, the dissertation studies the impacts of characteristics of pyramid control structure on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder by establishing logical links among characteristics of pyramid control structure, behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder and consequences of the behaviors. The research hypotheses are proposed by theoretical analysis. Furthermore, three corresponding theoretical models are constructed in each dimension and panel data models are established to have empirical analyses by the data of manufacturing companies listed in China from2003to2007. On the foundation of the empirical results, the dissertation constructs an integrative theoretical model of impacts of pyramid control structure's characteristics on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder.
Through the research process above, the conclusions are obtained as follows.
Firstly, on the company dimension, the tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder can be altered by ultimate control right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. The dissertation extends the viewpoint of tunneling from the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right and expands the connotation of propping to a long-term positive governance behavior. The impacts of pyramid control structure's characteristics on tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder are reflected by analysing the relationship between ultimate control right, the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and firm's total factor productivity. The empirical results indicate that the interest-driven orientation of ultimate controlling shareholder is affected by the level of ultimate control right and separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, which leads to the difference of tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder. Moreover, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder can modify the threshold of ultimate control right that causes the transfer from propping to tunneling.
Secondly, on the manager dimension, cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right have significant impacts on monitoring managers by ultimate controlling shareholder. The dissertation opens up a new aspect of studying monitoring. On the base of elaborating the agent problem between ultimate controlling shareholder and managers of listed companies and the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive, the influences of pyramid control structure's characteristics on monitoring are studied by comparing the positive intervals of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm's total factor productivity under different levels of cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. The empirical results show that the monitoring of ultimate controlling shareholders can be prompted and the agent cost is reduced in a relatively high level of cash flow right or a relatively low level of the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. It improves the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive.
Thirdly, on the employee dimension, ultimate control right and the type of ultimate controlling shareholder can impact the benefit allocation to employees. The benefit sharing and interest conflict between ultimate controlling shareholder and employees are studied by analyzing production function. The level of benefit allocation to employee is measured by the ratio of capital to labour inputs. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the benefit allocation of ultimate controlling shareholder by testing the relationship between ultimate control right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and the ratio. The empirical results demonstrate that ultimate control right have a positive impact on the benefit allocation when at a relatively low level. However, the effect becomes negative when at a relatively high level. Besides, the level of benefit allocation of government is significantly higher than that of family or individual.
本文在对股东行为分析的相关理论进行述评的基础上,梳理与述评了不同股权与控制权结构特征下股东行为的相关文献,从公司、管理层与员工的维度出发,围绕终极控制股东掏空与支撑公司、监督管理层及对员工的利益分配三个问题,在金字塔控制结构特征、终极控制股东行为及行为的结果间建立起逻辑联系,研究了金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为的影响。根据理论分析提出研究假设,分别在公司、管理层与员工三个维度上构建了理论模型,据此建立对应的面板数据模型,并使用STATA10.1对2003～2007年中国制造业上市公司的数据进行实证分析,得出了相关结论。在此基础上,构建了金字塔控制结构特征对终极控制股东行为影响的综合理论模型。
通过上述研究过程,本文得到了以下研究结论：
首先,在公司维度上,终极控制权、终极控制股东类型、终极控制权与现金流权分离可以改变终极控制股东的掏空与支撑行为。本文将掏空行为的研究视角从终极控制权与现金流权分离进一步扩展,并将支撑行为的内涵拓宽为长期积极治理行为,通过分析终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离、终极控制股东类型与公司全要素生产率的关系,反映了金字塔控制结构特征对掏空与支撑行为的影响。实证结果表明,终极控制权、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度的高低能影响终极控制股东的利益取向,从而引起终极控制股东在掏空与支撑行为上的差异；终极控制股东类型能调节促使支撑向掏空行为转化的终极控制权的临界值。
其次,在管理层维度上,现金流权、终极控制权与现金流权分离对终极控制股东的监督行为具有显著影响。本文开辟了监督行为研究的新视角,在阐述终极控制股东与上市公司管理层之间代理问题的基础上,从管理层股权激励的有效性出发,在不同现金流权水平、终极控制权与现金流权分离程度下,通过比较管理层持股与公司全要素生产率的正向关系区间大小,分析了金字塔控制结构特征对监督行为的影响。实证结果显示,较高的现金流权、较低的终极控制权与现金流权分离程度可以促进终极控制股东对管理层的监督,降低代理成本并扩大管理层持股与公司全要素生产率的正向关系区间,从而提高管理层股权激励的有效性。
最后,在员工维度上,终极控制权与终极控制股东类型能影响终极控制股东对员工的利益分配行为。本文通过对生产函数的分析,研究了终极控制股东与员工共享公司产出或发生利益冲突的情况,使用资本与劳动力投入之比衡量终极控制股东对员工的利益分配水平,通过验证终极控制权、终极控制股东类型与这一比率的关系,探索了不同金字塔控制结构特征下的利益分配行为。实证结果证明,终极控制权水平较低时,对终极控制股东的利益分配行为有正向影响；终极控制权水平较高时,对利益分配行为有负向影响；政府终极控制股东的利益分配水平要显著高于家族或自然人终极控制股东。
Chinese listed companies generally have ultimate controlling shareholders and the pyramid control structure is an important way to control the company and obtain benefits for the ultimate controlling shareholder. The characteristics of pyramid control structure, ultimate control right, cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, determine the differences of voting right, income right and private benefits of ultimate controlling shareholder. Thus, the characteristics can influence the behavioral orientation and have significant governance effects. Because of the complexity and imperceptibility of the control chains in the pyramid control structure, the behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder are invisible, which further aggravates the tunneling of ultimate controlling shareholder under high concentration of ownership structure. Futhermore, the multiplicity and redundancy of the control chains, which combines with the institutional background of the absence of the owners in state-owned enterprises, give rise to lack of monitoring managers by ultimate controlling shareholder and weaken the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive. Moreover, the interest conflict between ultimate controlling shareholder and employees in the process of property right change highlights the importance of benefit allocation to employees. Based on the problems above, it is urgent to study the impacts of characteristics of pyramid control structure on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder in theory and practice, and it has a significant meaning of guidance to consummate the supervision mechanism for listed companies, improve the efficiency of corporate governance and deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.
On the foundation of surveying the relevant theories of shareholder behavior analysis, the dissertation summarizes and reviews relevant literatures of the shareholder behaviors under different ownership and control structures. On the dimensions of company, manager and employee, the dissertation selects three research issues that are tunneling or propping companies, monitoring managers and benefit allocation to employees. According to the problems above, the dissertation studies the impacts of characteristics of pyramid control structure on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder by establishing logical links among characteristics of pyramid control structure, behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder and consequences of the behaviors. The research hypotheses are proposed by theoretical analysis. Furthermore, three corresponding theoretical models are constructed in each dimension and panel data models are established to have empirical analyses by the data of manufacturing companies listed in China from2003to2007. On the foundation of the empirical results, the dissertation constructs an integrative theoretical model of impacts of pyramid control structure's characteristics on behaviors of ultimate controlling shareholder.
Through the research process above, the conclusions are obtained as follows.
Firstly, on the company dimension, the tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder can be altered by ultimate control right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. The dissertation extends the viewpoint of tunneling from the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right and expands the connotation of propping to a long-term positive governance behavior. The impacts of pyramid control structure's characteristics on tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder are reflected by analysing the relationship between ultimate control right, the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and firm's total factor productivity. The empirical results indicate that the interest-driven orientation of ultimate controlling shareholder is affected by the level of ultimate control right and separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right, which leads to the difference of tunneling and propping of ultimate controlling shareholder. Moreover, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder can modify the threshold of ultimate control right that causes the transfer from propping to tunneling.
Secondly, on the manager dimension, cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right have significant impacts on monitoring managers by ultimate controlling shareholder. The dissertation opens up a new aspect of studying monitoring. On the base of elaborating the agent problem between ultimate controlling shareholder and managers of listed companies and the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive, the influences of pyramid control structure's characteristics on monitoring are studied by comparing the positive intervals of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm's total factor productivity under different levels of cash flow right and the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. The empirical results show that the monitoring of ultimate controlling shareholders can be prompted and the agent cost is reduced in a relatively high level of cash flow right or a relatively low level of the separation of ultimate control right from cash flow right. It improves the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive.
Thirdly, on the employee dimension, ultimate control right and the type of ultimate controlling shareholder can impact the benefit allocation to employees. The benefit sharing and interest conflict between ultimate controlling shareholder and employees are studied by analyzing production function. The level of benefit allocation to employee is measured by the ratio of capital to labour inputs. Therefore, the dissertation investigates the benefit allocation of ultimate controlling shareholder by testing the relationship between ultimate control right, the type of ultimate controlling shareholder and the ratio. The empirical results demonstrate that ultimate control right have a positive impact on the benefit allocation when at a relatively low level. However, the effect becomes negative when at a relatively high level. Besides, the level of benefit allocation of government is significantly higher than that of family or individual.
引文
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