我国分税制下政府间税收竞争研究
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摘要
政府间税收竞争是经济市场化和财政分权化的产物,反过来,税收竞争也对经济体制和财政运行的改革和发展产生重要影响。政府间税收竞争引发的企业、人才、资源以及各种经济活动频繁流动,引致了我国地区间经济协调发展的众多新问题与新矛盾。因此,在分税制下深入研究政府间税收竞争,客观评价税收竞争的经济绩效,剖析税收竞争赖以存在的制度环境,既有助于把握税收竞争内在动因,正确处理政府间的利益关系；为改善税收竞争的无序状态,促进全国资源合理配置,提供政策参考；还可以为我国进一步的财政分权改革、公共财政构建等提供税收方面的思考。本文就是对我国分税制下政府间税收竞争所做的探讨性研究。
本文以厘清税收竞争概念、对税收机制进行了必要分类为研究基础,对我国实行分税制以来,地方政府间税收竞争范围、对象、手段的新发展和变化进行剖析。指出地方政府间税收竞争主要是针对资本和劳动展开的,特别是从2009年后,税收竞争的争夺对象已从外资的“一枝独秀”发展到如今的外资、民资、国资的“三分天下”；税收竞争的主要手段也从向中央争取各种税收优惠、规费减免和财政补贴,以及放松执法力度等措施,发展到由其财权范围内的支出方面着手,来降低企业的实际税收负担,吸引流动性税基。基于不存在“同征税”和竞争主体不适格两个原因,本文给出当前我国中央与地方政府间不存在税收竞争的论断,但是中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈构成了地方政府之间展开税收竞争的外在条件,并深刻地影响着地方政府的税收竞争行为。
在对税收竞争的实证研究中,本文利用空间计量模型,选取上市公司所得税税负作为税收竞争的代理变量,总的结果是,2009年全部样本的实际所得税税率仅为15.63%,远低于25%的法定税率；一阶分析结果表明,相邻地区间存在明显的税收策略反应；二阶分析结果表明,非直接相邻地区彼此间仍然存在策略反应行为,但效果上不如以直接相邻地区定义的空间矩阵强。在对税收竞争是否促进经济增长的判断上,本文提出税收竞争与经济增长呈“倒U形”关系的假说,并利用省际面板数据加以验证。实证结果表明,当前我国税收竞争正处于“倒U形”曲线的左半侧,即当前税收竞争程度仍处在有益于经济增长的区间。但税收竞争过于激烈将阻碍经济增长这一规律,提醒我们应关注当前税收竞争恶化的趋势,以及对经济增长带来的消极影响,并从制度因素着手,优化税收竞争环境,促进良性税收竞争发展。
虽然激烈的税收竞争推动了中国经济持续高速增长,但税收竞争的消极效应也不断加大,对中国经济运行与制度规范产生巨大冲击。当前中国经济发展中出现的如东西部经济发展差距拉大、区域产业趋同、环保压力骤增、公共产品结构严重失衡、地方财政风险不断累积、税负扭曲、有悖公平原则等问题都与之相关,并由此滋生了一系列政治、道德、法律和社会问题。
针对税收竞争的“双刃剑”效应,如何兴利除弊,则取决于制度框架调整与改革。其中,必须处理好财政的集权与分权关系,在各级政府间明确的划分财权与事权；彻底改变对政府官员的激励机制,扭转其机会主义倾向；进一步改革我国转移支付制度,实现政府财力均等化；最紧迫的是使地方政府尽快从“土地财政”中解脱出来；此外,还必须对现行税制及其征管制度进行改革,促使税收竞争走向规范、适度的发展道路。
为此,本文提出了加快政府职能转变、加强民主与法制建设、推进中央与地方间的合理分权、调整政府收入结构、优化税制设计和管理、促进要素自由流动和建立竞争协调机制等方面的制度建设意见和建议。
Frequent flow of enterprise, human resources, and various economic activities triggered by Intergovernmental tax competition have effect on China's economic operation,but also lead to new problem and new contradiction of regional economic coordinated development. In theory, the intergovernmental tax competition has positive effects on the economic and social development. The competition has been controlling mechanism on local government, and promote the government to improve office efficiency, innovate incentive system, so as to promote economic growth, improve the welfare level of the area. But the intergovernmental tax competition will also bring about many negative effects, such as creating loss of tax revenue, shortage of public products, industry convergence, repeated construction, and environmental pollution. These seriously departure from the law of division of labor and take advantage of area. And these do harm to the normal order of market economy, the economic structure imbalance, the national economic stability and sustainable growth.
Based on the clarification of the concept of tax competition and classification of tax mechanism, this paper analyses the new development and change of the scope, object and means of tax competition between local governments since China carried out the system of tax distribution. It holds that the tax competition between local governments aims for capital and labor force. Especially after2009, the competition object changes from foreign capital as "the only thriving one" to foreign capital, private capital and state-owned asset as "three big parts". The primary means of tax competition also changes from seeking the central government for all kinds of tax preference, charges and fees reduction, financial subsidies and relaxing law enforcement, etc. to reducing the actual tax burden of enterprises to attract the liquidity tax base from finance expenditure control. The game between the central and local governments constitutes the external conditions for the tax competition between local governments and has a profound impact on local government tax-competitive behavior.
In the empirical research of tax competition, spatial econometric model adopted and income tax burden of listed companies chosen as proxy variable of tax competition, the overall result is the actual income tax rates of all samples in2009is just15.63%, far less than25%of the legal tax rate. It is obtained by first order analysis that tax strategy responses are obvious between adjacent areas and by second order analysis it is shown that strategy responses between not directly adjacent areas still exist, but the response effect is less obvious than space matrix in adjacent areas. And by panel data regression model it analyses the tax competition economic performance from1994to2008and gets positive regression coefficients—respectively obvious at10%and5%, which indicates that in local areas the positive effects of tax strategy are greater than the negative effects.
Although fierce tax competition promotes high-speed growth of Chinese economy, excessive tax competition produces tremendous impact on China's economic operation and system regulation. Many serious problems have arisen with the development of Chinese economy—widening east-west economic development gap, converging of regional industry, increasing burden of environmental protection, seriously unbalanced structure of public goods, accumulating local financial risks, distorted tax burden, violation of the principle of equity, and the like—breeding a series of political, moral,legal and other issues.
As to tax competition "double-edged sword" effect, how to promote the beneficial and abolish the harmful depends on the adjustment and reform of the institutional framework. First, China must handle the financial centralization and decentralization relationship, clearing the division of the property and governance among the government at all levels; it must completely change incentive mechanism of government officials, reversing the tendency of opportunism; it must further reform the transfer payments system, equalizing government finances. Most urgently, it must release local government from "land finance" Moreover, it must reform present tax system and its collection and management system, making tax competition stable, standard and moderate.
Therefore, this paper suggests that China should accelerate the transform of government function, strengthen democracy and the legal system construction, promote the proper decentralization between the central government and the local government, adjust government revenue structure, optimize the tax system design and management, facilitate the free flow of factors, establish the competition coordination mechanism and the like, in order to perfect tax system and regulations.
本文以厘清税收竞争概念、对税收机制进行了必要分类为研究基础,对我国实行分税制以来,地方政府间税收竞争范围、对象、手段的新发展和变化进行剖析。指出地方政府间税收竞争主要是针对资本和劳动展开的,特别是从2009年后,税收竞争的争夺对象已从外资的“一枝独秀”发展到如今的外资、民资、国资的“三分天下”；税收竞争的主要手段也从向中央争取各种税收优惠、规费减免和财政补贴,以及放松执法力度等措施,发展到由其财权范围内的支出方面着手,来降低企业的实际税收负担,吸引流动性税基。基于不存在“同征税”和竞争主体不适格两个原因,本文给出当前我国中央与地方政府间不存在税收竞争的论断,但是中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈构成了地方政府之间展开税收竞争的外在条件,并深刻地影响着地方政府的税收竞争行为。
在对税收竞争的实证研究中,本文利用空间计量模型,选取上市公司所得税税负作为税收竞争的代理变量,总的结果是,2009年全部样本的实际所得税税率仅为15.63%,远低于25%的法定税率；一阶分析结果表明,相邻地区间存在明显的税收策略反应；二阶分析结果表明,非直接相邻地区彼此间仍然存在策略反应行为,但效果上不如以直接相邻地区定义的空间矩阵强。在对税收竞争是否促进经济增长的判断上,本文提出税收竞争与经济增长呈“倒U形”关系的假说,并利用省际面板数据加以验证。实证结果表明,当前我国税收竞争正处于“倒U形”曲线的左半侧,即当前税收竞争程度仍处在有益于经济增长的区间。但税收竞争过于激烈将阻碍经济增长这一规律,提醒我们应关注当前税收竞争恶化的趋势,以及对经济增长带来的消极影响,并从制度因素着手,优化税收竞争环境,促进良性税收竞争发展。
虽然激烈的税收竞争推动了中国经济持续高速增长,但税收竞争的消极效应也不断加大,对中国经济运行与制度规范产生巨大冲击。当前中国经济发展中出现的如东西部经济发展差距拉大、区域产业趋同、环保压力骤增、公共产品结构严重失衡、地方财政风险不断累积、税负扭曲、有悖公平原则等问题都与之相关,并由此滋生了一系列政治、道德、法律和社会问题。
针对税收竞争的“双刃剑”效应,如何兴利除弊,则取决于制度框架调整与改革。其中,必须处理好财政的集权与分权关系,在各级政府间明确的划分财权与事权；彻底改变对政府官员的激励机制,扭转其机会主义倾向；进一步改革我国转移支付制度,实现政府财力均等化；最紧迫的是使地方政府尽快从“土地财政”中解脱出来；此外,还必须对现行税制及其征管制度进行改革,促使税收竞争走向规范、适度的发展道路。
为此,本文提出了加快政府职能转变、加强民主与法制建设、推进中央与地方间的合理分权、调整政府收入结构、优化税制设计和管理、促进要素自由流动和建立竞争协调机制等方面的制度建设意见和建议。
Frequent flow of enterprise, human resources, and various economic activities triggered by Intergovernmental tax competition have effect on China's economic operation,but also lead to new problem and new contradiction of regional economic coordinated development. In theory, the intergovernmental tax competition has positive effects on the economic and social development. The competition has been controlling mechanism on local government, and promote the government to improve office efficiency, innovate incentive system, so as to promote economic growth, improve the welfare level of the area. But the intergovernmental tax competition will also bring about many negative effects, such as creating loss of tax revenue, shortage of public products, industry convergence, repeated construction, and environmental pollution. These seriously departure from the law of division of labor and take advantage of area. And these do harm to the normal order of market economy, the economic structure imbalance, the national economic stability and sustainable growth.
Based on the clarification of the concept of tax competition and classification of tax mechanism, this paper analyses the new development and change of the scope, object and means of tax competition between local governments since China carried out the system of tax distribution. It holds that the tax competition between local governments aims for capital and labor force. Especially after2009, the competition object changes from foreign capital as "the only thriving one" to foreign capital, private capital and state-owned asset as "three big parts". The primary means of tax competition also changes from seeking the central government for all kinds of tax preference, charges and fees reduction, financial subsidies and relaxing law enforcement, etc. to reducing the actual tax burden of enterprises to attract the liquidity tax base from finance expenditure control. The game between the central and local governments constitutes the external conditions for the tax competition between local governments and has a profound impact on local government tax-competitive behavior.
In the empirical research of tax competition, spatial econometric model adopted and income tax burden of listed companies chosen as proxy variable of tax competition, the overall result is the actual income tax rates of all samples in2009is just15.63%, far less than25%of the legal tax rate. It is obtained by first order analysis that tax strategy responses are obvious between adjacent areas and by second order analysis it is shown that strategy responses between not directly adjacent areas still exist, but the response effect is less obvious than space matrix in adjacent areas. And by panel data regression model it analyses the tax competition economic performance from1994to2008and gets positive regression coefficients—respectively obvious at10%and5%, which indicates that in local areas the positive effects of tax strategy are greater than the negative effects.
Although fierce tax competition promotes high-speed growth of Chinese economy, excessive tax competition produces tremendous impact on China's economic operation and system regulation. Many serious problems have arisen with the development of Chinese economy—widening east-west economic development gap, converging of regional industry, increasing burden of environmental protection, seriously unbalanced structure of public goods, accumulating local financial risks, distorted tax burden, violation of the principle of equity, and the like—breeding a series of political, moral,legal and other issues.
As to tax competition "double-edged sword" effect, how to promote the beneficial and abolish the harmful depends on the adjustment and reform of the institutional framework. First, China must handle the financial centralization and decentralization relationship, clearing the division of the property and governance among the government at all levels; it must completely change incentive mechanism of government officials, reversing the tendency of opportunism; it must further reform the transfer payments system, equalizing government finances. Most urgently, it must release local government from "land finance" Moreover, it must reform present tax system and its collection and management system, making tax competition stable, standard and moderate.
Therefore, this paper suggests that China should accelerate the transform of government function, strengthen democracy and the legal system construction, promote the proper decentralization between the central government and the local government, adjust government revenue structure, optimize the tax system design and management, facilitate the free flow of factors, establish the competition coordination mechanism and the like, in order to perfect tax system and regulations.
引文
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