管理者与企业避税行为研究
|
摘要
避税行为是税收理论研究的一个重要课题,最初的研究集中于居民纳税行为研究,对企业避税行为研究甚少。对于规模较小的企业而言,其所有者通常也是日常经营者,此时,企业纳税决策行为与个人纳税决策行为极其类似。在税务机关审查率与处罚率给定情况下,如果税收规避成本小于税收规避带来的收益,那么企业便会选择逃避税收行为。随着现代企业制度的建立,企业的所有权与经营权相分离,所有者与管理者之间的委托-代理关系为企业避税决策行为研究带来了新的研究课题。此时,管理者在企业避税行为扮演怎么的角色成为学术研究的焦点和热点。然而,令人遗憾的是,国内现有文献较少涉及这一领域。与此同时,国外学者的研究对象多为欧美上市公司,而在我国上市公司中,国有控股公司占据很大比例,这导致我们不能直接借鉴国外现有的研究成果,同时也要求国内学者致力于中国公司治理的基本事实,详细深入地对我国企业避税行为进行研究。
基于上述事实,利用我国上市公司数据,在委托-代理的框架下,本文详细探讨了以下问题,本文首先研究了企业所有者为管理者提供的激励报酬对企业避税行为的影响,并在此过程考虑到我国企业所有权类型的特点；然后对管理者个体效应对企业避税决策的影响进行分析,最后考察了我国税收征管措施对管理者避税决策的影响力问题。
本文的主要结论如下：
(1)为管理者提供的以股票为基础的激励报酬,会显著增加企业的避税行为,但这种效应在不同所有权类型的公司中具有不同表现。在非国有控股企业中,激励报酬对管理者的激励作用更有效果,增加管理者的激励报酬会导致更多的企业避税行为。但在国有控股企业中,由于管理者更加不愿意承担避税行为带来的声誉、仕途方而的成本,即使增加其激励报酬,企业避税行为没有明显增加。
(2)管理者个人效应会对企业避税决策产生显著影响。管理者在决策过程中并不能具备完全理性,成本-收益的判断也不是其唯一的行事准则,管理者个人效应也会对决策行为产生影响。具体而言,高管的管理风格、高管任期长短对公司避税决策具有显著影响,但高管年龄、性别、学历、专业背景等特征对公司避税行为的影响并不显著。
(3)税收部门监管措施对管理者的避税决策具有威慑作用。首先,税收监管力度的提高抑制了激励报酬对管理者避税行为的影响,同时,这种抑制作用对非国有企业更加明显。其次,在高税收监管的地区,管理者个人效应的显著性水平也有所降低。
Tax avoidance is the important part of tax research, that was researched first in1970's. But the early literature on the tax avoidance mostly on evasion by individuals, not businesses. For closely-held small businesses whose owners are also managers, if the dollar of tax saving is greater than the utility cost of a big penalty, holding constant the chance of getting caught and the penalty for noncompliance. This moment the businesses is the as same as individual taxpapers. The additional issues arise in widely held corporations tax avoidance research because of the principal-agent setting with the development of modern enterprise system and the separation of ownership and control. This moment, the effect of managers on corporate tax avoidance become the focus of research areas. However It is regrettable that little existing literature focus on corporate tax avoidance with the separation of ownership and control in our country. At the same time, the fact that a large proportion of listed companies in our country is state holding companies in our courty is very different with existing research. This condition cause that the existion research is not applicable to corporatation in China, and promote scholars make a research on corporate tax avoidance deeply based on Chinese firms'governance conditions.
This dissertation make the research under the analysis framework of principal-agent and use the data about Listed Companies in China. Firstly, this dissertation analysis the effect of managers'compensation incentives on the corporate tax ovidance activities based on the firms'ownership type in our country. Sencondly, this dissertation makes a research on the association between the executive heterogeneity and corporate tax avoidance. Lastly, this dissertation make a empirical research on the effect of tax enforcement of authority on corporate tax avoidance activities.
The main conclusions of this dissertation contain:
(1) The positive association between compensation and tax avoidance will changed in state holding companies. The positive effect of managers'comepensation is more significant in non-state-holding companies than state holding companies. The managers' comepensation can't make firms engage more tax avoidance in state holding companies, because the cost of tax avoidance, such as reputation, career, is more serious for managers of state holding companies.
(2) Managers heterogeneity affect significantly corporate tax avoidance. Managers are not fully rational, and the decisions of corporate made by managers involve more than a cost-benefit calculation, and reflect managers'intrinsic characteristics. Specifically, the management styles and the executive's tenure have a significant effect on corporate tax avoidance, and the effect of age, sex, education etc. is not significant.
(3) The deterrence of tax enforcement in our country on corporate managers'tax avoidance decisions. Firstly, higher tax enforcement of authority can reduce the impact of compensation on tax avoidance activities, and the inhibition effect is more significant in non-state-holding firms. Secondly, the significance of managers'individual effect will drop in the higher tax enforcement area.
基于上述事实,利用我国上市公司数据,在委托-代理的框架下,本文详细探讨了以下问题,本文首先研究了企业所有者为管理者提供的激励报酬对企业避税行为的影响,并在此过程考虑到我国企业所有权类型的特点；然后对管理者个体效应对企业避税决策的影响进行分析,最后考察了我国税收征管措施对管理者避税决策的影响力问题。
本文的主要结论如下：
(1)为管理者提供的以股票为基础的激励报酬,会显著增加企业的避税行为,但这种效应在不同所有权类型的公司中具有不同表现。在非国有控股企业中,激励报酬对管理者的激励作用更有效果,增加管理者的激励报酬会导致更多的企业避税行为。但在国有控股企业中,由于管理者更加不愿意承担避税行为带来的声誉、仕途方而的成本,即使增加其激励报酬,企业避税行为没有明显增加。
(2)管理者个人效应会对企业避税决策产生显著影响。管理者在决策过程中并不能具备完全理性,成本-收益的判断也不是其唯一的行事准则,管理者个人效应也会对决策行为产生影响。具体而言,高管的管理风格、高管任期长短对公司避税决策具有显著影响,但高管年龄、性别、学历、专业背景等特征对公司避税行为的影响并不显著。
(3)税收部门监管措施对管理者的避税决策具有威慑作用。首先,税收监管力度的提高抑制了激励报酬对管理者避税行为的影响,同时,这种抑制作用对非国有企业更加明显。其次,在高税收监管的地区,管理者个人效应的显著性水平也有所降低。
Tax avoidance is the important part of tax research, that was researched first in1970's. But the early literature on the tax avoidance mostly on evasion by individuals, not businesses. For closely-held small businesses whose owners are also managers, if the dollar of tax saving is greater than the utility cost of a big penalty, holding constant the chance of getting caught and the penalty for noncompliance. This moment the businesses is the as same as individual taxpapers. The additional issues arise in widely held corporations tax avoidance research because of the principal-agent setting with the development of modern enterprise system and the separation of ownership and control. This moment, the effect of managers on corporate tax avoidance become the focus of research areas. However It is regrettable that little existing literature focus on corporate tax avoidance with the separation of ownership and control in our country. At the same time, the fact that a large proportion of listed companies in our country is state holding companies in our courty is very different with existing research. This condition cause that the existion research is not applicable to corporatation in China, and promote scholars make a research on corporate tax avoidance deeply based on Chinese firms'governance conditions.
This dissertation make the research under the analysis framework of principal-agent and use the data about Listed Companies in China. Firstly, this dissertation analysis the effect of managers'compensation incentives on the corporate tax ovidance activities based on the firms'ownership type in our country. Sencondly, this dissertation makes a research on the association between the executive heterogeneity and corporate tax avoidance. Lastly, this dissertation make a empirical research on the effect of tax enforcement of authority on corporate tax avoidance activities.
The main conclusions of this dissertation contain:
(1) The positive association between compensation and tax avoidance will changed in state holding companies. The positive effect of managers'comepensation is more significant in non-state-holding companies than state holding companies. The managers' comepensation can't make firms engage more tax avoidance in state holding companies, because the cost of tax avoidance, such as reputation, career, is more serious for managers of state holding companies.
(2) Managers heterogeneity affect significantly corporate tax avoidance. Managers are not fully rational, and the decisions of corporate made by managers involve more than a cost-benefit calculation, and reflect managers'intrinsic characteristics. Specifically, the management styles and the executive's tenure have a significant effect on corporate tax avoidance, and the effect of age, sex, education etc. is not significant.
(3) The deterrence of tax enforcement in our country on corporate managers'tax avoidance decisions. Firstly, higher tax enforcement of authority can reduce the impact of compensation on tax avoidance activities, and the inhibition effect is more significant in non-state-holding firms. Secondly, the significance of managers'individual effect will drop in the higher tax enforcement area.
引文
[1]Allingham, M., Sandmo, A., Income Tax Evasion:A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Public Economics,1972,1(3-4),323-338.
[2]Armstrong, C., Blouin, J., Larcker, D., The Incentives for Tax Planning. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,2010.
[3]Bamber, L. Jiang, J., Wang, I., What's My Style? The Influence of Top Managers and Their Personal Backgrounds on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure. Working paper, University of Georgia,2009.
| 4] Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[5]Bennedsen, M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfson, D., Do CEOs Matter. Working paper, University of Texas at Austin,2008.
[6]Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., Managing With Style:The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,68 (4):1169-1208.
[7]Boardman A. E., Vining A. R., Ownership vs. Competition:Efficiency in Public Enterprise. Public Choice,1992,73(2):205-239.
[8]Bordignon, M., A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion. Journal of Public Economics,1993,52(3):345-62.
[9]Chatterjee, A., Hambrick, D., It's All about Me:Narcissistic CEOs and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007,52(3):351-386.
[10]Chen, K.-P., Chu, C., Internal Control vs. External Manipulation:A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion. RAND Journal of Economics,2005,36(1): 151-164.
[11]Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q. et al., Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive Than Non-family Firms? Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[12]Cheng, Q., Warfield, T., Stock-based Compensation, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin,2002.
[13]Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Internal Control-Integrated Framework. The Framework. New York, NY:COSO.1992.
[14]Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Internal Control-Integrated Framework. Guidance on Monitoring Internal Control Systems. New York, NY:COSO.2009.
[15]Crocker, K., Slemrod, J., Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1593-1610.
[16]Cullis, J. G. Lewis, A., Why People Pay Taxes:From a Conventional Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention. Journal of Economic Psychology,1997, 18 (2-3):305-321.
[17]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,3(1):1-36.
[18]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[19]Desai M A, Dharmapala D., Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-powered Incentives. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[20]Desai, M., Dharmapala, D., Fung, W., Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration. In:Auerbach, A., Hines, J., Slemrod, J. (Eds.). Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century. New York:Cambridge University Press,2007a.345-383.
[21]Desai, M., Dharmapala, D., Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. Review of Economics and Statistics,2009,91(3):537-546.
[22]Desai, M., Dyck, I., Zingales, L., Theft and Taxes. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007b,84(3):591-623.
[23]Desai, M., The Divergence between Book Income and Tax Income. In:Poterba, J. (Ed.). Tax Policy and the Economy,17. Cambridge:MIT Press,2003.169-206.
[24]Dyreng, S., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E., Long-run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review,2007,83(1):61-82.
[25]Dyreng, S., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E., The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1163-1189.
[26]Erickson, M.G., Moon, D.L., Yue, D.T., DsRed as a potential FRET partner with CFP and GFP. Biophysical Journal,2003,85(1):599-611.
[27]Falkinger, J., Tax Evasion, Consumption of Public Goods and Fairness. Journal of Economic Psychology,1995,16(1):63-72.
[28]Feld, L. P., Frey, B. S., The Tax Authority and the Taxpayer:An Exploratory Analysis. Working paper, University of Zurich.2002.
[29]Feldman, N., Slemrod, J., Estimating Tax Noncomplicance with Evidence from Unaudited Tax Returns.The Economic Journal,2007,117 (3):327-52.
[30]Finkelstein S., Hambrick D. C., Strategic Leadership:Top Executives and the Effect on Organizations, St. Paul:West Pub. Co,1996.
[31]Fisman, R., Wei, S.J., Tax Rates and Tax Evasion:Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China. Journal of Political Economy,2004,112(2):471-96.
[32]Frank, M., Lynch, L., Rego, S., Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[33]Fraser, S. Greene, F., The Effect of Experience on Entrepreneurial Optimism and Uncertainty. Economica.2006,73(5):169-192.
[34]Friedman, Milton. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. New York Times Magazine (September 13,1970).
[35]Frischmann, P., Shevlin, T., Wilson, R., Economic Consequences of Increasing the Conformity in Accounting for Uncertain Tax Benefits. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(2-3):261-278.
[36]Gao, Pengjie and Ronald Shrieves. Earnings Management and Executive Compensation:A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary? working paper, Northwestern University and University of Tennessee at Knoxville,2002.
[37]Ge, W., Matsumoto, D. Zhang, J., Do CFOs Have Styles of Their Own? An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Financial Reporting Practices. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(4):1141-1179.
[38]Graham, J., Tucker, A., Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(3):563-594.
[39]Graham, J.R., Taxes and Corporate Finance:a Review. Review of Financial Studies,2003,16(4):1074-1128.
[40]Grassley, Sen, Charles E., US Senator Grassley Calls for Review of Corporate Return Disclosure Requirements. Worldwide Tax Daily,2002,198 (11):30.
[41]Guedhami, O., Pittman, J. A., The Importance of IRS Monitoring to Debt Pricing in Private Firms. Journal of Financial Economics,2008.90(1):38-58.
[42]Gupta, S., Newberry, K., Determinants of the Variability in Corporate Effective Tax Rates:Evidence from Longitudinal Study. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1997,16(1):1-34.
[43]Hall, B., Murphy, K. J., Stock Options for Undiversified Executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(1):3-42.
[44]Hambrick D.C. Mason P. A., Upper Echelons:Organization as a Reflection of Its Managers. Academy Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[45]Hanlon, M., Heitzman, S., A Review of Tax Research. Journal of. Accounting and Economics,2010,50 (2-3):127-178.
[46]Hanlon, M., Mills, L., Slemrod, J., An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance. In:Auerbach, A., Hines, J., Slemrod, J. (Eds.), Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century. New York:Cambridge University Press,2007. 171-210.
[47]Hanlon, M., Shevlin, T., Book-tax Conformity for Corporate Income:an Introduction to the Issues. Tax Policy and the Economy Volume 19. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.101-134.
[48]Hanlon, M., Slemrod, J., What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics,2009,93(1-2):126-141.
[49]Hanlon, M., The Persistence and Pricing of Earnings, Accruals, and Cash Flows When Firms Have Large Book-tax Differences. The Accounting Review,2005, 80(1):137-166.
[50]Hanlon, M., What Can We Infer about a Firm's Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements? National Tax Journal,2003,56(4):831-863.
[51]Hayes, R., Schaefer, S., How Much Are Differences in Managerial Ability Worth? Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,27(2):125-148.
[52]Hunton, J., R. Hoitash, and J. Thibodeau. The Relationship between Perceived Tone at the Top and Earnings Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011, 28(4):1190-1224.
[53]Jill M. D'Aquila., Is the Control Environment Related to Financial Reporting Decisions? Managerial Auditing Journal,1998,13(8):472-478.
[54]Johnson, S. A., Ryan H. E., Tian Y. S., Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud. working paper, Louisiana State University,2002.
[55 J Kreutzer, D. Lee, D. R., On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits. National Tax Journal,1986,39(2):241-243.
[56]Lee, H. J. Park, J. H., Top Team Diversity, Internationalization and the Mediating Effect of International Alliances. British Journal of Management,2006,17(3): 195-213.
[57]Lev, B., Nissim, D., Taxable Income, Future Earnings, and Equity Values. The Accounting Review,2004,79(4):1039-1074.
[58]Lisowsky, P., Robinson, L., Schmidt, A., An Examination of FIN 48:Tax Shelters, Auditor Independence, and Corporate Governance. Working Paper,2010, University of Illinois.
[59]Lisowsky, P., Seeking Shelter:Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information. The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1693-1720.
[60]Liu, C., Yermack, D., Where are the Shareholders' Mansions? CEOs Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance. Working paper, Arizona State University and New York University.2007.
[61]Lotz, J., Morss, E., Measuring Tax Effort in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund,1967,14(3):478-499.
[62]Malmendier, U. Tate, G., Who Makes Acquisitions? A test of the overconfidence hypothesis. NBER Working Paper,2003.
[63]Malmendier, U.,Tate, G., CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2661-2700.
[64]Manzon, G., Plesko, G., The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. Tax Law Review,2002,55(2):175-214.
[65]Marelli, M., On Indirect Tax Evasion. Journal of Public Economics,1984,25(1-2): 181-196.
[66]McGill, G., Outslay, E., Lost in Translation:Detecting Tax Shelter Activity in Financial Statements. National Tax Journal,2004,57(3):739-756.
[67]Mehran, H., Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38(2):163-184.
[68]Mertens, J., Measuring Tax Effort in Central and Eastern Europe. Public Finance and Management,2003,3(4):530-563.
[69]Mills, D. S., Alston, R. D., Rogers, V. et al., Factors Associated with the Prevalence of Stereotypic Behaviour in Thoroughbred Horses Passing through Auctioneer Sales. Applied Animal Behaviour Science,2002,78(2):115-124.
[70]Mills, L., Newberry, K., Trautman, W. Trends in Book-tax Income and Balance Sheet Differences. Tax Notes,2002,19(5):1109-1124.
[71]Mills, L., Book-tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research,1998,36 (2):343-356.
[72]Nellis J., Is Privatization Necessary? World Bank Viewpoint, note 17. Washington, DC:World Banck,1994.
[73]Phillips, J., CorporateTax-planning Effectiveness:the Role of Compensation-based Incentives. The Accounting Review,2003,78(3),847-874.
[74]Plesko, G.,.2002. Reconciling Corporation Book and Tax Net Income, tax years 1996-1998. SOI Bulletin Spring. Washington, DC:US Government Printing Office,2002.
[75]Porcano, T. M., Corporate Tax Rates:Progressive, Proportional, or Regressive. Journal of the American BTaxation Association,1986.8(1):17-31.
[76]Rego, S., Wilson, R., Executive Compensation, Tax Reporting Aggressiveness, and Future Firm Performance. Working Paper,2008, University of Iowa.
[77]Rego, S., Tax Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(4):805-833.
[78]Rego, S., Tax Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(4):805-833.
[79]Robinson, J., Sikes S., Weaver C., The Impact of Evaluating the Tax Function as a Profit Center on Effective Tax Rates. Forthcoming, The Accounting Review.2009.
[80]Robinson, J., Sikes, S., Weaver, C., Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments. The Accounting Review,2010,85(3):1035-1064.
[81]Robinson, L., Sansing, R., The Effect of 'Invisible' Tax Preferences on Investment and Tax Preference Measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008, 46(2-3):389-404.
[82]Shackelford, D., Shevlin, T., Empirical Tax Research in Accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):321-387.
[83]Shevlin, T., Commentary:Corporate Tax Shelters and Book-tax Differences. Tax Law Review,2002,55(3):427-443.
[84]Slemrod, J. Yitzhaki, S., Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration. In: Auerbach, A. J., Feldstein, M. (ed.). Handbook of Public Economics,2002. 1423-1470.
[85]Slemrod, J., The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness. National Tax Journal, 2004,57(4):877-899.
[86]Srinivasan, T. N., Tax Evasion:A Model. Journal of Public Economics,1973,2(4): 339-346.
[87]Steven, K. Nagin. D., The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1989,5(1):1-24.
[88]Treasury, H., Tackling Poverty and Extending Opportunity. London:IIM Treasury, 1999.
[89]Weisbach, D., Corporate tax avoidance. In:Proceedings of the National Tax Association Ninety Sixth Annual Conference,2003, p.9.
[90]Weisbach, D., Ten Truths about Tax Shelters. Tax Law Review,2002,215(55): 221-222
[91]Wilson, R., An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):969-999.
[92]Xu, W. C, Zeng, Y. Z, Zhang, J. S., Tax Enforcement as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:Empirical Evidence from China. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2010,19(1):1-16.
[93]Yin, G, How Much Tax do Large Public Corporations Pay? Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500. Virginia Law Review December,2003,89(8): 1793-1856.
[94]Zimmerman, J., Taxes and Firm Size. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1983, 5(1):119-149.
[95]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究.管理世界,2008,5：124-133.
[96]陈捷.国际避税的危害及我国反避税.税务研究,2005,11：65-67.
[97]程燕芸.新企业所得税法下的税务筹划.时代经贸,2008,6：148-149.
[98]崔晓静.金融危机后国际避税地法律监管的新发展.税务研究,2011,5：92-95.
[99]戴德明,姚淑瑜,毛新述.会计-税收差异、盈余管理与公司避税行为研究.中国人民大学工作论文,2005.
[100]盖地.税务会计与纳税筹划.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[101]高培勇.中国税收持续高速增长之谜.经济研究,2006,12：13-23.
[102]何威风,刘启亮.我国上市公司高管背景特征与财务重述行为研究.管理世界,2010,7：144-155.
[103]黄黎明.跨国公司税收筹划问题研究[博士学位论文].保存单位：厦门大学图书馆,2004.
[104]贾绍华.中国税收流失问题研究.北京：北京中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[105]姜付秀,伊志宏,苏飞等.管理者背景特征与企业过度投资行为.管理世界,2009,1：130-139.
[106]金人庆.中国当代税务要论.北京：人民出版社,2002.
[107]雷虹云.借鉴国际经验完善避税地税务管理.涉外税务,2008,9：18-22.
[108]李俊英.企业税务筹划与偷税、避税.内蒙古财经学院学报,2001,2：46-50.
[109]梁朋.税收流失经济分析.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[110]刘晨,阳田华.避税港型离岸金融中心对我国跨境资本流动的影响及监管建议.财政研究,20119：38-41.
[111]刘芳,陈平路.逃税行为及影响因素的理论分析.武汉理工大学学报,2004,28,1：84-87.
[112]刘华,涂敏杰,丁光宗.基于现金交易的双元控制主体企业增值税逃税研究.税务研究,2008,7：69-71.
[113]刘剑文,丁一.避税之法理新探(上).涉外税务,2003,8：8-12.
[114]刘剑文,丁一.避税之法理新探(下).涉外税务,2003,9：21-25.
[115]刘晓亮,刘晓莺.论关联企业避税的法律规制.集团经济研究,2006,2：42-44.
[116]刘怡,梁俊桥,刘春.个人税务与遗产筹划.北京:中信出版社,2004.
[117]罗光,萧艳汾.考虑税收遵从成本的逃税模型研究.税务研究,2007,1：82-84.
[118]罗银鹤.纳税筹划与偷税、避税的辨析.广西民族学院学报,2005,12：152-154.
[119]沈肇章.基于企业避税行为分析的反避税策略研究[博士学位论文].保存地点：暨南大学图书馆,2008.
[120]石水平.控制权转移、超控制权与大股东利益侵占——来自上市公司高管变更的经验证据.金融研究,2010,4：160-176.
[121]苏号朋.纳税篇.北京：中国经济出版社,2001.
[122]王贵东.论避税的合法性.商场现代化,2007,12：298.
[123]王立彦,刘向前.IPO与非法定公司所得税收优惠.经济学(季刊),2004,2：457-474.
[124]王素荣,蒋高乐.新会计准则对上市公司所得税税负影响研究.中国工业经济,2009,12：117-127.
[125]王延明.上市公司所得税负担研究——来自规模、地区和行业的经验证据.管理世界,2003,1：115-122.
[126]王跃堂,王亮亮,贡彩萍.所得税改革、盈余管理及其经济后果.经济研究,2009,3：86-98.
[127]吴联生,李辰.“先征后返”、公司税负与税收政策的有效性.中医社会科学, 2007,4：61-73.
[128]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负.经济研究,2009,10：109-120.
[129]吴申军.论我国转让定价税制的改革完善[博士学位论文].保存地点：厦门大学图书馆,2004.
[130]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠.管理世界,2009,3：134-142.
[131]肖继辉.基于不同股权特征的上市公司经理报酬业绩敏感性.南开管理评论,2005,3：18-24.
[132]杨默如.偷税、避税与税务筹划——概念界定的国际借鉴及法律建议.经济视角,2010,7：56-58.
[133]叶康涛.盈余管理与所得税支付：基于会计利润与应税所得之间差异的研究.中国会计评论,2006,2：205-224.
[134]尤克洋.小规模增值税的税收筹划及实务研究.会计之友,2006,7：31-32.
[135]曾亚敏,张俊生.税收征管能够发挥公司治理功用吗?管理世界,2009,3：143-151.
[136]张宏林.税务筹划与避税分析.经济师,2001,7：114-115.
[137]赵德芳.对资本弱化避税案例的思考.税务研究,2010,1：72-75.
[138]周黎安,刘冲,厉行.税收努力、征税机构与税收增长之谜.经济学(季刊)2011,1：1-18.
[139]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本和非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究,1996,6：71-80.
[140]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业家队伍成长现状与环境评价——2003年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告.管理世界,2003,7：110-119.
[141]朱青,王小荣,孙茂竹.企业所得税反避税：意义、措施与任务.涉外税务,2008,9：14-18.
[2]Armstrong, C., Blouin, J., Larcker, D., The Incentives for Tax Planning. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,2010.
[3]Bamber, L. Jiang, J., Wang, I., What's My Style? The Influence of Top Managers and Their Personal Backgrounds on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure. Working paper, University of Georgia,2009.
| 4] Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[5]Bennedsen, M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfson, D., Do CEOs Matter. Working paper, University of Texas at Austin,2008.
[6]Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., Managing With Style:The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,68 (4):1169-1208.
[7]Boardman A. E., Vining A. R., Ownership vs. Competition:Efficiency in Public Enterprise. Public Choice,1992,73(2):205-239.
[8]Bordignon, M., A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion. Journal of Public Economics,1993,52(3):345-62.
[9]Chatterjee, A., Hambrick, D., It's All about Me:Narcissistic CEOs and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007,52(3):351-386.
[10]Chen, K.-P., Chu, C., Internal Control vs. External Manipulation:A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion. RAND Journal of Economics,2005,36(1): 151-164.
[11]Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q. et al., Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive Than Non-family Firms? Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[12]Cheng, Q., Warfield, T., Stock-based Compensation, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin,2002.
[13]Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Internal Control-Integrated Framework. The Framework. New York, NY:COSO.1992.
[14]Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Internal Control-Integrated Framework. Guidance on Monitoring Internal Control Systems. New York, NY:COSO.2009.
[15]Crocker, K., Slemrod, J., Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1593-1610.
[16]Cullis, J. G. Lewis, A., Why People Pay Taxes:From a Conventional Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention. Journal of Economic Psychology,1997, 18 (2-3):305-321.
[17]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,3(1):1-36.
[18]Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[19]Desai M A, Dharmapala D., Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-powered Incentives. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[20]Desai, M., Dharmapala, D., Fung, W., Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration. In:Auerbach, A., Hines, J., Slemrod, J. (Eds.). Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century. New York:Cambridge University Press,2007a.345-383.
[21]Desai, M., Dharmapala, D., Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. Review of Economics and Statistics,2009,91(3):537-546.
[22]Desai, M., Dyck, I., Zingales, L., Theft and Taxes. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007b,84(3):591-623.
[23]Desai, M., The Divergence between Book Income and Tax Income. In:Poterba, J. (Ed.). Tax Policy and the Economy,17. Cambridge:MIT Press,2003.169-206.
[24]Dyreng, S., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E., Long-run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review,2007,83(1):61-82.
[25]Dyreng, S., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E., The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1163-1189.
[26]Erickson, M.G., Moon, D.L., Yue, D.T., DsRed as a potential FRET partner with CFP and GFP. Biophysical Journal,2003,85(1):599-611.
[27]Falkinger, J., Tax Evasion, Consumption of Public Goods and Fairness. Journal of Economic Psychology,1995,16(1):63-72.
[28]Feld, L. P., Frey, B. S., The Tax Authority and the Taxpayer:An Exploratory Analysis. Working paper, University of Zurich.2002.
[29]Feldman, N., Slemrod, J., Estimating Tax Noncomplicance with Evidence from Unaudited Tax Returns.The Economic Journal,2007,117 (3):327-52.
[30]Finkelstein S., Hambrick D. C., Strategic Leadership:Top Executives and the Effect on Organizations, St. Paul:West Pub. Co,1996.
[31]Fisman, R., Wei, S.J., Tax Rates and Tax Evasion:Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China. Journal of Political Economy,2004,112(2):471-96.
[32]Frank, M., Lynch, L., Rego, S., Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[33]Fraser, S. Greene, F., The Effect of Experience on Entrepreneurial Optimism and Uncertainty. Economica.2006,73(5):169-192.
[34]Friedman, Milton. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. New York Times Magazine (September 13,1970).
[35]Frischmann, P., Shevlin, T., Wilson, R., Economic Consequences of Increasing the Conformity in Accounting for Uncertain Tax Benefits. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(2-3):261-278.
[36]Gao, Pengjie and Ronald Shrieves. Earnings Management and Executive Compensation:A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary? working paper, Northwestern University and University of Tennessee at Knoxville,2002.
[37]Ge, W., Matsumoto, D. Zhang, J., Do CFOs Have Styles of Their Own? An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Financial Reporting Practices. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(4):1141-1179.
[38]Graham, J., Tucker, A., Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(3):563-594.
[39]Graham, J.R., Taxes and Corporate Finance:a Review. Review of Financial Studies,2003,16(4):1074-1128.
[40]Grassley, Sen, Charles E., US Senator Grassley Calls for Review of Corporate Return Disclosure Requirements. Worldwide Tax Daily,2002,198 (11):30.
[41]Guedhami, O., Pittman, J. A., The Importance of IRS Monitoring to Debt Pricing in Private Firms. Journal of Financial Economics,2008.90(1):38-58.
[42]Gupta, S., Newberry, K., Determinants of the Variability in Corporate Effective Tax Rates:Evidence from Longitudinal Study. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1997,16(1):1-34.
[43]Hall, B., Murphy, K. J., Stock Options for Undiversified Executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(1):3-42.
[44]Hambrick D.C. Mason P. A., Upper Echelons:Organization as a Reflection of Its Managers. Academy Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[45]Hanlon, M., Heitzman, S., A Review of Tax Research. Journal of. Accounting and Economics,2010,50 (2-3):127-178.
[46]Hanlon, M., Mills, L., Slemrod, J., An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance. In:Auerbach, A., Hines, J., Slemrod, J. (Eds.), Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century. New York:Cambridge University Press,2007. 171-210.
[47]Hanlon, M., Shevlin, T., Book-tax Conformity for Corporate Income:an Introduction to the Issues. Tax Policy and the Economy Volume 19. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.101-134.
[48]Hanlon, M., Slemrod, J., What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics,2009,93(1-2):126-141.
[49]Hanlon, M., The Persistence and Pricing of Earnings, Accruals, and Cash Flows When Firms Have Large Book-tax Differences. The Accounting Review,2005, 80(1):137-166.
[50]Hanlon, M., What Can We Infer about a Firm's Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements? National Tax Journal,2003,56(4):831-863.
[51]Hayes, R., Schaefer, S., How Much Are Differences in Managerial Ability Worth? Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,27(2):125-148.
[52]Hunton, J., R. Hoitash, and J. Thibodeau. The Relationship between Perceived Tone at the Top and Earnings Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011, 28(4):1190-1224.
[53]Jill M. D'Aquila., Is the Control Environment Related to Financial Reporting Decisions? Managerial Auditing Journal,1998,13(8):472-478.
[54]Johnson, S. A., Ryan H. E., Tian Y. S., Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud. working paper, Louisiana State University,2002.
[55 J Kreutzer, D. Lee, D. R., On Taxation and Understated Monopoly Profits. National Tax Journal,1986,39(2):241-243.
[56]Lee, H. J. Park, J. H., Top Team Diversity, Internationalization and the Mediating Effect of International Alliances. British Journal of Management,2006,17(3): 195-213.
[57]Lev, B., Nissim, D., Taxable Income, Future Earnings, and Equity Values. The Accounting Review,2004,79(4):1039-1074.
[58]Lisowsky, P., Robinson, L., Schmidt, A., An Examination of FIN 48:Tax Shelters, Auditor Independence, and Corporate Governance. Working Paper,2010, University of Illinois.
[59]Lisowsky, P., Seeking Shelter:Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information. The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1693-1720.
[60]Liu, C., Yermack, D., Where are the Shareholders' Mansions? CEOs Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance. Working paper, Arizona State University and New York University.2007.
[61]Lotz, J., Morss, E., Measuring Tax Effort in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund,1967,14(3):478-499.
[62]Malmendier, U. Tate, G., Who Makes Acquisitions? A test of the overconfidence hypothesis. NBER Working Paper,2003.
[63]Malmendier, U.,Tate, G., CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2661-2700.
[64]Manzon, G., Plesko, G., The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. Tax Law Review,2002,55(2):175-214.
[65]Marelli, M., On Indirect Tax Evasion. Journal of Public Economics,1984,25(1-2): 181-196.
[66]McGill, G., Outslay, E., Lost in Translation:Detecting Tax Shelter Activity in Financial Statements. National Tax Journal,2004,57(3):739-756.
[67]Mehran, H., Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38(2):163-184.
[68]Mertens, J., Measuring Tax Effort in Central and Eastern Europe. Public Finance and Management,2003,3(4):530-563.
[69]Mills, D. S., Alston, R. D., Rogers, V. et al., Factors Associated with the Prevalence of Stereotypic Behaviour in Thoroughbred Horses Passing through Auctioneer Sales. Applied Animal Behaviour Science,2002,78(2):115-124.
[70]Mills, L., Newberry, K., Trautman, W. Trends in Book-tax Income and Balance Sheet Differences. Tax Notes,2002,19(5):1109-1124.
[71]Mills, L., Book-tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research,1998,36 (2):343-356.
[72]Nellis J., Is Privatization Necessary? World Bank Viewpoint, note 17. Washington, DC:World Banck,1994.
[73]Phillips, J., CorporateTax-planning Effectiveness:the Role of Compensation-based Incentives. The Accounting Review,2003,78(3),847-874.
[74]Plesko, G.,.2002. Reconciling Corporation Book and Tax Net Income, tax years 1996-1998. SOI Bulletin Spring. Washington, DC:US Government Printing Office,2002.
[75]Porcano, T. M., Corporate Tax Rates:Progressive, Proportional, or Regressive. Journal of the American BTaxation Association,1986.8(1):17-31.
[76]Rego, S., Wilson, R., Executive Compensation, Tax Reporting Aggressiveness, and Future Firm Performance. Working Paper,2008, University of Iowa.
[77]Rego, S., Tax Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(4):805-833.
[78]Rego, S., Tax Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20(4):805-833.
[79]Robinson, J., Sikes S., Weaver C., The Impact of Evaluating the Tax Function as a Profit Center on Effective Tax Rates. Forthcoming, The Accounting Review.2009.
[80]Robinson, J., Sikes, S., Weaver, C., Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments. The Accounting Review,2010,85(3):1035-1064.
[81]Robinson, L., Sansing, R., The Effect of 'Invisible' Tax Preferences on Investment and Tax Preference Measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008, 46(2-3):389-404.
[82]Shackelford, D., Shevlin, T., Empirical Tax Research in Accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):321-387.
[83]Shevlin, T., Commentary:Corporate Tax Shelters and Book-tax Differences. Tax Law Review,2002,55(3):427-443.
[84]Slemrod, J. Yitzhaki, S., Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration. In: Auerbach, A. J., Feldstein, M. (ed.). Handbook of Public Economics,2002. 1423-1470.
[85]Slemrod, J., The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness. National Tax Journal, 2004,57(4):877-899.
[86]Srinivasan, T. N., Tax Evasion:A Model. Journal of Public Economics,1973,2(4): 339-346.
[87]Steven, K. Nagin. D., The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1989,5(1):1-24.
[88]Treasury, H., Tackling Poverty and Extending Opportunity. London:IIM Treasury, 1999.
[89]Weisbach, D., Corporate tax avoidance. In:Proceedings of the National Tax Association Ninety Sixth Annual Conference,2003, p.9.
[90]Weisbach, D., Ten Truths about Tax Shelters. Tax Law Review,2002,215(55): 221-222
[91]Wilson, R., An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):969-999.
[92]Xu, W. C, Zeng, Y. Z, Zhang, J. S., Tax Enforcement as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:Empirical Evidence from China. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2010,19(1):1-16.
[93]Yin, G, How Much Tax do Large Public Corporations Pay? Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500. Virginia Law Review December,2003,89(8): 1793-1856.
[94]Zimmerman, J., Taxes and Firm Size. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1983, 5(1):119-149.
[95]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究.管理世界,2008,5：124-133.
[96]陈捷.国际避税的危害及我国反避税.税务研究,2005,11：65-67.
[97]程燕芸.新企业所得税法下的税务筹划.时代经贸,2008,6：148-149.
[98]崔晓静.金融危机后国际避税地法律监管的新发展.税务研究,2011,5：92-95.
[99]戴德明,姚淑瑜,毛新述.会计-税收差异、盈余管理与公司避税行为研究.中国人民大学工作论文,2005.
[100]盖地.税务会计与纳税筹划.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[101]高培勇.中国税收持续高速增长之谜.经济研究,2006,12：13-23.
[102]何威风,刘启亮.我国上市公司高管背景特征与财务重述行为研究.管理世界,2010,7：144-155.
[103]黄黎明.跨国公司税收筹划问题研究[博士学位论文].保存单位：厦门大学图书馆,2004.
[104]贾绍华.中国税收流失问题研究.北京：北京中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[105]姜付秀,伊志宏,苏飞等.管理者背景特征与企业过度投资行为.管理世界,2009,1：130-139.
[106]金人庆.中国当代税务要论.北京：人民出版社,2002.
[107]雷虹云.借鉴国际经验完善避税地税务管理.涉外税务,2008,9：18-22.
[108]李俊英.企业税务筹划与偷税、避税.内蒙古财经学院学报,2001,2：46-50.
[109]梁朋.税收流失经济分析.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[110]刘晨,阳田华.避税港型离岸金融中心对我国跨境资本流动的影响及监管建议.财政研究,20119：38-41.
[111]刘芳,陈平路.逃税行为及影响因素的理论分析.武汉理工大学学报,2004,28,1：84-87.
[112]刘华,涂敏杰,丁光宗.基于现金交易的双元控制主体企业增值税逃税研究.税务研究,2008,7：69-71.
[113]刘剑文,丁一.避税之法理新探(上).涉外税务,2003,8：8-12.
[114]刘剑文,丁一.避税之法理新探(下).涉外税务,2003,9：21-25.
[115]刘晓亮,刘晓莺.论关联企业避税的法律规制.集团经济研究,2006,2：42-44.
[116]刘怡,梁俊桥,刘春.个人税务与遗产筹划.北京:中信出版社,2004.
[117]罗光,萧艳汾.考虑税收遵从成本的逃税模型研究.税务研究,2007,1：82-84.
[118]罗银鹤.纳税筹划与偷税、避税的辨析.广西民族学院学报,2005,12：152-154.
[119]沈肇章.基于企业避税行为分析的反避税策略研究[博士学位论文].保存地点：暨南大学图书馆,2008.
[120]石水平.控制权转移、超控制权与大股东利益侵占——来自上市公司高管变更的经验证据.金融研究,2010,4：160-176.
[121]苏号朋.纳税篇.北京：中国经济出版社,2001.
[122]王贵东.论避税的合法性.商场现代化,2007,12：298.
[123]王立彦,刘向前.IPO与非法定公司所得税收优惠.经济学(季刊),2004,2：457-474.
[124]王素荣,蒋高乐.新会计准则对上市公司所得税税负影响研究.中国工业经济,2009,12：117-127.
[125]王延明.上市公司所得税负担研究——来自规模、地区和行业的经验证据.管理世界,2003,1：115-122.
[126]王跃堂,王亮亮,贡彩萍.所得税改革、盈余管理及其经济后果.经济研究,2009,3：86-98.
[127]吴联生,李辰.“先征后返”、公司税负与税收政策的有效性.中医社会科学, 2007,4：61-73.
[128]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负.经济研究,2009,10：109-120.
[129]吴申军.论我国转让定价税制的改革完善[博士学位论文].保存地点：厦门大学图书馆,2004.
[130]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠.管理世界,2009,3：134-142.
[131]肖继辉.基于不同股权特征的上市公司经理报酬业绩敏感性.南开管理评论,2005,3：18-24.
[132]杨默如.偷税、避税与税务筹划——概念界定的国际借鉴及法律建议.经济视角,2010,7：56-58.
[133]叶康涛.盈余管理与所得税支付：基于会计利润与应税所得之间差异的研究.中国会计评论,2006,2：205-224.
[134]尤克洋.小规模增值税的税收筹划及实务研究.会计之友,2006,7：31-32.
[135]曾亚敏,张俊生.税收征管能够发挥公司治理功用吗?管理世界,2009,3：143-151.
[136]张宏林.税务筹划与避税分析.经济师,2001,7：114-115.
[137]赵德芳.对资本弱化避税案例的思考.税务研究,2010,1：72-75.
[138]周黎安,刘冲,厉行.税收努力、征税机构与税收增长之谜.经济学(季刊)2011,1：1-18.
[139]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本和非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究,1996,6：71-80.
[140]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业家队伍成长现状与环境评价——2003年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告.管理世界,2003,7：110-119.
[141]朱青,王小荣,孙茂竹.企业所得税反避税：意义、措施与任务.涉外税务,2008,9：14-18.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |