市场网络结构研究
|
摘要
演化经济学的研究方式方法对新古典经济学理论体系的冲击由来已久,而传统经济学对市场本质属性和结构特征的探讨已经停滞了很长时间。本文的研究目的是运用演化经济学的思想和研究方法,提出新的市场结构理论观点。具体而言,是建立市场复杂网络系统的视角,研究市场的网络结构构成,探讨在市场网络中的经济个体行为特征。
在研究之初,本文对市场网络系统的本质属性展开分析,以此作为全文研究的基础。为研究方便,本文提出了经济个体异质性,市场参与者有限理性,经济人追求的是效用(利润)的优化而不是最大化,信息不对称广泛存在这四个前提假设。
接下来的研究分成两部分：第一部分是建立市场网络系统中生产者——营销者——消费者的三部门分析方法,研究在行业市场子系统中的企业行为和消费者行为；第二部分是建立行业市场的网络结构分析框架,用节点连接的关系强弱和连接方式来分析竞争市场类型。
传统的研究思路往往将市场供需双方简单两分,形成生产者——消费者两部门交易模型,而本文通过对生产者网络的节点行为分析,发现了企业异质化的发展特点和群体分层的网络演化趋势有着密不可分的关系。企业在生产链条中不仅按照技术条件实行分工合作,而且会根据交易条件逐渐分层为制造者与营销者两个不同功能取向的群体。而这种企业的功能异质化和生产者网络——营销者网络的形成是伴生的。而在消费者方面,消费者同时也是生产参与者的客观现实使交易的信息不对称情况大为扭转。信息网络的普及也使大量消费导向的消费者网络能够迅速生成并大量汇集。消费者网络虽然生存期短暂,但在交易导向的消费者集体行动中扮演着重要角色,也为营销者取得与生产者抗衡的买方市场力量提供了强大的支持。通过对市场网络的宏观结构进行三部门的划分,纵向限制的定价约束、双边市场等新的市场形态也能够纳入框架中得到合理解释。
本文第二部分根据存在交易中介的网络结构模型,提出了根据交易连接关系的形态和强弱来进行竞争市场类型划分的新方法。通过将连接关系分为强连接、弱连接,本文用双边弱连接的信息传递关系模型重新解释了广告的效果；运用交易中介市场网络结构模型,本文对转售价格维持现象进行了分析,提出了防范零售商投机行为的新解释。
本文的创新主要体现在研究角度和研究方法上。将市场当作网络系统进行研究是一个新颖的角度,这种视角摒弃了一直以来重视研究经济个体行为,而忽视经济关系的传统,相当于将经济研究的物理世界观从牛顿力学跳转到场论。本文对经济个体的行为分析全部基于给定环境所形成的动态网络子系统。在这个视角下,经济个体的行为结果取决网络子系统的整体活动,所以任何先验的主观动机并不能由最终结果得到验证,这符合真实的因果关系逻辑。另外,在研究假设方面的创新也值得一提。经济体的异质性假设前提一直成为贯穿研究始终的重要条件,构成了市场网络在专业化分工和交易费用规避双重推动下得以深化的实体基础。
The study approach of evolutionary economics has long been impacting the theoretical system of neoclassical economics, whereas the traditional economics has been bogged down in discussing the nature and structural features of the market for a long time. This paper aims at proposing a new theoretical point of view of the market structure with the ideas and research methods of evolutionary economics. Specifically, it aims to establish a perspective of the complex network system of the market, and study the structure of market network, so as to discuss the behavioral characteristics of economic entity in it.
At the beginning of the study, this paper analyzed the nature of market network system, making it as the basis of the whole research. For convenience, this paper presents four assumptions, namely:the heterogeneity of enterprise, bounded rationality of market participants, that homooeconomicus pursues the optimization rather than the maximization of the utility (profit), and the widespread of asymmetric information.
The following study is divided into two parts:the first part creates an analysis method of producer-marketer-consumer in the market network system, so as to study the enterprise and individual behavior in the subsystem of industry market; in the second part, the author tries to establish an analytical framework of the network structure in industry market, and study the types of the competitive market through the strength and the way of the joint connection.
Traditional ideas tend to divide both sides of supply and demand simply, forming a trading model of producer-consumer sectors. However, by analyzing the node behavior of the producer network, this paper finds that there are inseparable relations between the development characteristics of the heterogeneous and network evolution trend of population stratification. In the production chain, the enterprises not only divide the labor in accordance with the technical conditions, but also would gradually be stratified into producers and marketers, two different function-oriented groups, according to the trading terms. Such heterogeneity of enterprise function is concomitant with producer network-marketer Network. As for the consumers, the reality that consumers are also the participants of the production greatly reverses the asymmetries of transaction information. The popularity of information networks also rapidly creates and collects a large number of consume-driven consumer networks. Although the life of consumer network is brief, it plays an important role in the transaction-oriented collective action of consumers, and also provides strong support for marketers to obtain the buyer's market force to compete with producers. With the macro-structure of the market network being divided into three sectors, vertical restraints on market pricing and new market form such as bilateral market can also be incorporated into the framework and get reasonable explanations.
According to the network structure model of three sectors, the second part of this thesis proposed a new method, i.e. classifying the types of the competitive market according to the shape and strength of relations based on transactions. Through dividing the connection relationship into strongly connected, weakly connected, this thesis re-interprets the effect of advertising using the model of information transmission of the bilateral connection; and with the connection model of three sectors, it conducted an analysis of Resale-price Maintenance.
The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the perspective and method of research. It is a novel point of view to take market as a network system, which abandons the tradition to pay great attention to studying the behavior of economic entity while ignoring the economic relations, which is equivalent to turn the perspective of the physical world of economic research from Newtonian mechanics to the field theory. The analysis of the behavior of economic entity is based on the dynamic network subsystem formed under the given conditions. In this perspective, the behavior results of economic entity depend on the overall activities of the network subsystem, so any priori subjective motives cannot be verified by the final results. This is in line with the logic of cause-effect relationship. In addition, the innovation in hypothesis is also worth mentioning. The assumption of economies heterogeneity is always taken as an important condition throughout the study. The heterogeneity of the enterprise constitutes a solid foundation for market network under the impulse of specialized labor division and the avoidance of transaction costs. Consumer heterogeneity, on the other hand, becomes the basis on the demand side to continuously expand market capacity as well as the boost for the independence of marketing network.
在研究之初,本文对市场网络系统的本质属性展开分析,以此作为全文研究的基础。为研究方便,本文提出了经济个体异质性,市场参与者有限理性,经济人追求的是效用(利润)的优化而不是最大化,信息不对称广泛存在这四个前提假设。
接下来的研究分成两部分：第一部分是建立市场网络系统中生产者——营销者——消费者的三部门分析方法,研究在行业市场子系统中的企业行为和消费者行为；第二部分是建立行业市场的网络结构分析框架,用节点连接的关系强弱和连接方式来分析竞争市场类型。
传统的研究思路往往将市场供需双方简单两分,形成生产者——消费者两部门交易模型,而本文通过对生产者网络的节点行为分析,发现了企业异质化的发展特点和群体分层的网络演化趋势有着密不可分的关系。企业在生产链条中不仅按照技术条件实行分工合作,而且会根据交易条件逐渐分层为制造者与营销者两个不同功能取向的群体。而这种企业的功能异质化和生产者网络——营销者网络的形成是伴生的。而在消费者方面,消费者同时也是生产参与者的客观现实使交易的信息不对称情况大为扭转。信息网络的普及也使大量消费导向的消费者网络能够迅速生成并大量汇集。消费者网络虽然生存期短暂,但在交易导向的消费者集体行动中扮演着重要角色,也为营销者取得与生产者抗衡的买方市场力量提供了强大的支持。通过对市场网络的宏观结构进行三部门的划分,纵向限制的定价约束、双边市场等新的市场形态也能够纳入框架中得到合理解释。
本文第二部分根据存在交易中介的网络结构模型,提出了根据交易连接关系的形态和强弱来进行竞争市场类型划分的新方法。通过将连接关系分为强连接、弱连接,本文用双边弱连接的信息传递关系模型重新解释了广告的效果；运用交易中介市场网络结构模型,本文对转售价格维持现象进行了分析,提出了防范零售商投机行为的新解释。
本文的创新主要体现在研究角度和研究方法上。将市场当作网络系统进行研究是一个新颖的角度,这种视角摒弃了一直以来重视研究经济个体行为,而忽视经济关系的传统,相当于将经济研究的物理世界观从牛顿力学跳转到场论。本文对经济个体的行为分析全部基于给定环境所形成的动态网络子系统。在这个视角下,经济个体的行为结果取决网络子系统的整体活动,所以任何先验的主观动机并不能由最终结果得到验证,这符合真实的因果关系逻辑。另外,在研究假设方面的创新也值得一提。经济体的异质性假设前提一直成为贯穿研究始终的重要条件,构成了市场网络在专业化分工和交易费用规避双重推动下得以深化的实体基础。
The study approach of evolutionary economics has long been impacting the theoretical system of neoclassical economics, whereas the traditional economics has been bogged down in discussing the nature and structural features of the market for a long time. This paper aims at proposing a new theoretical point of view of the market structure with the ideas and research methods of evolutionary economics. Specifically, it aims to establish a perspective of the complex network system of the market, and study the structure of market network, so as to discuss the behavioral characteristics of economic entity in it.
At the beginning of the study, this paper analyzed the nature of market network system, making it as the basis of the whole research. For convenience, this paper presents four assumptions, namely:the heterogeneity of enterprise, bounded rationality of market participants, that homooeconomicus pursues the optimization rather than the maximization of the utility (profit), and the widespread of asymmetric information.
The following study is divided into two parts:the first part creates an analysis method of producer-marketer-consumer in the market network system, so as to study the enterprise and individual behavior in the subsystem of industry market; in the second part, the author tries to establish an analytical framework of the network structure in industry market, and study the types of the competitive market through the strength and the way of the joint connection.
Traditional ideas tend to divide both sides of supply and demand simply, forming a trading model of producer-consumer sectors. However, by analyzing the node behavior of the producer network, this paper finds that there are inseparable relations between the development characteristics of the heterogeneous and network evolution trend of population stratification. In the production chain, the enterprises not only divide the labor in accordance with the technical conditions, but also would gradually be stratified into producers and marketers, two different function-oriented groups, according to the trading terms. Such heterogeneity of enterprise function is concomitant with producer network-marketer Network. As for the consumers, the reality that consumers are also the participants of the production greatly reverses the asymmetries of transaction information. The popularity of information networks also rapidly creates and collects a large number of consume-driven consumer networks. Although the life of consumer network is brief, it plays an important role in the transaction-oriented collective action of consumers, and also provides strong support for marketers to obtain the buyer's market force to compete with producers. With the macro-structure of the market network being divided into three sectors, vertical restraints on market pricing and new market form such as bilateral market can also be incorporated into the framework and get reasonable explanations.
According to the network structure model of three sectors, the second part of this thesis proposed a new method, i.e. classifying the types of the competitive market according to the shape and strength of relations based on transactions. Through dividing the connection relationship into strongly connected, weakly connected, this thesis re-interprets the effect of advertising using the model of information transmission of the bilateral connection; and with the connection model of three sectors, it conducted an analysis of Resale-price Maintenance.
The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the perspective and method of research. It is a novel point of view to take market as a network system, which abandons the tradition to pay great attention to studying the behavior of economic entity while ignoring the economic relations, which is equivalent to turn the perspective of the physical world of economic research from Newtonian mechanics to the field theory. The analysis of the behavior of economic entity is based on the dynamic network subsystem formed under the given conditions. In this perspective, the behavior results of economic entity depend on the overall activities of the network subsystem, so any priori subjective motives cannot be verified by the final results. This is in line with the logic of cause-effect relationship. In addition, the innovation in hypothesis is also worth mentioning. The assumption of economies heterogeneity is always taken as an important condition throughout the study. The heterogeneity of the enterprise constitutes a solid foundation for market network under the impulse of specialized labor division and the avoidance of transaction costs. Consumer heterogeneity, on the other hand, becomes the basis on the demand side to continuously expand market capacity as well as the boost for the independence of marketing network.
引文
[1]Alchain,A., "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory", Journal of Political Economy,1950,vol.58 (June):211-221.
[2]Alchain, A. and Demsetz, "Production, information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795.
[3]Arrow, K. J., "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing", Review of Economic Studies,1962,29:155-173.
[4]Badaracco, J.L., "The knowledge Link:How Firms Compete through Strategic Alliances", Boston, MA:Harvard Business School Press,1991,157-163.
[5]Baldwin, R.E., Okubo, T. Heterogeneous Firms, Agglomeration and Economic Geography:Spatial Selection and Sorting. Journal of Economic Geography,2006, (6).
[6]Barely. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets", Journal of Law and Economics,1962,25:27-48.
[7]B. Mittal:"Must Consumer Involvement Always Imply More information Search?" in Advances in Consumer Research XVI, ed.T.K.Srull (Provo, UT:Association for Consumer Research,1989,167-72.
[8]Burt, R. S., "Structural Holes:the Social Structure of Competition", Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press,1992.
[9]Cheung, S(张五常),"The Contractual Nature of the Firm" Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:1-21.
[10]Coase, R., "The Nature of the Firm", Economics,1937,4:386-405.
[11]Coase, R., "The Problem of Social Cost", the Journal of Law & Economics,1960, 3:1-44.
[12]Coleman, James S., "Foundations of Social Theory", Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1990.
[13]Economides, N. And E, Katsamakas., "Two-Sided competition of proprietary VS open source technology Platforms and the implications for the software industry", Management Science,2006,52:1057-1071.
[14]Fama. E. and Jensen, M., "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law & Economics,1983,26:301-27.
[15]Friedman, M., "The Methodology of Positive Economic", in Essays in Economics, Chicago University Press,1953.
[16]G. B. Richardson:"The Organization of Industry", Economic of Journal,1972, 82:883-96.
[17]Gilligan, Thomas W. The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, Rand Journal ok Economics,1986,17(4):551.
[18]Gulati, R., "Alliances and Networks", Strategic Management Journal,1998,19:293-317.
[19]Gulati, R., "Network Location and Learning:the Influence of Network Resources and Firm Capabilities on Alliance Formation", Strategic Management Journal,1999, 20:397-420.
[20]Gulati, R., Nohria N., Zaheer A., "Strategic Networks", Strategic Management Journal,2000,21:203-215.
[21]M. C. Jensen and W. H. Mecking:Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3 (October):305-360.
[22]Hart, O. and Moore, B., "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[23]Jarillo, J. C. "On Strategic Networks", Strategic Management Journal,1988,9:31-41.
[24]Jarillo,J.C., "Strategic Network-Creating the Borderless Organization", Organization Studies,1993,23:91-123.
[25]J.C. Moven:"Beyond Consumer Decision Making", Journal of Consumer Marketing, winter 1988,15-25.
[26]John, R & Lawrence, P.R., "Beyond Vertical Integration-the Rise o the Value-adding Partership", Harvard Business Review,1988, July-August:94-101.
[27]J.Rudd and F.J.Kohout, "Individual and Group Consumer Information Acquisitions in Brand Choice Situations", Journal of consumer Research,December 1983,303-309.
[28]Katz, M and C, Shapiro, "network externality, competition, and compatibility", American Ecomomic Review,1985, vol.5:424-440.
[29]Kenneth Arrow:The Organization of Economic Activity:Issues Pertinent to the Chioce of Market Versus Non-market Allocation, in The Analysis and Evolution of Public Expenditures, the PPB System vol.1, by Joint Economic Committee (Washington D.C.),1969,47-64.
[30]Knight, F., "Decreasing Cost and Comparative Cost:A Rejoinder", Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925,39:332-33.
[31]Khanna, T., Gulati, R.& Nohria, N. (1998). The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, Cooperation, and Relative Scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19,193-210.
[32]Marvel, Howard P.and McCafferty, Stephen. Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, Rand Journal of Economics,1984,15(3):348.
[33]Max Weber:The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York:The Free Press,1947.
[34]McEachern, William A., and Romeo, Anthony. Vertical Restraints in the Audio Components Industry:an Economic Analysis of FTC Intervention. In Ronald N. Lafferty, Robert H, Lande, and John B. Kirkwood, Impact Evaluation of Federal Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases, Washington D.C:Federal Trade Commission.1984.
[35]Nohria, Nitin and Robert Eccles(edited), (1992) "Networks and Originations: Structure, Form and Action", SMJ,1992,20:73-89.
[36]Polanyi, K., "The Economy as Instituted Process", In Polanyi, K., Arenberg, C. &Pearson, H., Trade and market in the early empires, New York:Free Press,1957, 243-270.
[37]Stigler, G., "The Division of Labor is limited by the Extend of the Market", Journal of Political Economy,1951,59:185-93.
[38]Teece,D.J., "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm", Journal of Behavior and Organization,1982,3:39-63.
[39]Telser, Lester G. Why should manufacturers want fair trade?, Journal of Law and Economics,1960,3(1),86-105.
[40]Telser, L. G., "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements", Journal of Business,1980, 53(1).
[41]Thorelli, H.B., "Networks:Between Markets and Hierarchies", Strategic Management Journal,1986,7:35-51.
[42]Williamson, Oliver E., "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy,1967,75:123-38.
[43]Williamson, Oliver E., "Transaction-Cost Economics:The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economy,1979,22:233-61.
[44]Williamson, Oliver E., "The Modern Corporation:Origins, Evolution, Attributes", Journal of Economic Literature,1981,19:1537-68.
[45]Williamson, Oliver E., the Economic Institutions of Capitlism:Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting." New York:The Free Press,1985.
[46]Williamson, Oliver E., "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization", Journal of Economics and Law,1993,36:453-486.
[47]Yang, X(杨小凯)and Shi, H(史鹤凌), "Specialization and Product Diversity", American Economic Review,1992,82:392-398.
[48]Young, Allyn, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress", The Economic Journal,1928,38:527-542.
[49]格兰诺维特.弱关系的力量.国外社会学,1998,2.
[50]G.J.施蒂格勒.产业组织和政府管制.上海三联书店,1996.
[51]黄泰岩.企业网络理论述评.经济学动态,1999,4.
[52]黄泰岩,牛飞亮.西方企业网络理论与企业家的成长.中国工业经济,1999(2)
[53]杰克.J.弗罗门.经济演化——探究新制度经济学的理论基础.经济科学出版社,2003.
[54]J.泰勒尔.产业组织理论.中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[55]科斯等.财产权力与制度变迁论文集.上海三联书店,1991.
[56]赖普清,姚先国.市场的性质：从“无形之手”到“有形之网”.中国工业经济,2011,4：95-105.
[57]李海舰,陈小勇.企业无边界发展研究.中国工业经济,2011,6：89-98
[58]罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德,合作的进化,上海人民出版社,2007：62-72.
[59]罗珉,高强.中国网络组织：网络封闭和结构洞的悖论.中国工业经济,2011,11：90-99.
[60]路易斯·普特曼.企业的经济性质.上海财经大学出版社,2000.
[61]麦克尔·波特.竞争论.中信出版社,2003年版
[62]麦克尔·波特等.日本还有竞争力么?.中信出版社,2002.
[63]迈克尔·舍默.当经济学遇上生物学和心理学.中国人民大学出版社,2009：88-99.
[64]麦克尼尔.新社会契约论.中国政法大学出版社,1994.
[65]马歇尔.经济学原理(上册).商务印书馆,1981.
[66]M.詹森和W.梅克林.企业理论：管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构.所有权、控制权与激励——代理经济学文选,上海三联书店,1998.
[67]O.E.威廉姆森.交易费用经济学：契约关系的规制.业制度与市场组织——交易费用经济学文选,上海三联书店,1999.
[68]O.E.威廉姆森.治理机制.中国社会科学出版社,2001.
[69]帕撒达·斯古普特,伊斯梅尔·撒格拉尔丁编：社会资本——一个多角度的观点北京,中国人民大学出版社,2005：54-56.
[70]托马斯·C·谢林.微观动机与宏观行为.中国人民大学出版社,2005：13-19,95.
[71]吴旭亮.纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究.产业经济研究,2010,1：39-47.
[72]小艾尔弗雷德·钱德勒.看得见的手.商务印书馆,1987.
[73]小艾尔弗雷德·钱德勒.企业规模经济与范围经济.中国社会科学出版社,1999.
[74]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究上卷.商务印书馆,1981.
[75]杨小凯,黄有光.专业化与经济组织——一种新兴古典微观经济学框架.经济科学出版社,1999.
[76]杨小凯,张永生.新兴古典经济学和超边际分析.中国人民大学出版社,2000年版.
[77]于立,吴旭亮.纵向限制的经济逻辑与反垄断政策.中国工业经济,2005,8：67-78.
[78]张五常.经济解释(文集).商务印书馆,2000.
[79]周立群.商品契约优于要素契约.经济研究,2002(1)
[2]Alchain, A. and Demsetz, "Production, information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,1972,62:777-795.
[3]Arrow, K. J., "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing", Review of Economic Studies,1962,29:155-173.
[4]Badaracco, J.L., "The knowledge Link:How Firms Compete through Strategic Alliances", Boston, MA:Harvard Business School Press,1991,157-163.
[5]Baldwin, R.E., Okubo, T. Heterogeneous Firms, Agglomeration and Economic Geography:Spatial Selection and Sorting. Journal of Economic Geography,2006, (6).
[6]Barely. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets", Journal of Law and Economics,1962,25:27-48.
[7]B. Mittal:"Must Consumer Involvement Always Imply More information Search?" in Advances in Consumer Research XVI, ed.T.K.Srull (Provo, UT:Association for Consumer Research,1989,167-72.
[8]Burt, R. S., "Structural Holes:the Social Structure of Competition", Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press,1992.
[9]Cheung, S(张五常),"The Contractual Nature of the Firm" Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:1-21.
[10]Coase, R., "The Nature of the Firm", Economics,1937,4:386-405.
[11]Coase, R., "The Problem of Social Cost", the Journal of Law & Economics,1960, 3:1-44.
[12]Coleman, James S., "Foundations of Social Theory", Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1990.
[13]Economides, N. And E, Katsamakas., "Two-Sided competition of proprietary VS open source technology Platforms and the implications for the software industry", Management Science,2006,52:1057-1071.
[14]Fama. E. and Jensen, M., "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law & Economics,1983,26:301-27.
[15]Friedman, M., "The Methodology of Positive Economic", in Essays in Economics, Chicago University Press,1953.
[16]G. B. Richardson:"The Organization of Industry", Economic of Journal,1972, 82:883-96.
[17]Gilligan, Thomas W. The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, Rand Journal ok Economics,1986,17(4):551.
[18]Gulati, R., "Alliances and Networks", Strategic Management Journal,1998,19:293-317.
[19]Gulati, R., "Network Location and Learning:the Influence of Network Resources and Firm Capabilities on Alliance Formation", Strategic Management Journal,1999, 20:397-420.
[20]Gulati, R., Nohria N., Zaheer A., "Strategic Networks", Strategic Management Journal,2000,21:203-215.
[21]M. C. Jensen and W. H. Mecking:Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3 (October):305-360.
[22]Hart, O. and Moore, B., "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[23]Jarillo, J. C. "On Strategic Networks", Strategic Management Journal,1988,9:31-41.
[24]Jarillo,J.C., "Strategic Network-Creating the Borderless Organization", Organization Studies,1993,23:91-123.
[25]J.C. Moven:"Beyond Consumer Decision Making", Journal of Consumer Marketing, winter 1988,15-25.
[26]John, R & Lawrence, P.R., "Beyond Vertical Integration-the Rise o the Value-adding Partership", Harvard Business Review,1988, July-August:94-101.
[27]J.Rudd and F.J.Kohout, "Individual and Group Consumer Information Acquisitions in Brand Choice Situations", Journal of consumer Research,December 1983,303-309.
[28]Katz, M and C, Shapiro, "network externality, competition, and compatibility", American Ecomomic Review,1985, vol.5:424-440.
[29]Kenneth Arrow:The Organization of Economic Activity:Issues Pertinent to the Chioce of Market Versus Non-market Allocation, in The Analysis and Evolution of Public Expenditures, the PPB System vol.1, by Joint Economic Committee (Washington D.C.),1969,47-64.
[30]Knight, F., "Decreasing Cost and Comparative Cost:A Rejoinder", Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925,39:332-33.
[31]Khanna, T., Gulati, R.& Nohria, N. (1998). The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, Cooperation, and Relative Scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19,193-210.
[32]Marvel, Howard P.and McCafferty, Stephen. Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, Rand Journal of Economics,1984,15(3):348.
[33]Max Weber:The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York:The Free Press,1947.
[34]McEachern, William A., and Romeo, Anthony. Vertical Restraints in the Audio Components Industry:an Economic Analysis of FTC Intervention. In Ronald N. Lafferty, Robert H, Lande, and John B. Kirkwood, Impact Evaluation of Federal Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases, Washington D.C:Federal Trade Commission.1984.
[35]Nohria, Nitin and Robert Eccles(edited), (1992) "Networks and Originations: Structure, Form and Action", SMJ,1992,20:73-89.
[36]Polanyi, K., "The Economy as Instituted Process", In Polanyi, K., Arenberg, C. &Pearson, H., Trade and market in the early empires, New York:Free Press,1957, 243-270.
[37]Stigler, G., "The Division of Labor is limited by the Extend of the Market", Journal of Political Economy,1951,59:185-93.
[38]Teece,D.J., "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm", Journal of Behavior and Organization,1982,3:39-63.
[39]Telser, Lester G. Why should manufacturers want fair trade?, Journal of Law and Economics,1960,3(1),86-105.
[40]Telser, L. G., "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements", Journal of Business,1980, 53(1).
[41]Thorelli, H.B., "Networks:Between Markets and Hierarchies", Strategic Management Journal,1986,7:35-51.
[42]Williamson, Oliver E., "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy,1967,75:123-38.
[43]Williamson, Oliver E., "Transaction-Cost Economics:The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economy,1979,22:233-61.
[44]Williamson, Oliver E., "The Modern Corporation:Origins, Evolution, Attributes", Journal of Economic Literature,1981,19:1537-68.
[45]Williamson, Oliver E., the Economic Institutions of Capitlism:Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting." New York:The Free Press,1985.
[46]Williamson, Oliver E., "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization", Journal of Economics and Law,1993,36:453-486.
[47]Yang, X(杨小凯)and Shi, H(史鹤凌), "Specialization and Product Diversity", American Economic Review,1992,82:392-398.
[48]Young, Allyn, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress", The Economic Journal,1928,38:527-542.
[49]格兰诺维特.弱关系的力量.国外社会学,1998,2.
[50]G.J.施蒂格勒.产业组织和政府管制.上海三联书店,1996.
[51]黄泰岩.企业网络理论述评.经济学动态,1999,4.
[52]黄泰岩,牛飞亮.西方企业网络理论与企业家的成长.中国工业经济,1999(2)
[53]杰克.J.弗罗门.经济演化——探究新制度经济学的理论基础.经济科学出版社,2003.
[54]J.泰勒尔.产业组织理论.中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[55]科斯等.财产权力与制度变迁论文集.上海三联书店,1991.
[56]赖普清,姚先国.市场的性质：从“无形之手”到“有形之网”.中国工业经济,2011,4：95-105.
[57]李海舰,陈小勇.企业无边界发展研究.中国工业经济,2011,6：89-98
[58]罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德,合作的进化,上海人民出版社,2007：62-72.
[59]罗珉,高强.中国网络组织：网络封闭和结构洞的悖论.中国工业经济,2011,11：90-99.
[60]路易斯·普特曼.企业的经济性质.上海财经大学出版社,2000.
[61]麦克尔·波特.竞争论.中信出版社,2003年版
[62]麦克尔·波特等.日本还有竞争力么?.中信出版社,2002.
[63]迈克尔·舍默.当经济学遇上生物学和心理学.中国人民大学出版社,2009：88-99.
[64]麦克尼尔.新社会契约论.中国政法大学出版社,1994.
[65]马歇尔.经济学原理(上册).商务印书馆,1981.
[66]M.詹森和W.梅克林.企业理论：管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构.所有权、控制权与激励——代理经济学文选,上海三联书店,1998.
[67]O.E.威廉姆森.交易费用经济学：契约关系的规制.业制度与市场组织——交易费用经济学文选,上海三联书店,1999.
[68]O.E.威廉姆森.治理机制.中国社会科学出版社,2001.
[69]帕撒达·斯古普特,伊斯梅尔·撒格拉尔丁编：社会资本——一个多角度的观点北京,中国人民大学出版社,2005：54-56.
[70]托马斯·C·谢林.微观动机与宏观行为.中国人民大学出版社,2005：13-19,95.
[71]吴旭亮.纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究.产业经济研究,2010,1：39-47.
[72]小艾尔弗雷德·钱德勒.看得见的手.商务印书馆,1987.
[73]小艾尔弗雷德·钱德勒.企业规模经济与范围经济.中国社会科学出版社,1999.
[74]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究上卷.商务印书馆,1981.
[75]杨小凯,黄有光.专业化与经济组织——一种新兴古典微观经济学框架.经济科学出版社,1999.
[76]杨小凯,张永生.新兴古典经济学和超边际分析.中国人民大学出版社,2000年版.
[77]于立,吴旭亮.纵向限制的经济逻辑与反垄断政策.中国工业经济,2005,8：67-78.
[78]张五常.经济解释(文集).商务印书馆,2000.
[79]周立群.商品契约优于要素契约.经济研究,2002(1)
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |