制度创新对资源节约和环境保护的影响研究
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摘要
我国矿山开发中的尾矿库和尾矿资源环境形势非常严峻。因尾矿库溃坝引致的尾矿资源浪费和环境污染问题,是当前我国国民经济和社会发展中较为突出的严峻问题,不但有严重的二次资源损失和浪费现象,而且同时还产生重大安全与社会危机隐患,严重地挑战了政府公信力,给人民的生命财产安全和国家、社会的和谐稳定及经济可持续发展带来了巨大的破坏。更为重要的是,总结连续多年发生多起重特大矿难事故、尾矿库溃坝事件或尾矿违规排放等所引致的资源浪费及环境污染问题,发现这些严重危害人们身心健康、造成重大生命财产损失并且不断在侵蚀经济增长成果的重大难题,部分在一定范围内一定程度上引发了社会危机,部分隐藏着潜在的社会公共危机,给社会的和谐稳定和经济的可持续健康发展带来极大的影响。因此,探究矿山开发中资源节约和环境保护失范现象背后的诱因及其解决机制,是摆在党和政府以及学者面前的重大课题。
当前我国学术界对于资源节约与环境保护问题的研究和探索已经取得了很多成果,但对矿山尾矿库的资源浪费与环境污染的解释和回应仍不能令人满意,表现在：其一,将尾矿库溃坝等事故的责任主要对准矿山企业或矿主,很少去剖析矿难、污染和资源浪费背后的内在制度机理,很少去检讨现有相关经济制度与政策,对尾矿资源环境治理之制度机制的有效性问题有所忽视；其二,现有对资源环境治理的研究多从技术层面加以展开,而在社会学领域的理论探讨不够,妨碍了尾矿库管理与治理研究的深化；其三,资源环境的制度研究主要强调强调产权制度,但现实表明,产权的明晰并未解决尾矿资源环境问题,其它制度安排如价格机制和社区自治运动,同样也是尾矿资源环境治理活动所必需的制度形式；其四,尾矿资源环境的管理和治理,缺乏相应的制度安排。
基于上述研究现状,本文首先展开了对制度及经济制度等基本概念、基本理论问题的探讨。制度作为一个系统内部成员认可和遵同、并作为映照着人的博弈中均衡选择的一种“规则系统”和“构型安排”,是一种社会规范或社会的游戏规则,是构建人类相互行为的被人发现并通过人为设定的正式或非正式约束,构造了人们在政治、社会或经济方面发生交换的激励结构。而所谓的经济制度,就是规定市场经济主体从事经济活动的规则体系,既包括国家法律制度,也包括经济生活中的价值形态、经济交往的无形规则、国际惯例等,这些规则体系构成了一个社会或国家的基本经济秩序的合作与竞争关系。制度通常有正式制度和非正式制度之分,但正式制度和非正式制度并非截然分开,正式制度是一种文本化和规范化的非正式制度,一个社会或民族的文化价值是制度的基础。从经济发展的要求来看,一方面,制度是经济增长的关键,包含着法治、政府权力与制衡结构、司法独立等宪政原则,塑造了一个社会中关键经济主体的激励；但另一方面,经济的发展会促进制度变迁,并为制度变革提供经济条件,没有市场经济发育之诱导基础的制度通常是非效率的。随着中国经济的发展,社会各阶层、各利益集团就会要求从制度安排甚至政治秩序上为既得利益加以保护,或者诉求未得利益,进而引发产权制度、社会激励机制、竞争机制的变革。不过,虽然制度变迁可能会触及既得利益,但制度变迁与创新并不一定就削弱统治集团的统治能力和利益,相反却有可能会增加它的能力和利益。这些研究结论,为尾矿资源环境治理的制度研究奠定了理论基础。
在经济发展与资源节约、环境保护的互动关系和我国资源环境战略的基础上,分析了制度与资源节约、环境保护之间内在关系,并论证了制度推动资源环境治理的理论基础。科学发展是符合人心的文明的发展,是人与自然、环境和谐的发展,这也是价值规范尾矿资源开发利用的经济发展观。资源是人类社会存在和发展的物质基础,环境为经济发展提供空间支持,而经济发展是资源环境和谐共存的保障。制度建设有助于资源节约和环境保护,有效的制度是促进矿山开发中资源节约利用和促进环境保护以及经济可持续健康发展的前提和基础；在资源环境治理的制度设计上,既要考虑对破坏环境牟取暴利者加强监管和实施惩罚,也要考虑对监管者施行行之有效的激励约束。研究还认为,社区运动是一个非常好的尾矿资源节约和促进环境保护的治理机制和模式,但因不具有相应的合法空间和制度支持,社区运动中社会成员的行动力和行动者拥有的可动员资源有限。因此,社区力量直接介入矿区资源环境利益博弈、以及有效或实质实现相关利益人公开对话的制度创新成为矿山开发中尾矿资源环境治理的关键。这一点可以在中国投资秘鲁矿产资源开发项目中得到验证：秘鲁的社区能参与尾矿库建设方案的审核,社区在相当程度上介入海外矿山资源开发管理,并且具有相当的话语权,这其实也意味着,制度创新也要求提供非市场的公共治理机制。
开展了矿山开发资源环境冲突的制度分析。矿山开发的资源环境治理的制度困境导致制度供给上的“政府失灵”与“市场失灵”。在矿山开发领域,矿山资源的产权制度,利益关系、价值信念、思维方式等各方面都有冲突,导致经济行为和地方公共政策与服务不能兼顾社会利益。而摆脱困境的思路是“多中心治理”,也就是要取得制度协同,通过明确尾矿资源的产权、更新文化价值理念、促进公平与正义来确定矿山尾矿资源环境制度建设的重点,这样,通过明确国家、市场和企业各自社会责任,在公共全力部门、私人经济部门和第三部门之间正在形成一种相对独立、分工合作的新型治理结构。
深入剖析了当前我国矿山尾矿资源环境治理的体制现状、国外尾矿资源环境治理的经验与教训以及我国尾矿资源和尾矿库管理体制再造的原则和目标体系,重点探索了尾矿库管理的社区自治制度、尾矿库失事保证金制度。尾矿资源环境的形势严峻,这既有政策的不完善性、经济制度的缺陷以及社会管理制度和领导干部问责等制度的缺陷。此外,尾矿库治理的经济制度创新,不仅要理顺并强化尾矿资源的产权激励,而且还要在尾矿资源环境的价格机制上进行创新,强化尾矿资源的价格保障。而在尾矿库的治理机制上,要强化社区自治,完善社区自治治理的政治与社会制度体系,强化失事保证金制度。与此相关的一些重要发现或结论或观点包括：其一,我国现有的矿山尾矿资源开发利用及环境保护制度多不鼓励资源节约和环境保护,表现在：(1)矿业权管理制度自身不鼓励矿业权人充分利用尾矿库里的尾砂、废石等低品位资源,主要是采矿许可证的既定期限性决定了采矿权人的短期行为,使之放弃对资源节约利用和保护环境的承诺；(2)采矿权与探矿权分离制度严重背离了矿产资源综合利用与环境保护政策,在一定程度上激励了探矿权人的短期行为,不鼓励采矿权人利用履行资源综合利用和环境保护等义务；(3)矿业有“资源补偿费、资源税、探矿权使用费、采矿权使用费、探矿权价款、采矿权价款”的六大收费行为,但这些收费制度未能体现矿山企业的资源开发利用水平、资源消耗情况,不鼓励尾矿资源综合开发利用；(4)矿业权评估体制也不鼓励资源综合开发利用,主要是其评估方法难以激励探矿权人、采矿权人利用履行资源综合利用和环境保护的义务；(5)增值税制度无从考评资源的消耗量、资源的综合利用水平等因素,难以政策预期的激励作用,也与循环经济的理念不一致；另外,增值税税制本身不鼓励低品位、低成本的资源开发利用；(6)此外,现行的环境保护制度、矿政管理组织制度、安全技术监督检查制度以及尾矿库安全生产管理制度等都存在缺陷,基本上都不鼓励尾矿资源再利用。另外,我国还缺失了有效保障社会组织在尾矿资源环境治理中作用发挥的制度,尾矿库重大事件事故的问责制度也不健全。其二,基于典型国家尾矿资源环境治理的经验与教训,需要进一步明确政府矿山资源管理的职责,提高矿产资源规划和政策协调能力,建立尾矿资源综合管理体制,完善尾矿库治理的激励约束机制；另外,促进尾矿库管理的经济制度创新观念上,要求倡导高度的“文化自觉”,避免陷入“建构理性主义”的思径取向,摒弃静态的“配置效率”,树立“适应性效率”观,构建尾矿库治理的具体制度体系架构。其三,尾矿库区的居民社区是尾矿库“共享性资源”的有效管理单位,社区内的居民不但与所处地矿山资源及自然环境的维护有切身的利害关系,而且因共同的传统,使得他们有动机(社群性激励)、有意识、有社会资本来提供尾矿资源环境治理的集体行动。当然社区治理也存在一些难题,如社区的变迁以及人员的流动、农村居民环保意识的淡薄、社区自治组织不健全、潜在群体性事件的威胁等,但通过制度改进,理顺并保障社区的尾矿库治理自主权,完善社区的运行管理制度和社区自治组织等,就可以规避这些难题,实现尾矿资源环境治理的有效社区治理。其四,尾矿库失事的案例研究表明,失事保证金制度对于潜在事故直接责任人切实履行责任义务,对于迅速平息尾矿库事故造成的社会不稳定,对于确保遭受事故灾害损失的人民群众的利益,对于预防尾矿溃坝事故的发生,都具有重大意义。当然,制度的实施机制也非常重要,以防止对制度进行不合理甚至非法的变通。
Tailings storage facility and tailings resources and environment in mine development are facing a huge challenge in China. Tailings resources wasting and environment pollution caused by tailings dam break are currently highlighted problems in national economic and social development in China, which not only leads to severe secondary resources loss and wasting phenomenon but also breeds significant security and social crisis, challenges government credibility, damages people's lives/property safety, breaks national/social harmony and stability, and affects sustained development in economy. More importantly, to summarize resources wasting and environmental pollution due to many major mine disasters, tailings dam break events, and tailings emission violations for many years, it can be found that for these severe problems which have seriously damaged people's physical and metal health, caused great loss of lives and property and ate away economic growth constantly, some have already lead to social crisis within certain rage to certain extent while some have potential public crisis behind and do harm to social harmony and stability and sustained development in economy. Therefore, it is a key subject in front of the Party and Government and scholars to research into the cause behind the non-compliance of resources conservation and environment project in mine development in China and its solution.
At present, the Chinese academic circles have obtained many achievements in aspect of studying and exploring resources conservation and environment protection. However, interpretations and responses to resources wasting and environment pollution in tailings storage facility are still far from satisfactory. It is manifested in the following ways. Firstly, many studies impute the tailings dam break accidents to mine enterprises or mine owners, rarely analyze the internal institutional system behind mine disasters, pollutions, and resources wasting, seldom review existing relevant economic system and polices, and neglect the effectiveness of tailings resources and environment governance system. Secondly, existing studies on resources and environment governance mainly focus on technology level and discuss very little sociological theories, which has prevented tailings storage facility management and governance researches from going further. Thirdly, system researches on resources and environment mainly emphasize on property system. However, the fact is that clarification of property right doesn't solve problems of tailings resources and environment. Other systems such as price mechanism and community autonomy movement are likewise the necessary system for tailings resources and environment governance activities. Fourthly, management and governance of tailings resources and environment are lack of corresponding system.
Based on above research status, the paper first discusses the basic theories and fundamental concepts of system and economic system. As a rule-based system or configuration arrangement which is accepted and conformed to by members of the system and reflects the balanced choosing of its members in a game, the term "system" means the social norm or the game rule in a society, also the formal or informal constraint discovered and set by people but constructing inter-behavior of human being. System builds the incentive structure for political, social, and economic exchanges of people. The so-called economic system is the ruling system that regulates market economic entity engaging in economic activities, including national legal systems and invisible rules and international routines of value form and economic association in economic life. These rules make up the cooperation and competition in basic social or national economic order. System can be formal system and informal system. However, no hard and fast line can be drawn between formal system and informal system. Formal system is a kind of informal system which has been textualized and normalized. The cultural value of a society or nation is the foundation of system. In terms of economic development requirements, for one thing, system is the key to economic growth, containing constitution principals of rule by law, structure of government power and restriction, independence of judicature, etc. and creating motivations of key economic subject in a society, but for the other thing, economic development would promote system changes and provide economic conditions for system changes. Without market economy development as induction factor, system is always non-efficient. As Chinese economy develops, all orders and interest groups of society will ask for system arrangement and even political order to protect their acquired interests or demand the interests they haven't acquired. Therefore, property system, social incentive mechanism, and competitive mechanism are changing. Nevertheless, system change may affect acquired interests, but system change and innovation might not weaken governability and interests of ruling group and might improve its governability and interests instead. These research conclusions have created the theoretical foundation for system research on tailings resources and environment governance.
Based on the interactive relationship of economic development with resources conservation and environment protection, with reference to the strategy of resource environment in China, the paper has analyzed the internal relation of system to resources conservation and environment protection and demonstrated the theoretical basis of resources and environment governance promoted by system. Scientific development is a civilized development in line with humanity, a harmonious development between people with nature and environment. It is the concept of economic development of tailings resources development and utilization based on criteria of value. Resources are the material base for existence and development of human society, environment provides spatial support for economic development, and economic development is the guarantee of harmonious coexistence between resources and environment. System construction will contribute to resources conservation and environment protection and effective system is the premise and basis to promote resources conservation and utilization in mine development and to improve environment protection and economic sustainable and healthy development. The system development of resources and environment governance shall take into consideration of enhanced supervision and penalty implementation upon those who damages environment to seek exorbitant profits, and take into account of effective incentives and restraints on supervisors. However, because there is no corresponding legal space and system support, the implementation capacity of social members and mobilized resources of actors in community movement are limited. Therefore, the key to tailings resources and environment governance in mine development is the direct intervention by community into conflict of resources and environment benefits in mine area, and the effective system innovation or system innovation which can actually realize the open dialogue between interested parties. It has been verified in Peru mineral resources development project invested by China. Community in Peru can take a part in approving tailings storage facility construction program. Community has been involved a lot in oversea mineral resources development management and holds substantial right of speech. In fact, it also means that system innovation needs non-market public governance.
The paper has carried out an institutional analysis of resources and environment conflict in mine development. The system dilemma of resources environment governance in mine development causes "government failure" and "market failure" in system supply. In mine development, there are conflicts in mine resources'property system, interest relation, values, beliefs, way of thinking, etc. Therefore, economic behavior and local public policy and services can not take social benefits into consideration at the same time. The way to get out of the difficulty is multi-agency management, that is, to face and resolve the contradiction of system is to achieve coordination of system and to define the focus of tailings resources and environment system construction by way of confirming property right of tailings resources, updating concept of cultural values, and promoting equity and justice. In this way, social responsibility of nation, market, and enterprise is clarified and a relatively independent and separated new governance structure is formed between public authorities, private economic section, and the third sector.
The paper has made a thorough inquiry into Chinese tailings resources and environment governance system status, oversea tailings resources and environment governance experience and lessons, and principles and objective system to rebuild Chinese tailings resources and tailings storage facility management systems, focusing on researching community autonomy system of tailings storage facility management and deposit system for tailings storage facility governance. Tailings resources and environment are facing a huge challenge, which is caused by imperfection of policy, defects in economic system, and defects of social management system and accountability system on leading cadre. Moreover, in order to innovate economic system of tailings storage facility governance, we have to not only straighten and strengthen property right incentive of tailings resources but also innovate price mechanism of tailings resources and environment and intensify price protection of tailings resources. For tailings storage facility government mechanism, we have to strengthen community autonomy, complete political and social system of community autonomy governance, and intensify deposit system for accidents. The relevant significant findings or conclusions or viewpoints include:Firstly, in China, existing systems for tailings resources development and utilization and environment protection don't encourage resources conservation and environment protection, manifested in the following:(1) Mining right management system itself doesn't encourage mining right owner to make the best use of low grade resources such as tails and waste rocks in tailings storage facility. It is mainly the fixed time limit of mining permit that decides the short-term act of mining right owner and makes him give up the promise to save resources and protect environment; (2) The system of separation of mining right and prospecting right diverges drastically from the policy of mineral resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection, encourages the short-term act of prospecting right owner to a certain extent, and doesn't encourage mining right owner to fulfill the obligation of resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection; (3) In mining industry, there are six charges, i.e. "resource compensation fee, resource tax, prospecting royalties, mineral royalties, prospecting right cost, and mining right cost", but these charging system doesn't reflect resources utilization level and resources consumption status of mine enterprises and doesn't encourage tailings resources comprehensive development and utilization; (4) Mining right evaluation system doesn't encourage resources comprehensive development and utilization. It is mainly the evaluation method that is difficult to motivate prospecting right owner and mining right owner to fulfill the obligation of resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection; (5) Value added tax system cannot evaluate factors such as resources consumption and resources comprehensive utilization level, difficult to realize the stimulation expected by policies and different from the principle of circulating economy; besides, tax system of value added tax itself doesn't encourage the development and utilization of low grade and low cost resources; (6) Furthermore, current environment protection system, mining right management and organization system, safety technology supervision and inspection system, and tailings storage facility safety production management system are all defective and basically don't encourage re-utilization of tailings resources. In addition, China is also lack of system that effectively ensures social organization takes a part in tailings resources and environment governance. Accountability system of major tailings storage facility accidents is also unsound. Secondly, based on typical experience and lessons of national tailings resources and environment governance, we need to further clarify government responsibility in mine resources management, improve mineral resources planning and policy coordination, build tailings resources comprehensive management system, and complete incentive and restraint mechanism of tailings storage facility governance. Besides, on promoting innovative concept of economic system in tailings storage facility management, it is required to promote highly "cultural consciousness", avoid falling into thought orientation of "constructive rationalism", discard static "allocative efficiency", erect a concept of "adaptive efficiency", and make up specific system architecture of tailings storage facility governance. Thirdly, the resident community in area of tailings storage facility is an effective management unit of tailings storage facility "shared resources". Not only do residents in the community have immediate relation with local mine resources and natural environment maintenance, but also due to common heritage, they have motivation (community incentive), consciousness, and social capital to take collective action for tailings resources and environment governance. However, community governance has certain difficulties, such as community changes, labor movement, indifference of rural residents to environment protection, incomplete community autonomy organization, threat of potential mass disturbance, etc. However, these difficulties can be avoided through system improvement, justification and guarantee of community autonomy of tailings storage facility governance, perfection of community operations management system and community autonomy organization, etc. and effective community governance can be realized for tailings resources and environment governance. Fourthly, the case study of tailings storage facility accidents shows that the deposit system for accidents is of great importance in making the person directly responsible for potential accident perform duties and obligation effectively, settling social instability caused by tailings storage facility accident quickly, ensuring the interests of people suffering from accident disaster, and avoiding tailings dam break. The implementation mechanism of system is also very important, so as to avoid unreasonable or even illegal modification to system.
当前我国学术界对于资源节约与环境保护问题的研究和探索已经取得了很多成果,但对矿山尾矿库的资源浪费与环境污染的解释和回应仍不能令人满意,表现在：其一,将尾矿库溃坝等事故的责任主要对准矿山企业或矿主,很少去剖析矿难、污染和资源浪费背后的内在制度机理,很少去检讨现有相关经济制度与政策,对尾矿资源环境治理之制度机制的有效性问题有所忽视；其二,现有对资源环境治理的研究多从技术层面加以展开,而在社会学领域的理论探讨不够,妨碍了尾矿库管理与治理研究的深化；其三,资源环境的制度研究主要强调强调产权制度,但现实表明,产权的明晰并未解决尾矿资源环境问题,其它制度安排如价格机制和社区自治运动,同样也是尾矿资源环境治理活动所必需的制度形式；其四,尾矿资源环境的管理和治理,缺乏相应的制度安排。
基于上述研究现状,本文首先展开了对制度及经济制度等基本概念、基本理论问题的探讨。制度作为一个系统内部成员认可和遵同、并作为映照着人的博弈中均衡选择的一种“规则系统”和“构型安排”,是一种社会规范或社会的游戏规则,是构建人类相互行为的被人发现并通过人为设定的正式或非正式约束,构造了人们在政治、社会或经济方面发生交换的激励结构。而所谓的经济制度,就是规定市场经济主体从事经济活动的规则体系,既包括国家法律制度,也包括经济生活中的价值形态、经济交往的无形规则、国际惯例等,这些规则体系构成了一个社会或国家的基本经济秩序的合作与竞争关系。制度通常有正式制度和非正式制度之分,但正式制度和非正式制度并非截然分开,正式制度是一种文本化和规范化的非正式制度,一个社会或民族的文化价值是制度的基础。从经济发展的要求来看,一方面,制度是经济增长的关键,包含着法治、政府权力与制衡结构、司法独立等宪政原则,塑造了一个社会中关键经济主体的激励；但另一方面,经济的发展会促进制度变迁,并为制度变革提供经济条件,没有市场经济发育之诱导基础的制度通常是非效率的。随着中国经济的发展,社会各阶层、各利益集团就会要求从制度安排甚至政治秩序上为既得利益加以保护,或者诉求未得利益,进而引发产权制度、社会激励机制、竞争机制的变革。不过,虽然制度变迁可能会触及既得利益,但制度变迁与创新并不一定就削弱统治集团的统治能力和利益,相反却有可能会增加它的能力和利益。这些研究结论,为尾矿资源环境治理的制度研究奠定了理论基础。
在经济发展与资源节约、环境保护的互动关系和我国资源环境战略的基础上,分析了制度与资源节约、环境保护之间内在关系,并论证了制度推动资源环境治理的理论基础。科学发展是符合人心的文明的发展,是人与自然、环境和谐的发展,这也是价值规范尾矿资源开发利用的经济发展观。资源是人类社会存在和发展的物质基础,环境为经济发展提供空间支持,而经济发展是资源环境和谐共存的保障。制度建设有助于资源节约和环境保护,有效的制度是促进矿山开发中资源节约利用和促进环境保护以及经济可持续健康发展的前提和基础；在资源环境治理的制度设计上,既要考虑对破坏环境牟取暴利者加强监管和实施惩罚,也要考虑对监管者施行行之有效的激励约束。研究还认为,社区运动是一个非常好的尾矿资源节约和促进环境保护的治理机制和模式,但因不具有相应的合法空间和制度支持,社区运动中社会成员的行动力和行动者拥有的可动员资源有限。因此,社区力量直接介入矿区资源环境利益博弈、以及有效或实质实现相关利益人公开对话的制度创新成为矿山开发中尾矿资源环境治理的关键。这一点可以在中国投资秘鲁矿产资源开发项目中得到验证：秘鲁的社区能参与尾矿库建设方案的审核,社区在相当程度上介入海外矿山资源开发管理,并且具有相当的话语权,这其实也意味着,制度创新也要求提供非市场的公共治理机制。
开展了矿山开发资源环境冲突的制度分析。矿山开发的资源环境治理的制度困境导致制度供给上的“政府失灵”与“市场失灵”。在矿山开发领域,矿山资源的产权制度,利益关系、价值信念、思维方式等各方面都有冲突,导致经济行为和地方公共政策与服务不能兼顾社会利益。而摆脱困境的思路是“多中心治理”,也就是要取得制度协同,通过明确尾矿资源的产权、更新文化价值理念、促进公平与正义来确定矿山尾矿资源环境制度建设的重点,这样,通过明确国家、市场和企业各自社会责任,在公共全力部门、私人经济部门和第三部门之间正在形成一种相对独立、分工合作的新型治理结构。
深入剖析了当前我国矿山尾矿资源环境治理的体制现状、国外尾矿资源环境治理的经验与教训以及我国尾矿资源和尾矿库管理体制再造的原则和目标体系,重点探索了尾矿库管理的社区自治制度、尾矿库失事保证金制度。尾矿资源环境的形势严峻,这既有政策的不完善性、经济制度的缺陷以及社会管理制度和领导干部问责等制度的缺陷。此外,尾矿库治理的经济制度创新,不仅要理顺并强化尾矿资源的产权激励,而且还要在尾矿资源环境的价格机制上进行创新,强化尾矿资源的价格保障。而在尾矿库的治理机制上,要强化社区自治,完善社区自治治理的政治与社会制度体系,强化失事保证金制度。与此相关的一些重要发现或结论或观点包括：其一,我国现有的矿山尾矿资源开发利用及环境保护制度多不鼓励资源节约和环境保护,表现在：(1)矿业权管理制度自身不鼓励矿业权人充分利用尾矿库里的尾砂、废石等低品位资源,主要是采矿许可证的既定期限性决定了采矿权人的短期行为,使之放弃对资源节约利用和保护环境的承诺；(2)采矿权与探矿权分离制度严重背离了矿产资源综合利用与环境保护政策,在一定程度上激励了探矿权人的短期行为,不鼓励采矿权人利用履行资源综合利用和环境保护等义务；(3)矿业有“资源补偿费、资源税、探矿权使用费、采矿权使用费、探矿权价款、采矿权价款”的六大收费行为,但这些收费制度未能体现矿山企业的资源开发利用水平、资源消耗情况,不鼓励尾矿资源综合开发利用；(4)矿业权评估体制也不鼓励资源综合开发利用,主要是其评估方法难以激励探矿权人、采矿权人利用履行资源综合利用和环境保护的义务；(5)增值税制度无从考评资源的消耗量、资源的综合利用水平等因素,难以政策预期的激励作用,也与循环经济的理念不一致；另外,增值税税制本身不鼓励低品位、低成本的资源开发利用；(6)此外,现行的环境保护制度、矿政管理组织制度、安全技术监督检查制度以及尾矿库安全生产管理制度等都存在缺陷,基本上都不鼓励尾矿资源再利用。另外,我国还缺失了有效保障社会组织在尾矿资源环境治理中作用发挥的制度,尾矿库重大事件事故的问责制度也不健全。其二,基于典型国家尾矿资源环境治理的经验与教训,需要进一步明确政府矿山资源管理的职责,提高矿产资源规划和政策协调能力,建立尾矿资源综合管理体制,完善尾矿库治理的激励约束机制；另外,促进尾矿库管理的经济制度创新观念上,要求倡导高度的“文化自觉”,避免陷入“建构理性主义”的思径取向,摒弃静态的“配置效率”,树立“适应性效率”观,构建尾矿库治理的具体制度体系架构。其三,尾矿库区的居民社区是尾矿库“共享性资源”的有效管理单位,社区内的居民不但与所处地矿山资源及自然环境的维护有切身的利害关系,而且因共同的传统,使得他们有动机(社群性激励)、有意识、有社会资本来提供尾矿资源环境治理的集体行动。当然社区治理也存在一些难题,如社区的变迁以及人员的流动、农村居民环保意识的淡薄、社区自治组织不健全、潜在群体性事件的威胁等,但通过制度改进,理顺并保障社区的尾矿库治理自主权,完善社区的运行管理制度和社区自治组织等,就可以规避这些难题,实现尾矿资源环境治理的有效社区治理。其四,尾矿库失事的案例研究表明,失事保证金制度对于潜在事故直接责任人切实履行责任义务,对于迅速平息尾矿库事故造成的社会不稳定,对于确保遭受事故灾害损失的人民群众的利益,对于预防尾矿溃坝事故的发生,都具有重大意义。当然,制度的实施机制也非常重要,以防止对制度进行不合理甚至非法的变通。
Tailings storage facility and tailings resources and environment in mine development are facing a huge challenge in China. Tailings resources wasting and environment pollution caused by tailings dam break are currently highlighted problems in national economic and social development in China, which not only leads to severe secondary resources loss and wasting phenomenon but also breeds significant security and social crisis, challenges government credibility, damages people's lives/property safety, breaks national/social harmony and stability, and affects sustained development in economy. More importantly, to summarize resources wasting and environmental pollution due to many major mine disasters, tailings dam break events, and tailings emission violations for many years, it can be found that for these severe problems which have seriously damaged people's physical and metal health, caused great loss of lives and property and ate away economic growth constantly, some have already lead to social crisis within certain rage to certain extent while some have potential public crisis behind and do harm to social harmony and stability and sustained development in economy. Therefore, it is a key subject in front of the Party and Government and scholars to research into the cause behind the non-compliance of resources conservation and environment project in mine development in China and its solution.
At present, the Chinese academic circles have obtained many achievements in aspect of studying and exploring resources conservation and environment protection. However, interpretations and responses to resources wasting and environment pollution in tailings storage facility are still far from satisfactory. It is manifested in the following ways. Firstly, many studies impute the tailings dam break accidents to mine enterprises or mine owners, rarely analyze the internal institutional system behind mine disasters, pollutions, and resources wasting, seldom review existing relevant economic system and polices, and neglect the effectiveness of tailings resources and environment governance system. Secondly, existing studies on resources and environment governance mainly focus on technology level and discuss very little sociological theories, which has prevented tailings storage facility management and governance researches from going further. Thirdly, system researches on resources and environment mainly emphasize on property system. However, the fact is that clarification of property right doesn't solve problems of tailings resources and environment. Other systems such as price mechanism and community autonomy movement are likewise the necessary system for tailings resources and environment governance activities. Fourthly, management and governance of tailings resources and environment are lack of corresponding system.
Based on above research status, the paper first discusses the basic theories and fundamental concepts of system and economic system. As a rule-based system or configuration arrangement which is accepted and conformed to by members of the system and reflects the balanced choosing of its members in a game, the term "system" means the social norm or the game rule in a society, also the formal or informal constraint discovered and set by people but constructing inter-behavior of human being. System builds the incentive structure for political, social, and economic exchanges of people. The so-called economic system is the ruling system that regulates market economic entity engaging in economic activities, including national legal systems and invisible rules and international routines of value form and economic association in economic life. These rules make up the cooperation and competition in basic social or national economic order. System can be formal system and informal system. However, no hard and fast line can be drawn between formal system and informal system. Formal system is a kind of informal system which has been textualized and normalized. The cultural value of a society or nation is the foundation of system. In terms of economic development requirements, for one thing, system is the key to economic growth, containing constitution principals of rule by law, structure of government power and restriction, independence of judicature, etc. and creating motivations of key economic subject in a society, but for the other thing, economic development would promote system changes and provide economic conditions for system changes. Without market economy development as induction factor, system is always non-efficient. As Chinese economy develops, all orders and interest groups of society will ask for system arrangement and even political order to protect their acquired interests or demand the interests they haven't acquired. Therefore, property system, social incentive mechanism, and competitive mechanism are changing. Nevertheless, system change may affect acquired interests, but system change and innovation might not weaken governability and interests of ruling group and might improve its governability and interests instead. These research conclusions have created the theoretical foundation for system research on tailings resources and environment governance.
Based on the interactive relationship of economic development with resources conservation and environment protection, with reference to the strategy of resource environment in China, the paper has analyzed the internal relation of system to resources conservation and environment protection and demonstrated the theoretical basis of resources and environment governance promoted by system. Scientific development is a civilized development in line with humanity, a harmonious development between people with nature and environment. It is the concept of economic development of tailings resources development and utilization based on criteria of value. Resources are the material base for existence and development of human society, environment provides spatial support for economic development, and economic development is the guarantee of harmonious coexistence between resources and environment. System construction will contribute to resources conservation and environment protection and effective system is the premise and basis to promote resources conservation and utilization in mine development and to improve environment protection and economic sustainable and healthy development. The system development of resources and environment governance shall take into consideration of enhanced supervision and penalty implementation upon those who damages environment to seek exorbitant profits, and take into account of effective incentives and restraints on supervisors. However, because there is no corresponding legal space and system support, the implementation capacity of social members and mobilized resources of actors in community movement are limited. Therefore, the key to tailings resources and environment governance in mine development is the direct intervention by community into conflict of resources and environment benefits in mine area, and the effective system innovation or system innovation which can actually realize the open dialogue between interested parties. It has been verified in Peru mineral resources development project invested by China. Community in Peru can take a part in approving tailings storage facility construction program. Community has been involved a lot in oversea mineral resources development management and holds substantial right of speech. In fact, it also means that system innovation needs non-market public governance.
The paper has carried out an institutional analysis of resources and environment conflict in mine development. The system dilemma of resources environment governance in mine development causes "government failure" and "market failure" in system supply. In mine development, there are conflicts in mine resources'property system, interest relation, values, beliefs, way of thinking, etc. Therefore, economic behavior and local public policy and services can not take social benefits into consideration at the same time. The way to get out of the difficulty is multi-agency management, that is, to face and resolve the contradiction of system is to achieve coordination of system and to define the focus of tailings resources and environment system construction by way of confirming property right of tailings resources, updating concept of cultural values, and promoting equity and justice. In this way, social responsibility of nation, market, and enterprise is clarified and a relatively independent and separated new governance structure is formed between public authorities, private economic section, and the third sector.
The paper has made a thorough inquiry into Chinese tailings resources and environment governance system status, oversea tailings resources and environment governance experience and lessons, and principles and objective system to rebuild Chinese tailings resources and tailings storage facility management systems, focusing on researching community autonomy system of tailings storage facility management and deposit system for tailings storage facility governance. Tailings resources and environment are facing a huge challenge, which is caused by imperfection of policy, defects in economic system, and defects of social management system and accountability system on leading cadre. Moreover, in order to innovate economic system of tailings storage facility governance, we have to not only straighten and strengthen property right incentive of tailings resources but also innovate price mechanism of tailings resources and environment and intensify price protection of tailings resources. For tailings storage facility government mechanism, we have to strengthen community autonomy, complete political and social system of community autonomy governance, and intensify deposit system for accidents. The relevant significant findings or conclusions or viewpoints include:Firstly, in China, existing systems for tailings resources development and utilization and environment protection don't encourage resources conservation and environment protection, manifested in the following:(1) Mining right management system itself doesn't encourage mining right owner to make the best use of low grade resources such as tails and waste rocks in tailings storage facility. It is mainly the fixed time limit of mining permit that decides the short-term act of mining right owner and makes him give up the promise to save resources and protect environment; (2) The system of separation of mining right and prospecting right diverges drastically from the policy of mineral resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection, encourages the short-term act of prospecting right owner to a certain extent, and doesn't encourage mining right owner to fulfill the obligation of resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection; (3) In mining industry, there are six charges, i.e. "resource compensation fee, resource tax, prospecting royalties, mineral royalties, prospecting right cost, and mining right cost", but these charging system doesn't reflect resources utilization level and resources consumption status of mine enterprises and doesn't encourage tailings resources comprehensive development and utilization; (4) Mining right evaluation system doesn't encourage resources comprehensive development and utilization. It is mainly the evaluation method that is difficult to motivate prospecting right owner and mining right owner to fulfill the obligation of resources comprehensive utilization and environment protection; (5) Value added tax system cannot evaluate factors such as resources consumption and resources comprehensive utilization level, difficult to realize the stimulation expected by policies and different from the principle of circulating economy; besides, tax system of value added tax itself doesn't encourage the development and utilization of low grade and low cost resources; (6) Furthermore, current environment protection system, mining right management and organization system, safety technology supervision and inspection system, and tailings storage facility safety production management system are all defective and basically don't encourage re-utilization of tailings resources. In addition, China is also lack of system that effectively ensures social organization takes a part in tailings resources and environment governance. Accountability system of major tailings storage facility accidents is also unsound. Secondly, based on typical experience and lessons of national tailings resources and environment governance, we need to further clarify government responsibility in mine resources management, improve mineral resources planning and policy coordination, build tailings resources comprehensive management system, and complete incentive and restraint mechanism of tailings storage facility governance. Besides, on promoting innovative concept of economic system in tailings storage facility management, it is required to promote highly "cultural consciousness", avoid falling into thought orientation of "constructive rationalism", discard static "allocative efficiency", erect a concept of "adaptive efficiency", and make up specific system architecture of tailings storage facility governance. Thirdly, the resident community in area of tailings storage facility is an effective management unit of tailings storage facility "shared resources". Not only do residents in the community have immediate relation with local mine resources and natural environment maintenance, but also due to common heritage, they have motivation (community incentive), consciousness, and social capital to take collective action for tailings resources and environment governance. However, community governance has certain difficulties, such as community changes, labor movement, indifference of rural residents to environment protection, incomplete community autonomy organization, threat of potential mass disturbance, etc. However, these difficulties can be avoided through system improvement, justification and guarantee of community autonomy of tailings storage facility governance, perfection of community operations management system and community autonomy organization, etc. and effective community governance can be realized for tailings resources and environment governance. Fourthly, the case study of tailings storage facility accidents shows that the deposit system for accidents is of great importance in making the person directly responsible for potential accident perform duties and obligation effectively, settling social instability caused by tailings storage facility accident quickly, ensuring the interests of people suffering from accident disaster, and avoiding tailings dam break. The implementation mechanism of system is also very important, so as to avoid unreasonable or even illegal modification to system.
引文
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